APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, a human resources director, slipped and fell while performing her job responsibilities. The employee did not return to work following the incident and was subsequently terminated. Although the employee received temporary total disability benefits, she filed suit alleging that she was entitled to additional temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits. While concluding that the employee had sustained a 19% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, the trial court capped the award at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating because the employee was not denied a meaningful return to work. The employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that she had a meaningful return to work. She also contends that she is entitled to temporary partial disability benefits. In response, the employer asserts that the 19% impairment rating is excessive. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge, the judgment is affirmed.

In accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, who sustained injuries while attempting to repair a piece of food service equipment, filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Later, the employer terminated the employee, alleging misconduct in the performance of his duties. The trial court ruled that because the employer had discharged the employee in retaliation for the claim, the employee did not have a meaningful return to work and, furthermore, was entitled to the statutory maximum of six times the medical impairment. The employer appealed. Because the evidence supports the ruling of the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, James Edward Kilby, III, pled guilty to felony reckless endangerment and reckless aggravated assault. For the felony reckless endangerment conviction, the trial court imposed a two-year sentence, ordering the Defendant to serve six months of incarceration before release to the community corrections program. For the reckless aggravated assault conviction, the trial court imposed a four-year sentence, ordering the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days of incarceration before release to the community corrections program. The trial court ordered that these sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of six years, to serve eighteen months of incarceration followed by community corrections. In this appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court improperly ordered the Defendant to serve more than one year in split confinement. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it sentenced the Defendant. As such, we reverse the trial court’s judgments and remand the cases for a new sentencing hearing.

Appellant, Larry D. McGuire, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for felon in possession of a handgun. After a guilty plea, Appellant was sentenced to two years in incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. After several months in incarceration, Appellant was granted determinate release. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was filed. Appellant’s probation was partially revoked for time served and Appellant was reinstated to a new, two-year term of probation. A second probation violation warrant was filed. After a hearing, Appellant’s probation was revoked. The trial court ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. Appellant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in determining that he violated his probation and ordering that he serve the sentence in incarceration. After a review of the record and authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This lawsuit originated as a medical malpractice action that was filed against the Hospital and other defendants in 2000. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on the medical malpractice claim in 2003 because Plaintiffs had failed to come forward with competent testimony from a medical doctor regarding causation. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint to allege that the Hospital had tortiously interfered with the Plaintiffs’ contract with a nurse expert witness. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on this claim in 2010. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on the issue of tortious interference with contract, but we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim and remand for further proceedings.

Father has a son who was placed in the custody of his maternal grandmother when he was ten months old because Mother was deceased and Father was incarcerated. Grandmother filed a petition for termination of Father’s parental rights. Following a hearing the trial court determined Father had abandoned his child as that term is defined by Tenn. Code Ann. §361-102(1)(A)(iv) and that it was in the child’s best interests for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father has been incarcerated for all but five months of the child’s life and has engaged in conduct that exhibits his wanton disregard for his son’s welfare. The child has no meaningful relationship with Father due to Father’s life choices, which have resulted in repeated arrests and periods of incarceration. We agree with the trial court that Father has abandoned his child and that it is in the child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

The defendant, Bobby Lewis Smith, was convicted by a Clay County jury of delivery of a schedule III controlled substance, a Class D felony. He was subsequently sentenced, as a Range III offender, to serve nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing admission of a videotape in violation of the Confrontation Clause and authentication rules; and (3) that ordering service of the nine-year term resulted in an excessive sentence. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted on one count of driving under the influence (DUI) and one alternative count of driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 or higher. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to  suppress certain evidence obtained by the police on the grounds that the defendant was arrested without probable cause. The trial judge granted this motion and ultimately dismissed both counts. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by determining that the arresting officer did not have probable cause. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the trial court committed no error and affirm its judgment accordingly.

The widow of a man who suffered a devastating injury while undergoing a medical procedure in the defendant hospital filed suit against the hospital and the doctor who ordered the procedure, claiming medical malpractice, failure to obtain informed consent, and battery. The defendant hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, and the defendant doctor filed a motion to dismiss, both arguing that the plaintiff’s malpractice claims had to be dismissed because she failed to strictly comply with requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (a)(1) (60-day notice) and §29-26-122(a) (certificate of good faith). The trial court granted both motions in part and denied them in part. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the medical malpractice claims against both defendants as well as the related claims. We also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the claim against the defendant doctor for failure to obtain the patient’s informed consent, but we affirm its dismissal of the medical battery claim against the defendant doctor.
 

