APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Marques Sanchez Johnson, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for four counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, six counts of theft of property, and one count of evading arrest in two separate cases. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of burglary of a motor vehicle and one count of theft in each case in exchange for a total effective sentence of six years in the first case and twelve years in the second case as a Range IV, career offender, with the trial court to determine after a sentencing hearing whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of eighteen years as a Range IV, career offender. Appellant insists that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. After a review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s determination that consecutive sentences were warranted because Appellant had an extensive criminal record and was a professional criminal. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Patrick Thurmond, appeals the denial of his sixth petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his conviction of aggravated rape is void. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Petitioner, Jamie Scott Moore, pled guilty in Rutherford County to two counts of attempted sale of methamphetamine on October 6, 2006. As a result, he was sentenced to six years at thirty percent as a Range I, standard offender on each offense, to be served concurrently with each other. Petitioner was to serve 270 days prior to release on probation. As part of the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed that on his first violation of probation he would waive any application for a suspended sentence and serve the sentence in its entirety. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus in which he argued that he was “prematurely and illegally released” before serving all 270 days of the agreed sentence. After a hearing on the petition, the trial court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to support his argument with authority, failed to present the court with an adequate record for review, and sought an appeal to this court from the denial of a writ of mandamus, a right not prescribed in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b). Consequently, the appeal is dismissed, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A judgment creditor sued the owners of two parcels of real property, who received the
property from the ex-wife of debtor, and the ex-wife, to enforce a judgment lien on property
previously owned by debtor; debtor’s ex-wife, who was awarded the property in a final
divorce decree entered subsequent to the recording of the judgment lien, claimed that her
interest in the property had priority over that of the judgment creditor. The trial court granted
summary judgment to creditor; ex-wife and grantees appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the
trial court.

This is a divorce appeal, primarily over property issues. The parties were married for approximately six years, with no children born of the marriage. During the marriage, they owned several homes, including the home in which they lived, but some went into foreclosure. Given the complicated state of the parties’ finances, the trial was lengthy. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court entered an order holding that the home in which the couple lived was the wife’s separate property and dividing the remainder of the parties’ assets and debts. The husband now appeals, raising numerous issues. We affirm in part, and reverse the finding that the home in which the parties resided was the wife’s separate property. In light of our holding that the home in which the parties lived was marital property, we remand the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of its division of the marital estate.

Appellant, Keith Sales, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of pssession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, two counts of possession of Alprazolam with intent to sell, and one count of possession of a handgun as a convicted felon. Appellant’s arrest was as the result of the execution of a search warrant based upon information provided by a confidential informant. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Appellant pled guilty reserving a certified question for appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Appellant pled guilty in a negotiated plea agreement to one count each of possession of 5 grams or more of cocaine, one count of possession of Alprazolam, and one count of possession of a handgun as a convicted felon. He received an effective nine-year sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the information set out in the affidavit does not meet the two prong test set out in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed.2d 637 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed.2d 723 (1964), (“Aguilar-Spinelli”), as adopted in State v. Jacumin, concerning the proof of the reliability of a confidential informant. We have reviewed the record on appeal, and conclude that the information supplied in the affidavit meets the Aguilar-Spinelli/Jacumin test. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, George L. Morgan, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court should have held an evidentiary hearing to consider his claim that his dual convictions and consecutive sentences for second degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery are illegal and void because they violate double jeopardy principles. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Jerry McGaha, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to accept his guilty pleas to nine counts of child rape because his plea agreements did not include the mandatory requirement of community supervision for life. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee alleged that she was injured in the course and scope of her employment with Employer in December 2005. Employee retained the law firm of PryorParrott PC in December 2005 to represent her. They filed a claim with the Department of Labor, but benefits were denied. An action was then filed on Employee’s behalf in the Chancery Court of Campbell County in January 2007. In March 2009, the Chancery Court granted PryorParrott’s motion for leave to withdraw and granted it a lien for expenses in the amount of $1,146.38 and a lien for attorney’s fees in the amount of 10% of any benefits recovered by Employee. Employee then retained attorney David H. Dunaway to represent her. Dunaway ultimately settled Employee’s workers’ compensation claim for a lump sum payment of $100,000. In December 2010, the case was set for settlement approval in Chancery Court. Dunaway, on Employee’s behalf, voluntarily dismissed her Chancery Court case and immediately filed a joint petition for approval of the settlement in the Circuit Court of Campbell County. The Circuit Court approved the settlement, awarded total attorney’s fees in the amount of 20% of Employee’s recovery, and ordered Dunaway to hold in trust the fees pending resolution of PryorParrott’s lien claim. PryorParrott later moved the Chancery Court to set aside the voluntary dismissal, and that court granted the motion. At a later hearing in September 2011, PryorParrott and Dunaway submitted to the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court to determine disputes related to PryorParrott’s lien and the division of fees. The Chancery Court determined that PryorParrott was entitled to a fee of 10% of the settlement, or $10,000, and expenses of $1,146.38, and ordered Dunaway to

The defendant, Brian Keith Medley, appeals the Cumberland County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation for DUI, fifth offense. He argues that the record did not contain substantial evidence in support of the court’s finding that he violated his probation and that the court erred by not allowing him to assert the defense of necessity. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robert W. Hawkins (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one count of aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The trial court merged the two convictions into the conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to a term of five years, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and arguing that the trial court improperly commented on the motivation of the Defendant during his testimony. He also alleges that the trial court should have sentenced him to full probation. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James L. Johnson, pro se, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2006 convictions for rape and attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and his resulting ten-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief. He argues that his convictions and sentences are void because the indictment for rape was defective and his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Grandparents of a minor child who had raised the child since her birth, filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s Mother. The trial court held that the Mother had abandoned the child by failing to visit and failing to support her and that termination of Mother’s rights was in the child’s best interest. Mother appeals; finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

On appeal, the petitioner, Alberto Eddie Deleon, contests the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he was incarcerated for an excessive time span prior to instigation of extradition proceedings. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant/Appellant was arrested and charged with driving under the influence and violation of the implied consent law. At trial, Appellant and the arresting officer gave conflicting testimony as to whether Appellant refused to submit to a blood test. The jury acquitted Appellant of the driving under the influence charge, but the trial court, crediting the arresting officer’s testimony, found that the Appellant had violated the implied consent law. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in crediting the testimony of the arresting officer despite the acquittal by the jury. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Tosha Taylor, appeals the denial of her motion to reopen her post-conviction petition. Because she failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal.

Timothy Scott Marcum and Audrey L. Marcum (“Plaintiffs”) purchased real property containing a house originally constructed by Haskel “Hack” Ayers and Tomi Ayers (“Defendants”). After the purchase, Plaintiffs discovered problems with the house. Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a settlement agreement. Subsequently, Plaintiffs discovered additional problems with the house. Plaintiffs sued Defendants. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendants summary judgment after finding that the settlement agreement constituted an unambiguous release of all claims past, present, and future. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm.

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, arson, a Class C felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. Prior to trial, the defendant pled guilty to an additional count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. She was sentenced to four years for the arson and three years on each count of tampering with evidence, with each sentence to run concurrently but consecutive to a twenty-one year sentence for the second degree murder, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for second degree murder and that the trial court erred by sentencing her to partial consecutive sentences. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by finding the evidence insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of especially aggravated robbery and felony murder. Affording the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence presented at trial and the reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

The parental rights of Mother and Father to their two children were terminated based upon abandonment, persistent conditions, and non-compliance with the permanency plans. We affirm in part and we reverse in part; however, we affirm the termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father.

Jeffrey R. Cooper (“Cooper”) sued Phillip Glasser, Richard Glasser, and David Glasser (“the Defendants ”) in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) 1 for, among other things, breach of contract. Cooper previously had filed two lawsuits arising out of the same underlying facts as those of this lawsuit. Both previous lawsuits, the first in a California state court and the second in a United States District Court in Tennessee, were voluntarily dismissed. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court held that the second voluntary dismissal in federal court was a judgment on the merits under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, res judicata prevented Cooper from filing suit for a third time in Tennessee. Cooper appeals. We affirm.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Pamela A. Jones, suffered a work-related injury in 2004 and reached a settlement agreement with her employer, Vanderbilt University (Vanderbilt). She filed this action arguing that Vanderbilt was required to pay for bilateral knee replacement pursuant to the settlement agreement. Vanderbilt alleged that the need for the requested medical treatment was not caused by the work injury. After a hearing, the trial court ordered Vanderbilt to pay for Ms. Jones’s bilateral knee replacement. Vanderbilt has appealed. We affirm the judgment.

In this workers’ compensation case, the trial court awarded the employee, a truck driver who fell while attempting to get in his truck, 60% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for injuries to his left knee and both shoulders. The employer has appealed, asserting that the award is excessive. The employer also maintains the employee failed to prove that the injury to his right shoulder was work-related. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this post-divorce case, Mother sought to modify the existing custody arrangement relating to the Children that she shared with Father. At the time of divorce, the parties agreed to equal co-parenting time but designated Mother as the primary residential parent. Mother filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, alleging that a material change in circumstances had occurred. Father objected. The trial court held that there had been a material change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the Children to modify the parenting plan as Mother requested. Father appeals the court’s modification decision. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Father’s rights based on clear and convincing evidence that Father was sentenced to incarceration for ten (10) years while the child at issue was younger than eight (8) years of age. The trial court further found that it was in the best interest of the child for Father’s rights to be terminated in order for the child to establish a permanent home with his foster family. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its best interest analysis. Discerning no error, we affirm.