APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce case. Prior to the parties’ marriage, the wife lived in Arkansas and the husband lived in Tennessee. When the parties married, the wife quit her job in Arkansas and the parties moved into a house in Tennessee. They separated after just seven months of marriage, and the husband filed this complaint for divorce. After a two-day trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced and equitably divided the parties’ marital property. The trial court awarded the wife transitional alimony, attorney fees as alimony in solido, and moving expenses for the wife to return to Arkansas. The husband now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a premises liability case. Plaintiff/Appellant sustained injuries after she tripped over a steel post that was protruding just above the surface of a parking lot that is owned by the Defendant/Appellee. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, finding that the Appellee owed no duty to the Appellant, and that Appellant was at least 50% at fault for her own injury, thus negating her negligence claim. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Tennessee Department of Health filed civil charges against Nurse Jackson alleging that she had inappropriately prescribed medications for her daughter. Before a hearing on the merits was held, however, the Department filed a Notice of Nonsuit without prejudice. After an Order of Voluntary Dismissal was entered, Nurse Jackson filed a Petition in the chancery court seeking dismissal of the case against her with prejudice, as well as her attorney fees expended, claiming that the Board of Nursing had subjected her to an unwarranted investigation and prosecution which was “not well grounded in fact and was not warranted by existing law, rule or regulation[.]” She did not, however, seek a consideration of the merits of the charges against her. The chancery court dismissed Nurse Jackson’s Petition. We find that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider her Petition; therefore, the judgment of the chancery court is vacated and the case is dismissed.

The Defendant, Matthew Brian Graham, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for one count of attempted child abuse and three counts of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud and ordering the remainder of his effective eight-year sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Gerry Hoover, was convicted by a Coffee County jury of three counts of rape of a child. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of forty-eight years. Petitioner’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Gerry Hoover, No. M200701595-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 768928, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 25, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2008). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves an attempt to substitute parties after the original plaintiff in this wrongful death case died. The trial court struck the motion to substitute parties and dismissed the case. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life in prison, appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals alleging a number of errors in the conduct of the trial, particularly the trial court’s failure to suppress a statement the defendant had made to the police. The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the statement was the product of an unlawful arrest, but held that the admission of the statement qualified as harmless error. This Court granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in order to determine the propriety of the defendant’s arrest and to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals had used the appropriate standard of review in its harmless error analysis. Because the arrest of the defendant was supported by probable cause and there was no other prejudicial error during the course of the trial, the judgment is affirmed.

This case involves a claim for attorney’s fees and costs under the Public Records Act. The
trial court declined to award fees and costs to appellant under Tenn.Code Ann. § 10-7-
505(g), which requires a finding of a willful and knowing failure to comply with requests
filed pursuant to the Act. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying an award of attorney’s fees and costs because the court made specific findings
concerning the willfulness of appellee’s failure to respond, and the evidence does not
preponderate against those findings. Affirmed.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping and three counts of aggravated rape, all Class A felonies. He received four twenty-year sentences, all to run concurrently. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by using criminal convictions he received for crimes committed after those committed in the instant case to enhance his present sentences from fifteen to twenty years. After review we conclude that the trial court did not err by enhancing the defendant’s sentences. We affirm.

A Sumner County grand jury indicted appellant, Bobby A. Raymer, for one count of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated robbery, and a jury found him guilty of both counts. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years to be served at 100% release eligibility. On appeal, appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court should have merged the two convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to use a demonstrative exhibit. Upon review of the record and the applicable case law, we conclude that the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. The conviction for aggravated robbery is affirmed.

This appeal involves a claim for breach of a life insurance contract issued by Old Line. Father named his son, a minor, as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy. When Father died, the proceeds of the policy were issued to minor’s older sister, who depleted the funds. Beneficiary filed suit against Sister and Old Line, alleging that Sister misappropriated the life insurance proceeds and that Old Line erroneously awarded the proceeds to Sister without proper documentation. A default judgment was entered against Sister. Following a trial on Beneficiary’s claim against Old Line, the court ordered Old Line to re-issue a portion of the proceeds to Beneficiary. Old Line appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Appellant, Henry Floyd Sanders, was indicted for six counts of aggravated sexual battery and four counts of rape of a child. On appellant’s motion, the trial court dismissed one count of aggravated sexual battery on the grounds of insufficient evidence. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all remaining counts. The trial court ordered appellant to serve partial consecutive sentences of ten years each for the aggravated sexual battery convictions and twenty years each for the rape of a child convictions, yielding an effective forty-year sentence. Appellant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to a third party; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal due to a variance between the bill of particulars and the State’s election; and (3) whether the trial court erred in ordering partial consecutive sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A White County jury convicted petitioner, Joel Ernest Blanton, of one count of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, for which the trial court ordered an effective twenty-four-year sentence. Following the direct appeal, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, petitioner pursues only one claim of error, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain visitor logs from the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) that could have been used to impeach the primary material witnesses against him. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable case law, we agree with petitioner and reverse and remand this case for a new trial.

