APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Bryan Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Sedrick Williams, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his judgment of conviction is facially void because it fails to reflect that he is to serve 100% of the sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 8, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until August 9, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the order to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is an appeal from a finding of contempt. When the parents of a six year old girl divorced, they agreed to name the father as the child’s primary residential parent. The mother subsequently acted in a hostile and uncooperative way towards the father, and her parenting time was reduced. Shortly thereafter, the father filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had failed to pay court-ordered child support for four consecutive months. Following a hearing, the trial court held the mother in contempt. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred by trying criminal and civil contempt in the same proceeding. She also argues that the trial court’s order was invalid, because it did not specifically state that her actions were “willful.” We affirm the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher H. Martin, pleaded guilty to two counts of rape of a child on May 21, 1997. He filed a petition for post- conviction relief on July 25, 2013. He now appeals from the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On appeal, he contends that the State breached a condition of his plea agreement, that the breach occurred outside of the statute of limitations for post-conviction proceedings, and that due process should preclude the strict application of the statute of limitations in his case. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Ronald E. Boykin, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his judgments for sexual battery by an authority figure are void because he never agreed to a hybrid plea and was not informed that he would be subject to community supervision for life. He further argues that the condition of lifetime community supervision is in direct contravention of a statute and is, therefore, illegal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court denying the petition.

The Defendant, Demetrius Marcelle Smith, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Hamilton County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering his sentence into execution. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court.

In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop of the defendant, claiming that the trial court erred by concluding that the defendant had been seized without legal justification. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, John E. Lane, stands convicted of one count of first degree murder. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to two pictures of the deceased victim’s body and wounds that were displayed on a projector during the trial. Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I am constrained to agree with the majority that the trial court’s decision in this case must be affirmed. I write separately for two reasons. First, I would point out that the facts of this case dramatically illustrate the results dictated by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s continuing restriction, if not effective evisceration, of the community caretaking doctrine in Tennessee. As the majority points out, this restrictive interpretation recently was reaffirmed, and arguably expanded, by the majority opinion of the our supreme court in State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 2013).

Petitioner, Randall Turner, pleaded guilty to first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated robbery, for which he received agreed-upon sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and thirty years. The pro se petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he requested DNA analysis of his “clothing, pants, shoes and socks” as well as a witness’s “pajamas.” The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, and this appeal follows. On appeal, petitioner argues that the post-conviction court should have: (1) recused itself from considering his case; (2) appointed counsel to represent petitioner; and (3) granted his petition for DNA testing. After our review of the parties’ briefs, the scant record before this court, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Floyd Lee Perry, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his motion to re-open his original petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a murder he committed as a juvenile. On appeal, he claims that he is entitled to relief pursuant to the new precedent established in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which held that it violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment to sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole without individual consideration of mitigating circumstances. Following review of the applicable law and the record before us, we conclude that the motion was properly denied and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Johnny L. McGowan, Jr., appeals as of right from the Morgan County Circuit Court’s orders denying his petitions for writs of habeas corpus and error coram nobis. The petitioner challenges his 1993 Rutherford County Criminal Court convictions of three counts of aggravated assault for which he received a total effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Justin Evan Davis, was found guilty by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of selling and delivering one-half gram or more of cocaine, Class B felonies, in case number 12CR157 and in case number 12CR158. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court merged the respective convictions in each indictment and sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twelve years’ confinement. The Defendant’s twelve-year sentence in 12CR157 was ordered to be served consecutively to convictions in two unrelated cases. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey S. Nichols, pro se, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus regarding his 2005 convictions for nine counts of aggravated sexual battery and five counts of rape of a child for which he received an effective seventeen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief because (1) the judgments in case numbers 02-530 through 02-538 for his aggravated sexual battery convictions do not contain the required community supervision for life provision and (2) the rape of a child convictions in case number 02-706, which required the victim to be under age thirteen, concerned a thirteen-year-old victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Myron Jay Wilson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Following his convictions of promoting prostitution and money laundering, the petitioner, Joseph Chi-Choi Wong, filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the summary dismissal of his petition. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted of being a habitual motor vehicle offender, driving under the influence, and failure to appear and was sentenced to an effective term of nine years and six months. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence because it is excessive and contrary to law. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Edward Shannon Polen (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of theft over $60,000 and two counts of securities fraud. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twelve years in prison. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges the length and manner of service of his sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Vernica Shabree Calloway, was convicted of aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony, and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the assault conviction with the neglect conviction and sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election of offenses; (3) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that it could convict her of either Count 1 or Count 2 of the indictment, but not both; (4) her convictions violate double jeopardy; (5) the trial court erred in admitting expert opinion testimony after the State violated the trial court’s order with respect to the information that could be provided to the expert; (6) the trial court erred in admitting as an exhibit a “learned treatise”; (7) the trial court erred in admitting unfairly prejudicial and irrelevant evidence; (8) the trial court erred by denying her motion to redact portions of her interviews with the police and the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”); (9) the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the victim’s foster mother; and (10) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we remand for entry of a single judgment setting the defendant’s release eligibility at 30%. We conclude that all of the defendant’s other issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A homeowner who was sued by a contractor hired an attorney to defend against the suit. The homeowner and the attorney entered into a contract where by the attorney would charge $225 per hour, calculate the bill in quarter hour increments and bill monthly. The homeowner made his monthly payments as the litigation progressed, but after he became dissatisfied with the service he was getting, he stopped paying . He subsequently discharged the attorney and hired other counsel. The attorney sent the homeowner a final bill for $8,529. The homeowner paid $4,000 and offered to settle the remainder for a lesser amount. The attorney refused and brought suit against the homeowner for the unpaid balance. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the attorney. We affirm.

The defendant, Gerald Anthony Humphrey, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to DUI, first offense, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail, with seven days to serve prior to release on supervised probation. As a condition of his guilty plea, he attempted to reserve certified questions of law regarding the constitutionality of the “loud muffler” statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-202, under which the arresting officer initiated the traffic stop of his vehicle. Based on our review, we conclude that the defendant failed to meet his burden to properly certify his questions of law. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Rodney Evans ("the Defendant") was convicted by ajury of driving under the influence. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days' probation after service of the forty-eight (48) hour minimum in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Juvenile Court for Johnson City (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Frank G. (“Father”) to the minor child Ty-Shawn H. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Dale Samuel Waggoner, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and being a felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of eighteen years, to be served at eighty-five percent, for the aggravated robbery conviction and three years, to be served at thirty-five percent, for the felon in possession of a handgun conviction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.