APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, John Robert Q. Jackson, challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court after he was revoked from community corrections. He argues that the trial court erred by considering his pending criminal allegations when ordering that he serve some of his sentences consecutively with each other. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his record of criminal activity was extensive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff Bank accelerated a loan secured by an aircraft after Borrower failed to maintain insurance on the aircraft as required by the loan documents. Bank filed an action to collect amounts due; took possession of and disposed of the aircraft; and sought a judgment for the deficiency. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Bank. Defendant Loan Guarantors appeal. We affirm in part; reverse in part, finding that Bank did not provide sufficient notice as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-9-611; and remand for further proceedings.

A woman who was severely injured in a collision with an automobile driven by an unlicensed minor filed suit against the minor. The minor’s parents’ insurance company denied coverage and refused to defend the suit on the basis of an exclusion in the insurance policy for damages caused by a party driving without permission of the owner or a person “in lawful possession” of the vehicle. No defense was offered, and the injured party obtained a $1 million default judgment against the minor driver. The injured party and the minor’s parents then jointly filed suit against the insurance company, alleging that the insurance company was liable for breach of contract, bad faith, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and violation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act based upon its denial of coverage. The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, the minor was entitled to insurance coverage under her parents’ policy at the time of the accident. The remainder of the case was tried, and the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The jury also found the insurance company had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and the trial court trebled the compensatory damages and awarded attorney fees under the Act. The insurance company has raised a number of issues in this appeal, inter alia, the grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the question of coverage; the finding of liability for bad faith, the liability and enhanced penalty under the TCPA, and the requirement that plaintiffs should make an election between the punitive damages and the enhanced damages. We affirm the breach of contract holding, including the conclusion that the policy terms provided coverage. We reverse and vacate the holding of liability for bad faith, including the award of punitive damages thereunder, since the statutory cause of action was not plead. We also reverse the award of treble damages under the TCPA, but affirm the finding of a violation of the Act. We affirm as modified the award of attorneys’ fees.
 

Brys Andrew Hensley (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of reckless aggravated assault and was placed on judicial diversion with a probationary period of two years. The State subsequently alleged that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s judicial diversion, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced the Defendant. After a second hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to reconsider its previous ruling, and this appeal followed. We hold that, in revoking the Defendant’s diversion and probation, the trial court failed to exercise its statutory discretion and thereby committed reversible error. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I agree with the majority’s analysis of the coverage issue in Section V and its conclusion that TFM breached the contract by denying coverage. As a result of this breach, the judgment against TFM in the amount of $67,000 was appropriate. I concur as well with the analysis of the bad faith claims in Section VI.

The defendant, Kiara Tashawn King, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property with a value of $500 or more, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to an effective five-year sentence, to be served on probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court failed to follow the correct sentencing procedure, imposed an excessive sentence, and erred by denying judicial diversion. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an effective sentence of five years of probation and that its decision to deny judicial diversion did not wholly depart from the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court accordingly.

The appellant, Jeremy Bailey, pled nolo contendere in the Hickman County Circuit Court to two counts of statutory rape, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant agreed to be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender and received consecutive four-year sentences with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve the sentences as eleven months, twenty-nine days in jail "day for day" prior to his being released on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his requests for judicial diversion and full probation and by ordering that he serve his sentence of confinement day for day. The State concedes that the trial court erred by imposing day-for-day confinement. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and full probation but remand for correction of the judgments to reflect that the appellant is entitled to earn good conduct credits while serving eleven months and twenty-nine days of his felony sentences in jail.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Deeric McAfee, of second degree murder and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder, the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s criminal history, the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce on cross-examination a letter written by the appellant, the trial court erred by giving an instruction regarding flight, and the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted appellant, Frank Huber Sumner, of robbery. The trial court sentenced him to nine and one-half years of confinement as a multiple offender. Appellant challenges his sentence, arguing that the length of his sentence is excessive and that he should have received an alternative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael L. Snodgrass, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his judicial diversion for a charge of theft of property valued at less than $500 and imposing a split confinement sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with ten days to be served in jail. On appeal, he contends that the court erred in sentencing him to split confinement and imposing a requirement that he serve 75% of his sentence before eligibility for work release, furlough, trusty status and related rehabilitative programs. We affirm the denial of full probation but reverse the judgment and remand for entry of a judgment that deletes the special condition that the Defendant to serve ten days “flat” and specifies the percentage of his sentence he must serve before eligibility for rehabilitation programs.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jamey Ray Christy, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony; voluntary manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and aggravated assault, all class C felonies; and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon involved, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the voluntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide convictions and imposed concurrent terms of eight years’ confinement for the vehicular homicide and aggravated assault and three years’ confinement for the reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed a consecutive term of ten years’ confinement for the aggravated child neglect conviction, for an effective sentence of eighteen years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of aggravated child neglect. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Linda Gass (“Heir”), an heir to the Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton, appeals from an order of the trial court entered on October 30, 2012, which determined that certain specifically described real property upon which Heir lives is an asset of the estate and may be sold by the appellee, Barbara D. Carmichael, the Executrix of the decedent’s estate (“Executrix”), pursuant to the terms of the decedent’s will. Because it is clear that the jurisdiction of this Court was not invoked properly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioner, Anthony Barnes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The plea agreement provided for an effective eight year sentence and, further, that the petitioner could apply for a suspended sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in incarceration. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the State complied with an agreement to recommend probation to the trial court. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

