APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The former president and chief operating officer of a corporation brought this action against the corporation and its CEO, alleging that Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-13-101, which grants “employees and laborers of any corporation . . . a lien upon the corporate and firm property . . . for any sums due them for labor and service performed for the corporation,” provided him a lien in the amount of his alleged unpaid bonus and severance payments. The trial court dismissed the statutory lien claim, holding that the claimant was not included in the statutory definition of “employee.” The claimant has appealed. We hold that the Supreme Court’s ruling in State ex rel. McConnell v. People’s Bank & Trust Co., 296 S.W. 12 (Tenn. 1927) that a corporation’s “managing officers” are not “employees” as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-13-101 controls. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s award of summary judgment to Rutherford County on the basis of foreseeability and comparative fault in this negligence action under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

An employee alleged that he suffered a work-related hearing loss. After finding that the employee established a compensable injury, the trial court awarded 40% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee suffered a compensable injury. Alternatively, the employer contends that the award was excessive. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce dispute over custody of five children. Sylvia Susana Marquez (“Mother”) and Pedro Marquez (“Father”), divorced in 2003, are mother and father of the five minor children (“the Children,” collectively). Father was designated the primary residential parent of the Children. Mother filed a petition in the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) to modify the parenting plan and for emergency custody based on allegations of violence involving Father. In her petition, Mother also argued that a material change of circumstances had occurred such as to justify her being designated the primary residential parent of the Children. The Trial Court found an emergency had arisen and awarded temporary emergency custody of the Children to Mother. Later, after a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order restoring custody to Father after stating that the emergency had been “removed by [Father].” Mother appeals. We affirm.

Quincy Deangelo Gardner ("the Petitioner") filed for post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree felony murder, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The order from which the pro se incarcerated appellant, Morris L. Marsh, seeks to appeal was entered on November 28, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the November 28, 2012 order, even considering the date upon which the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (February 10, 2013). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is the second appeal of this case, involving the issue of child support and arrears. In In re Jaiden C.W., No. M2010-01105-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 2306057 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2011), this Court vacated the trial court’s determination of Appellant Father’s child support obligation because the trial court did not base its determination on Father’s actual income. Upon remand, the trial court interpreted the law of the case to limit its review only to Father’s income,and to negate any consideration of other variables affecting child support. Because the trial court misinterpreted the law of the case to limit its review of the parties’ actual circumstances, we vacate the order on child support and remand for reconsideration. Vacated and remanded.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee reported to his employer that he had sustained bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work activities. The employer provided the employee with medical treatment. After the parties reached an impasse at the benefit review conference, the employer filed a petition seeking a determination of whether the employee was entitled to additional workers’ compensation benefits. The employee’s pre-trial motion to compel discovery was denied by the trial court. At trial, both sides presented expert medical evidence to support their positions as to the cause and nature of the employee’s condition. The trial court denied the employee’s claim, accrediting the testimony of the employer’s expert witness that the employee did not suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and that his symptoms did not arise out of or occur in the course and scope of his employment. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to compel discovery and in accrediting the testimony of the employer’s expert witness. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

After a defense verdict in this medical malpractice case, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the trial court, sitting as the thirteenth juror, to determine that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and grant them a new trial. The court denied the motion. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court’s remarks from the bench show that it did not properly perform its role as the thirteenth juror. We affirm.

The Defendant, Joshua Todd Crittenden, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of two counts of robbery, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-401 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to consecutive ten-year terms of confinement for an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The employee alleged she sustained a gradual injury to her cervical spine as a result of her job. Her employer denied her condition was work-related and contended that her claim was barred by her failure to provide timely notice of her claim and the operation of the statute of limitations. The employer also argued subsequent employers were liable per the last injurious injury rule. The trial court found for the employee and awarded benefits. On the employer’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court held that the employee’s award was capped at one and one-half times the anatomical impairment rate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1). The employer appeals, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning compensability and the statute of limitations. The employee asserts the trial court erred by capping her disability award. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

After the employee sustained a compensable injury to his low back which required surgery, he returned to work. The company for which he worked was sold to another entity after the date of injury but before the employee’s return to work. At trial, both parties agreed that the one and one-half times multiplier cap did not apply because the sale of the company was a “loss of employment” for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6241(d). At trial, the employee was awarded 78% permanent partial disability, the maximum permitted under law, based on an anatomical rating of 13%. The employer has appealed and is contending that the award is excessive. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.
 

Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision upholding the decision of the designee of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, which denied appellant unemployment benefits. We reverse, finding that, while appellant did quit his job voluntarily, he had good cause for doing so.
 

In this workers’ compensation appeal, the employee, a truck driver, alleged that he injured his right shoulder and low back when his tractor-trailer overturned. His employer stipulated that the shoulder injury was compensable, but denied that he had sustained a permanent back injury. Instead, the employer contended that the employee’s back symptoms were the result of a previous back injury, which had been the subject of a previous workers’ compensation claim and settlement. The trial court determined that the employee had suffered a new, compensable back injury and was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court apportioned 80% of the liability for the award to the employer and 20% to the Second Injury Fund. Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that a new, compensable back injury occurred. In the alternative, it argues that the trial court incorrectly apportioned the award. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

A Hamilton County jury convicted appellant, Quinzell Grasty, of felony murder, second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction and sentenced appellant to serve a life sentence for felony murder. The trial court also sentenced appellant to serve eight years for attempted especially aggravated robbery and three years for aggravated burglary, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to police, by admitting photographs of the victim and a recording of the 9-1-1 call, by failing to redact references to appellant’s gang affiliation from his statement, and by admitting demonstrative evidence in the form of a shotgun purported to be similar to the weapon used in the murder. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Michael Young, pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery in exchange for an effective forty-year sentence. Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress petitioner’s statement to police based on his being a juvenile and by failing to ensure that petitioner understood the sentence alignment included in the plea agreement. He also contends that his guilty plea was rendered involuntary because of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a dispute over post-settlement medical care. The employee alleged that he developed asthma as a result of exposure to welding fumes in the workplace. The employee and employer settled the workers’ compensation claim. The trial court’s order approving the parties’ settlement provided that the employer would pay employee permanent partial disability benefits and provide future medical care “for the work related injury described” in the order. The trial court also designated Dr. Robert Younger III as the treating physician. Following the settlement, a dispute arose between the parties regarding payment for Dr. Younger’s treatment. The employer refused to pay for continuing treatment for the employee’s asthma because he was no longer exposed to welding fumes. The employee sought to require the employer to pay for the medical treatment Dr. Younger provided. After reviewing the medical proof submitted by the parties, the trial court ordered the employer to pay for Dr. Younger’s recommended treatment. The employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee filed petition under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act to enforce a child support order entered in a California divorce proceeding against the father of the children. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Wesley S. (“the Child”), the minor child of Wesley K.S. (“Father”) and Kari F. (“Mother”). The parents were runaway teenagers when the Child was born in August 2007. Father was incarcerated several times during the Child’s first two years. Father’s latest incarceration began on May 14, 2009, and  he has been in jail continuously since that date. The Child was taken into custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on December 17, 2010. On May 31, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father. The sole ground alleged was abandonment, based on his conduct prior to incarceration exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child due to his pre- incarceration conduct. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm.

An applicant for billboard permits sought judicial review of the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny the applications. We have concluded, as did the trial court, that the grandfathering provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 did not apply in this case. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision upholding the Department’s denial of the billboard permit applications.
 

This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, the doctors and clinic, on the basis that the Appellants’ only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29–26–115. Appellants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding their expert. Under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011), we affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the expert’s testimony and its grant of summary judgment. Affirmed and remanded.

Donald Hughes and Donna Hughes (“Plaintiffs”) sued Clifford R. Barbee and Anna Melissa Barbee (“Defendants”) seeking, among other things, an order restraining Defendants from obstructing an alleged public roadway. After a trial the Trial Court entered its order on May 29, 2012 finding and holding, inter alia, that the road at issue “was a public road which had been in existence (and used by the public) for a number of years,” that Defendants had failed to prove that the road had been abandoned, and that the road was to “be opened for use by the public.” Defendants appeal to this Court. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm.

An applicant for billboard permits sought judicial review of the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny the applications. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision upholding the Department’s denial.
 

The Petitioner, Jeffery Gaylon Douglas, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions for rape and sexual battery on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by improperly advising him to testify at his trial. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, the doctors and clinic, on the basis that the Appellants’ only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29–26–115. Appellants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding their expert. Under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011), we affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the expert’s testimony and its grant of summary judgment. Affirmed and remanded.