APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The question presented by this appeal is which parent should be named the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. The trial court named Appellee Mother primary residential parent. Appellant Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The defendant, Telly Lamont Booker, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a school zone, evading arrest, and unlawful possession of a weapon. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his previous convictions, by permitting a police officer to testify as an expert witness on the habits of individuals involved in the illegal drug trade, and by refusing to provide a requested jury instruction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Michael Thacker, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal by a mother from the juvenile court’s judgment finding her in civil contempt for failure to pay child support and incarcerating her until she paid $400 toward the arrearage to purge the contempt. Finding the evidence inadequate to support a finding that the mother had the ability to pay child support when it was due or that she had the ability to pay $400 at the time of the hearing in order to purge the sentence, we reverse.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which Custodial Parents sought termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court granted the termination petition, finding that Mother willfully failed to support and visit the Child and that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Olivia Kathleen Epps, pleaded guilty to first offense driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-1-401 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine days, all suspended but forty-eight hours. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to her arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court./p>

The Petitioner, Cleo Henderson, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The mother of two minor children appeals the order placing her children and a stepdaughter in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services and limiting her to supervised visitation following a determination that the mother’s husband severely sexually abused another child in the home and the determination that the children were dependent and neglected. We affirm.
 

Lillian (“the Child”) is the offspring of H.A.S. (“Father”) and H.D.S. (“Mother”). The parties were never married to each other. They entered into two mediated agreements regarding Father’s co-parenting time with the Child. The agreements were never presented to or approved by a court. The parties followed the agreements for a time but conflicts developed and Father filed a petition seeking review and modification of the agreements. He asserted that there had been a material change in circumstances and that he should be awarded primary custody of the Child. Following a bench trial, the court found and approved the mediated agreements as being in the Child’s best interest. The court further determined that there had been no change in circumstances warranting a change in custody; but the court did find and hold that Father’s co-parenting time should be revised. Father appeals. We affirm.

Matthew V. and Carlene V. (“the Foster Parents”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Lewis S. (“Father”), father to the minor twin children Maria B. S. and Anna J. S. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Trial Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding that grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113 (g)(1), (g)(3), and (g)(9) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm as modified.

The petitioner, James Richard Lening, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, felony vandalism, and aggravated criminal trespass, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Damien Clark, was convicted of second degree murder. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction in State v. Damien Clark, W2007-00651-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 890886 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 1, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition was dismissed. Petitioner appeals, asserting that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jim George Conaser, contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for harassment and (2) that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s harassment conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the sentence from that conviction to run consecutively to a prior, unserved sentence.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Neil Vader, was convicted of driving in violation of a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO) order, driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), violation of the implied consent law, and driving on a revoked driver’s license. Defendant waived a jury trial to determine the number of his prior DUI convictions. The trial court found that Defendant had three prior DUI convictions and was guilty of DUI fourth offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve one year and nine months for counts one and two and eleven months and twenty nine days for count three. All of Defendant’s sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The trial court merged count four, driving on a revoked driver’s license, with violation of a MVHO order. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) the trial court erred in excluding testimony offered as extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach a witness; (2) the prosecuting attorney engaged in misconduct during closing arguments; and (3) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s evidentiary error and prosecutorial misconduct constitutes reversible error. After thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a post-divorce order of protection. Several years after the parties’ divorce in another state, the appellant mother obtained an order of protection against the appellee father in a Tennessee general sessions court, to restrict his contact with her and the parties’ minor child. The parties’ out-of-state divorce decree was enrolled in the Tennessee chancery court, where the mother also sought a continued order of protection, contempt relief, and modification of the parties’ parenting arrangement. All matters, including the general sessions order of protection, were consolidated in the Tennessee chancery court. The chancery court held a hearing on the order of protection. It declined to extend the order of protection and dissolved it. All other matters before the chancery court remained pending. The mother filed a notice of appeal to this Court. We hold that the dissolution of the order of protection, with other matters still pending, is not a final and appealable judgment. We dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and remand to the chancery court.

