APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves Wife’s attempt to set aside a judgment entered against her relating to her failure to fulfill seven promissory notes. The trial court granted Wife’s motion to set aside, in part, affirming her liability for three of the seven notes but holding that Wife was not liable for the remaining notes. Wife appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the Trial Court’s denial of a Motion to Recuse in a post-divorce proceeding. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by the Petitioner/Former Husband, Joel David Constance (“Petitioner”), pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case the employee was an over-the-road truck driver attempting to make a delivery of refrigerated goods in Atlanta, Georgia. Because she was late, she was forced to wait 11 hours in her truck in high temperatures without air conditioning. She suffered a ruptured aneurysm as she exited the truck to complete the unloading process, which she alleged was caused by the high temperatures, anxiety, and emotional stress. Her employer denied the claim, and she filed suit for workers’ compensation benefits in Rutherford County, Tennessee. The trial court found that the ruptured aneurysm was caused by the stress of work conditions and awarded 65% permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, William Arthur Shelton, appeals the Morgan County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2004 convictions for first degree murder, three counts of false imprisonment, and two counts of vandalism and his effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Victor Thompson, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210(a)(1), 39-14-103 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive terms of twenty-five years for second degree murder and eleven months, twenty-nine days for theft. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred during sentencing. We conclude that the lengths of the sentences are proper but that the trial court erred by failing to state on the record the facts and conclusions which support consecutive sentences pursuant to State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995). We remand the case in order of the court to make its findings and conclusions on the record.

The Petitioner, Tina G. Strickland, appeals the Carter County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her 2010 conviction upon a guilty plea for vehicular homicide and her twelve-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by finding that her guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a veterinarian’s common law and statutory claims for retaliatory discharge and her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant employer filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. The trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because the veterinarian had not introduced expert proof to support her claim. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment on the retaliatory discharge claims. Both parties filed applications for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which were granted by the trial court and by this Court. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the retaliatory discharge claims. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Travis Andrew Harris, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-12-101, 39-13-403, 39-16-603 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of eleven years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and (2) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony as substantive evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal questions the propriety of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-505(g) (Supp. 2013). The statute provides that an award of fees and costs can be made when a municipality wrongfully fails to disclose public documents requested pursuant to the Public Records Act. In the prior appeal of this action, this Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the plaintiff fees and costs she incurred in seeking the disclosure of public documents from the City of Chattanooga pursuant to the referenced statute. Upon remand, the plaintiff filed a petition seeking attorney’s fees and costs exceeding $70,000.00. The trial court found that the total fees and costs sought by the plaintiff were unreasonable and excessive, and the court reduced the amount of fees awarded to $50,284.50. The court also reduced the costs awarded for mileage and court reporter charges. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of an award of the full amount of fees and costs sought.

The Petitioner, Luis Rodriguez, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus regarding his 2008 conviction for especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition when his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B results from the trial court’s denial of a post-trial recusal motion. The Appellant filed a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge from presiding over the preparation of the record for her appeal of the substantive issues in the case. The trial judge denied the motion by written order, making specific findings of fact. The Appellant appeals. Discerning no evidence that would lead a reasonable person to question the trial judge’s impartiality, we affirm the denial of Appellant’s recusal motion.

In this State appeal, the State challenged the Knox County Criminal Court’s setting aside the jury verdicts of guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony and ordering dismissal of the charges. This court reversed the judgment of the trial court setting aside the verdicts and dismissing the charges of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary, reinstated the verdicts, and remanded the case to the trial court for sentencing. We also determined that although the trial court erred by dismissing the firearms charge on the grounds named in its order, error in the indictment for that offense nevertheless required a dismissal of those charges. Finally, we affirmed the defendants’ convictions of aggravated robbery. Upon the defendant’s application for permission to appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court remanded the case to this court for consideration in light of State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013). Having reconsidered the case in light of the ruling in Cecil, we confirm our earlier holdings. The jury verdicts of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary are reinstated, and those convictions are remanded to
the trial court for sentencing. The trial court’s dismissal of the firearms charge is affirmed on grounds other than those relied on by the trial court, and the convictions of aggravated robbery are affirmed.

Appellant, the State of Tennessee, appeals after the Hardeman County Circuit Court granted a motion to dismiss the indictments against Appellee, Virgil Calvin Howell. Appellee was indicted by the Hardeman County Grand Jury for three counts of contracting without a license in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 62-6-103 and 62-6-120. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the indictments. On appeal, the State insists that the trial court improperly determined that Appellee was not a contractor because Appellee was supervising more than $25,000 of improvements to buildings that he owns and are intended for public use. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the trial court improperly dismissed the indictments where the plain language of the statute indicates that the actions performed by Appellee amounted to contracting as defined by the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Roger Joseph (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting, among other claims, that, due to mental illness, he could not have formed the requisite intent for first degree murder. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment dismissing the Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition.

