APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case presents the issue of whether proper service of process was accomplished regarding the defendant, Saeed Etezadi, M.D. Plaintiff, Will J. Milton, filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Etezadi on April 14, 2003. The complaint and summons were served upon Dr. Etezadi’s office manager, with a notation appearing on the summons that service was accepted as “agent.” Dr. Etezadi filed an answer which, inter alia, raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Mr. Milton voluntarily dismissed that action and subsequently re-filed within one year of the non-suit. In connection with the second action, the complaint and summons were allegedly served upon Dr. Etezadi at his office. Dr. Etezadi filed an Answer, again raising the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Dr. Etezadi also asserted that all applicable statutes of limitation and repose had expired. He later filed a motion to dismiss. Following the hearing, the trial court dismissed the claims against Dr. Etezadi, finding that there was no service of process in either action. Mr. Milton appeals. We affirm.

A Campbell County jury found petitioner, Crystal Miranda Kirby, guilty of first degree premeditated murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced her to an effective life sentence. On direct appeal, this court ordered the merger of the two murder convictions but denied relief in all other respects. Petitioner then filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, claiming that the State violated her due process rights under Brady v. Maryland by withholding two video-taped statements that were allegedly exculpatory in nature. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On March 18, 1998, a concrete truck collided with a shuttle bus used to transport passengers between the Memphis International Airport and a nearby rental car facility. A passenger, who suffered a severe brain injury as a result of the collision, and his wife brought suit against the owner of the bus, the manufacturer of the bus, the manufacturer of the bus windows, and the franchisor of the rental car business. They based their claims in negligence and products liability, contending that the bus was unsafe because it was not equipped with passenger seatbelts, because it had side windows made of tempered glass rather than laminated glass, and because it provided perimeter seating instead of forward-facing rows. The trial court granted summary judgment to the window manufacturer and partial summary judgments as to the products liability claims against the bus owner and franchisor, but otherwise denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, which asserted that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by federal motor vehicle safety standards. Following trial, the jury found that the plaintiffs had sustained damages in the amount of $8,543,630, but assessed 100% of the fault to the corporate owner of the concrete truck, which had reached a settlement with the plaintiffs prior to trial. On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to a new trial, citing twelve grounds for review. As a threshold issue, however, the defendants continued to argue federal preemption of the claims. The Court of Appeals held that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 205 and 208, 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.205, .208 (1995), preempted the claims based on the lack of passenger seatbelts and the material used in the window glass, and further ruled that the trial court had erred by failing to grant a directed verdict on the perimeter-seating claim because the evidence was insufficient to establish causation. We granted the plaintiffs permission to appeal and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the intervening decision by the United States Supreme Court in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011). On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its prior judgment, concluding that the ruling in Williamson did not affect its previous analysis. The plaintiffs were again granted permission to appeal. Because the seatbelt and window-glass claims are not preempted by federal law and the evidence sufficiently demonstrates causation in fact as to the perimeter seating claim, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims of error during the course of the trial.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Cayetano Ramirez, of attempted rape of a child. The trial court imposed a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police, (2) an alleged Brady violation, (3) the admission of a prior act in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (4) the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles T. Hartley, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging that his sentence for attempted aggravated sexual battery was illegal because the judgment of conviction reflected that, as a child predator and a violent offender, he must serve one hundred percent of the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, Delevan Beniamin Mohammed, pled guilty to possession of more than three hundred grams of cocaine with intent to sell in a drug free school zone, with an agreed sentence of 25 years as a Range II offender, with the trial court to determine manner of service of the sentence. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The final judgment from which the appellant seeks to appeal was entered on December 3, 2012. The only Notice of Appeal “filed” by the appellant on December 28, 2012, was submitted to the trial court clerk via facsimile transmission in violation of Rule 5A.02(4)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Kelvin Winn, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the identification of him from a photographic array; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a jailhouse informant to testify without limitations; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to lead witnesses over his objection; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of duplicative photographs; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Michael McVay, with rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, rape, and sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve 25 years for rape of a child, 20 years for aggravated sexual battery, 20 years for rape, and 10 years for sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court ordered all sentences to run consecutively, with a 100% release eligibility for the first three counts - child rape, aggravated sexual battery, and rape, and a 35% release eligibility for count four, sexual battery by an authority figure, for an effective sentence of 75 years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant presents the following issues: (1) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s sexual behavior; (2) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior complaint of sexual assault; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Additionally, the State contends the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant on two of his four convictions. After thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions. However, the trial court’s sentencing order is vacated in part and this case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The Defendant, Glenn Lydell McCray, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-102 (2010) (aggravated assault), 39-17-1307 (2010) (felon in possession of a firearm). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty years for especially aggravated kidnapping, eight years for each aggravated assault, and three years for illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court ordered consecutive sentences for the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault convictions, for an effective forty-six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (3) the court erred by failing to merge the aggravated assault convictions, and (4) the court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Although the jury was not properly instructed regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bruce L. Robinson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding in Missouri v. Frye , __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), established a new constitutional right that did not exist at the time of his guilty pleas, thereby requiring retroactive application. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the petition as time-barred.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that aggravated assault involves some form of confinement in this case. In State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 578 (Tenn. 2012), the supreme court held, 

The defendant, Nora Hernandez, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order revoking her probation and denying her bid to vacate her convictions and sentences. Because this court lacks jurisdiction of the claim relevant to the defendant’s motion to vacate, that portion of the appeal is dismissed. Because the record supports revocation of her probation, the judgment of the trial court ordering the same is affirmed.

The petitioner, Troy Allen Pruitt, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2007 convictions in that court of aggravated robbery and fraudulent use of a credit card. Because the petitioner failed to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and because binding law-of-the-case determinations from his direct appeal defeat his claim of prejudice, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s ruling suppressing the out-of-court identification of the defendant via a photograph array and the subsequent in-court identification by the same witness at the suppression hearing. The State contends that the trial court erred by deeming the identification procedure unduly suggestive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to four years, suspended after three months and nineteen days in confinement. In January 2012, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation. After a hearing on the allegation, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court did not err. The trial court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

Larry Scott Reynolds ("the Petitioner") was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court failed to make "sufficient findings of fact to allow meaningful review" and "erred in questioning the Petitioner and in making other comments" at the post-conviction hearing. The Petitioner also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds that Mother was incarcerated under a sentence of more than 10 years and her child was under the age of eight at time of sentencing, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that Mother was convicted of the intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent, see Tenn. Code Ann.  36-1-113(g)(7). Mother appeals. We affirm.

This is the second appeal of a post-divorce decision concerning child support. In the first appeal, we determined that the trial court erred in failing to make the required findings to justify an upward deviation in child support, thus we vacated the award of child support and remanded for a determination of the appropriate amount. Following the hearing on remand, the trial court set the appropriate amount of child support and determined that Father had overpaid child support. The court did not award Father a judgment or credit in the amount of his overpayment, and Father appeals. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award Father a credit or judgment in the amount of his overpayment.

This case involves the construction of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Father appeals the transfer of his case from circuit court to chancery court, the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a declaratory judgment, and the trial court’s ruling finding him in breach of the post-majority support provision of the marital dissolution agreement and awarding Mother attorney fees. We reverse as to the attorney fee award, but affirm as to the remainder.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a commercial lease. The lease gave the plaintiff tenant two successive options to extend the term of the lease, provided the tenant gave timely notice of its intent to exercise the renewal option. The tenant exercised the first renewal option, but did not give timely notice of intent to exercise the second option. The lease also contained language giving the tenant a grace period to exercise the option if the lessor gave notice that the lessor had not received notice of renewal. The lessor did not give the written notice to the tenant. The tenant filed a lawsuit against the defendant lessor, seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff tenant asserted in the lawsuit that the tenant had the grace period to exercise the renewal option because the lease required the lessor to give written notice, and the lessor had failed to do so. Both parties filed dispositive motions based on their interpretations of the lease. Construing the lease, the trial court held that the grace period was never triggered so the tenant’s renewal option lapsed and granted a judgment in favor of the lessor. The tenant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is divorce case pertaining to the marriage of Carrie Mobley (“Mother”) and Mark Adam Mobley (“Father”). The parties were married for 15 years. They have three minor daughters (collectively “Children”). Following a two-day trial, the court divorced the parties, divided their marital property, and made decrees regarding the custody of the Children. With respect to the Children, the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent; it then ordered a 50/50 shared residential parenting arrangement. Following the divorce, the court found Mother to be in willful contempt of multiple provisions of its judgment. It sentenced her to ten days in jail on each of five counts. The court suspended the sentences on condition that there be no further violations. Mother appeals. She challenges the trial court’s judgment as to (1) the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, (2) portions of the residential parenting schedule, and (3) the inclusion of a “paramour provision” in the divorce judgment. In addition, she appeals the contempt findings, sentences, and award of fees to Father on the contempt proceedings. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Brian Kerr ("the Defendant") was convicted after a jury trial of driving under the influence, reckless driving, and failure to maintain his lane of travel. The trial court also found that the Defendant had violated the implied consent law. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after service of ten days in confinement. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for each conviction. The Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the Defendant’s failure to submit to a blood alcohol test when the trial court had not yet ruled on whether the Defendant violated the implied consent law. Lastly, the Defendant contends that, if the trial court first rules that a defendant violated the implied consent law and then gives the jury instruction regarding the defendant’s failure to submit to a blood alcohol test, the trial court is indirectly commenting on the evidence in violation of Article VI, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence and failure to maintain his lane of travel. However, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant’s conviction for reckless driving.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendants, James L. Dowell, III, and Rivera L. Peoples, of five counts of aggravated robbery and five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced each defendant to an effective sentence of 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Dowell asserts that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to dismiss for breach of an immunity "Cooperation" agreement with the State; (2) admitted into evidence a form in which Defendant Peoples disclosed Defendant Dowell’s phone number; (3) admitted into evidence items obtained from Defendant Peoples’s Chevrolet Impala; (4) allowed Agent Richard Littlehale to testify as an expert witness; (5) denied his motion for acquittal; (6) failed to define "substantial interference" for the jury; and (7) imposed a sentence of 100 years. Defendant Peoples asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient as to his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed Agent Richard Littlehale testify as an expert witness; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to define "substantial interference" for the jury; and (4) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this condemnation action, the condemning authority appeals the jury’s valuation of property taken and award of compensation to landowner. Finding that the valuation of the property is within the range of opinions of fair market value testified to at trial, that the jury was properly instructed, and that the court’s conduct of the trial was proper, we affirm the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict.