APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The employee alleged that she was permanently and totally disabled due to a lower back injury suffered while operating a foot pedal on a drill press in April 2004. The employee had previously alleged an injury to her lower back, which was settled on a “doubtful and disputed” basis. Although the employee’s treating physician testified that the April 2004 incident was a temporary flare-up of her earlier injury, he did assign new permanent restrictions. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a new injury and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The Second Injury Fund and the employer have appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Billy Joe Smith, pled guilty to: (1) possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Class E felony; (2) maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances were used or sold, a Class D felony; and (3) two separate counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Due to his prior criminal convictions, Defendant was designated as a Range II multiple offender for each felony conviction, and agreed to a sentence length of four years for each felony. The plea agreement provided for sentences of 11 months and 29 days for each misdemeanor conviction, and for all of the sentences to run concurrently with each other for an effective sentence of four years as a Range II offender. There was no  agreement as to the manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that Defendant would serve the sentence in the Department of Correction. Defendant has appealed and argues that the trial court should have granted him full probation or split confinement, or ordered the sentences to be served in the community corrections program. Following a thorough review we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this negligence action, the jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict against one of the two
defendants. We find no error in the judgment regarding liability, but we must vacate and
remand as to damages because the trial court erred in excluding testimony and evidence
regarding the plaintiff’s medical expenses.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. After the employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back, the parties reached a settlement of the claim at a benefit review conference.  As part of the agreement, the employer agreed to provide a job for the employee within the medical restrictions arising from the injury. The employer eventually decided not to rehire the employee after he failed to return to work. Thereafter, the employee filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking reconsideration of his settlement. The trial court granted the petition and increased the disability award. On this appeal, the employer takes issue with (1) the trial court’s adoption verbatim of the employee’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, (2) the trial court’s conclusion that the employee was entitled to reconsideration, (3) the exclusion of evidence related to the employee’s prior back problems, and (4) the claimed excessiveness of the award. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Jermain Sean Lipford, was indicted by the Franklin County Grand Jury for initiating a process to manufacture methamphetamine, manufacturing methamphetamine, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, reckless endangerment, felony possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, driving under the influence, violation of the implied consent law, driving on a revoked license, and fourth offense driving on a revoked license. Appellant pled guilty to initiating a process to manufacture methamphetamine. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to eight years, to be served in the Community Corrections program after the service of 150 days in incarceration. After the issuance of a revocation warrant and hearing, Appellant conceded the grounds for the violation of his Community Corrections sentence. Appellant was ordered to serve the original sentence. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly determined Appellant was not entitled to jail credit. After a review of the record, we conclude the trial court properly awarded sentencing credits to Appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Tajay Vaughn (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of thirty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In his petition, he argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Jimmy L. Smith (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that counts one through four of the indictment underlying his convictions are defective, and, therefore, his judgments of conviction are void. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing. The Petitioner then filed this appeal. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Rutherford County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Gregory Moore, of one
count of aggravated sexual battery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-504(a)(4) (2006), and three counts
of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, see id. § 39-13-529(b)(1), for offenses
committed against his seven-year-old step-daughter. The trial court imposed an effective
sentence of 13 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support his conviction of aggravated sexual battery and the trial court’s
imposition of sentences. We discern an anomaly in the judgments for counts three and four
requiring correction on remand. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court, as
modified.

This medical malpractice action, which had been pending for several years, was summarily
dismissed because the plaintiff did not file a response to the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff’s only expert witness admitted she was not qualified to opine
concerning the standard of care at issue, and the statute of limitations had run. Upon motion
of the defendants pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), the trial court
awarded the defendants $9,000 in discretionary costs. This appeal followed. We affirm. We
have also determined that this appeal is frivolous and remand to the trial court to determine
the proper amount of damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122.

The defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict holding her liable to her employer for her involvement in a co-worker’s misappropriation of funds. The jury found that the defendant’s involvement included (1) intentional misrepresentations, (2) concealment of facts relevant to the misappropriation, and (3) breach of contractual duties owed to the employer. The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of the proof. The motion was based upon the defendant’s assertion that the statute of limitations barred the claim. We affirm.

In this appeal, a show cause order was entered in this case on August 28, 2012, directing counsel for the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant has responded to the show cause order in a response that does

In this action, the Estate has appealed to this Court the denial of an exception to
appellee's claim.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, George R. Thacker, of solicitation to commit first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it declined to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment and the law regarding accomplice testimony. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an agreement between the Appellee, a nonprofit corporation, and the Appellant, a real estate agent, whereby the Appellant would acquire foreclosed properties, oversee all necessary repairs and renovations of the properties, and ultimately sell them for the benefit of the Appellee. The Appellee’s executive director was given the authority to act on its behalf in all dealings with the Appellant. As compensation, the Appellant received commissions on the purchase and sale of each property, and a percentage of the repair costs for his oversight of the repairs and renovations of each property. After operating pursuant to the oral agreement for over a year, the parties executed a written agreement for the same purpose. Throughout their relationship, the Appellant acquired approximately eighty-four (84) properties for the Appellee. Subsequently, after discovering that their records did not contain documentation of actual repair costs which the Appellant was required to submit under the written agreement, the Appellee filed a complaint for an accounting. The trial court appointed a Special Master to conduct an accounting. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Special Master filed a report in which he ordered that the Appellant be disgorged of all funds received by virtue of the agreements with the Appellee based on his failure to provide documentation of actual repair costs, and further suggested an award of attorney’s fees and costs in favor of the Appellee. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final order adopting and confirming the Special Master’s findings, and denied the Appellant’s objections to the Special Master’s report. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the Appellant was not required to submit documentation of actual repair costs on the properties acquired pursuant to the oral agreement. We further conclude that the course of conduct between the Appellant and the Appellee’s executive director modified the written agreement, such that the Appellant was not required to submit documentation of actual repair costs. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Josue Segura, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, Segura argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, by refusing to grant a second mental evaluation, and by allowing the State to introduce certain photographs of the victim. Segura also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jerome Sawyer, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As grounds for relief, petitioner argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his eighteen-year sentence for aggravated sexual battery by applying enhancing factors, other than prior criminal convictions, not found by a jury. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirm the judgment of the court.