This appeal involves the modification of a parenting arrangement. After many years without parenting time, the mother asked the juvenile courtto designate her as the primaryresidential parent for the parties’ daughter. The juvenile court held domestic violence in the father’s home constituted a materialchange in circumstances. However,the juvenile courtconcluded that, despite the incidents of domestic violence, it was in the daughter’s best interest for the father to remain as the primary residential parent. The juvenile court awarded the mother alternate residential parenting time. The mother appeals, raising numerous issues. We affirm.

The trial court found that Defendants were liable to Plaintiff bank for losses stemming from a scheme wherein Defendants defrauded Plaintiff bank into making automobile loans to unqualified borrowers who were customers of a defendant. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

The trial court prohibited the use of taped testimony from a prior trial when a doctor exercised his statutory right not to appear at trial, ordering that the doctor “needs to testify live or not at all.” Efforts of the defendants’ counsel to secure the doctor’s live testimony were successful,only to have the plaintiffs’ counsel argue that counsel was being ambushed. The trial court finally determined not to allow the doctor to testify. The issues relating to prohibiting the doctor’s taped testimony and then prohibiting the doctor’s live testimony were appealed, along with other issues that arose during the trial. We find these two testimonial issues dispositive. We reverse the trial court on both issues and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Damien O. Armstrong, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eight years, with one year of confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his home because the search warrant was defective. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother’s parental rights to her daughter were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to pay support, and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals, asserting that the evidence in support of the grounds is not clear and convincing and that the record does not show that termination of her rights would be in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Appellant, David Earl Freeman, pled guilty to three counts of theft of property and three counts of misapplication of funds in Hamilton County. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of sixteen years and placed on probation. He was also ordered to pay restitution to the victims. Subsequently, Appellant pled guilty to one count of theft of property and one count of passing a worthless check. A four-year sentence was imposed and ordered to run consecutively to the sixteen-year sentence. The new sentence was to be served on probation, and Appellant was ordered to pay restitution to the victims. A probation violation warrant was filed based in part on Appellant’s failure to pay restitution payments and the fact that he was convicted of several new charges in North Carolina. The trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remaining fourteen years of his sentence in incarceration. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation as there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Chiropractic clinic which provided services to party injured in an automobile accident brought action against the injured party, who had assigned the proceeds of his claim against tortfeaser to the clinic in payment of the services, and the tortfeasor’s liability insurer, which did not honor the assignment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer holding that: the victim did not have any rights relative to the insurance provider; the insurance policy required written consent for an assignment and there was no evidence of such consent; there was no privity between the clinic and the insurance provider; the clinic was not a beneficiary of the insurance policy; and the suit was a direct action against an insurance company which is prohibited by Tennessee law. The clinic appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

Heather Widner, Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Edward Smith (“Plaintiff”) sued Chattanooga Entertainment, Inc. d/b/a Electric Cowboy (“Electric Cowboy”) and Ashley Langworthy with regard to the tragic death of Glenn Edward Smith (“Deceased”). Electric Cowboy filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Electric Cowboy summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that on the relevant night there had been no sale of alcoholic beverages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-102 by Electric Cowboy to Ashley Langworthy. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting Electric Cowboy summary judgment and whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow Plaintiff additional time for discovery. We find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that no sale of alcoholic beverages by Electric Cowboy to Ashley Langworthy occurred on the relevant night, and that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow further discovery. We, therefore, affirm.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse. The motion was based upon allegations of bias against the party, who is also a licensed attorney representing herself in this matter. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

The Petitioner, Timothy Christopher Pillow, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In September of 2006 in exchange for an eight-year sentence, Appellant, Jeremy Bo Eaker, pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. Appellant was released to probation with credit for time served. Subsequently, Appellant was arrested for possession of cocaine and hallucinogenic mushrooms. A violation of probation warrant was filed. Appellant pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine and received a sentence of nine years, to be served concurrently to the eight-year sentence for which he was already on probation. Appellant’s probation was revoked, and Appellant was ordered to serve twelve months in incarceration with the trial court reserving the right to suspend the balance of the sentence upon Appellant’s entry into a drug treatment program. Following Appellant’s release from incarceration and reinstatement to probation, numerous probation violation warrants were filed against Appellant on the basis of among other things new criminal charges and positive drug screens. As a result of these various probation violations, Appellant’s probation was partially revoked, he was ordered to enter into and complete a drug treatment program, and he was ordered to community corrections. This appeal arises following a violation of probation warrant filed in response to Appellant’s January 17, 2013 arrest for possession of methamphetamine and failure to report the arrest to his probation officer. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his effective nine-year sentence in incarceration. Appellant appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. After a review of the record, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.