APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After fifteen years of marriage, Charlotte Ann Goad Human (“Wife”) sued Jeffrey Allen Human (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree of Divorce which, inter alia, declared the parties divorced, divided the marital assets and debts, and entered a Permanent Parenting Plan designating Husband as the primary residential parent for the parties’ two minor children. Wife appeals to this Court alleging that the Trial Court erred in entering a Parenting Plan designating Husband as the primary residential parent when Husband did not request this designation. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings relative to the Permanent Parenting Plan, and we affirm.

This appeal concerns a dispute over the modification of a permanent parenting plan. Leslie Kay Johnson (“Mother”) and Darren Tracy Johnson (“Father”) were divorced in the Chancery Court for Monroe County (“the Trial Court”). A permanent parenting plan was entered regarding the parties’ minor child (“the Child”). Mother was designated as the primary residential parent with the parties to have equal parenting time with the Child. Mother later filed an emergency petition for custody and contempt, alleging that the Child had severe anxiety about going to see Father. Father filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Mother failed to file a proposed parenting plan contemporaneously with her petition as required by statute, Mother’s petition should be dismissed. Both Mother and Father ultimately filed proposed parenting plans with Father’s being submitted with his own Petition for Change in Co-Parenting Time. The Trial Court denied Father’s motion to dismiss. After a hearing on the competing petitions, the Trial Court modified the parenting plan to grant Mother more time with the Child. Father appeals. We hold that the Trial Court had jurisdiction to decide Mother’s petition and that the Trial Court did not err in modifying the existing parenting plan. We affirm the Trial Court.

 Petitioner, Tommy Lee Page, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of sale of a controlled substance in a Drug Free School Zone.  He entered a guilty plea to the reduced charge of the sale of a controlled substance weighing less than .5 grams.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years as a Range II, multiple offender.  Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and that he entered his guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily.  After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to prove any of his allegations that counsel’s representation was ineffective and we conclude that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.  Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Roy Len Rogers, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of first degree premeditated murder, second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. Subsequently, the trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction and imposed a mandatory life sentence for that conviction and a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his home; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the verdicts were inconsistent; (3) that the trial court erred by refusing to allow the Defendant to play a 911 tape; (4) that the trial court improperly admitted irrelevant photographs of tires of the Defendant’s vehicle; (5) that the State withheld Brady material, specifically the statement of a potential suspect; and (6) that a juror evidenced bias by her actions and body language prior to deliberations. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we determine that there is no reversible error in the judgments of the trial court and affirm.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, one count of delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, one count of maintaining a dwelling for purposes of selling controlled substances, a Class D felony, and one count of casual exchange of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. After accepting the defendant’s plea, the trial court merged the defendant’s convictions concerning the sale and the delivery of cocaine. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for the sale of cocaine, three years for maintaining a dwelling for purposes of selling a controlled substance, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for his casual exchange. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve these sentences concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of five years. The defendant moved the court for alternative sentencing, but the trial court denied this motion following a hearing and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for alternative sentencing. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. The judgments denying alternative sentencing are affirmed.

This appeal arises from an action filed by Plaintiff to set aside a quitclaim deed executed by Decedent conveying Decedent’s home to her grandsons. Following a bench trial, the Chancery Court of Fayette County concluded that Decedent was incompetent to execute the deed and that the grandsons exercised undue influence over Decedent to obtain the deed. In a subsequent order, the trial court concluded that the grandsons intentionally defrauded Decedent to obtain Decedent’s signature on the deed and ordered them to pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. On appeal, the grandsons argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Decedent was incompetent to execute the deed and in concluding that the grandsons exercised undue influence over her to obtain the deed. Additionally, the grandsons contend that the trial court erred in concluding that they intentionally defrauded Decedent in order to obtain Decedent’s signature on the deed and in ordering them to pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the grandson’s appeal constitutes a frivolous appeal under Tenn. Code Ann. section 27-1-122. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Chris Nachampasak, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for one count of first degree murder, one count of felony murder, four counts of aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment after a drive-by shooting at a graduation party that resulted in the death of a fourteen-year-old child.  Appellant subsequently pled guilty to a single count of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault in return for the dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment.  In exchange for the guilty pleas, Appellant received an effective sentence of thirty-five years in incarceration.  Subsequently, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.  Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.  After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas where Appellant failed to show a manifest injustice.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Michael Alan Burleson, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated burglary of a vehicle and was sentenced to a total of five years to be served on community corrections. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the sentences and ordered the appellant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case in which Company sought to hold Defendant personally liable for the amount remaining on a contract. During Company’s proof-in-chief, Defendant used parol evidence attempting to show that while he signed the contract, the parties understood that he was signing as a representative of his business. Following Company’s presentation of its proof, Defendant moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion, finding that Company failed to establish that Defendant was personally liable. Company appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Charles Edward Graham aka Charles Edward Stevenson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence concerning the judicial misconduct of a trial judge affected the outcome of his 2005 jury trial and 2010 post-conviction evidentiary hearing. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Joshua Lynn Pitts, of driving under the influence (“DUI”).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation after serving forty-eight hours in jail.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal stop of his vehicle.  After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle.  As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pro se petitioner, Johnny L. McGowan, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the statute of limitations should be tolled because his claim is based on a constitutional right that did not exist at the time of his plea, and further contends that the post-conviction court erred in failing to appoint counsel prior to dismissal.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Bradley County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Bruce Anton Parks, Jr., of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years and six years, respectively, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to declare a mistrial when the State questioned a police officer about whether anyone had provided an alibi for the appellant, and that his effective thirty-one-year sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Lee Shaw, of  possession of more than twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.  Shaw received an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence supporting Shaw’s drug-related convictions was sufficient to establish constructive possession.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Charles Nash (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appealed, claiming that he is entitled to relief because his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to a motion to suppress, in failing to object to the State’s closing arguments, and in failing to present a defense of duress. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a bench trial, the Williamson County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Pierrette L. Wessels, of driving under the influence (DUI), DUI per se, and failing to obey a traffic control device.  The trial court merged the DUI per se conviction into the DUI conviction and sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as forty-eight hours in jail and the remainder on supervised probation.  For failing to obey a traffic control device, the trial court sentenced the appellant to thirty days on probation to be served concurrently with the DUI sentence.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant her motion to suppress evidence.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Company providing dial-up and broadband Internet services to Internet Service Providers that in turn provided these services to end-users sought refund of sales taxes it had paid to the State from January 2001 through March 2004 on the ground that its services did not constitute “telecommunications” or “telecommunication services” as those terms are defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(a)(32). Both the Company and the State filed motions for summary judgment and the trial court granted the Company’s motion. The trial court found the Company provided Internet access services, the services were “enhanced” rather than “basic” services, and the true object of the services was not telecommunications. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

After her daughter was attacked by a tenant’s dog, the mother plaintiff sued the tenant and the property owners. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owners based upon a lack of knowledge/notice of the dog’s vicious propensities. For the following reasons, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and we remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, Ginger Ilene Hudson Stump, was indicted by a Bedford County Grand Jury for twenty-six counts of forgery.  See T.C.A. § 39-14-114 (Supp. 2011).  Pursuant to her plea agreement, Stump entered guilty pleas to six Class E felonies (counts 3, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19) involving more than $500 but less than $1,000 and one Class D felony (count 25) involving $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences.  As a part of this agreement, the State dismissed the remaining nineteen forgery counts.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Stump as a career offender to twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, Stump argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her an alternative sentence and in denying her a community corrections sentence.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and this appeal must be dismissed.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Mother appeals from the trial court’s post-divorce modification decreasing Father’s child support obligation. Finding no error, we affirm. We have also determined that Father is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees he incurred in this appeal  pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c).

Petitioner, Taft Arkey Murphy, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.  Petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to sell three hundred or more grams of cocaine in a school zone,  possession with intent to sell twenty-six or more grams of cocaine in a school zone, the sale of twenty-six or more grams of cocaine in a school zone, two counts of the sale of twenty-six or more grams of cocaine, and possession of a handgun by a felon.  He received an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective (1) by failing to adequately communicate and meet with him to prepare for the case and failing to properly investigate the facts of the case; (2) by failing to discuss with Petitioner whether he should testify on his own behalf at trial; and (3) by failing to object to testimony regarding Petitioner’s prior voluntary manslaughter conviction. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

Plaintiffs/appellants, who are owners of real property in a residential community that was developed for horse riding enthusiasts, filed this action to enforce restrictive covenants that prohibit the use of motorized vehicles on trails in the residential community. At the hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, all of the parties agreed to the entry of an order prohibiting the use of any motorized vehicles on horse trails within four specified sections that contained the restrictive covenants; at the same hearing, the parties also agreed with the trial court’s statement that all other claims would be dismissed. A Final Order was entered that was consistent with the parties’ agreement. Although the plaintiffs consented in open court to the order that was entered and they did not file a motion to alter or amend that order, plaintiffs now appeal from that order. On appeal, they contend they were deprived of the opportunity to put on evidence at the hearing on the motions to dismiss; they also contend the court erred in dismissing all other claims. Finding the plaintiffs expressly consented in open court to the entry of the order appealed from, that the plaintiffs made no request to introduce evidence, and that they agreed to the dismissal of all other claims, we have determined that the plaintiffs waived all issues raised in this appeal. Therefore, we affirm the trial court. Defendants contend this was a frivolous appeal and have requested damages. Exercising our discretion, we respectfully deny the defendants request for damages.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is the second appeal of this case. We previously affirmed the trial court’s award of temporary total disability benefits and past medical expenses, but reversed its decision not to award permanent disability benefits and future medical expenses. Wilson v. Jennings, No. E2010-02028-WC-R3-WC, 2012 WL 727853 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Mar. 6, 2012). On remand, the trial court heard additional medical, vocational and other proof as to the employee’s anatomical impairment and vocational disability. Based on that evidence, it awarded 200 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits and future medical expenses. The employer has again appealed, contending that the trial court erred by denying its motion for sanctions, by denying its motion in limine to exclude certain medical testimony, by relying on the proof of the employee’s vocational expert and by awarding discretionary costs. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.