This custody case arises from an agreed order of parentage. After Father’s paternity was established, he filed a petition in juvenile court for custody of the child. At the conclusion of several hearings that took place over a span of years, the juvenile court entered an order naming Father primary residential parent and awarding Mother weekend parenting time. Mother appealed. While awaiting appeal, Mother filed a petition to have the child declared dependent and neglected. The Special Judge presiding over that petition transferred Mother’s petition to Lake County, where Father and the child reside. In response to the allegations in Mother’s petition, Father filed a petition for an injunction and to have Mother’s future parenting time supervised. A different Special Judge granted Father’s request without a full hearing, stating that Mother’s parenting time would remain supervised until further orders of the court. No further orders were ever entered. We affirm the trial court’s order naming Father primary residential parent, but vacate the transfer of Mother’s petition to Lake County and the modification of Mother’s parenting time. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant-Appellant, Serena Carter, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s imposition of a twenty-five-year sentence for facilitation of first degree felony murder. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which Lisa C. and Michael C. filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Christopher M. to his child. The paternal grandparents filed an intervening petition to adopt the child. The trial court terminated Christopher M.’s parental rights and granted Lisa C. and Michael C.’s petition to adopt the child. Christopher M. appeals the termination of his parental rights. Following our review, we conclude that the court erred in relying upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3) in terminating Father’s parental rights and reverse that ground of termination. Additionally, we are unable to review the remainder of the court’s decision because the final order failed to set forth findings of fact as required by section 36-1-113(k) in support of its second ground of termination. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights based upon section 36-1-113(g)(3) and vacate the remainder of the final order. The case is remanded for entry of an order that sets forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the termination of Christopher M.’s parental rights.

Defendant, James Allen Pollard, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court merged Defendants’ murder convictions and sentenced him to life in prison for first degree murder and to 18 years to be served at 100 percent for his especially aggravated robbery conviction, which was ordered to be served consecutively to his life sentence. Defendant appeals his convictions and asserts the following: 1) that the State violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), when it failed to disclose evidence regarding State’s witness Anthony Bowers; 2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant Defendant a continuance to investigate Anthony Bowers; 3) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police; 4) the trial court erred by allowing Detective Windsor to testify regarding his opinion about whether Defendant acted in self-defense; 5) the trial court committed plain error by allowing an officer to testify regarding blood spatter; 6) the alleged errors constitute cumulative error requiring a reversal of Defendants’ convictions; and 7) the trial court erred by ordering Defendant’s sentences to run consecutively. After a careful review of the entire record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and the lengths of his individual sentences; however, we reverse the trial court’s order of consecutive sentencing and remand for a new sentencing hearing in order for the trial court to state on the record the facts which support consecutive sentencing. See State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995).

The Defendant-Appellant, Doris Sharphine Halliburton, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a term of three years, with Halliburton to serve one year in the Dyer County Jail before serving the remaining two years of her sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, Halliburton argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and (2) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

After pleading guilty to the indicted charges of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at $10,000 or more, and theft of property valued at less than $500, appellant, Colin D. Savage, was tried and convicted on the remaining charges of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the convictions for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at $10,000 or more and sentenced appellant to four years in confinement. The court pronounced a six-year sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction, twenty-four years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, twenty-four years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial court ordered that the sentences for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping run consecutively to each other, with the remaining sentences running concurrently with them, resulting in an effective sentence of forty-eight years. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and claims the following errors: (1) the State’s evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in declining to merge the convictions for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. After reviewing the record for sufficiency of the evidence, consecutive sentencing, and propriety of the trial court’s refusal to merge the convictions, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant-Appellant, Emmett Hartnest, Jr., was convicted by a Hardin County jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with Hartnest to serve ten days in the Hardin County Jail before serving the balance of his sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, Hartnest argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of a motion for
recusal. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition for recusal appeal pursuant to the de novo
standard as required under Rule 10B, §2.06, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the
petitioner’s motion for recusal.

Defendant-Appellant, Jamel Marsh, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of voluntary manslaughter and received a sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Marsh argues: (1) the trial court’s method of selecting and qualifying the jury violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 22-2-308 and 22-2-313 and as well as Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel from cross-examining Rachel Hixson about whether she received preferential treatment in her unrelated criminal cases in exchange for her testimony against Marsh and erred in preventing defense counsel from making an offer of proof regarding this alleged preferential treatment, thereby violating Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); and (3) his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment to show that the jury found Marsh guilty of voluntary manslaughter.