APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a probate court order in a guardianship case. In a prior action involving the same parties, the circuit court established a trust to hold insurance proceeds due to Minor Children and appointed Mother trustee. Subsequently, the present case was initiated when Grandfather petitioned the probate court to be appointed guardian over separate pension funds due to Minor Children. Mother also sought to be appointed guardian over the pension funds initially, but she later withdrew her request. Despite Mother’s withdrawal, the probate court investigated Mother’s personal finances and became concerned with her management of the previously established trust. The probate court appointed a guardian ad litem to further investigate Mother’s management of the trust. We hold that the probate court acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction in doing so and therefore vacate the court’s judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Carlos Rice, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the issue of whether the requirement of obtaining new process or recommencing an action in general sessions court is triggered for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-710 by the failure to return unserved the prior process within 60 days as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-902. Eddie R. Gates (“Gates”), alleging damages sustained in an automobile accident, sued Andrew S. Perry (“Perry”) in the General Sessions Court for Bradley County (“the General Sessions Court”). Gates’ suit was dismissed. On Gates’ appeal to the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Circuit Court”), Perry moved to dismiss, again alleging that the statute of limitations had run during the long gap between issuance and reissuance of process in the General Sessions Court action. The Circuit Court denied Perry’s motion, holding that the time bar did not operate because process was not returned unserved and, therefore, the statute of limitations never ran. We granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We reverse the Circuit Court.

Write-in candidate for election to the Council of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County appeals the dismissal of his challenge on constitutional grounds to the statute requiring that, fifty days before an election, write-in candidates for offices in the election submit a notice to the county election commission requesting that their votes be counted. Determining that the statute is constitutional as written and as applied, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner filed pro se a writ of error coram nobis seeking relief from his first degree murder and robbery convictions. The trial court summarily denied relief and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The defendant, William Cole Comer, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of driving under the influence, failure to stop, and possession of drug paraphernalia, and his bench conviction of violating the implied consent law, claiming that the trial court erred by permitting the arresting officer to testify as an expert witness for purposes of admitting a cocaine field test. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Loren Janosky, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2003 convictions of aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2011, the Maury County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Michael Wiss, for harassment by the electronic phone communication of text messaging. A jury convicted Appellant of harassment. He was then sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days and ordered to pay a $2500 fine. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence presented by the State at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction.
 

This is an employment discrimination case. The employment of the plaintiff employee was terminated in the course of a reduction in force. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant employer alleging that she was singled out for termination in the reduction in force based on her age and/or race. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The trial court reasoned that the evidence submitted by the plaintiff was insufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether the employer singled her out for termination based on her age and/or race, and that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer for terminating the plaintiff’s employment was pretextual. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse. The standard for summary judgment applicable in this case is the standard set out in Hannan and Gossett. Under the very high standard in those cases, the employer cannot negate an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case merely by showing that the plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence at the summary judgment stage; to obtain summary judgment under that standard, the employer must show that the plaintiff cannot establish this element of her claim at trial. Thus, we hold that the employer failed to meet this standard on any of the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination.

The Defendant, Laythaniel Haney, Jr., was convicted by a Cocke County Criminal Court jury of the delivery of a controlled substance and received a fifteen-year sentence as a career offender. In this delayed appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by finding that 1) he was not prejudiced by jurors’ falling asleep during the trial and 2) he was not prejudiced by his being under the influence of drugs at the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Davis, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, challenging both the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on accident. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This negligence action arose from an automobile accident occurring on October 8, 2009, in Knox County. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on September 7, 2010, alleging that the defendant was negligent in the operation of her vehicle, causing the rear-end collision. A jury trial was held November 8-13, 2012, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial and a supplemental motion for new trial. The trial court denied these motions, determining that the evidence preponderated in favor of the jury’s verdict. The plaintiff timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendants alleging the unlawful use of his image and likeness and asserting statutory claims for violation of the Tennessee Personal Rights Protection Act and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and common law claims for unjust enrichment, accounting, and conversion. Upon defendants’ motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on complete preemption by the Copyright Act. We affirm.

In this child support enforcement action, the trial court granted the State, on behalf of the minor child’s mother, an arrearage award of $16,753.49 against the child’s father. The trial court found that the father’s sole source of income was his federal Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and ordered the father to pay his entire lump-sum SSI payment to Child Support Enforcement. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment only as to the amount of the arrearage. We reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment attaching the father’s SSI benefits and remand for correction of the judgment.

The Defendant, Chavis Ricardo Douglas, pled guilty to possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of between one-half ounce and ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, felon in possession of a weapon, and two counts of possession or casual exchange of marijuana. After the entry of his guilty plea, but before sentencing, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied after a hearing. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-two years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it did not find a "fair and just reason" to allow the Defendant to withdraw his plea. After a thorough review of the applicable law and the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Angela K. Pendergrass, appeals her Hamilton County Criminal Court bench trial conviction of driving under the influence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Donald King, of sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a drug free school zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it limited the scope of cross-examination of two witnesses, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we discern no error in the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
 

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Saidrick Tiwon Pewitte, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell; possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver; possession of a Schedule III controlled substance (dihydrocodeinone) with the intent to sell; possession of dihydrocodeinone with the intent to deliver; and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417, -1324 (2011). He received a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, David Wayne Richards, pled guilty in the Hawkins County Criminal Court to possession of a Schedule III controlled substance with intent to deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years, one day with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court ordered that the appellant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion or alternative sentencing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

The Defendant, Adonta Lasha Griggs, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence because there was not “sufficient evidence” for the trial court to conclude a violation occurred and (2) that even if a violation occurred, the trial court abused its discretion by placing his original sentence into effect, instead of ordering a sentence of split confinement. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence.

The Defendant-Appellant, Danny Owens, was indicted by a Lawrence County Grand Jury for the first degree premeditated murder of his wife. At trial, Owens was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Owens as a Range I, standard offender to a sentence of twenty years at one hundred percent release eligibility. On appeal, Owens argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he had threatened to kill the victim shortly before her death; (2) the trial court erred in admitting statements from the victim; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to exceed the scope of redirect examination in its questioning of a witness; (4) the trial court erred in admitting witnesses’ observations of the victim’s bruises; (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (6) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (7) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Leonard Giles, Jr., appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. On appeal, Giles argues (1) the special condition of his probation prohibiting him from driving or possessing a vehicle is invalid; (2) the trial court erred in failing to consider the invalidity of this special condition during his revocation hearing; (3) the admission of witness statements at the revocation hearing violated his right of confrontation; and (4) the cumulative effect of the aforementioned errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Alvin “A.J.” Waller, Jr., was convicted after a jury trial of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced the defendant to ten years as a multiple offender on that count. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty years as a multiple offender at one hundred percent for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and ordered the two sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals, challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Dwayne Wright, was convicted of one count of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises five issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for the jury to visit the crime scene; (3) whether the trial court properly allowed the victim to testify regarding prior sexual abuse; (4) whether the trial court properly ruled that the victim’s statements were admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception; and (5) whether the sentence imposed is proper. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment and sentence as imposed.

A jury convicted the defendant of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and he was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The defendant appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress and admitting an incriminating statement he made to police; (2) refusing to allow him to introduce the contents of a learned treatise during the cross-examination of a witness; (3) limiting closing argument; (4) excluding  character evidence; (5) denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence; and (6) improperly applying the enhancing and mitigating factors during sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no error, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.