The Defendant-Appellant, Baleke Kromah, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for five counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. He was subsequently convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of count three and was acquitted of the remaining counts. Kromah was sentenced to ninety days of imprisonment followed by four years of probation. On appeal, Kromah argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to order the State to make an election of offenses at the close of the State’s proof. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jameel Childress, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In January, 1999, the petitioner pled guilty, in seven separate cases, to two counts of robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and one count of theft of property over $1000. Because all sentences imposed in the case were ordered to be served concurrently, the petitioner received an effective sentence of nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition because the sentences imposed are illegal, as they were statutorily required to be served consecutively because the petitioner was on bond when the offenses were committed. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for relief.

The defendant, Thomas Ray Ward, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to three counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, Class E felonies, and was given consecutive two-year sentences for each offense. However, the defendant was placed on probation for a period of eight years. A violation warrant was subsequently issued, and, at the hearing, the defendant acknowledged that he had committed the technical violations of his agreement. The trial court found the defendant to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation and ordered that the balance of the reinstated six-year sentence be served in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that the decision to revoke was error because it was based upon the fact that the defendant had prior violations of his probation rather than on the technical violations which were established at the hearing. Following review of the record, we affirm the revocation of probation.

The defendant, Jackie D. Seymore, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court convictions of rape of a child, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Edward Pavwoski, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein he challenged his 2009 Maury County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of two counts of rape and six counts of incest. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief, we affirm.

In this case involving serious injuries sustained in a collision between a school bus and a pickup truck, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. We must, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
 

This case involves the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages in General Sessions Court, and a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court. Within ten days of the General Sessions Court judgment, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). The plaintiff did not file any further bond at that time. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiff had not complied with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. § 27-5-103. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on that basis. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the appeal from General Sessions Court in light of our recent decision in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), and remand for further proceedings.

Tirrone Akillia Simpkins ("the Petitioner") pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served at 100%. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that his plea was constitutionally invalid and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with the plea submission hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to his child, who was born addicted to drugs and with extensive medical needs, on the ground of persistence of conditions; Father, who was incarcerated when the child was born, appeals, contending that the termination of his rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We have determined that the evidence shows that the Father’s lack of participation in the care of the child and the treatment of the child’s medical needs constitutes neglect; that the neglect persists and is reasonably probable to continue; that it will not be remedied; and that continuation of the relationship would put the child at further risk, thereby diminishing the child’s complete integration into a safe and stable home. Consequently, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.
 

In reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff’s payment of $211.50 satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 for appealing a case from general sessions court to circuit court, the majority relies upon the recent case of Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013). Because I believe Bernatsky is based upon a flawed premise, I respectfully dissent.

This is the second appeal in an action seeking settlement agreements and settlement reports from Corrections Corporation of America pursuant to the Public Records Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-301 et seq. In the first appeal, this court determined that CCA is the functional equivalent of a governmental entity in operating correctional facilities and remanded the action to the trial court to determine whether the documents requested by the petitioner fell within the statutory definition of public records set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-301. On remand, CCA refused to turn over two categories of documents, settlement agreements and settlement reports, arising out of inmate litigation, arguing that they did not fall within the statutory definition of public records and are confidential. CCA additionally argued that the settlement reports are protected as attorney work product. The trial court held that both the settlement agreements and reports are public records, that the settlement reports do not constitute attorney work product, that CCA is required to produce the settlement agreements and reports, and that the petitioner is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-505(g). We affirm the finding that the settlement agreements are public records and that CCA is required to produce the settlement agreements. We also affirm the trial court’s findings that the settlement reports are public records and that CCA has failed to demonstrate that the settlement reports were produced “in anticipation of litigation;” therefore, the reports are not attorney work product and CCA must produce the reports. Further, we affirm the award of attorney’s fees incurred at trial that pertained to requiring CCA to produce the settlement agreements. Finally, we find the petitioner is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal to the extent they pertain to the settlement agreements, but not the settlement reports. On remand, the trial court shall make the appropriate award.

Diane Benson and the Northwest Tennessee Shooting Sports Association filed requests for variances to devote property to a Use Permitted on Appeal within a Forestry-Agricultural-
Residential-District in Dyersburg. Mrs. Benson’s request was tabled, but the NTSSA’s request was ultimately granted. Mrs. Benson, along with two others, filed a petition for writ of certiorari and for declaratory judgment. Appellees filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the declaratory judgment action and we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Mary Kruger and Kurt Kruger’s petition for writ of certiorari. However, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Mrs. Benson’s claim that the BZA acted illegally, arbitrarily or capriciously, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.