A Marion County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Eric Lebron Hale, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 17 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and contends that the jury instructions provided by the trial court resulted in an improper constructive amendment to the indictment, that a fatal variance existed between the indictment and the proof adduced at trial, that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of a certain witness, that the trial court committed errors in juryinstructions granted and refused, and that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of the right to a fair trial. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery as it was charged in the indictment, and because the jury instructions on the offense of aggravated robbery resulted in an improper constructive amendment of the indictment, and because a fatal variance existed between the indictment and proof adduced at trial, the defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery is reversed. In its stead we impose a conviction of the lesser included offense of theft of property valued at $500 or less and remand the case to the trial court for a sentencing hearing on the newly-imposed misdemeanor conviction.

The Petitioner, Steven James Rollins, filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The post-conviction court denied Petitioner relief on all grounds related to the guilt phase of the trial but granted a new sentencing hearing on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State is not challenging the grant of a new sentencing hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s ruling denying relief as to the guilt phase of the trial. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that a biased juror served on his jury, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to voir dire potential jurors properly, and that his mental retardation exempts him from the death penalty. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner was denied his constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the Petitioner’s convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner, Brenda Holliman, of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, she filed the instant petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that a co-defendant recanted statements he made at his guilty plea hearing and that the recantation constitutes newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition based on the statute of limitations. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the coram nobis court and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing.

I concur with the majority’s decision in all respects, except the decision to affirm the dismissal of the medical battery claim against Dr. Nguyen pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6).
 

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph Bernette Driver, of facilitation of aggravated robbery and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a Range I standard offender, to six years for the facilitation of aggravated robbery conviction and a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the show-up identification; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for facilitation of aggravated robbery; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence for the conviction of facilitation of aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Anthony P.D. (“Father”) to the minor child Chyna L.M.D. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence of grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm.

The petitioner, Patrick Trawick, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising him not to testify at trial, which precluded him from presenting his only viable defense. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Jerry Lee Hunter, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an eighteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that his entry of a guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After purchasing a home, the plaintiffs sued the sellers’ real estate agent under the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act for failing to disclose that work was done on the foundation of the home prior to the purchase. The trial court granted summary judgment to the real estate agent, finding that she had no knowledge of adverse facts as defined by the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Petitioner, Joshua Jameel Bond, filed this petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2009 guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder, which was amended from first degree murder. Petitioner agreed to an out-of-range sentence of forty years. As grounds for relief, petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate certain witnesses and evidence and that he was unaware of the nature and consequences of his guilty plea. The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. Our review of the record and the parties’ briefs reveals no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court entered an order of involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.02(2) in this action for malicious prosecution. We affirm.

The defendant, Charles W. White, Sr., was convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”) by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but forty-eight hours suspended. His driver’s license was also suspended for one year for violation of the implied consent law. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the stop of his vehicle. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A grand jury indicted appellant, Michael Jarvis Shipp, for one count of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. A jury found him guilty of first degree murder and the lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, for which the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life and eight years, respectively. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence underlying both counts. We find that the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant on both counts and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendants in suit to reform deed of trust or warranty deed appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss action on ground of prior suit pending. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

The capital Petitioner, William Glenn Rogers, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s order denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his merged first degree murder conviction and death sentence for the killing of nine-year-old Jacqueline Beard, as well as his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and two counts of criminal impersonation. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of forty-eight (48) years’ imprisonment for his non-capital offenses. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

In this action, the plaintiff has attempted to assert claims for ordinary negligence and medical malpractice against nursing home defendants by filing two separate actions and then seeking to consolidate the cases or to amend the complaint to assert both types of claims in one case. The first complaint filed only asserted claims for ordinary negligence against the nursing home defendants. Sixty days after having given the statutory notice to the healthcare providers of her intent to file medical malpractice claims, the plaintiff commenced a separate action against the same nursing home defendants and an additional defendant, a physician who treated the nursing home patient, by filing a complaint for medical malpractice. Upon motions of the nursing home defendants, the trial court refused to consolidate the cases, dismissed the medical malpractice claims against the nursing home defendants upon the ground of a prior suit pending, and denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint in the first case to add claims for medical malpractice against the nursing home defendants. Having determined that the plaintiff complied with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26121(a) by giving the requisite 60 days notice to the medical providers and that the statute of limitations had not run, we have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01 motion to amend the complaint. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint for ordinary negligence against the nursing home defendants thus allowing the plaintiff to assert medical malpractice claims against the nursing home defendants and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.