APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a direct appeal by newly incorporated Berry’s Chapel Utility, Inc., from a declaratory order by the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. The dispute hinges on whether the TRA had jurisdiction over Berry’s Chapel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-4-101(6)(E) (2010). The TRA held that Berry’s Chapel was a public utility as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-4-101(6)(E) (2010), thus, it was subject to the jurisdiction of the TRA. Berry’s Chapel asserts it was a non-profit and, thus, it was a non-utility by statutory definition and not subject to the TRA’s jurisdiction. We affirm the decision of the TRA.

The Petitioner, David Ivy, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2006). On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that (1) he is actually innocent of the offense; (2) counsel were ineffective in both phases of the trial and on appeal; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments in both phases of the trial; (4) the application of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(2) was improper; (5) the Capital Defense Team of the Shelby County Public Defender’s Office is “constitutionally ineffective”; and (6) the death penalty is unconstitutional. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the Petitioner post-conviction relief.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a tenured teacher’s failure to return from sick leave amounts to a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure. We hold that, although a tenured teacher’s failure to return from sick leave may constitute cause for termination, there is no statute authorizing a board of education to deem it a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure. Accordingly, by dismissing the plaintiff tenured teacher without providing her with written charges or an opportunity for a hearing, the defendant board of education violated her rights under the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act and her constitutional right to due process of law protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement, back pay consisting of her full salary, compensatory damages for the actual harm she sustained, and attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the judgment of the trial court, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this decision.

Divorce action in which Mother raises numerous issues, including the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, the parenting plan in which Mother’s parenting time was limited to 120 days a year, child support, and the classification and division of marital property. Mother also challenges the trial court’s decisions to admit the testimony of two witnesses and to exclude the testimony of two other witnesses. We have concluded that the trial court erred in excluding two of Mother’s expert witnesses and in admitting testimony regarding child abuse allegations that should have been excluded based upon Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-409. Having considered the record, including the testimony of Mother’s two experts and excluding the testimony that must be excluded pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-409, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s designation of Father as the Primary residential parent; however, the evidence does preponderate against the parenting schedule which greatly limits Mother’s parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s classification and division of the marital estate in all respects. Because we have concluded that the evidence preponderates against the parenting schedule, we remand this issue to the trial court to adopt a parenting schedule that affords Mother additional parenting time, although not equal parenting time, and to modify the child support award to comport with Mother’s income and the new parenting schedule.

The petitioner, Jackie Caldwell, appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner stands convicted of aggravated rape and is serving a twenty-two year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she raises the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and an improper sentence. Following review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of relief.

The defendant, Danielle Sims, was convicted of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of three years, with eleven months, twenty-nine days to serve at 75% and the remainder on intensive state probation. On appeal, she argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her rape conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case is the consolidation of appeals by the Defendant, Thomas D. Taylor (a/k/a James Ray McClinton), of two cases, a direct appeal and the appeal from a the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. A Bradley County jury convicted the Defendant of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of sixty years, at 100%, for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and ten years, at 35%, for the aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered these sentences to run consecutively for a total effective sentence of seventy years. In his direct appeal, the Defendant contends the following: (1) for numerous reasons, he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court erred when it limited cross-examination of the victim; (3) prosecutors engaged in misconduct; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to consider new evidence presented during the motion for new trial. In the appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition because the victim’s medical records contained newly discovered evidence. After consolidating the appeals and thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, in the Defendant’s direct appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. In the Defendant’s appeal from his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants, insurance company and its agent, on Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence on the basis of duty. We dismiss for failure to appeal a final judgment.
 

The appellant, Ricky Ray Starnes, pled guilty to a violation of a habitual traffic offender order, a Class E felony, and a violation of registration, a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of two years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of community corrections. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Gregory N. Brown, was charged in a two-count indictment with domestic aggravated assault and cruelty to animals. Defendant pled guilty to domestic aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and the cruelty to animals charge was dismissed. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve six years as a Range I standard offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Defendant appeals his sentence and argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence within the applicable range. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

Rose A. Chapman and Alfred C. Chapman (“Plaintiffs”) sued Wellmont Holston Valley Medical Center (“the Hospital”) regarding a fall Ms. Chapman suffered while a patient at the Hospital. The Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding that the Hospital was not at fault. Plaintiffs appeal raising one issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting the Hospital’s motion in limine to exclude testimony about an apology and offer to pay bills allegedly made by one of the Hospital’s nurses. We find this issue has been waived, and we affirm.

A woman who suffered a series of persistent infections after surgery filed a malpractice complaint against the defendant surgeon. Her complaint alleged that the infections were cause by a small metal object that the defendant had negligently left in her body during the surgery. The plaintiff attached to her complaint the statutorily required certificate of good faith, which certified that she had consulted with an expert, who provided a signed statement confirming that he believed, on the basis of the medical records, that there was a good faith basis to maintain the action. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. After the object was discovered to be a surgical clip of a type that was designed to be retained by the patient’s body, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the plaintiff did not oppose. The defendant surgeon subsequently filed a motion for sanctions against the plaintiff under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 (d)(3), which gives the court the authority to punish violations related to the certificate of good faith. The trial court granted the motion, and awarded the defendant doctor over $22,000 in attorney fees. We reverse.

