APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Teresa Deion Smith Harris, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s dismissal of her pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, a truck driver, sustained a compensable back injury. After having surgery, he returned to his pre-injury job for a year and was able to drive with the aid of narcotic medications prescribed to treat his back pain. He subsequently left his employment after results of an annual U.S. Department of Transportation (“DOT”) medical examination determined that his use of the narcotics prohibited him from driving. The trial court found that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded benefits in excess of one and one-half times the anatomical impairment rating. The employer’s workers compensation insurance carrier has appealed, asserting that the employee’s loss of employment was unrelated to his work injury and that the award should have been limited to one and one-half times the impairment. We affirm the judgment.

Blair Wood and Gary Wood (“Plaintiffs”) sued Tony Wolfenbarger and Brenda Wolfenbarger (“Defendants”) alleging, in part, that Defendants had wrongfully cut down six trees on Plaintiffs’ real property. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Defendants were liable for negligently cutting the trees, that the current market value of the timber cut was $840, and that Plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment in double the amount of the current market value of the timber pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-28-312. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court alleging that the Trial Court erred in awarding damages based upon the timber value. We find and hold that the evidence preponderates against the finding that timber value was the correct measure of damages in this case. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment to award Plaintiffs damages of $62,100 based upon the trunk formula method of valuation and affirm the judgment as so modified.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back in August 2002 which was settled in May 2006. Thereafter the employee continued to be treated by his authorized treating physician. In 2009 the employer requested and the employee consented to an independent medical examination.Thereafter the employer requested another independent medical examination. The employee declined. In April 2011, the employer filed a motion seeking to require the employee to submit to a medical examination pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1) and Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35. The trial court denied the motion, and the employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Bobby L. Looper (“the Defendant”) of one count of second degree murder, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the length of his sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and the length of his sentence. This matter is remanded to the trial court for the entry of a corrected judgment order.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Stanley Blue, of facilitation of first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty years. The Petitioner did not appeal his sentence, but this Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. State v. Stanley Blue, No. W2007-00292-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 723845 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 19, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2009). The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the sentence imposed by the trial court was illegal. The post-conviction court granted the Petitioner’s petition, in part, finding that his sentences were not constitutional. The State appealed, contending that the post-conviction court erred when it granted the Petitioner a new sentencing hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this divorce action the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce, gave custody of the children to the father, divided the marital property and ordered a monetary judgment against the mother to the father, as an equitable distribution of the marital property. The mother has appealed and questioned the Trial Judge's award of custody of the children to the father, and the Trial Judge ordering a monetary judgment against the mother to the father. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.
 

Property of the appellants was seized following a traffic stop. Requests for return of the property were denied by the Knox County Sheriff’s Department. The appellants, who were not facing any criminal charges, filed an action in criminal court seeking the return of all the seized property. The Sheriff’s Department subsequently filed drug forfeiture warrants and property receipts. The appellants argued that the Sheriff’s Department was attempting to initiate Department of Safety jurisdiction in disregard of their earlier filing in criminal court. The criminal court dismissed the action, asserting lack of jurisdiction. The appellants appeal. We affirm.

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation issued a permit allowing a proposed rock quarry to discharge storm water and wastewater into a nearby creek. Owners of property allegedly affected by the discharge filed an appeal challenging the issuance of the permit with the Water Quality Control Board, as well as a petition seeking a declaratory order construing the rules regarding the protection of existing uses of waters. The Water Quality Control Board refused to issue a declaratory order and the property owners appealed to the Davidson County Chancery Court. Because we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested,we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for dismissal of this cause. Vacated and remanded.
 

This is an appeal from an order denying a petition to have the appellees held in criminal contempt based upon their failure to comply with various subpoenas commanding them to appear at depositions and produce documents to be used by the appellants in the context of an administrative asset forfeiture proceeding on the docket of the Tennessee Department of Safety. The petition was filed in the Criminal Court for Knox County, Tennessee. It was denied on grounds that the court in which the petition was filed had no jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. The appellants appeal. We affirm.

Petitioner filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside a parental termination and adoption decree. The motion asked relief from the Judgment on the ground set forth in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 62.02(1) and (2). The Trial Court held that petitioner did not establish a basis to set aside the Judgment on the grounds relied upon in the Rule 60.02 motion. On appeal we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Losing proposer for solid waste management services challenges Lawrence County’s decision to contract with another proposer. Because we find that the County acted arbitrarily and illegally in making its decision, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
 

The defendant, Krystal Bowman, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion for her conviction of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his conviction of aggravated assault and accompanying 10-year sentence of incarceration, the defendant, Yoni Sales Barahona, appeals, alleging some 21 assignments of error. Some of the issues have been waived, and others are redundant. The defendant’s reviewable challenges are these: (1) the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress, (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of the victim, (3) the trial court erred by admitting the identification of the defendant by both the victim and a witness, (4) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a knife recovered from the scene, (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (6) the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error in either the conviction or the sentence, we affirm the judgment.

Petitioner, Andrew D. Harville, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and felony evading arrest. Petitioner was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment for his murder conviction and two years for evading arrest, and his sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. A summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions can be found in this Court’s opinion in State v. Andrew Deon Harville, No. W2008-02375-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 571786 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Feb. 19, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 16, 2010). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s request for relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Craig O. Majors, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary in Montgomery County. See Craig O. Majors v. State,No.M2009-00483-R3-CD,2010 WL 2483512 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Nashville, Jun. 21, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2010). Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on appeal. Id. at *1. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on various grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief as Petitioner has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed

At issue is the scope of a binding arbitration clause in a federally-reinsured multiple peril crop insurance policy and the scope of federal preemption of common law claims. The insured, a nursery in Warren County, Tennessee, suffered a catastrophic loss of stock, primarily trees and shrubs, due to a tornado on April 7, 2006. The insured submitted a claim in excess of a million dollars. The adjuster determined, due to “under-reporting of inventory”, that the insured was only entitled to recover $195,225. The insured demanded arbitration; the arbitrator ruled that the insured was due no additional payment. Thereafter, the insured filed this action asserting common law claims against the insurer, its adjustment firm, and the independent insurance agency that solicited the policy, for breach of contract, negligence, breach of the duty of care, negligent misrepresentation, and statutory bad faith. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims against the insurer and its adjustment firm finding the claims were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata because the issues were decided at arbitration and that the insured’s only remedy was judicial review of the arbitration decision. On appeal, the insured contends that its state law claims were not barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Appellees disagree and additionally assert that the insured’s common law claims are preempted by federal law. We have determined the claims for breach of contract, breach of duty of care, and statutory bad faith are preempted by federal law; however, the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation are not preempted by federal law and are not barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this action for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

This is the second of two similar but separate civil actions and appeals among the same
parties. At issue is the scope of a binding arbitration clause in a federally-reinsured multiple
peril crop insurance policy and the scope of federal preemption of common law claims. The
insured, a nursery in Warren County, Tennessee, suffered a catastrophic loss of stock,
primarily trees and shrubs, due to a severe freeze in April of 2007. The insured submitted a
claim for indemnity. The adjuster determined, due to “under-reporting of inventory”, that the
insured was only entitled to recover $115,822. Instead of pursuing arbitration pursuant to the
policy of insurance, the insured filed this action asserting common law claims against the
insurer, its adjustment firm, and the independent insurance agency that solicited the policy,
for negligent misrepresentation, breach of duty of care, negligence, breach of contract, and
statutory bad faith. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims against the insurer and its
adjustment firm finding there were no issues of material fact and the insurers were entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law because the policy mandated arbitration. On appeal,
the insured contends that its state law claims are not barred by the policy. The insurer and its
adjustment firm disagree contending that all claims related to the insurance policy must be
submitted to arbitration and additionally assert that the insured’s common law claims are
preempted by federal law. We have determined the claims for breach of contract, breach of
duty of care, and statutory bad faith are preempted by federal law; however, the claims for
negligence and negligent misrepresentation are not preempted by federal law and these two
claims do not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision. Therefore, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

The Defendant, Francisco Javier Ancona, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder, attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and employing a handgun during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A.§§ 39-13-202,39-13-403,39-14-403, 39-13-102, 39-17-1324(b) (2010). He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree felony murder conviction, fifteen years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction to be served concurrently with the first degree murder conviction, nine years for the aggravated burglary conviction to be served consecutively to the first degree murder conviction but concurrently with the aggravated assault conviction, nine years for the aggravated assault conviction to be served consecutively to the first degree murder conviction but concurrently with the aggravated burglary conviction, and nine years for employing a handgun during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction to be served consecutively to the aggravated burglary conviction, resulting in an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus eighteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements of the Defendant’s co-defendants into evidence at the trial; (3) the trial court erred by failing to redact a statement made by a co-defendant to the police from a telephone recording played at the trial; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the State to amend the indictment to include a greater offense than originally charged; (5) the trial court erred by allowing separate convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary; and (6) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, John Wesley Shutt, pled guilty to first offense DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. As part of his plea agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law: “whether the officer had probable cause to make the arrest.” After careful review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the officer involved had probable cause to arrest the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Isiah Buckley, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the petitioner pled guilty, as a Range I offender, to facilitation of second-degree murder, a Class B felony, and received an out-of-range sentence of fifteen years, with the manner of service to be determined. After a hearing, the petitioner was ordered to serve the sentence. In the instant appeal, the petitioner contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically,he contends trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to inform the trial court of withheld exculpatory evidence; and (2) failing to investigate and to interview witnesses. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Attorney representing the husband in a divorce proceeding claimed a statutory lien on funds in his trust account to secure payment of his fee; the attorney filed a separate action seeking a determination of his rights to funds held in his trust account. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. Finding that the court dismissed the case employing an erroneous legal standard, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Michael Scott Farner, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1988 guilty-pleaded convictions of second degree murder, assault with intent to commit first degree murder, and seconddegree burglary are void because his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and because his sentences are illegal. Because we perceive no error in the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Ericka Barfield, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probation and order that she serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Gregory D. Valentine, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of  Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on Defendant’s motion.