APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns the appropriate response when a trial court learns during a jury’s deliberations that a juror exchanged Facebook messages with one of the State’s witnesses during the trial. A criminal court in Davidson County declined the defendant’s request to hold a hearing to question the juror and the witness to ascertain whether the communications required a new trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court had not erred by declining the defendant’s request for a hearing. State v. Smith, No. M2010-01384-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 8502564 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2012). We disagree and, therefore, vacate the judgment and remand the case for a hearing consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellants claimed that Appellee was liable for injuries caused by dogs that Appellee allegedly owned and allowed to run loose in the Appellants’ neighborhood. The trial court’s order fails to state the legal ground upon which the court granted the motion for summary judgment. Further, there is no indication in the record of the trial court’s reason(s) for granting the motion. Because Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04 mandates inclusion of the trial court’s legal ground in the order on the motion for summary judgment, we vacate and remand.

A Madison County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Marquon L. Green, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to ten years to be served at 85%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this negligence action, the trial court, following a bench trial, found the defendant 51% at fault and the plaintiff 49% at fault for a severe injury plaintiff, Margie R. Huskey, suffered to her left arm at the Rhea County Convenience Center. The trial court assessed total compensatory damages at $298,376.65, which it reduced by 49%, awarding $152,172.09 to Ms. Huskey. The court further assessed damages of $25,000.00 for loss of consortium in favor of plaintiff, Norman Huskey, which it likewise reduced by 49%, awarding $12,750.00. The County raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by finding the County liable for negligence; (2) whether the injured plaintiff was at least 50% at fault and therefore barred from recovery; and (3) whether the damages awarded were excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Stephen A. Pugh, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to recognize a defective indictment and by allowing the petitioner to plead guilty under that indictment, which did not charge a crime recognized under the law of Tennessee. The petitioner is currently serving an effective seventeen-year sentence in the Department of Correction following his guilty plea to two counts of attempted first degree murder. Following review, we affirm the denial of relief.

William Henry Preston (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Pursuant to a plea agreement and his pleas of guilty to six counts of aggravated rape, the Petitioner received a total effective sentence of forty years as a Range I standard offender. In his petition, he alleges that his sentences are illegal because the trial court and his counsel failed to advise him that he would be subject to community supervision for life as a result of his convictions. In addition, the Petitioner asserts that his total effective sentence of forty years has expired due to the accumulation of sentence reduction credits. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is a breach of contract case. Appellant, a medical doctor, was hired by Appellee Clinic under terms outlined in an employment agreement. After four years employment, the relationship between the parties reached an impasse and Appellant made plans to leave the Clinic to open his own practice. When the parties could not agree concerning payments due under the contract, the instant lawsuit was filed by Appellant, claiming that the Appellee had breached the contract. Appellee counter-sued for breach of contract, breach of duty of loyalty, and conversion, claiming that the Appellee had retained certain of his accounts receivable and had limited his work schedule in contravention of the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee on the breach of contract and duty of loyalty claims, and set damages pursuant to the report of the Special Master. Appellant appeals. We conclude that remaining questions of law and fact preclude the grant of summary judgment, but that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s claim for unpaid vacation time and properly referred the issue of damages to the Special Master. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Stephen Mark Addleburg (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of failure to provide proof of financial responsibility; possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana; possession of a weapon by a convicted felon; and possession of a handgun while under the influence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We remand the case solely for correction of clerical errors contained in the two misdemeanor judgments.

This appeal involves the trial court’s disposition of Wife’s post-judgment motions and redivision of marital property. Following the trial court’s entry of the final decree of divorce, Wife filed several post-judgment motions seeking relief from the final decree based on Husband’s misrepresentation and concealment of assets prior to the trial court’s division of the marital estate. After an extensive period of discovery, the trial court agreed with Wife and concluded that she was entitled to a new division of marital property and relief from the final decree under either Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court further ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees and expert fees. Husband appeals. We affirm.

Husband and Wife were divorced in 2000 and Wife was awarded one-half of the retirement benefits Husband earned from the military during the parties’ ten-year marriage. Wife has been unable to collect her portion of these benefits because the language of the court’s decree does not satisfy the requirements of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §1408, et seq. Shortly after the divorce was granted, Wife filed a Rule 60 motion to amend the court’s Final Decree of Divorce to comply with the Act, which the trial court granted. Husband appealed because the trial court made substantive changes to Wife’s award beyond what was necessary to comply with the Act. The Court of Appeals agreed with Husband on appeal and issued a mandate directing the trial court to amend its Final Decree using language meant to comply with the Act’s requirements to enable Wife to receive her portion of Husband’s retirement benefits directly from the military.  Wife still has not been able to collect her portion of Husband’s retirement benefits and filed another Rule 60 motion seeking to amend the Final Decree again to comply with the Act’s requirements. The trial court denied Wife’s motion and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. Wife presents extraordinary circumstances entitling her to relief pursuant to Rule 60.02(5).

We accepted this appeal to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to seek post-conviction relief from a judgment in a civil case finding her in criminal contempt and imposing sanctions, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 (2012). We hold that a criminal contempt adjudication under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 does not amount to a criminal conviction under the general criminal laws for purposes of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the dismissal of the petition.

Appellee/Buyer purchased certain telecommunications equipment from Appellant/Seller. Upon inspection, Appellee discovered the equipment was defective and rejected the goods. Appellant contends that the returned goods were never delivered and that Appellee bears the risk of loss under the Tennessee Uniform Commercial Code. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Appellee/Buyer, finding that, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 47-2-510, the risk of loss remained with Appellant/Seller. Appellant appeals this finding, as well as the award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees in favor of Appellee. We reverse the award of attorney fees. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

The Defendant, Eric Dates, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, all suspended but 48 hours. See T.C.A. 55-10-401 (2012). On appeal, he contends that (1) the traffic stop was an unconstitutional search and seizure, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction, and (3) the verdicts were inconsistent. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Tony Thomas, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tiwon Antwan Harvell, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of facilitation of aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-11-403, 39-13-402, 39-16-603. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of ten years for facilitation of aggravated robbery and four years for evading arrest. On appeal, he contends that his interview with the police should have been suppressed and that a transcript of the interview should not have been introduced with the video recording. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed by a pro se inmate. The Defendants/Appellees filed motions to dismiss the Petition, arguing that the Petition was untimely and that it lacked the required verification pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-8-104. The trial court dismissed the Petition without ruling on the inmate’s motion for an enlargement of time to respond to the motion to dismiss. The inmate appealed. On appeal, the Appellees argue that the inmate’s Notice of Appeal was untimely. We conclude that the inmate’s Notice of Appeal was timely filed. In addition, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to rule on the inmate’s pending motion was harmless, as the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to consider the petition by the inmate’s failure to verify the truth of the petition. Affirmed and remanded.

A jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a handgun after having been previously convicted of a felony drug offense. The defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years for the homicide, six years for the aggravated assault, and four years for the weapons possession. The trial court elected to impose the aggravated assault conviction consecutively to the homicide conviction for an aggregate sentence of forty-one years. The defendant appeals, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of the mens rea element of second degree murder; that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of prior felony drug convictions to be introduced as impeachment; and that the trial court improperly imposed a consecutive sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pro se petitioner, Jack Layne Benson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his second petition for post-conviction relief, which the court treated as a motion to reopen his first petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the first post-conviction petition, which prevented him from seeking permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. He also asserts that the post-conviction court improperly dismissed his petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing in violation of his due process rights. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Correl Marcellus Baker, was convicted by a Coffee County jury of aggravated robbery and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction and merged the reckless endangerment conviction into the aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting that the reckless endangerment conviction was merged into the aggravated robbery conviction.

In this grandparent visitation case, we must determine, in the absence of a controlling statutory provision, the appropriate burdens of proof and standards courts should apply where a grandparent and a parent seek to modify and terminate, respectively, court-ordered grandparent visitation. We hold that when a grandparent or a parent initiates a proceeding to modify or terminate court-ordered grandparent visitation, courts should apply the burdens of proof and standards typically applied in parent-vs-parent visitation modification cases. Thus, the burden of proof is upon the grandparent or parent seeking modification or termination to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence both that a material change in circumstances has occurred and that the change in circumstances makes the requested modification or termination of grandparent visitation in the child’s best interests. Applying this holding, we conclude that the record in this case supports the trial court’s judgment modifying grandparent visitation. However, we conclude that the trial court failed to make sufficiently specific findings of fact to support its judgment finding the mother in contempt of the order granting grandparent visitation. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment, reinstate that portion of the trial court’s judgment which modified the grandparent visitation arrangement, and vacate those portions of the trial court’s judgment finding the mother in contempt and ordering her to pay a portion of the grandparents’ attorney’s fees.

Appellant, Marques D. Wheeler, entered a guilty plea to aggravated burglary and received a four-year suspended sentence to be served in community corrections. Following several violations, the trial court revoked appellant from community corrections and resentenced him to six years. Appellant contends that the trial court’s resentencing was improper because the trial court failed to follow the statutory procedure of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, James Dennis Lamb, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to two counts of theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more and two counts of writing worthless checks valued $500 or less and received an effective four-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered that he serve the balance of his effective sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that he serve the sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The issues in this case are (1) whether the evidence supports an award of 8% to the body as a whole for an injury covered by the Workers’ Compensation statutes of this state, and (2) whether the trial judge erred in multiplying that award by a factor of six in the final judgment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that the medical proof supports the trial court’s finding of an 8% anatomical impairment and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the employee is entitled to receive permanent partial disability benefits of six times the anatomical impairment rating. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment awarding the employee permanent partial disability benefits of 48% to the body as a whole.

Following a jury trial, the Defendants, Gregory Mathis and Elza Evans, were each convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-305, -13-402, -14-403. The trial court sentenced Defendant Mathis to an effective sentence of 126 years and Defendant Evans to an effective sentence of two lifetimes without the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, the Defendants raise the following issues: (1) Defendant Evans contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from Defendant Mathis’s trial; (2) both Defendants contend that the especially aggravated kidnapping offenses were essentially incidental to the aggravated robbery offense; (3) both Defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions; and (4) both Defendants contend that the trial court erred in imposing their sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Johnny L. Heitz, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated kidnapping conviction and resulting thirty-year sentence. He contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to two statements made by prosecutors during closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.