The defendant, Lewis Green, appeals the trial court’s decision to deny his request for alternative sentencing and judicial diversion. The defendant pled guilty to seven counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of possession of marijuana with intent sell. He received an effective five-year sentence for the convictions. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentences be served in incarceration and denied the defendant’s request for judicial diversion. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentencing decisions of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Allen Hessmer, appeals pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The trial court denied the Defendant’s request to proceed pro se during his pretrial hearings on the charges of aggravated burglary, arson of a structure, arson of personal property or real estate, harassment, and stalking. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the Criminal Court for Wilson County

A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, DeShawn Lamar Baker, charging him with solicitation of aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and felony possession of a handgun. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and felony possession of a handgun. Defendant was sentenced to ten years for the conspiracy charge, eighteen years for aggravated robbery, and four years for the handgun charge to be served concurrently for an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) that the State commited prosecutorial misconduct by failing to timely disclose the discovery of his wallet containing the victim’s driver’s license and that John Peoples would be called as a witness at trial. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Douglass Leon Lyle (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years for each offense, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) the State’s election of offenses was ineffective; (2) the trial court should have merged the two convictions; (3) the trial court erred in its ruling on a Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 motion; (4) the jury charge was erroneous; and (5) his sentences are excessive. We hold that the State’s election of offenses was ineffective as to Count 2, and we reverse that conviction and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence as to Count 1.

Defendant, Deangelo Thompson, appeals from his conviction in the Shelby County Criminal Court for reckless aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II multiple offender to five years incarceration. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred by sentencing him to five years in confinement for his conviction; and that certain comments and questions by the trial court constitute plain error. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant of the felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery of the victim, George Miller, Jr. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motions to suppress the results of a buccal swab and testimony regarding DNA test results. He also contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a claim for interest on inheritance and estate tax refunds. In 2002, the decedent’s estate filed a Tennessee inheritance tax return and paid an estimated amount of taxes due. Over the next several years, the estate was embroiled in litigation; the litigation expenses diminished the size of the estate. Once the litigation concluded, the estate became entitled to more deductions on its inheritance tax return. To obtain the benefit of the deductions, the estate filed two amended Tennessee inheritance tax returns, one in 2009 and one in 2010, claiming that it was entitled to substantial tax refunds based on its overpayment of inheritance and estate taxes in 2002. The defendant Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue paid the refunds claimed in the estate’s amended returns, plus a pittance of interest on the refunds. The estate filed this lawsuit against the commissioner, claiming that it was entitled to additional interest on the inheritance and estate tax refunds under the applicable law. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; each agreed that the facts are undisputed and each claimed that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the commissioner. The estate now appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Charles W. Elsea, Jr., appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction proceedings. However, because the Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 section 10 for seeking discretionary review of the denial of his motion, this court has no jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Leslie Dwight Coffey (“Husband”) filed this action for divorce against his spouse, Paula Sue Coffey (“Wife”). During the course of the proceedings, Husband was held in contempt on no less than four separate occasions. The contempt findings were sometimes related to some aspect of his refusal to pay child support. He was also found guilty of contemptuous conduct related to other matters. Each time, his sentence was suspended. Eventually, the suspended time amounted to a total of 50 days in jail. After over ten years of litigation, Wife filed two separate petitions asking that Husband show cause why he should not be held in criminal contempt. On the second petition, the court found Husband in criminal contempt, revoked the suspensions of the previously-imposed sentences and imposed a five day sentence for the new contempt. The court also awarded Wife $10,000 in attorney’s fees in a separate order entered the morning after Wife’s counsel filed an affidavit claiming over $20,000 in fees and expenses. Husband appeals. We affirm that part of the judgment holding Husband in criminal contempt and ordering him to serve a total of 55 days, which figure includes the previously-suspended sentences. We vacate that part of the judgment awarding Wife $10,000 in attorney’s fees and remand for a hearing to allow Husband an opportunity to challenge the fees and expenses claimed by Wife’s counsel.

The defendant was convicted of possessing more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fourteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress cocaine that was seized by police after they searched his person. We conclude that the defendant waived this argument by failing to include it in his motion for new trial. The defendant also claims that the State violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by using two of its peremptory strikes to remove two African American potential jurors. We conclude that these potential jurors were removed for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by allowing a felony drug conviction that was more than ten years old into evidence after the defendant denied that he sold drugs on the stand. We agree, but we conclude that the error was harmless. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly.