APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A White County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mack Broussard, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on self-defense; (2) failing to redact the portion of the appellant’s statement to police in which he said he was on probation at the time of the crime; and (3) allowing a State witness to give a speculative opinion about the appellant’s motive for the killing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the biological father, David R. (“Father”), of the minor child, Leland C.L. The child was taken into custody on June 14, 2010, at two months of age, due to the biological mother’s drug use and the fact that he tested positive for opiates and hydrocodone at birth. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights naming the father as a respondent on January 7, 2011. Following a bench trial, the Court granted the Petition upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father had abandoned the child by failing to provide a suitable home for him, and also that the father was in substantial noncompliance with his permanency plans. The Court further found that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Jason Clinard, appeals the Stewart County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, he contends that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s agreeing to transfer his case from juvenile to circuit court. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

In this action the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds the statute of limitation had run on plaintiff's cause of action. The Trial Court overruled the Motion on the grounds that the tolling provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(c) was applicable to GTLA actions and granted permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. On appeal, we hold that the tolling provision does not apply because the statute did not expressly extend it to GTLA actions.

The petitioner, Denny McAbee, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael R. Malone, pled guilty to reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and was sentenced to two years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior three-year sentence for which he was on community corrections at the time he committed the present offense. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Newt Carter (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, challenging his convictions for aggravated rape and aggravated burglary. As his bases for relief, he alleged several grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that “newly discovered evidence” existed in the case. After the close of the Petitioner’s proof in an evidentiary hearing, upon motion by the State, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel (1) failed to account for the Petitioner’s learning disabilities and (2) failed to call Benjamin Jackson as a witness. Based upon the record before us, we are compelled to vacate the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this action to the Madison County Circuit Court for conclusion of the evidentiary hearing and for the post-conviction court to make factual findings and conclusions at the close of all the proof based on all of the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing.

This is a grandparent visitation case, in which Mother appeals the trial court’s award of specific visitation to Appellee grandparents under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6306. Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that she opposed visitation, that she had failed to rebut the presumption of substantial harm under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306(b)(4),and that grandparent visitation was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In case 09-335, the Defendant, Tina Dehart, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000, and the trial court sentenced her to three years to be served on community corrections, but it later granted her judicial diversion. In case 11-622, the Defendant pled guilty to theft of property valued over $500. After her plea, the trial court determined that her new conviction violated the terms of her probationary sentence in case number 09-335. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years in case number 09-335 and to two years in case number 11-622. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively and in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we conclude that there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Former owner of condominium unit whose unit was ordered sold after being determined, due to unsanitary conditions and offensive odors, to constitute a nuisance, appeals the trial court’s order permanently enjoining her from acquiring a unit in the condominium. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a mother and father as to their three children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services became involved after it was reported that the father sexually abused the parties’ older daughter. Initially, the children were permitted to stay in the mother’s custody under a protection agreement and a restraining order which prohibited the father from any contact with the children. In violation of both, the mother and father fled the state with the children. As a result, the children were taken into protective custody. In the ensuing dependency and neglect proceedings, the children were found to be the victims of severe child abuse by both the father and the mother, and this finding was not appealed. The father eventually pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery of the child. The Department filed this petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. The trial court found several grounds for termination, including severe child abuse and abandonment by failure to support, and terminated the parental rights of both parents. The mother and father now appeal. We reverse the finding that the father abandoned his children by failure to support, but affirm all other grounds for termination and affirm the termination of the parental rights of both parents.

This appeal in a writ of certiorari action arises from a dispute over the authority of a pension board. The City of Knoxville (“the City”) filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) challenging an action by the City of Knoxville Pension Board (“the Pension Board”). The City alleged that the Pension Board exceeded its authority in allowing a number of employees (“the Respondents”) to select a new retirement plan option despite the fact that the Respondents already had made their onetime selection for a different and now less attractive retirement plan option. Knoxville voters previously had rejected by referendum an ordinance that would have given the Respondents this opportunity for a new selection. The Pension Board argued that it merely was correcting an inadvertent error that had disadvantaged the Respondents. The Trial Court held that the Pension Board exceeded its authority and reversed the actions of the Pension Board. The Respondents appeal to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

Sarah Hurst (“Hurst”) sued Colman S. Hochman (“Hochman”) and Hochman Family Partners, L.P. (“the Partnership”) alleging that Hochman had committed a battery upon her, and seeking damages for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress among other things. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree that, inter alia, awarded Hurst damages of $2,500 against Hochman for battery; denied Hurst’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, and punitive damages; and dismissed Hurst’s claims against the Partnership. Hurst appeals raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in denying her claim of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act and in dismissing her claims against the Partnership. We affirm.

On September 10, 2009, a Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Aaron Benard Barnett, of one count of aggravated burglary and one count of vandalism, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed his jury convictions and his sentence, and this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. State v. Aaron Benard Barnett, No. W2009-02582-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1224208 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 30, 2011), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgment of the post-conviction court. We, therefore, affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Jeremy Taylor (“the Petitioner”) entered a guilty plea to charges of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the speedy trial provisions of the Interstate Detainer Act were violated as to the Petitioner. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing, finding that the Petitioner’s claim did not render the judgments against him void. The Petitioner now appeals. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we dismiss the appeal.

This case involves a traffic ticket for speeding received by the Defendant, Joe Clyde Tubwell, in Memphis, Tennessee. The Defendant was found guilty by the Memphis City Court. The Defendant contends that he was denied the right to appeal that decision as an indigent. In Shelby County Circuit Court, he subsequently filed a “Petition for Mandamus or for Order Directing that Indigent Be Allowed to Appeal.” The Circuit Court dismissed this filing. The Defendant now appeals. After review, based on the specific facts of this case, we now dismiss the appeal without prejudice and remand this action to the Shelby County Circuit Court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing in this matter.

This appeal involves a claim of retaliatory discharge. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant shipping company, working in a job position that required physical labor. The plaintiff seriously injured his back in the course of his employment. As a result, he underwent surgery and took an extended leave of absence. After his leave of absence, the plaintiff returned to his former position with no restrictions. A month later, he suffered another back injury that necessitated another leave of absence. Pursuant to its medical leave policy, the defendant company terminated the plaintiff’s employment. Eight months after his employment was terminated, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim. The plaintiff’s employment contract included a contractual six-month limitations period. The defendant company filed a motion for summary judgment based on the six-month contractual limitations period, and also asserting that it was entitled to judgment on the merits based on the undisputed facts. The trial court declined to grant the company’s motion for summary judgment based on the six-month limitation period, but it granted summary judgment in favor of the company on the merits. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse in part but affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on a different basis than that upon which the trial court relied, holding that the plaintiff employee’s lawsuit is time-barred under the contractual limitations period in the plaintiff’s employment contract.

The defendant, Brenda Woods, was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of three counts of procuring an illegal vote, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of two years for each offense, with credit given for one day’s jail service and the remainder of the time on supervised probation. The defendant was also disqualified from holding public office for the duration of her sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-114(a). She raises the following four issues on appeal: (1) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that deprived her of a fundamentally fair trial; (2) whether the trial court erred by overruling her Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain her convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony from an investigator about his telephone conversations with her. Fpllowing our review, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

A jury convicted the defendant, Anthony Benton, of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and possessing a handgun after having been convicted of a felony, a Class C felony. The reckless endangerment count was merged into the aggravated assault conviction. The defendant received an effective sentence of nineteen years. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the verdicts. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but remand for a corrected judgment.

The defendant, Winston C. McClain, appeals the sentencing decision of the Marshall County Circuit Court. After entering an open plea agreement, and following merger, the defendant stands convicted of: (1) sale of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony; (2) possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class B felony; (3) simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; (4) unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; (5) evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor; and (6) resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced to an effective term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the sentence is excessive and contrary to law. Following review, we affirm the sentence as imposed.
 

Anton Carlton (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he received a sentence for an offense for which he was not convicted. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of habeas corpus relief. However, we remand the case to the sentencing court to enter a corrected judgment as specified in this opinion.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of reckless aggravated assault, Class D felonies, and sentenced to serve two concurrent three-year terms, split six months in confinement with the balance to be served on probation. On appeal, she contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, that double jeopardy prevented her dual convictions, and that the trial court erred in denying her judicial diversion. After careful review, we conclude that sufficient evidence exists to support her convictions, that double jeopardy requires her two convictions be merged and that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in denying judicial diversion. The defendant’s convictions and sentence of three years with six months served in confinement and the balance on probation are affirmed This case is remanded to the trial court solely for purposes of entering a single corrected judgment.

A Hamilton County Jury convicted Defendant, Montez Davis, of second-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of a weapon. He received sentences of twenty-one years for second degree murder, one year for reckless endangerment, and one year for unlawful possession of a weapon, to be served concurrently for an effective twentyone-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; and (3) that the trial court improperly sentenced him. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Junior Lenro Smothers, filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis (“coram nobis petition”) in the Madison County Circuit Court attacking his two convictions for aggravated statutory rape and one conviction for delivery of a schedule II controlled substance. The coram nobis trial court summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Donald Clark, has appealed the Davidson County Circuit Court order dismissing his second petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) his indictments were "faulty"; and (3) he was illegally arrested. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the motion for new trial as duplicitous and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.