APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Benjamin Keith Fowler, of six counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of criminally negligent homicide, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court merged the homicide verdicts and imposed two convictions of first degree murder. The court also merged the especially aggravated burglary verdicts and imposed a single conviction of that offense. In this appeal, the defendant contends that prosecutorial misconduct and the behavior of a State witness deprived him of the right to a fair trial, that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony, and that the trial court erred by prohibiting the admission of certain evidence. Although we discern no error with regard to the issues presented by the defendant, we observe plain error with regard to the defendant’s conviction of especially aggravated burglary  Because dual convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated burglary in this case are prohibited by statute, the defendant’s conviction of especially aggravated burglary is modified to a conviction of aggravated burglary and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

Kenneth R. Griffin (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Scott Knerr, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in counts 1 and 2 for attempted aggravated rape, in counts 3 and 4 for aggravated sexual battery, in count 5 for attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, and in count 6 for attempted aggravated kidnapping. A jury convicted Knerr of the lesser included offenses of attempted sexual battery in count 3, attempted aggravated sexual battery in count 4, and attempted false imprisonment in count 6 and acquitted him of the remaining counts. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged count 3 with count 4 and sentenced Knerr to four years with all but sixty days suspended. In addition, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of six months with all but sixty days suspended for Knerr’s conviction for attempted false imprisonment. On appeal, Knerr argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted aggravated sexual battery and attempted sexual battery. Upon review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss. The Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-5-319, grants Tennessee appellate courts subject matter jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeals only in specifically enumerated circumstances involving arbitration agreements. The statutory exceptions include appeals from orders denying an application to compel arbitration, and appeals from orders granting an application to stay arbitration. Because the order appealed in this case is simply a denial of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss, it does not fall within the statutory exceptions. Accordingly, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Dismissed and remanded.

After foreclosure proceedings were instituted against Plaintiff, Plaintiff asserted numerous claims against Defendants. All claims were dismissed in the trial court. We affirm.

Petitioner, Willie Lewis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. See State v. Willie Lewis, No. W2008-02636-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL1267070 (Tenn. Crim. App., March 31, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Sept. 3, 2010). Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the applicable sentencing range and failing to investigate his criminal record. Petitioner contends that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have proceeded to trial but would have accepted the State’s plea offer. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment for willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. We vacate the decision of the chancery court and we remand for further findings.

This appeal involves a post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. Mother appeals the trial court’s decision modifying the parenting plan to designate Father the primary residential parent of the parties’ children. Finding no error in the court’s ruling, we affirm.

The Defendant, Melvin J. Branham, pled guilty to robbery and received a sentence of fifteen years as a career offender to be served at sixty percent. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, he was ordered to report for incarceration thirty days following entry of his plea. Prior to the expiration of that thirty-day period, the State successfully sought to revoke the Defendant’s bond based upon the Defendant’s drug usage. The Defendant thereafter filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or have his bond reinstated, arguing that he would not have pled guilty had he known his bond would have been revoked before the thirty days ran out. The trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant appeals. After review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea where the Defendant failed to show a manifest injustice and that the proper avenue for review of the bond revocation was via Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Paul Wallace Dinwiddie, Jr. (“the Petitioner”) sought post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Michael Barnes, challenges his jury conviction for possession of contraband in a penal institution, alleging that the following errors were made at his trial: (1) that the chain of custody regarding the contraband was not sufficiently established; (2) that the stun belt he was forced to wear during his trial violated his due process rights; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Xavier Crawford, stands convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant submits that the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Larry Jenkins, pled guilty to multiple counts of burglary, theft, and vandalism, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Montez Dewayne Birt, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and received a six-year, suspended sentence. Thereafter, a violation warrant was filed, and following a hearing, the trial court revoked the sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement based upon his failure to report to his probation officer. The Defendant appeals the revocation and order of total incarceration. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Carey Faught (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two convictions for especially aggravated robbery and the two convictions for attempted aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He also argues that his conviction for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony violates principles of double jeopardy. Finally, the Defendant contends that his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court found that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate willful abandonment in this action to terminate the parental rights of Mother. We affirm.

The Defendant, Shawn Christopher Sales, pled guilty to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to 163 days in confinement followed by fifteen years to be served in Community Corrections. In March 2013, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed a second affidavit alleging the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence, and, after a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it revoked his Community Corrections sentence because the State presented insufficient evidence to support the revocation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns post-divorce alimony issues. Dwight O. Satterfield (“Mr. Satterfield”) and Margaret H. Satterfield (“Ms. Satterfield”) divorced after 31 years of marriage. Mr. Satterfield some years later filed a motion to terminate alimony in the General Sessions Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Ms. Satterfield had been cohabiting with a man. The Trial Court ruled orally that under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), Ms. Satterfield’s cohabitation did not precipitate termination of alimony. Before an order was entered on his first motion, Mr. Satterfield filed another motion, this time based on the statutory rebuttable presumption that arises if there is cohabitation. The Trial Court held that res judicata resolved the issue and that alimony would not be modified. Mr. Satterfield appeals. We affirm the Trial Court as to its interpretation of the MDA. However, as Mr. Satterfield’s second motion was pending when the first order was entered, the first order was not final and the Trial Court erred in holding in its second order that res judicata resolved the alimony issue. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Jonathan Downey (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder and then merged the latter two convictions with the felony murder conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction of first degree felony murder. The State asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s merger of the aggravated burglary conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction of first degree felony murder. We order the trial court to reinstate the Defendant’s conviction of aggravated burglary and remand this matter for sentencing on that conviction.

I concur completely in Judge Swiney’s well-reasoned majority opinion. I write separately to stress the linchpin of the majority’s rationale in rejecting Mr. Satterfield’s first issue.

The Defendant, Jackie Wayne Miller, pled guilty to initiation of the process of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of the sentences. The trial court subsequently ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years and three months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Kaliyah S. and Jaya P. (“the Children”), the minor children of Kayla S. (“Mother”). In November 2010, the Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed in foster care. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Jaya’s father, Josh P., on November 30, 2010. The petition alleged severe child abuse as the sole ground for termination. DCS filed an amended petition in May 2011, which also named Kaliyah’s father, Rontez L. (“Father”), and alleged that his parental rights should be terminated on the statutory ground of abandonment by wanton disregard. Father was incarcerated at the time the amended petition was filed. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother and Josh P. upon finding that DCS had proven the ground of severe child abuse by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned Kaliyah by engaging in conduct exhibiting wanton disregard for her welfare prior to his incarceration. When making its ruling, the trial court concluded that DCS was not required to make reasonable efforts to assist Father in reunification because DCS sufficiently proved the statutory ground of abandonment alleged against him. The court also found that termination of the parental rights of all three respondents was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination that DCS was relieved of the requirement of making reasonable efforts of reunification with regard to Father and remand for further proceedings.

The issue on this appeal is the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The trial court, applying the principles promulgated in Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 1996), held that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it requires the plaintiff to submit to arbitration virtually all of his claims, while allowing the defendants access to a judicial forum for some of their potential claims. We agree with the trial court that the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor is controlling and that Taylor mandates a holding that theagreement is unconscionable and unenforceable. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, Henry Bates, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, burglary of a building, and vandalism of $1,000 or more. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of forty-two years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that both issues are without merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. I believe the Trial Court committed no reversible error, and I would affirm the decision of the Trial Court. The majority acknowledges that there are two distinct lines of cases from this Court on this issue. The majority discusses these cases in detail and there is nothing to be gained by my discussing them once again in this dissent. I, however, believe that those decisions holding that in a case involving “aggravated circumstances,” DCS is relieved of making an attempt to reunify the parent and the child best give effect to the intent of our General Assembly.