APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A lumber company employee with a history of heart bypass surgery died suddenly at a job site. After learning that the employee’s work activities could have triggered an arrhythmia or myocardial infarction, the widow filed suit for workers’ compensation benefits. The treating cardiologist of the employee concluded that his physical activities on the job contributed to his death, while a cardiologist who examined the medical records disagreed. The trial court awarded benefits, and the employer appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to a special workers’ compensation appeals panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Thomas L. Agnew, appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court conviction for third offense driving on a revoked or suspended license, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-50-504(a)(1), (2) (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010). The Defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with six months to be served in jail at 75%. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in imposing six months of confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Harold Moore, of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, possessing less than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, and possessing less than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to five years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Father’s individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”) were garnished to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees, and he filed a motion to quash the garnishment, claiming that the accounts were exempt from garnishment under Tennessee law. In a previous appeal, this Court concluded that the IRAs were exempt property, and we reversed the trial court’s order dismissing Father’s motion to quash the garnishment. On remand, the trial court vacated its previous order but again dismissed Father’s motion to quash. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to grant Father’s motion to quash and to dissolve the writ of garnishment.

A Williamson County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Robert Allen Zaloba, for eight counts of rape of a child, one count of rape, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The first five counts of rape of a child (counts 1-5) pertained to one victim, and the remaining three counts of rape of a child, one count of rape, and one count of aggravated sexual battery involved a second victim. The trial court severed counts six through ten for trial. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts, for which the trial court sentenced appellant to serve an effective forty-eight-year sentence. Appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court properly admitted a reference that appellant had engaged in sexual relations with another individual; (2) whether the trial court properly denied appellant’s request to admit the victim’s prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; (3) whether the trial court properly denied appellant’s request for a jury instruction that it could consider the victim’s prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; (4) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury that "recklessly" was a proper mens rea for rape of a child; (5) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury by using the disjunctive "or" to connect the requisite mental states; (6) whether the trial court erred in rejecting appellant’s mitigation proof at sentencing; (7) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences; (8) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant’s convictions; and (9) whether the circumstantial nature of the case rendered any errors by the trial court not harmless. Discerning no reversible error in the proceedings, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years, with credit for time served and the balance to be served on probation as an alternative sentence. The defendant now appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction and that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence seized by police during a search of her property, both before and after the issuance of a search warrant. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case.  Appellant Homeowner contracted with Appellee for the installation of a “smart home” system. After myriad problems arose, Appellant fired Appellee, who filed the instant lawsuit to collect the unpaid balance for equipment and installation. The trial court determined that the primary purpose of the parties’ agreement was the sale of goods and applied Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court granted judgment in favor of Appellee, but allowed certain offsets for items rejected by Appellant. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the UCC, and in its calculation of damages. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s determination that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act does not apply. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Andrea Nichole Bean, pled guilty to the sale and the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a sentence of sixteen years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served in the Department of Correction ("DOC"). In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her an alternative sentence. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Nathaniel Shelbourne (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of intentional or knowing aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a term of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his prior sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant claims that (1) the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victim’s injuries; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment; (3) the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction; and (4) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we have determined that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Homeowner and Contractor filed competing suits against one another in the general sessions court. Homeowner was awarded $1,500.00 against Contractor; Contractor’s suit against Homeowner was dismissed. Contractor then appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed all actions filed by both parties, finding that the construction contracts required arbitration of disputes. Homeowner appeals and we affirm.

The petitioner, Matthew Jackson, was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to an effective ten years of incarceration. The petitioner filed a prior application for the writ of error coram nobis, the denial of which was affirmed on appeal. The petitioner brings this subsequent petition for the writ of error coram nobis, asserting various grounds for relief. The trial court denied the writ, noting that the claim was time-barred and that the petitioner failed to allege facts which would negate the knowing and voluntary nature of his pleas. After a review of the record, we affirm.

I concur with the majority opinion except as to the issues of consecutive sentencing and lesser included offenses.

