APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Juvenile Court for Johnson City (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Frank G. (“Father”) to the minor child Ty-Shawn H. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child.

The Petitioner, James Buck, pled guilty to failure to appear, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Career Offender to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, maintaining that he is entitled to relief based upon his attorney’s deficient representation. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Melvin Powell, was found guilty of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2010) (amended 2011). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty-five years at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the State failed to make a proper election of the offense, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting paternity testing results based on the laboratory’s accreditation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Marquis Dashawn Hendricks, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine while employing a deadly weapon, possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of more than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and simple possession of marijuana. Appellant received an effective sentence of life in prison for the convictions. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, expert testimony about the trajectory of the bullet that was fired into the victim’s vehicle, and the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial on the basis of a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation. After a review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for first degree murder; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony where the challenge to the testimony was related to the credibility of the expert’s opinion; and the State did not commit a Brady violation so the trial court properly denied a mistrial. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellant, Marquis Dashawn Hendricks, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine while employing a deadly weapon, possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of more than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and simple possession of marijuana. Appellant received an effective sentence of life in prison for the convictions. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, expert testimony  about the trajectory of the bullet that was fired into the victim’s vehicle, and the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial on the basis of a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation. After a review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for first degree murder; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony where the challenge to the testimony was related to the credibility of the expert’s opinion; and the State did not commit a Brady violation so the trial court properly denied a mistrial. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Respectfully, the facts of this case in the light most favorable to the State do not establish the first degree murder element of premeditation. The evidence does establish a knowing killing, and so I would impose a conviction of second degree murder and would remand for sentencing.

The Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of Ralph D.M. (“Father”) to the minor twin children Alexis W. and Hannah W. (“the Children”) on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(2), and persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights asserting that he is neither the biological father nor the legal father of the Children and, therefore, had no parental rights to the Children to be terminated. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father is the Children’s legal father, that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights, and that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Children.

Petitioner, Robert D. Mendenhall, was indicted in case number 2006-A-231 for two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder and in case number 2006-C-2134 for two counts of theft of property valued at over $60,000, and four counts of violations of the Tennessee Securities Laws. Subsequently, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder in case number 2006-A-231. He also pled guilty to two counts of theft of property over $60,000, one count of securities fraud by a device, scheme, or artifice, and securities fraud by sale of an unregistered security in case number 2006-C-2134. As a result of the guilty pleas, Petitioner received an effective sentence of forty years. He was represented by separate counsel in each case. Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, among other things. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the denial of post-conviction relief. Upon review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Michael Morris, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in July of 2004 for possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. Petitioner pled guilty to the charge in September of 2004 in exchange for a suspended four-year sentence and drug treatment. In September of 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Daniel A. Rogers (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence, simple possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, and driving on a suspended driver’s license. The Defendant also was convicted by the trial court of violating the implied consent law, resulting in the suspension of his driver’s license for one year. Following a sentencing hearing on his remaining convictions, the Defendant received a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation after the service of sixty days. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court declined to provide a jury instruction regarding the State’s duty to preserve evidence, and he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Petitioner, Erik E. Guerrero, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the judgments and sentence on appeal. State v. Erik E. Guerrero, No. M2010-00851-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3107722, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 21, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2011). The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his trial counsel failed to: (1) request a jury instruction on the natural and probable consequences rule; (2) adequately advise him of all of the considerations of not testifying in his own defense; and (3) to challenge the admissibility of his statements. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err when it dismissed the petition. The post-conviction court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained a compensable aggravation of his pre-existing spinal condition. The trial court ruled that he failed to satisfy his burden of proof and dismissed the complaint. The employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 petition to set aside the marital dissolution agreement and permanent parenting plan in their final decree of divorce; she contends she entered into the agreements under duress due to coercion by her husband. The trial court concluded the marital dissolution agreement and permanent parenting plan were not entered into under duress; the court also found that the permanent parenting plan was in the best interests of the children. Finding the trial court applied the correct legal standards and the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

The trial court dismissed the employee’s workers’ compensation action because the employee had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203(a)(1) (2008). The employee’s appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court vacated an arbitration award in favor of Respondent Morgan Keegan on the ground of evident partiality. Finding Petitioner failed to introduce evidence to support allegations of evident partiality, we reverse and remand to the trial court for confirmation of the arbitration award.

Petitioner, Steven Anderson, filed what he designated was his fourth petition for habeas corpus relief attacking his 1994 convictions for aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. The convictions were the result of guilty pleas pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement resulting in an effective sentence of 50 years’ incarceration. The State filed a motion for summary dismissal because the claims had been brought three previous times, and no colorable claim was alleged. The habeas corpus trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus, and also a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The coram nobis petition is not in the appellate record. Petitioner appeals, and after a thorough review, we affirm pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Jimmy Wayne Wilson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury in 1985 of committing a rape in 1984. The jury also determined the Defendant to be an habitual criminal, and the Defendant, accordingly, was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this proceeding, the Defendant is attacking his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Bradford E. Holliday, Michael A. Holliday, and Clayton E. Holliday (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Homer C. Patton and Jeffrey B. Presley (collectively “Defendants”) for breach of contract and specific performance. Plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted after finding and holding, inter alia, that the release provision contained in an amended agreement executed by Defendants “contains broad release language which the Court finds to be adequate to release claims of fraud asserted now by the Defendants in this action.” Defendants appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the release was sufficient to waive claims of fraud and whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Defendants could not have reasonably relied upon representations made by Bradford E. Holliday. We find and hold that the release language contained in the amended agreement was insufficient to release claims of fraud and that there are genuine issues of material fact as to the issue of reasonable reliance, and we reverse the grant of summary judgment. We,  however, affirm that portion of the Trial Court’s order memorializing Defendants’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice of their counterclaims for fraud against Michael A. Holliday and Clayton E. Holliday.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Anthony Foster, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of reckless endangerment and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the reckless endangerment conviction with the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced Foster to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Foster argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment showing that Foster was charged with and convicted of aggravated assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii), which is a Class C felony.

The Petitioner, Rolly William Whitford, pled guilty to sexual battery and rape, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s sentence on appeal. State v. Rolly William Whitford, No. M2009-02525-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 255310 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 20, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 25, 2011). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, asserting that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, maintaining that his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was never advised of the lifetime supervision requirement for sex offenders. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Martha Ann Freeman, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her conviction for first degree murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. She contends that trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining process. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Terry Johnson, of one count of second degree murder, three counts of attempted second degree murder, and one count of possession of a firearm during a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions and the trial court’s refusal to allow the appellant to introduce evidence of the deceased victim’s involvement in an unrelated murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The ruling of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Matthew Jackson, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s order denying his requested habeas corpus relief. In his petition, Petitioner attacked his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery. He was convicted following his entry of guilty pleas in the Robertson County Circuit Court in 2001. The record shows there were no agreements as to sentencing except the parties agreed all sentences would be served concurrently. In this habeas corpus petition, Petitioner asserts he was sentenced to an illegal sentence because the trial court did not inform him of the following consequences of his guilty pleas: (a) mandatory registration as a sex offender; and (b) mandatory sentence of community supervision for life in addition to incarceration. Petitioner also sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. The trial court denied Petitioner habeas corpus relief to the extent of not setting aside the convictions or the sentences. However, the trial court remanded the cases to the Robertson County Circuit Court for entry of corrected judgments for the aggravated rape convictions regarding registration as a sexual offender and community supervision for life. We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Lake County.

The Petitioner, Anthony Washington, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition as having been untimely filed and failing to state a cognizable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.