APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Michael Jermaine Harris, was convicted of aggravated arson in 2009 and was sentenced to nineteen years. He unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence. See State v. Michael Jermaine Harris, No. E2009-01383-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3155196, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2010). Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to prepare adequately for trial, failed to obtain an expert witness, failed to procure an alibi witness, and failed to adequately cross-examine one of the police officers involved. Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court denied Mother’s motion to correct a clerical mistake in the permanent parenting plan pursuant to Rule 60.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Mother appeals. Vacated and Remanded.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kenny Kimble, was found guilty of rape of a child. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. In his only issue raised on appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony. The State argues that this issue is waived because the motion for new trial was untimely filed, having been filed more than thirty days after entry of the judgment of conviction. We reject the State’s argument concerning the timeliness of the motion for new trial. The judgment of conviction was not stamp-filed by the clerk, and thus there is nothing in the record to show that the motion for new trial was filed late. However, after review of the issue on its merits, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Antonio Wyatt, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the court wherein he was convicted. Upon motion of the State, the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing based upon Petitioner’s failure to show in the petition “that his judgments are either void or that his sentence has expired.” Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal. Petitioner asserts the judgments are void because the trial court ordered Petitioner to serve the one-year portion of incarceration of a split confinement sentence “day for day 100%” and because the trial court refused to allow Petitioner statutorily mandated pre-trial jail credits. While some of the documents in the record presented by Petitioner indicate irregularities in the judgments which could lead to a determination that the sentencing portions are void, we conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he is no longer “restrained of his liberty” by the challenged convictions. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I am writing separately to express my disagreement with the majority opinion's assertion that a trial judge's ruling with regard to hearsay is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. I am persuaded that the analysis of State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2009), is the appropriate method for reviewing issues involving hearsay.

Upon remand by our supreme court, see State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501 (Tenn. 2010), Defendant Ralph Byrd Cooper, Jr., was resentenced by the trial court to serve sixty (60) years as a career offender for his conviction of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. Defendant appeals his sentence, asserting as his sole issue that the trial court erred by determining he was a “career offender.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jeremy Young, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends (1) that his guilty plea to first-degree murder was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys allowed their hired agents to unduly influence him into pleading guilty, failed to seek a change of venue, and led him to believe that he could get his conviction overturned on post-conviction relief. After consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Upon her indictment for six counts of aggravated child abuse and six counts of aggravated child neglect, the defendant, Latonya Deon Dalton, pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony. In exchange for her pleas, the defendant received concurrent, ten-year sentences as a Range III offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the court ordered that the defendant serve one year in confinement, followed by probation for the remaining balance of the agreed-upon sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court failed to “give due consideration” to the principles of sentencing and also failed to give her nearly four months of jail credit. Following our review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court. However, we remand for the trial court to determine the amount of jail credit to which the defendant is entitled and apply that toward the one-year portion of her sentence to be served in confinement.

Teacher who brought action against Rutherford County, the Rutherford County Board of Education, and two employees of the Board appeals the grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissal of her claim that defendants violated the Education Truth in Reporting and Employee Protection Act of 1989, as well as her claims for invasion of privacy, abuse of process, misrepresentation, and harassment. We affirm the trial court’s holding that there is no general cause of action under the Education Truth in Reporting and Employee Act of 1989. Finding that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation which preclude summary judgment, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the remaining claims.

An attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility brought suit against the Board hearing panel that decided his case. The attorney asserts that the hearing panel violated the Open Meetings Act. We have concluded that the trial court properly determined that the Open Meetings Act does not apply to the Board’s hearing panels.

In this procedurally complex case, the Defendant, Duvale Vashawn Pruitt, pled nolo contendere to multiple drug-related charges, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years of probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed two probation violation warrants, one in September and another in October of 2007. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve ninety days in jail and then start his probationary sentence again. In February 2011, the Defendant’s probation officer filed a third probation violation warrant based upon the Defendant’s possession of a switchblade knife at a courthouse, and the trial court issued a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his ten-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s sentence on appeal. State v. Duvale  Vashawn Pruitt, No. E2011-01995-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4762115, at *1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 8, 2012), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. On December 11, 2012, after our opinion was filed, the Defendant filed a “Motion seeking recall of the previously adjudicated probation violation warrants in which [the trial court] sentenced and ordered Petitioner on May 27, 2011, to serve the balance of his sentence, or ten years at thirty percent, in confinement.” The trial court dismissed the motion, and the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his motion because the capias and detainer lodged against him for a probation violation should have been recalled because he had satisfied his sentence by serving time in federal custody. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude the Defendant has no right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion. As such, the Defendant’s appeal is dismissed.

Petitioner, Reginald D. Hughes, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of the pro se third petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court.

Petition to modify child support obligation was filed by Father; Mother filed a counter-petition requesting that the court make a determination as to where their child would attend school. The trial court dismissed Father’s petition when he did not provide information to support his assertion that he no longer received a portion of the income upon which his child support obligation was based and therefore he failed to show a change of circumstance relative to his income. The court found that it would be in the child’s best interest to attend school in the school for which Mother’s residence was zoned and granted Mother’s counter-petition; the court also awarded attorney fees to Mother. We affirm the court’s decision relative to the child’s school enrollment. We reverse the order dismissing Father’s petition for modification and remand the case for reconsideration; we reverse the award of attorney fees.

Defendant pled guilty to fourteen counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies; one count of burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony; four counts of theft of property with a value in excess of $10,000 but less than $60,000, Class C felonies; seven counts of theft of property with a value in excess of $1,000 but less than $10,000, Class D felonies; one count of theft of property with a value in excess of $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; and five counts of theft of property with a value less than $500, Class A misdemeanors. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years for each aggravated burglary, two years for the burglary of the automobile, six years for each Class C felony theft of property, four years for each Class D felony theft of property, two years for each Class E felony theft of property, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor theft of property. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing, resulting in an overall effective sentence of twenty-two years. The defendant now appeals the trial court’s sentencing decision, urging that the trial court erred in its application of certain enhancement and mitigation factors. Because a trial court’s mere error in the application of statutory enhancing and mitigating factors no longer provides any basis for reversing a defendant’s sentence, and because the defendant’s sentences are generally consistent with the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, James Harding Dalton, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-404 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court appointed a receiver for the appellant nonprofit corporation and held its president in contempt for repeated failures to comply with the court’s previous orders. The nonprofit corporation appeals. We affirm.

The appellant, Christopher Lee Davis, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; carjacking, a Class B felony; and attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. On direct appeal, our supreme court affirmed the appellant’s convictions but remanded for resentencing on the issue of consecutive sentencing. See State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 721-22 (Tenn. 2011). On remand, the trial court again ordered partial consecutive sentencing, which resulted in an overall effective sentence of forty-nine years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher Scott Chapman, pled guilty to aggravated assault in Davidson County in 2005. As a result, he was sentenced to four years in incarceration. The sentence was suspended, and Petitioner was ordered to probation. In 2008, Petitioner was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder. After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Petitioner was sentenced to six years in incarceration to be served consecutively to the Davidson County sentence. Petitioner filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus in August and September of 2012 in the Lake County Circuit Court challenging the Sumner County conviction. The petitions were denied because they were unverified and did not present proper grounds for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner filed two additional petitions for habeas corpus relief in Lake County, again challenging the Sumner County conviction for aggravated assault. The habeas corpus court denied the petitions, determining that the claims were not cognizable in a petition for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the habeas corpus court improperly denied habeas corpus relief. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the habeas corpus court properly denied habeas corpus relief where Petitioner failed to show that his judgment was void.

Appellant, Stephen Dewayne Baker, was indicted by the Putnam County Grand Jury in January of 2010 for one count of first degree murder, one count of felony murder, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of arson, and one count of tampering with evidence. Appellant was convicted by a jury of all offenses as charged in the indictment. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the first degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and imposed a life sentence. Appellant was also ordered to serve twelve years for the aggravated robbery conviction, six years for the arson conviction, and six years for the tampering with evidence conviction. The trial court ordered the arson and tampering with the evidence convictions to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the life sentence and sentence for aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus eighteen years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated this appeal. On appeal, Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred by denying a change of venue; (2) the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (4) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts; (5) the trial court erred in admitting the dying declarations of the victim; (6) the trial court erred in admitting testimony of Harold Harp about Appellant’s behavior; and (7) the trial court erred in admitting a photograph of the victim’s body. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court: (1) did not err in denying a change of venue where there was no proof that the jury pool was tainted from exposure to information about the incident; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress where consent for the search was valid and the search warrant was properly procured; (3) properly admitted evidence of Appellant’s drug use and past violent behavior; (4) properly admitted the dying declaration and excited utterances of the victim; (5) properly admitted the testimony of Mr. Harp; and (6) properly admitted photographs of the victim’s body. Additionally, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Visitor to a nursing home who was injured when a door swung into her brought suit against the nursing home, alleging that the door constituted a dangerous and defective condition and that the nursing home failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuries to visitors. The nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted on the basis that the door did not constitute a dangerous or defective condition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Jay Earl Haynes, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury in August 2009, for two counts of rape in connection with the anal rape of the two mentally-incapacitated grandsons of Appellant’s live-in girlfriend. Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because he could not have known that the victims were mentally incapacitated and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is ample evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find that Appellant knew of the victims’ mental incapacity and that his criminal activity was so extensive as to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jaron Lee Goodson, entered an open plea agreement to one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of twelve years, at 100%, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in determining the length of the sentence. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed.

In this action for damages related to a motor vehicle collision, Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. Plaintiff contests Defendant’s compliance with summary judgment requirements and the trial court’s consideration of extraneous evidence in reaching its decision. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Leman E. Russell, pled guilty to one count of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver in Dyer County in January 2006. He received a sentence of ten years with six months incarceration and nine and a half years on Community Corrections. Because of various violations and adjudications, Appellant was placed on probation on February 3, 2011. On September 27, 2011, a probation violation warrant was filed alleging that Appellant violated the terms of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original ten-year sentence in confinement. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation and imposing his original sentence because there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Michael L. McMahan (“the Petitioner”) entered a guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary, five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and two counts of aggravated robbery. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that his plea was constitutionally invalid and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his plea submission hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.