APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Susan Deshon Winters, was indicted by a Coffee County Grand Jury for bribery of a public servant (count 1), possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver (count 2), possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver (count 3), and possession of drug paraphernalia (count 4). See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-102; 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1); 39-17-417(a)(4), (g)(1); 39-17-425. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Winters entered guilty pleas to the charged offenses, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. The trial court subsequently sentenced Winters as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Winters argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her a sentence of split confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments for bribery of a public servant, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. However, because the record indicates that Winters entered a guilty plea to the indicted offense of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, rather than the offense of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony, we reverse the judgment in count 2 and remand the case for resentencing on that conviction.

The appellant, James Dennis Lamb, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to two counts of theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more and two counts of writing worthless checks valued $500 or less and received an effective four-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered that he serve the balance of his effective sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that he serve the sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The issues in this case are (1) whether the evidence supports an award of 8% to the body as a whole for an injury covered by the Workers’ Compensation statutes of this state, and (2) whether the trial judge erred in multiplying that award by a factor of six in the final judgment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that the medical proof supports the trial court’s finding of an 8% anatomical impairment and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the employee is entitled to receive permanent partial disability benefits of six times the anatomical impairment rating. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment awarding the employee permanent partial disability benefits of 48% to the body as a whole.

Following a jury trial, the Defendants, Gregory Mathis and Elza Evans, were each convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-305, -13-402, -14-403. The trial court sentenced Defendant Mathis to an effective sentence of 126 years and Defendant Evans to an effective sentence of two lifetimes without the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, the Defendants raise the following issues: (1) Defendant Evans contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from Defendant Mathis’s trial; (2) both Defendants contend that the especially aggravated kidnapping offenses were essentially incidental to the aggravated robbery offense; (3) both Defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions; and (4) both Defendants contend that the trial court erred in imposing their sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A patron at a sports bar shot and killed a man without threat or warning.  The widow of the murdered man and his daughter filed separate lawsuits which were later consolidated, naming the owner of the bar as defendant, and claiming that the victim’s death was the result of inadequate security on the premises. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment contending that he did not violate any duty owed to the plaintiffs, because the shooting that occurred was completely unforeseeable under the circumstances. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion. We affirm.

The defendant, Cleven Johnson, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated sexual battery, claiming that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for mistrial; (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the crime scene, and of a victim’s injuries and by admitting evidence of the defendant’s guilty plea to accompanying offenses; and (4) the sentence was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm and grant Appellees’ request for damages for a frivolous appeal.

Petitioner, Jerry A. Bell, was convicted in three separate trials of multiple felonies which resulted in three separate appeals. See State v. Jerry Bell, No. W2003-02870-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1105158 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 10, 2005); State v. Jerry Bell, No.W2004-01355-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2205849 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 12, 2005); State v. Jerry Bell, No. W2005-02812-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2872472 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 9, 2006). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief jointly attacking these convictions and arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled because the cases of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); and State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (“Gomez II”); established a new constitutional right requiring the tolling of the statute of limitations or in the alternative that his due process rights were violated such that the tolling of the statute of limitations is required. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals this dismissal. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that there is no basis upon which to toll the statute of limitations. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Daniel Ward, appeals his Campbell County Criminal Court jury convictions of 10 counts of aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the bill of particulars was inadequate, that his pretrial statement to police was not voluntarily and knowingly given, and that the 54-year sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of aggravated sexual battery in count six, that conviction is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed

 .

A jury convicted the defendant, Brice Cook, of premeditated first degree murder after the defendant shot the victim, Shantell Lane. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing a witness to offer lay opinion testimony; (2) denying the defendant’s request for a copy of a witness’s prior statement to police; (3) allowing certain hearsay testimony; (4) refusing to grant a mistrial when a witness referred twice to the defendant’s previous trial; (5) giving limiting instructions to the jury over the defendant’s objection; (6) allowing prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and (7) refusing to excuse for cause potential jurors who exhibited a bias against a defendant’s exercise of his or her right to remain silent. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, John Lowery, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. He asserts that newly discovered evidence, namely two witnesses’ recantation of their identification of the petitioner as the shooter and a previously unknown witness who said the petitioner was not at the scene of the crime, warranted a new trial on his convictions of premeditated first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the coram nobis court and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

The Appellant, Cumberland Bail Bonding Company, appeals the Roane County Criminal Court’s denial of its petitions to write bonds in the Criminal Courts of the Ninth Judicial District. On appeal, the Appellant argues that because it met all the necessary qualifications for bonding companies, the trial court’s order withholding approval for it to write bonds should be reversed, and the case should be remanded with instructions to approve it to write bonds as requested or with instructions to implement the procedures outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125 in an expedited fashion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of an order approving the Appellant to write bonds in the Ninth Judicial District.

Pro se Petitioner, Willie Andrew Cole, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition requesting DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-30-301. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition for DNA analysis without a response from the State or an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from a dispute over grandparent visitation. Whitney Nichole Huffman Lewis (“Mother”) is the mother of the minor child Isaiah Huffman (“the Child”). Billy W. Huffman and Lora D. Huffman (“the Grandparents,” collectively), father and stepmother of Mother, filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) to establish visitation rights with the Child. The Child had visited often with the Grandparents, but Mother ended the visits after a falling out with Mr. Huffman. Following a trial, the Trial Court denied the Grandparents’ petition after finding there was no significant relationship between the Grandparents and the Child and that there was no risk of substantial harm to the Child. The Grandparents appeal to this Court. We find and hold that while the Grandparents and the Child did have a significant existing relationship, the Grandparents failed to prove that cessation of this relationship would pose a danger of substantial harm to the Child. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified.

