APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of penalties and interest on ad valorum taxes owed by a funeral home business after the business was placed in receivership. The Appellant/Shelby County Trustee filed a claim with the Appellee/Receiver to recover delinquent taxes, penalties and interest. The trial court denied the penalties and interest, but allowed the Receiver to pay the base taxes. The Trustee appeals. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm and remand.

The Petitioner, Joseph Nelson, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that due process concerns should toll the one-year statute of limitations to allow review of his underlying claims. Because the Petitioner has failed to prove any grounds upon which to toll the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Brandon Compton, of two counts of first degree murder. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the judgments of conviction and entered convictions for second degree murder, remanding to the trial court for resentencing. State v. Brandon Compton, No. E2005-01419-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2924992, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 13, 2006) perm. to app. denied (Feb. 26, 2007). After the trial court resentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for each of his second degree murder convictions to be served consecutively, this Court affirmed the twenty-five year consecutive sentences. State v. Brandon Compton, No. E2007-01790-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4071825 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 2, 2008) perm. app. denied (Feb. 17, 2009). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, claiming that his attorney failed to: (1) adequately investigate witnesses, (2) present the theory of self-defense, (3) refute the State’s characterization of the Petitioner as a drug dealer, and (4) present expert testimony on gunshot residue. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.
 

Plaintiff purchased landlocked property and filed suit against adjoining landowners to establish an easement for a private road and for utilities pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 54-14-101, et seq. After the jury of view returned its verdict form selecting a certain route for the easement, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, which the trial court granted. Defendants filed a motion to set aside the order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which the trial court denied. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

Defendant, Michael Vance, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, making a false report to a law enforcement officer, evading arrest, aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  The trial court severed counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 from counts 4, 6, 7, and 8, and upon the State’s motion, the trial court subsequently dismissed with prejudice counts 6, 7, and 8 of the indictment.  Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of first degree murder, making a false statement to a law enforcement officer, evading arrest, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for felony murder, three years for making a false report, three years for evading arrest, and one year for unlawful possession of a weapon.  Defendant’s sentences in counts 2, 3, and 5 were ordered to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to his life sentence.  In this direct appeal, Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the testimony of the victim’s divorce attorney; 3) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of prior bad acts under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 404(b); 4) the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of the defense mental health expert, Dr. Lynn Zager; 5) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of the defense mental health expert, Dr. Murray Smith; 6) the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of the State’s mental health expert, Dr. Rokeya Farooque; 7) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a photo of the victim taken while the victim was living; 8) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim; 9) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a durable power of attorney executed by the victim; 10) the trial court erred by not severing count 1 from the remaining counts; 11) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing; and 12) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions.  After a careful review of the record before us, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Johnny Tate, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that both trial counsel and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to challenge the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions on due process and double jeopardy grounds. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Stephen Wayne Davis, appeals from his 2012 Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of guilty of one count each of aggravated kidnapping, robbery, and attempt to commit rape. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because the record supports the jury verdicts and because we conclude that principles of due process do not invalidate the aggravated kidnapping conviction, we affirm the convictions.

The Defendant, Kyto Sihapanya, pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident involving death, a Class E felony, and following too closely, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A.§§ 55-10-101, 55-8-124 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by denying judicial diversion, (2) by denying probation, and (3) by sentencing him to two years. We conclude that the trial court properly denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Petitioner to two years but that the court erred by denying probation. We reverse the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Stephanie D. Cooley, pled guilty to two counts of obtaining controlled substances by fraud in Sumner County in 2007. As a result, she was sentenced to two, concurrent, two-year sentences. The sentences were suspended, and Petitioner was ordered to probation. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the Sumner County convictions in Davidson County in October of 2012. The petition was dismissed because there was nothing on the face of the judgments to indicate that the convictions were void. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the habeas corpus court improperly denied habeas corpus relief. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the habeas corpus court properly denied habeas corpus relief where Petitioner failed to show that her judgments were void.

The petitioner, Samuel Winkfield, was indicted for first degree (premeditated) murder, first degree (felony) murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, tampering with evidence, and conspiracy to tamper with evidence. During his July 2007 trial, the petitioner was acquitted of the felony murder and conspiracy to tamper with evidence charges. Because the jury was unable to reach a decision regarding the remaining charges, he was retried in January 2008 and convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. The jury was again unable to reach a decision on the kidnapping charge, and this charge was eventually dismissed. On the direct appeal of his convictions, the petitioner challenged the admission into evidence of his testimony from the first trial, the exclusion from evidence of the MySpace page of the State’s chief witness, the sufficiency of the evidence, and his sentence. His convictions and sentences were affirmed. The petitioner then filed a timely post-conviction petition, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner asserted his trial counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to investigate and produce witnesses; in failing to obtain expert testimony; in failing to adequately cross-examine witnesses; and in failing to explore alternative defense strategies. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Having reviewed the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This civil action is the progeny of a criminal proceeding in which Plaintiff was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for criminal trespass and stalking following an incident that occurred at the headquarters of Nissan North America. Plaintiff was convicted of criminal trespass; however, the stalking charge was dismissed because a corporation is not defined as a “person” under the stalking statute. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action against Nissan North America asserting claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process pertaining to the stalking charge. Nissan filed a motion for summary judgment and a statement of undisputed facts that was supported by the affidavit of the Williamson County Deputy District Attorney General who investigated and prosecuted the criminal proceedings. Plaintiff filed a response opposing Nissan’s motion for summary judgment; however, she failed to file a statement of disputed facts or any affidavit or deposition testimony to dispute the facts relied upon by Nissan as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 requires. After setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 56.04, the trial court summarily dismissed the complaint upon the findings that Nissan presented competent evidence to negate essential elements of Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff failed to create an issue of disputed material fact regarding any of the grounds relied upon by Nissan. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, we affirm the summary dismissal of the complaint.

