APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Petitioner, Timothy Lynn Denton, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Timothy Lynn Denton, No. E2006-02557-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 933200 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 7, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2008). The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to convey to him plea offers and by failing to appeal the trial court’s ruling that he was competent to stand trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this case, the child at issue was declared dependent and neglected and was placed in grandmother’s custody following the child’s removal from mother. Months later, father petitioned for custody of the child. The court granted father’s petition and awarded grandmother reasonable visitation. Thereafter, father filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights. Mother objected and sought custody or visitation, while grandmother asked the court to either reinforce her court-ordered visitation or grant joint custody. The court denied the petition to terminate mother’s parental rights, transferred grandmother’s courtordered visitation to mother, and advised grandmother that she would enjoy visitation as designated by the parents. Grandmother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

I concur completely in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to express my disagreement with the following dicta in the majority opinion: While the wording of [Tennessee Supreme Court] Rule 13 [§1(d)(2)(B)] indicates that Grandmother may have had a statutory right to an attorney during the termination proceeding,

The Defendant, Albert Franklin Thompkins, appeals as of right from the trial court’s revocation of his enhanced probation and reinstatement of his eight-year sentence for rape. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because the State failed to prove that he had violated the terms of his probation in a substantial way in that he had not committed any new crimes nor was there any evidence that he had failed any drug screens. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s probation and order that the Defendant execute his original sentence in confinement.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Larry Wayne Webb, of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range IV, career offender to twelve years. On appeal, the appellant contends, and the State concedes, that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree that the evidence is insufficient. Therefore, the conviction is reversed, and the charge is dismissed.
 

In 1986, petitioner, Charles Borum, pled guilty to two offenses, a Dickson County charge of aggravated kidnapping and a Davidson County charge of aggravated rape, and received forty-year sentences on each offense. Davidson County agreed to run the aggravated rape conviction concurrently with the Dickson County aggravated kidnapping conviction. Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the Davidson County conviction is illegal, and thus void, because it did not award him pretrial jail credit as required by law. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Fred Chad Clark, II, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of seven counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (Supp. 2005, 2006) (amended 2007, 2011) (rape of a child), -504 (2006) (aggravated sexual battery). He was sentenced as a Range I offender to seventeen years for each rape of a child conviction and to ten years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, to be served at 100% as a child rapist. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing, for an effective thirty-four year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to establish the corpus delicti; (2) there was a material variance between the proof and the State’s election of offenses; (3) the trial court erred in admitting surreptitiously recorded conversations he had with his wife on January 18, 2007; (4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s use of pornography; (5) the trial court erred in allowing a detective to offer opinion testimony about the Defendant’s truthfulness; (6) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the mental state of recklessness for the counts involving rape of a child; and (7) the trial court erred in sentencing by using an inapplicable enhancement factor and in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in Counts V, VI, VII, IX, and X. Due to deficiencies in the election of offenses relative to Counts I, II, III, and IV, we reverse those convictions and remand the case for a new trial for those counts.

The District Attorney General denied the request of the Defendant, Aref Al Yamani, for pretrial diversion. The Defendant appealed to the trial court, who found that the District Attorney General had abused its discretion when it denied the Defendant’s request for pretrial diversion because the District Attorney failed to consider all the relevant factors when it denied the Defendant’s request. Based upon this finding, the trial court ordered the District Attorney General to approve the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion. The State appeals, contending that the proper remedy in this scenario is for the trial court to vacate the District Attorney General’s decision and remand the matter to the District Attorney General to further consider and weigh all the relevant factors, citing State v. Richardson, 357 S.W.3d 620 (Tenn. 2012). After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the trial court erred when it failed to remand the case to the District Attorney General to consider all the relevant factors. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand to the Shelby County Criminal Court with directions to remand to the Shelby County District Attorney General for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.

A show cause order was entered in this case on August 16, 2012, directing the non-attorney father of the minor child in this case to state why this appeal should not be dismissed based upon his filing of the notice of appeal on behalf of his son and without the benefit of counsel. The father responded to the show cause order, but his contentions do not cure the defect in the notice of appeal. Our review of the record reveals that this court lacks jurisdiction. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Larry Boyd, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, which led him to enter a guilty plea “under duress.” Specifically, he asserts that counsel “refused” to set the case for trial and failed to investigate the facts of the case, interview key witnesses, and adequately communicate with him. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Chester Carr Peterson, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a sentence that included community corrections. The Defendant’s community corrections officer filed a violation warrant, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence, finding that he had violated the terms of his sentence, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in prison. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Joseph Davison, was convicted of two counts of rape and sentenced to twelve years for each count, to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based upon the fact that the original charges filed against him only identified his DNA profile, and he was not identified by name until after the statute of limitations had expired. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Adrian Hill ("the Defendant") appeals the trial court’s judgments finding him guilty of failing to comply with a child support order in two separate cases under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-104(a). The trial court convicted the Defendant on one count in each of the two cases after conducting a bench trial. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that he was: (1) denied the right to grand jury action; (2) denied the right to a trial by jury; and (3) sentenced contrary to the applicable sentencing laws for criminal offenses. Upon review, because the statute at issue is a general criminal statute as opposed to a contempt statute, we conclude that the Defendant was entitled to grand jury action as a requirement to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. The record demonstrates that the Defendant did not receive grand jury action and did not waive his right to grand jury action. Therefore, we are compelled to vacate the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the Defendant.

While it is uncertain from the record, it appears the Petitioner, Joe Billy Russell, Jr., pled guilty in 1994 to two counts of the sale of cocaine. Pursuant to a negotiated settlement, which included the Petitioner’s agreement not to apply for alternative sentencing, the trial court sentenced him to two concurrent sentences of four years each. In 2011, the Petitioner filed a pro se motion to vacate the judgment, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered. The trial court dismissed the motion, finding that it was filed beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

The Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder. While the Petitioner raised a multitude of issues below, on appeal, his sole issue is whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, the Petitioner makes the following arguments on appeal: (1) that trial counsel failed to present evidence that in the ten years between the first and second trials, the methods by which the State’s expert witness reached his conclusion of arson had been discredited by the scientific community; (2) that trial counsel failed to advance the defense theory of an accidental fire by not calling as a witness the physician who treated both the Petitioner and the victim to testify regarding the burn patterns on their bodies; and (3) that trial counsel failed to move for a mistrial when the State and the State’s witnesses referenced the Petitioner’s prior trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying relief.

Keith J. Allen (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the sentence on his first degree felony murder conviction is illegal, and, therefore, his judgment of conviction is void. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to impose a life sentence for his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Michael Raines, pro se, appeals the Polk County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting twenty-three-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his petition was barred by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this claim for workers’ compensation benefits, the employee suffered a compensable back injury. The trial court awarded 85% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and additional temporary total disability benefits, resulting in an award of 400 weeks of benefits. The employer has appealed, asserting that the permanent partial disability award is excessive and that the trial court erred by awarding  additional temporary total disability benefits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff sued for damages for the destruction of a tractor and trailer and for the loss of its
use. Defendants moved for a directed verdict, arguing that loss of use and/or loss of profits
cannot be recovered because the property was destroyed and it was not unique. The jury
found liability for the destruction of the property and for loss of use and/or loss of profits.
The trial court then granted a directed verdict on the loss of use/loss of profits, stating that
such damages cannot be recovered for destroyed property. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse.

The appellee in this case filed a motion to dismiss appeal on July 20, 2012, arguing that the judgment of divorce entered by the trial court on December 6, 2010, is not a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken and the appellate record on file is therefore incomplete. The orders entered by the trial court on July 9, 2012, confirm that the notice of appeal was filed prematurely, as all claims between the parties have not yet been resolved. The appellant did not file a response to the motion. Our review of the record reveals that the order to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Marcus Anderson, of domestic assault by causing reasonable fear of bodily injury, and he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on domestic assault by causing reasonable fear of bodily injury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Bedford County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Richard Dale Capps, charging him with two counts of aggravated assault and one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. An indictment was also returned against co-defendant Sarah Malone charging her with conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. The present appeal only involves Defendant. Following a joint jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. Co-defendant Malone was convicted as charged. Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to eight years for aggravated assault and six years for conspiracy to commit aggravated assault with the sentences to be served concurrently in confinement. Defendant’s conviction for reckless aggravated assault merged with his conviction for aggravated assault. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request to admit the prior inconsistent statements of Andrew Pugh and Maurice Smith as substantive evidence; and (3) that the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant as a Range II offender because the State did not give timely notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed suit for benefits, alleging that he aggravated a back injury while performing his job responsibilities. His employer contended that the incident resulted only in an increase in pain from a pre-existing injury and was not, therefore, compensable. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found in favor of the employee and, using an eight percent medical impairment rating and a multiplier of one and one-half times the medical impairment rating, awarded permanent partial disability benefits. The employer appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that a compensable injury occurred and, alternatively, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee was entitled to an eight percent medical impairment rating. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, a human resources director, slipped and fell while performing her job responsibilities. The employee did not return to work following the incident and was subsequently terminated. Although the employee received temporary total disability benefits, she filed suit alleging that she was entitled to additional temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits. While concluding that the employee had sustained a 19% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, the trial court capped the award at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating because the employee was not denied a meaningful return to work. The employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that she had a meaningful return to work. She also contends that she is entitled to temporary partial disability benefits. In response, the employer asserts that the 19% impairment rating is excessive. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge, the judgment is affirmed.

In accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, who sustained injuries while attempting to repair a piece of food service equipment, filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Later, the employer terminated the employee, alleging misconduct in the performance of his duties. The trial court ruled that because the employer had discharged the employee in retaliation for the claim, the employee did not have a meaningful return to work and, furthermore, was entitled to the statutory maximum of six times the medical impairment. The employer appealed. Because the evidence supports the ruling of the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.