Petitioner, Adrian Curb, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, or in the alternative, a petition for writ of error coram nobis, challenging the conviction resulting from his 1997 guilty plea to aggravated assault. As grounds for relief, he claimed that his attempted first degree murder indictment was improperly amended to aggravated assault, thus coercing him into involuntarily pleading guilty to the amended charge. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition because petitioner failed to establish an exception to the one-year statute of limitation for petitions for post-conviction relief. The court also concluded that petitioner failed to demonstrate the requisite factors for newly discovered evidence as required for writ of error coram nobis relief. Following our review, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Troy Reynolds (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty in February 2012 to evading arrest by vehicle, theft of property valued at over $1,000, and burglary. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of three years to be suspended and served on supervised probation, consecutive to an earlier suspended sentence. The State later filed a violation of probation warrant. The Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation revocation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Eric Cathey, filed in the Shelby County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of felony murder and aggravated child abuse, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Stanley B. Hill, was convicted by a Blount County jury of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife, Vickie Hill, and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) allowing the medical examiner to use demonstrative evidence that was inherently unreliable, unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, and not disclosed to defense counsel prior to trial and (2) excluding a piece of physical evidence as a sanction for his violation of the reciprocal discovery obligations under Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Cumberland County jury convicted the Petitioner, Gary Thomas Reed, of initiating the process of manufacturing methamphetamine. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Gary Thomas Reed, No. E2009-02238-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1842711 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Aug. 24, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 24, 2011). The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that his attorney failed to call an exculpatory witness at trial and failed to object to a violation of the sequestration rule. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and one count of driving with a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor, while reserving a certified question of law concerning the constitutionality of a city ordinance requiring vehicles operating within the municipality to have a “tag light” illuminating the vehicle’s license plate after dark. The defendant was sentenced to eight years probation on the possession charge and to a concurrent six months probation for driving with a suspended license. Upon review, we conclude that the certified question reserved by the defendant is not dispositive of the constitutionality of the traffic stop at issue. The defendant’s appeal is dismissed accordingly.

The Petitioner, Jerry Whiteside Dickerson, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus regarding his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute over grandparent visitation. Whitney Nichole Huffman Lewis (“Mother”) is the mother of the minor child Isaiah Huffman (“the 1 Child”). Billy W. Huffman and Lora D. Huffman (“the Grandparents,” collectively), father and stepmother of Mother, filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) to establish visitation rights with the Child. The Child had visited often with the Grandparents, but Mother ended the visits after a falling out with Mr. Huffman. Following a trial, the Trial Court denied the Grandparents’ petition after finding there was no significant relationship between the Grandparents and the Child and that there was no risk of substantial harm to the Child. The Grandparents appeal to this Court. We find and hold that while the Grandparents and the Child did have a significant existing relationship, the Grandparents failed to prove that cessation of this relationship would pose a danger of substantial harm to the Child. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified.

A six-year-old boy’s spine was fractured in a car wreck when the force of the impact caused him to jackknife over his lap seatbelt and pushed the seatbelt into his stomach and against his spine. The child’s mother filed suit on his behalf against Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), alleging that the defective design of the seatbelt and Ford’s failure to warn of a potential danger caused the child’s permanent paralysis and other enhanced injuries. A jury returned a $43.8 million verdict for compensatory damages, finding Ford to be 15% at fault and two non-parties 85% at fault. Ford’s share of the verdict, based on its degree of fault, was $6,570,000. The jury awarded no punitive damages. Ford moved for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was excessive. The trial court denied the motion for new trial and affirmed the verdict in its capacity as thirteenth juror. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, ruled that the verdict was excessive and remanded to the trial court with a suggestion of remittitur from $43.8 million to $12.9 million, a 70.55% reduction. The suggested remittitur, if the plaintiff accepted it, would reduce Ford’s share of the verdict to $1,935,000. Meals ex rel. Meals v. Ford Motor Co., No. W2010-01493-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1264454, at *18-21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2012). We hold that the Court of Appeals had the authority to suggest a remittitur even though Ford did not request a remittitur. We further hold that the Court of Appeals erred in remitting the verdict to $12.9 million. Having taken the strongest legitimate view of all the material evidence in favor of the verdict, assuming the truth of all that supports it, allowing all reasonable inferences, and discarding any to the contrary, we hold that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence and was within the range of reasonableness. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the jury’s verdict is reinstated.
 

Appellant, Colby Terrell Black, was serving an effective twelve-year suspended sentence imposed as a result of his 2007, 2008, and 2010 guilty pleas to aggravated assault, two counts of sale of cocaine, and a second aggravated assault, respectively. He was arrested in 2011 for aggravated domestic assault. The trial court held a revocation hearing, after which it revoked appellant’s probation and ordered execution of his sentences. He successfully appealed the trial court’s order on the basis that the trial court failed to set forth the evidence it relied upon in ordering revocation and did not address the allegation that appellant had committed a new offense. The trial court complied with this court’s directive and filed an extensive order detailing the reasons for revocation. Appellant again appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by not considering his mental state at the time of the offense and by failing to find that the preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation. Upon our review, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a self-represented litigant’s continued efforts to occupy property which is the subject of foreclosure proceedings. After dismissal of his second action regarding the property, the appellant files this appeal. We dismiss the appeal for failure to file a brief that complies with the appellate rules and conclude that this is a frivolous appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122.