John T. Vine, II (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation to commit aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-two years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. He also argues that the trial court committed plain error in admitting as evidence the videotaped recording of the Defendant’s interview with police. Finally, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentences and the trial court’s imposition of partially consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur with the majority opinion, except I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority that the trial court erred in denying appellant alternative sentencing. After considering the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing and the record as a whole, it is my view that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing appellant to a term of incarceration. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion reversing the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on Sworn Account, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 245-107, for unpaid credit card charges against the credit card holder. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment that was accompanied by a statement of the material facts as to which Plaintiff contended there was no genuine issue for trial, and each fact was set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph as the rule required, with a specific citation to the record. Defendant filed a response objecting to the motion; however, Defendant failed to demonstrate that the facts Plaintiff relied upon in making the motion for summary judgment were, in fact, disputed as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. As a consequence, the facts relied upon by Plaintiff were undisputed and the trial court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the amount owed. We affirm.
 

This consolidated appeal concerns Plaintiff’s ownership interest in condominium units. Plaintiff filed several complaints concerning the alleged mismanagement of her property. The complaints at issue in this case were dismissed by the trial court, which found that the applicable statute of limitations had passed and that several of Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Chivous S. Robinson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence concerning the judicial misconduct of a trial judge affected the outcome of his 2000 jury trial and 2005 post-conviction proceedings. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

Petitioner, Demarcus Sanders, appeals from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner attacked his guilty plea to second degree murder and his resulting twenty-five-year sentence on the basis that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of which Petitioner entered a guilty plea that was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, E. Louis Thomas, was convicted by a Shelby County jury for the offense of first degree murder, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s timely filed pro se application for permission to appeal to that court. See State v. E. Louis Thomas, No. W2008-01360-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2977874 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2010) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011). Both of Petitioner’s counsel were allowed to withdraw as counsel of record on August 24, 2010, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 14. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The earliest it could be considered “filed,” under the “mailbox” rule, was March 22, 2012. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition because it was filed outside the one year statute of limitations. Petitioner appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Donald Keith Solomon, pled guilty in 2009 to numerous charges and, subsequently, sent a letter to the trial court, which apparently was treated as a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Appointed counsel then filed an amended petition, setting out as claims for relief that trial counsel had failed to advise the petitioner of his “legal innocence” of three of the charges for passing worthless checks and that, contrary to his understanding at the plea submission, he was required to pay court costs.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the petitioner’s trial counsel had “thoroughly investigated and reviewed the evidence” with him and “any decisions made about the timing of filing of motions were a strategic decision.” We conclude that the record supports the opinion and order of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

Attorney filed petition pursuant to the Public Records Act for disclosure of documents held by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, the Board’s Chair, and Disciplinary Counsel to the Board relating to eight disciplinary proceedings. Access to the documents had been withheld based on a claim that the documents were exempt from disclosure in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 25.3. Responding officials appeal the trial court’s order that the documents be produced. Finding that the documents sought were confidential and privileged from disclosure, we reverse the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition.

Shelenda Nicole Windmon (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of attempt to commit aggravated child abuse. Pursuant to her plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to six years with manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court granted probation but denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. The Defendant now appeals the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Roy L. McAlister (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant was given an effective sentence of three years, suspended to supervised probation after service of 219 days in confinement. Upon the filing of a probation violation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation violation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his original appeal of the trial court’s ruling, we vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to clarify its findings. Subsequently, the trial court issued an order clarifying its findings and affirming its previous order revoking the Defendant’s probation. The Defendant again appealed the trial court’s ruling. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Mother and Father were divorced in 2006, and their parenting plan did not include an award of child support because residential parenting time was equally shared and they were earning roughly the same amount. Mother filed a petition in 2010 seeking an award of child support based on Father’s increased income. The trial court deviated downward from the presumptive amount of child support established by the child support guidelines to take into account each party’s expenses incurred in driving back and forth to work, and then awarded Mother child support payable on a monthly basis. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded its authority by deviating downward for a reason not explicitly set forth in the guidelines. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because tribunals have discretion to deviate from the guidelines for reasons other than those explicitly set forth in the guidelines.

The Defendant, Edwina Johnson, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued over $1,000 and one count of identity theft. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of three years, to be served on probation, consecutive to an effective three year sentence of incarceration imposed in a separate case. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that she had violated the terms of her probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it found she had violated the rules and conditions of her probation and when it denied her request for an alternative sentence. She further contends that the trial court erred because it found she had committed the probation violation on a date not within the term of her supervised probation period. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of evading arrest. He received an effective sentence of three hundred years. The defendant was convicted on the theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another as he was not physically present in the home during the violent home invasion. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that his convictions should be reversed because the State failed to establish the chain of custody of a ski mask containing the defendant’s DNA that was recovered from the getaway vehicle after the crimes, and that the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after a witness made a general remark to the effect that the defendant had engaged wrongful behavior in the past. After review, we find that the defendant’s claims lack merit. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.