The appeal concerns a dispute over personal property. The appellant landlord refused to permit the appellee tenant to renew her lease, and the tenant was forced to leave the premises. Several items of personal property belonging to the tenant were apparently left behind. The tenant sued the landlord for reimbursement for the value of the property. After a bench trial, the trial court ordered the landlord to reimburse the tenant. The landlord now appeals. As the appellate record contains neither a transcript of the proceedings nor a statement of evidence, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce. After approximately four years of marriage, Herbert L. Hall (“Husband”) sued Chona S. Hall (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and divided the marital estate. Wife filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Wife appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in entering a decree for divorce when the parties had not engaged in mediation, and, that the Trial Court failed to adhere to applicable local court rules. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Shortly after the mother of four children was killed in an accident, her husband instituted an action to recover damages for her death; the father of the children moved to intervene in the action and for the court to hold a hearing on whether the husband had abandoned the mother, thereby waiving his right as surviving spouse to participate in the wrongful death action. The trial court did not hold a hearing; rather, it held that the husband was the proper party to pursue the action, allowed the Guardian of the children to represent the interest of the children in the action, and dismissed Father’s petition. The surviving spouse, Guardian and tortfeasor subsequently petitioned the court for approval of a settlement of the wrongful death claim; the court granted the petition. Father appeals, contending that the court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the issue of whether the husband was estranged from the mother, in approving the settlement, and in placing the settlement documents under seal. We remand the case for a hearing on whether the husband waived his right as surviving spouse to participate in the wrongful death action and reverse the court’s placement of the settlement documents under seal; in all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Terry Green (“the Defendant”) entered a best interest plea to one count of theft of property of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, with no agreement as to his sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant to a term of four years, with four months to be served in confinement. The trial court suspended the remainder of the sentence, placing the Defendant on probation for a period of five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s application for diversion and/or his request for full probation. The Defendant also claims that the trial court, in determining whether to grant or deny judicial diversion, erred in allowing “evidence of allegations of wrongdoing that had nothing to do with the case before the [c]ourt” and erred in “giving more weight to that evidence.” After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Charmon D. Copeland, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-305 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years’ confinement at 100% service as a violent offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the prosecutor engaged in three instances of improper conduct, and (3) the trial court improperly sentenced him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a direct appeal by newly incorporated Berry’s Chapel Utility, Inc., from a declaratory order by the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. The dispute hinges on whether the TRA had jurisdiction over Berry’s Chapel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-4-101(6)(E) (2010). The TRA held that Berry’s Chapel was a public utility as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-4-101(6)(E) (2010), thus, it was subject to the jurisdiction of the TRA. Berry’s Chapel asserts it was a non-profit and, thus, it was a non-utility by statutory definition and not subject to the TRA’s jurisdiction. We affirm the decision of the TRA.

The Petitioner, David Ivy, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2006). On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that (1) he is actually innocent of the offense; (2) counsel were ineffective in both phases of the trial and on appeal; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments in both phases of the trial; (4) the application of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(2) was improper; (5) the Capital Defense Team of the Shelby County Public Defender’s Office is “constitutionally ineffective”; and (6) the death penalty is unconstitutional. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the Petitioner post-conviction relief.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a tenured teacher’s failure to return from sick leave amounts to a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure. We hold that, although a tenured teacher’s failure to return from sick leave may constitute cause for termination, there is no statute authorizing a board of education to deem it a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure. Accordingly, by dismissing the plaintiff tenured teacher without providing her with written charges or an opportunity for a hearing, the defendant board of education violated her rights under the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act and her constitutional right to due process of law protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement, back pay consisting of her full salary, compensatory damages for the actual harm she sustained, and attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the judgment of the trial court, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this decision.

Divorce action in which Mother raises numerous issues, including the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, the parenting plan in which Mother’s parenting time was limited to 120 days a year, child support, and the classification and division of marital property. Mother also challenges the trial court’s decisions to admit the testimony of two witnesses and to exclude the testimony of two other witnesses. We have concluded that the trial court erred in excluding two of Mother’s expert witnesses and in admitting testimony regarding child abuse allegations that should have been excluded based upon Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-409. Having considered the record, including the testimony of Mother’s two experts and excluding the testimony that must be excluded pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-409, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s designation of Father as the Primary residential parent; however, the evidence does preponderate against the parenting schedule which greatly limits Mother’s parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s classification and division of the marital estate in all respects. Because we have concluded that the evidence preponderates against the parenting schedule, we remand this issue to the trial court to adopt a parenting schedule that affords Mother additional parenting time, although not equal parenting time, and to modify the child support award to comport with Mother’s income and the new parenting schedule.

The petitioner, Jackie Caldwell, appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner stands convicted of aggravated rape and is serving a twenty-two year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she raises the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and an improper sentence. Following review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of relief.

The defendant, Danielle Sims, was convicted of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of three years, with eleven months, twenty-nine days to serve at 75% and the remainder on intensive state probation. On appeal, she argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her rape conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case is the consolidation of appeals by the Defendant, Thomas D. Taylor (a/k/a James Ray McClinton), of two cases, a direct appeal and the appeal from a the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. A Bradley County jury convicted the Defendant of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of sixty years, at 100%, for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and ten years, at 35%, for the aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered these sentences to run consecutively for a total effective sentence of seventy years. In his direct appeal, the Defendant contends the following: (1) for numerous reasons, he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court erred when it limited cross-examination of the victim; (3) prosecutors engaged in misconduct; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to consider new evidence presented during the motion for new trial. In the appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition because the victim’s medical records contained newly discovered evidence. After consolidating the appeals and thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, in the Defendant’s direct appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. In the Defendant’s appeal from his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants, insurance company and its agent, on Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence on the basis of duty. We dismiss for failure to appeal a final judgment.