APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Stacy Lee Fleming, appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his conviction for delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Willie Duncan, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, Appellant raises several issues: 1) the indictment for the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is defective for failing to name the underlying felony; 2) the jury instructions on the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony were improper; 3) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the convictions; 4) a statement about Appellant’s juvenile record requires a new trial under plain error review; 5) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences; and 6) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing partially consecutive sentences. Upon review of the record, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions, that the statement about Appellant’s juvenile record does not constitute plain error, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant. However, we find that the indictment for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is fatally flawed for failing to name the predicate felony. We also note a clerical error on the judgment form for the charge of aggravated robbery which requires remand for the entry of a corrected judgment. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in part, reverse and dismiss in part, and affirm and remand in part.

Appellant, Richard Cleophus Smith, was indicted by presentment by the Knox County Grand Jury for felony murder, first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, evading arrest by motor vehicle, evading arrest, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, driving while privilege suspended, and failure to provide proof of financial responsibility. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges except aggravated assault for which he was found guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of life plus twenty-six years. On appeal, Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient; (2) that the trial court constructively amended the presentment charging driving while license suspended, after jeopardy attached by instructing the jury on the offense of driving without a license in possession; (3) that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request for a special jury instruction; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of two officers; (5) the trial court erred in denying his request for notes and memoranda generated by State witnesses when generating their reports; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal. We affirm all judgments except the judgment for driving without a license in possession which must be dismissed because the trial court constructively amended the presentment by giving the contested jury instruction.

The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Griffis, was convicted by a Madison County jury of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2012). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to four years’ incarceration, suspended to supervised probation. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Kenneth Kirkwood, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, use of a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated burglary. Following a sentencing hearing, the court imposed a total effective sentence of forty-five years, to be served at 100%. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. He argues on appeal that the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence, that counsel was ineffective, and that the trial court erred by not granting him a continuance on his motion for new trial. After thoroughly reviewing the evidence, we affirm the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Anya G. (“the Child”), the minor child of Melisa G. (“Mother”). In October 2011, temporary custody of the Child was granted to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and the Child was placed in foster care. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and the Child’s father, Michael G., on December 27, 2012. The petition alleged 1 as statutory grounds for termination abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by an incarcerated parent who exhibited wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to incarceration, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother upon finding that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the grounds of (1) abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to her incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child and (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Lakeith Humphrey, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and his sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the legal accuracy of the special jury instruction regarding premeditation given at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Tonya Michelle Stoltz, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. At the close of the State’s proof, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for acquittal as to initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine but denied it as to the possession charge. The jury found Appellant guilty of possession of methamphetamine. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days at 75% service in incarceration. After Appellant’s motion for a new trial was denied, she appealed, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain the conviction for possession of methamphetamine. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence is sufficient and that the conviction for possession of methamphetamine should be affirmed.

This is an appeal from a Restraining Order entered on May 20, 2014. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until June 20, 2014, thirty-one (31) days after the date of entry of the Restraining Order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Brenda Judy Moss, pled guilty to theft over $60,000, a Class B felony, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of the sentence.  The trial court subsequently ordered a ten-year split confinement sentence, with the Defendant to serve one year in jail followed by nine years of supervised probation.  The Defendant asserts that the sentence is excessive and that split confinement was improper based upon the facts of the case.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Daniel Mosby, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence. The Defendant previously entered a guilty plea to aggravated burglary and, pursuant to the plea agreement, was sentenced to 10 years to be served in the community corrections program with credit for time served. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his original sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Curtis Taylor, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in a multi-count indictment for first degree murder (Count 1), attempted first degree murder (Count 2), possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony (Count 3), and use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Count 4). After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in Count 1, and was convicted of the offenses as charged in Counts 2 through 4. According to the judgment forms, Appellant was sentenced to ten years in Count 1, fifteen years in Count 2, four years in Count 3, and ten years in Count 4, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. However, the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects a sentence of two years in Count 3, but the same total effective sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant presents the following issues for our review on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for voluntary manslaughter; and (2) whether the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments and sentences. However, because the judgment forms do not accurately reflect the sentence as imposed by the trial court during the sentencing hearing, the matter is remanded for entry of corrected judgments to reflect that Appellant was sentenced to two years in Count 3, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, and that the sentences in Counts 1, 2, and 4 are to run consecutively to each other but concurrently to the sentence in Count 3, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. Accordingly, the matter is affirmed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves water service by one utility district to a neighboring utility district. The plaintiff utility district provided water service to the defendant neighboring utility district for many years pursuant to a series of contracts. The last contract included a date certain on which the contract expired. Before the expiration date, the defendant neighboring utility district agreed to begin purchasing its water from a different provider upon expiration of the water service contract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking, inter alia, to enjoin the defendant provider and the neighboring utility district from entering into a contract for water services. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant neighboring utility district and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the defendants were permitted to contract for water services. It then dismissed all remaining claims against the defendants. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s valuation of Husband’s ownership interest in three businesses, determination of Husband’s income, division of marital assets, duration of rehabilitative alimony awarded to her, amount of child support Husband was ordered to pay, and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to her. We determine that the trial court accepted the calculation of a $134,085.00 promissory note as a liability for one business co-owned by Husband but failed to require value of the same amount as a note receivable for the business collecting payment on the debt, owned 50% by Husband. We therefore increase the trial court’s valuation of the business collecting payment on the debt by one-half the amount of the applicable note receivable, or $67,042.50. We also determine that the trial court erred by attributing to Husband the full liability for the third business, a limited liability company in which Husband owns a one-half interest. We accordingly reduce the allocation for that liability by one-half, or $45,689.50, increasing the total modification of the value of Husband’s net assets awarded by the trial court by the amount of $112,732.00. We award to Wife 48% of this increase, or $54,111.36, commensurate with what we determine to be the trial court’s equitable distribution of marital property, and we remand for a determination regarding the proper method of distribution for this additional award to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether a governmental fund established in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-401 to -408 (2012), which allows governmental entities to pool resources in order to address liabilities created under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, is subject to the uninsured motorist coverage requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 56-7-1201 to -1206 (2008). We hold that such funds are statutorily exempt from the insurance statutes and therefore the requirements of the uninsured motorist statute do not apply. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment upholding the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to Tennessee Risk Management Trust and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Lessor sued lessees for failure to payrent and received a default judgment in general sessions court. Lessee appealed to circuit court and filed a counterclaim for failure to maintain the premises and make repairs. The trial court found for lessor.  Lessees appealed. Due to the lack of a transcript or a proper statement of the evidence, we must affirm.

This appeal arises out of contentious post-divorce proceedings. The parties had equal parenting time with their three sons. Both parents filed a petition to modify the parenting plan and sought to be named primary residential parent. The parties also filed competing petitions for contempt. Following a five-day trial, the trial court named Father the primary residential parent of the oldest son, but it continued the parties’ equal parenting arrangement for the two younger sons. The trial court found Father guilty of two counts of criminal contempt. The court also made an award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Both parties appeal. We dismiss the appeal of the contempt order for lack of a final judgment. We affirm the custody order, vacate the award of attorney’s fees, and remand for further proceedings

Father appeals the termination of parental rights to his child. The maternal grandparents obtained custody of the child shortly after her birth due to evidence of drugs in the child’s bloodstream. When the child was one year of age, Father was incarcerated and remained so two years later when the maternal grandparents filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The juvenile court found statutory grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights and concluded that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. On appeal, Father argues that the evidence did not support the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We disagree and affirm the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights.

Plaintiff in a premises liability action appeals from the trial court’s finding that she was more than fifty percent at fault for her injury. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and imposition of discovery sanctions. A bank sued holders of an assumption agreement for default, and the holders of the assumption agreement filed a counter-claim against the bank requesting rescission of the assumption agreementduetothe bank’s alleged negligentmisrepresentation of the existence of flood insurance on the property as well as a misrepresentation regarding the value of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank and imposed discovery sanctions against the holders of the assumption agreement. Finding no genuine issues of material fact, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. In addition, we have reviewed the record and cannot say the trial court abused its discretion

This post-divorce appeal concerns a parenting plan that provided for equal time between the Parents, who subsequently filed competing petitions to modify, claiming that a material change in circumstances necessitated a change in the parenting plan. The trial court found that a change in circumstances had not yet occurred but awarded Mother approximately 12.5 days of additional parenting time after deciding that the Child should attend school in Mother’s county. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Petitioner, Anthony Brown, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his convictions for possession with intent to deliver cocaine and possession of marijuana and resulting twenty-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, specifically, that trial counsel failed (1) to crossexamine the State’s witnesses regarding trial testimony that was inconsistent with that given at the preliminary hearing and (2) to question witnesses about drug paraphernalia found at the scene, in keeping with his defense strategy. After considering the record and the relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, David Orlando Avinger, was indicted by a Davidson County grand jury for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery.  After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the lesser included offense of second degree murder, as well as the charged offenses of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery.  The trial court merged the convictions for second degree murder and felony murder, and Appellant was sentenced to an effective life sentence.  On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and alleges that the trial court impermissibly limited defense counsel’s cross-examination of a witness.  After reviewing the record, we find that the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant and that there was no error in the ruling of the trial court related to the limitation of the witness’s testimony.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After recovering from a work-related injury, the employee returned to work for his pre-injury employer but resigned after only a few days. Later, he made a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court ruled that the employee was deprived of a meaningful return to work and awarded benefits in excess of one and one-half times his physical medical impairment rating. The employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by so finding and that the one and one-half times cap should apply. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Applicant filed a petition for writ of certiorari against Decatur County challenging the denial of his beer permit application. The trial court reversed the decision of the local beer board on the basis that the sale of beer was allowed due to Decatur County’s status as a Tennessee River resort district. Because we conclude that Decatur County’s ordinance restricting the sale of beer within two thousand feet of a church remains in effect despite Decatur County’s status as a Tennessee River resort district, we reverse the decision of the trial court. Reversed and remanded.