Petitioner, Julio Villasana, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. Petitioner entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class A felony, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, Petitioner was sentenced by the trial court to the maximum sentence of 25 years for aggravated vehicular homicide and two years for leaving the scene of an accident. His sentences were ordered to run concurrently. This court affirmed Petitioner’s sentence on direct appeal. In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner asserted that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered. The post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the transfer of a state prisoner’s action based on improper venue. The prisoner was housed in a correctional facility located in Hardeman County, Tennessee. The correctional facility is operated by a private entity. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-803,the Circuit Court of Davidson County transferred this action to Hardeman County, where the correctional facility is located. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a prisoner who was sentenced to death in 1991. Nineteen years later, he filed a petition in the Criminal Court for Shelby County seeking to reopen his post-conviction proceeding on the ground that he possessed new scientific evidence of his actual innocence. His evidence consisted of a newly-obtained I.Q. test score purportedly showing that he could not be executed by virtue of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 (2010) because he was intellectually disabled. The trial court declined to hold a hearing and denied the prisoner’s petition. The trial court determined, as a matter of the law, that the prisoner’s newly-obtained I.Q. test score was not new scientific evidence of his actual innocence of the offenses to which he earlier pleaded guilty. The prisoner filed an application for permission to appeal the denial of his petition to reopen in the Court of Criminal Appeals. In addition to asserting that the newly-obtained I.Q. test score was new scientific evidence of his actual innocence, the prisoner asserted that this Court’s decision in Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011), announced a new constitutional right and, therefore, provided another basis for reopening his petition for post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals entered an order on June 29, 2011, affirming the trial court’s denial of the petition to reopen because the I.Q. test score did not amount to scientific evidence of actual innocence for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) (2006) and because Coleman v. State did not announce a new rule of constitutional law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(1). We granted the prisoner’s application for permission to appeal to address whether the phrase “actually innocent of the offense” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) encompasses ineligibility for the death penalty in addition to actual innocence of the underlying crime and whether our holding in Coleman v. State established a new constitutional right to be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 40-30-117(a)(1). We hold that the Tennessee General Assembly, when it enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2), did not intend for the phrase “actually innocent of the offense” to include ineligibility for the death penalty because of intellectual disability. We also hold that Coleman v. State did not establish a new rule of constitutional law that must be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30117(a)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals denying the prisoner’s petition to reopen his post-conviction petition.
 

In Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tenn. 2001), this Court held that “the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of [intellectually disabled] individuals because such executions violate evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, are grossly disproportionate, and serve no valid penological purpose in any case.” The next year, the United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion:
We are not persuaded that the execution of [intellectually disabled] criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty. Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our “evolving standards of decency,” we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution “places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life” of a[n intellectually disabled] offender.
 

This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. The appellees filed a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights with respect to the minor child at issue. The trial court, upon finding clear and convincing evidence of several grounds on which to base termination and concluding that termination was in the child’s best interest, revoked the biological father’s parental rights to the child. The father appeals. We affirm.

In this action plaintiff charged defendant had breached the contract between them and sought specific performance. The Trial Court held the contracts were ambiguous and construed them in accordance with the actions the parties took in regard to the contracts. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the defendant and dismissed the Complaint, but refused to award the prevailing party attorney's fees as was required in the parties' contract. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment, but modify and remand, with instructions to the Trial Court to award the prevailing party her attorney's fees.

Defendant was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder after a trial by jury. He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by admitting three pieces of evidence: (1) an excerpt from a 911 call made by the victim several days before his death, in which the victim claimed to be "a little . . . concerned" about the defendant’s behavior; (2) testimony from one of the defendant’s friends to the effect that the friend did not believe that any affair had occurred between the defendant and the friend’s then-wife; and (3) testimony concerning various searches performed on the defendant’s computer involving the name "Missy." Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction concerning the destruction of evidence. After review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err with respect to the evidentiary and jury instruction claims raised by the defendant. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Roane County jury convicted the Defendant, Roger A. Beu, Jr., of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years as a Range I, standard offender, at thirty percent, to serve thirty days in jail, with the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial based on the prosecutor’s improper comments to the jury during closing argument; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the written statement of the victim; and (3) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully concur in the results in this case. My departure relates to only one issue – the rationale for affirming the trial court’s admission into evidence a portion of a recording of the victim’s telephone call to the police in which the victim expressed his concern over the defendant’s behavior. Assuming that this evidence passes the hearsay barrier as evidence of the victim’s state of mind, I would have held that the victim’s state of mind as expressed in the recording was irrelevant to the issues on trial. I note that the recording itself does not express the date of the telephone call, but the prosecutor’s oral, in-court preface to the playing of the recording indicates to the trial court that the call was placed on June 5, 2008. Given the somewhat banal comment offered on the recording and the remoteness of nearly three weeks, I see no relevancy of the statement to the issues joined at trial. That said, I would have also held that the error was harmless.

The Defendant, Akeem T. Goodman, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, -403 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive Range I terms of twenty-two years at 100% service as a violent offender for an effective forty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Lawrence Ralph, Jr., appeals as of right from the Warren County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his drug-related convictions and effective seventeen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance from trial counsel; and (2) that he was denied access to legal materials that he needed to prepare to represent himself at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Pamela J. Booker, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking her probation for her three convictions for violating a habitual traffic offender order and ordering her to serve her effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, she contends that the court erred in ordering her to serve the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James M. Watkins (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury convictions for burglary of a business, vandalism of property worth $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and possession of burglary tools. He received an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range III, career offender. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the contents found as a result of a stop and subsequent search of the Defendant and a bag in his possession. He also argues the following: that the trial court erred in overruling the Defendant’s objection to a jury instruction; that newly acquired evidence exists that would have affected the outcome of the trial; and that Officer Rogers’ testimony was perjury that prejudiced the Defendant. Lastly, the Defendant alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.