A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Steven Shane Neblett, of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to three years, to be suspended after the service of one year of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, in part, because the State failed to prove that he did not act in self-defense; (2) the trial court offered the jury vague and inappropriate jury instructions; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him by not applying applicable mitigating factors and by imposing an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Davidson County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment charging Brandon Keith Ostein (hereinafter“Ostein”) and Jamie Lynette Dean (hereinafter“Dean”) as co-defendants. Count 1 charged possession with intent to sell or deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, and Count 2 charged possession of drug paraphernalia. The evidence was seized as a result of the search of Ostein’s person during a traffic stop of a Hummer driven by Dean, the search of a Ford F-150 pickup truck registered to Dean and parked at a location away from the traffic stop, and the search of a residence leased to Ostein’s father for which Ostein paid the rent. Ostein filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the use of all evidence against him based upon unconstitutional seizures and searches. Dean did not file a motion to suppress the use of evidence against her, and did not join in Ostein’s motion. Dean did not participate in the suppression hearings. The trial court granted Ostein’s motion to suppress evidence. Upon the State’s request to dismiss charges against both Ostein and Dean, the trial court dismissed all charges against them based upon the State’s representation that it could not proceed to trial. Promptly thereafter, the State filed a notice of appeal as to both Ostein and Dean. After a thorough review of the record we dismiss the State’s appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing, upon request of the State, the charges against Dean. As to the trial court’s order suppressing evidence against Ostein, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Appellant/Father appeals the trial court's finding that he was in criminal contempt for failure to pay child support. Upon review of the record, we reverse and dismiss the criminal contempt charges.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee injured her ankle in the course and scope of her employment. She received treatment from an authorized physician for a period of time, but did not improve and did not return to work. After the initial injury and treatment of her ankle, she began receiving treatment for problems with her right knee. Employer denied that Employee had sustained a permanent injury to her ankle and also denied that Employee had suffered a compensable injury to her knee. The trial court found that Employee sustained compensable injuries to both the knee and ankle and awarded permanent partial and temporary total disability benefits. We find that the combined benefits exceeded that statutory maximum then in effect and modify the award accordingly. Otherwise, we affirm the remainder of the judgment.

In this procedurally complex case, the Defendant, Duvale Vashawn Pruitt, pled nolo contendere to multiple drug-related charges, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years of probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed two probation violation warrants, one in September and another in October of 2007. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve 90 days in jail and then start his probationary sentence again. In February 2011, the Defendant’s probation officer filed a third probation violation warrant based upon the Defendant’s possession of a switchblade knife at a courthouse, and the trial court issued a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence of ten years at 30% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals.

The Petitioner, Christopher A. Williams, pro se, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his attempt to commit aggravated robbery and felony murder convictions and resulting sentence of life imprisonment. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in that his convictions and sentences are void because his right to counsel was denied and his privilege against self-incrimination was violated. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Demetrie Owens, of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property valued over $1000, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence. State v. Demetrie Darnell Owens, No. M2009-02611-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3448138 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 2, 2010), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not adequately cross-examine the State’s witnesses and because he improperly “opened the door” to proof of a prior bad act by the Petitioner. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In presentments by a Sullivan County Grand Jury, appellant, Allan Pope, was charged with four counts of theft of services more than $1,000 but less than $10,000; one count of official misconduct; one count of using public equipment for private purposes; and one count of theft of services more than $10,000 but less than $60,000. A jury found appellant not guilty of all counts of theft of services more than $1,000 but less than $10,000. He was found guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court imposed a one-year suspended sentence for official misconduct and a three-year suspended sentence for theft of services more than $10,000 but less than $60,000 and placed appellant on probation for six years. On appeal, appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal or motion for new trial; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for official misconduct; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for private use of county equipment; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for theft of services more than $10,000 but less than $60,000, and; (5) whether the trial court erred in ordering restitution. Upon review of the record, we agree with appellant and conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions for official misconduct and private use of public property, therefore we reverse the judgments of conviction and dismiss those counts of the indictment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on theft of services more than $10,000 but less than $60,000 and remand the matter for entry of judgments consistent with this opinion.

A Maury County jury convicted appellant, Antonio Jamarc Warfield, of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the conviction of especially aggravated robbery, modify the conviction of especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary, and remand for entry of a judgment on the aggravated burglary conviction consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Robert Eric Collins, appeals from the Hawkins County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his two guilty plea convictions for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, Class C felonies, and his effective three-year community corrections sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to advise him properly of potential conflicts of interest and (2) forcing him to plead guilty by telling him that he could not receive a fair trial in Hawkins County. We affirm the judgement of the trial court.

The petitioner, Quinton A. Cage, filed an application to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was incompetent when his post-conviction petition was filed. The post-conviction court denied the motion,and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

The parents of a three year old girl were divorced by order of a Georgia court, and their settlement agreement was incorporated into the divorce degree. The parties subsequently moved to this state, and after several years Father petitioned the Tennessee court to name him as the child’s primary residential parent. He also asked the court to modify his child support. After a hearing, the trial court declared that Mother would remain the child’s primary residential parent, and it granted Father additional visitation. The court also found that Father was not entitled by law to a reduction in his child support obligation, but it adopted Mother’s proposal that the obligation be reduced by about one fourth. On appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred by failing to apply the Tennessee child support guidelines to determine his support obligation. We vacate the child support order and remand for setting Father’s support using the Child Support Guidelines. Despite concerns expressed by Father, we find the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction.