APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an interpleader action resulting from competing claims to the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Insured’s mother, finding that, because she was the only named beneficiary of the policy, she was entitled to the proceeds. Insured’s husband appeals, arguing that, because Insured’s mother was only named as a contingent beneficiary, the default provisions of the policy remained in effect, resulting in him being the primary beneficiary of the policy. Husband also appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his bad faith claim against the insurer. We affirm the dismissal of the bad faith claim, but conclude that the contract at issue is ambiguous and the issue in this case is not properly decided on summary judgment. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The trial court determined that the minor children in this case were dependent and neglected upon finding that one of the children was the victim of severe child abuse. Mother appeals. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, Timmy Herndon, appeals from the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In 1999, the Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery and received a fifteen-year sentence. Two months before his parole was set to expire, the Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a twenty-two page petition for habeas corpus relief alleging a variety of issues all related to the constitutionality of the aggravated robbery statute upon which he was convicted. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition as moot because, at the time of the hearing, the Petitioner’s sentence and parole had expired. In this appeal, the Petitioner presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether he is entitled to a hearing because he filed his petition for habeas corpus relief prior to the expiration of his sentence and parole; (2) whether his claim presents “a present and live, controversy”; (3) whether “‘potential’ merits” to his claim exist which entitle him to appointed counsel; and (4) whether the habeas corpus court’s order summarily dismissing his petition is void because the court “acted without subject matter jurisdiction.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A contract required payment of “fee residuals” from customers referred by BSG, LLC to Check Velocity, a company providing check re-presentment services. The contract provided that payment of fee residuals survived the termination of the agreement between the parties and continued until the “expiration of the Customer agreements as they may be renewed.” Two agreements were executed between a referred customer and Check Velocity. The first agreement, which expired by its own terms, provided for check re-presentment services. The second agreement continued the re-presentment services required by the first agreement and added additional services. In addition, other terms of the first agreement were changed, including a choice of law provision. We hold that the second agreement with additional services and changed terms was not a renewal of the first agreement. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Check Velocity.

In this action a Petition was filed and a conservator was appointed for Dr. Maurice M. Acree,
Jr., and William Acree was made a party to that proceeding. Five years after a conservator
was appointed, William Acree filed a "Complaint" in that action. The Trial Court determined
that a complaint could not lie in that action, and treated it as a Rule 60 Motion and denied
William Acree any relief. William Acree has appealed to this Court and we affirm the Trial
Court's Judgment, but modify the Judgment on the basis that the record reveals plain error
which should be addressed because the trusts remain active.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a will. The named residuary beneficiary predeceased the testatrix. The executrix of the decedent’s estate argued that a survivorship requirement in the will applies to the named residuary beneficiary, so her interest lapsed. The issue of the residuary beneficiary argued that the survivorship requirement did not apply to the residuary beneficiary, so Tennessee’s anti-lapse statute operates to pass the beneficiary’s interest to her issue. The trial court held for the executrix, construing the will so as to apply the survivorship requirement to the residuary beneficiary. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the will, and so affirm.

The mother brought a petition to modify support and for contempt, alleging that the father
had willfully understated his income during an earlier proceeding to modify support. The
juvenile court judge found that the mother had proved her allegations and awarded her a
judgment of over $26,500 for back child support as well as attorney fees of over $12,800.
We hold that the statutory prohibition against retroactive modification of child support
disallows the award of pre-petition support. Accordingly, we are compelled to vacate the
trial court’s award of support for the time prior to the date on which the mother filed her
petition to modify child support. We affirm the prospective modification and the award of
child support from that date.

In re Estate of Milam, 181 S.W.3d 344, 353 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). (“[W]hen a decedent undertakes to make a will, we must presume that the decedent intended to die testate, and we must seek to construe the will, where possible, as including all of the testator’s property at death”). Second, as I will discuss more fully hereafter, the testatrix in this case clearly evidenced an intent to die testate. “The testator’s intent is to be determined from the particular words used in the will itself, . . . and not from what it is supposed the testator intended.” Id. at 353 (internal citation omitted).

A Maury County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Charles E. Lowe-Kelley, of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. At sentencing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole for each premeditated murder conviction, merged the felony murder convictions into the premeditated murder convictions, and imposed concurrent sentences of 15 years’ incarceration for each attempted first degree murder conviction to be served concurrently with the two life sentences. In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a continuance, (2) allowing a juror to remain on the jury who expressed an opinion about the case, (3) admitting evidence without establishing a proper chain of custody, (4) admitting a tape-recorded conversation between the defendant and a separately-tried codefendant, and (5) imposing consecutive sentences. On initial review, we concluded that all issues except the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing were waived because the defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial. See State v. Charles E. Lowe-Kelley, No. M2010-00500-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 14, 2011). The petitioner applied for permission to appeal this court’s decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. On August 28, 2012, the supreme court ruled that the defendant’s motion for new trial was timely and that the trial court properly allowed amendments to the motion for new trial and remanded the case to this court for consideration of the defendant’s appellate issues. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant filed a motion to correct a judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal  Procedure 36 in the Shelby County Criminal Court. The trial court subsequently entered an order denying the Appellant’s motion. In this appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion. Because there is no appeal as of right from the denial of a Rule 36 motion to correct a judgment, the appeal is dismissed.

Sherman Lane Pierce and Cathryn Pierce (“the Pierces”) own real property in Meigs County, Tennessee. James H. Delashmitt and Minnie C. Delashmitt (“the Delashmitts”) own real property that adjoins the Pierces’ property. The Pierces sued the Delashmitts alleging, among other things, that the Delashmitts had trespassed upon the Pierces’ property and attempted to fence off a portion of the Pierces’ driveway. The Delashmitts answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim asserting that the Pierces had trespassed on the Delashmitt’s property. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the Pierces had adversely possessed a portion of the disputed property. The Pierces appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding and holding that the Pierces failed to prove adverse possession as to the entire disputed area. The Delashmitts raise an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding and holding that the Pierces adversely possessed any portion of the disputed property. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Demetrius M. Clark, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of two counts of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell and/or deliver, two counts of possession of hydrocodone with the intent to sell and/or deliver, one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court merged the two convictions for cocaine possession and merged the two convictions for hydrocodone possession and sentenced Clark as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of ten years for the cocaine possession conviction, three years for the hydrocodone possession conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the drug paraphernalia conviction and to a consecutive sentence of three years at one hundred percent for the firearm conviction, for an effective sentence of thirteen years. On appeal, Clark argues: (1) he was deprived of his due process right to present a defense; (2) the trial court committed plain error in denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered pursuant to a search warrant; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the validity and effect of amendments to restrictive covenants for a residential development and amendments to the charter and bylaws for the homeowners’ association serving the development. After the death of the president of the original corporate developer, a successor developer purchased the original developer’s remaining property with the intent to continue to develop the property. Several homeowners filed suit in the Chancery Court for Franklin County, alleging that the successor developer’s new development plan violated restrictive covenants. The trial court granted the successor developer a judgment on the pleadings, and the homeowners appealed. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings, principally on the question of whether a general plan of development, or the plat for the subdivision, gave rise to certain implied restrictive covenants. Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., No. M2008-00290-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 400635, at *9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2009). While the successor developer’s application for permission to appeal was pending, the homeowners’ association amended its charter and the restrictive covenants to address certain issues identified by the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the homeowners filed a second suit, principally contesting the validity of the amendments. The trial court consolidated the two suits and granted the successor developer a summary judgment on all claims in both suits. However, the trial court also enjoined the successor developer from acting contrary to its corporate charter. The homeowners appealed a second time. On this occasion, the Court of Appeals concluded that the procedure used to amend the charter and restrictive covenants was valid but remanded the case with directions to determine whether these amendments were reasonable and to determine whether the plat supported the existence of implied restrictive covenants. Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., No. M2010-00579-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1661605, at *9-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2011). The successor developer filed an application for permission to appeal, asserting that Tennessee law did not support the Court of Appeals’ reasonableness inquiry and that the plat provided no basis for the existence of implied restrictive covenants. We have determined that the amendments were properly adopted and that there is no basis for implied restrictive covenants arising from a general plan of development or from the plat.

The appellant, Christopher Wayne Lee, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revoking his probation for robbery and burglary and ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Inmate appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of certiorari. The chancery court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and because inmate failed to show that the prison disciplinary board acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. We affirm, finding the inmate failed to show that the disciplinary board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily.

This is an action to collect child support ordered in the parties’ 1965 divorce decree. The Trial Court held that the ten year statute of limitations contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 110(2) acted as a bar to this action and dismissed the case. Anna Ruth Collins (Eisenberg) appeals to this Court. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Fred Smith, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his fifty-year sentence for second degree murder is illegal. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition.

Married couple sought judicial review of decision of Department of Human Services holding that they were not eligible for medicaid under an amendment to the Social Security Act known as the “Pickle Amendment.” Upon consideration of the record we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court.

This appeal involves a determination of the proper final discipline for an attorney who pleaded guilty to willful tax evasion. We hold that because ABA Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 5.11(b)applies to criminal acts such as those admitted by the attorney here, the trial court’s order of disbarment is affirmed.

In this post-divorce dispute, Father challenges the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan to designate Mother as primary residential parent and the trial court’s calculation of his income and monthly child support obligation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Reginald Dewayne Terry, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in a two-count indictment for aggravated burglary with intent to commit theft and with intent to commit assault. Defendant was convicted by a jury of the count of aggravated burglary with intent to commit theft and sentenced by the trial court to 15 years confinement. Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification of Defendant in a photographic lineup; 2) the trial court erred by allowing Detective Gerald McShepard to testify that the photo of Defendant used in the photo lineup was a booking photo because such testimony was more prejudicial than probative; 3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow Defendant to crossexamine the victim about her failure to appear at a prior court date; 4) the trial court erred by allowing Detective McShepard to give a lay opinion regarding fingerprint evidence; and 5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated burglary. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred by ruling that the victim’s refusal to appear at the originally scheduled trial date was not relevant to her credibility as a witness. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.

This is an appeal from a judgment affirming the disbarment of an attorney. After considering evidence presented incident to five complaints against the attorney, a hearing panel designated by the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that disbarment was warranted. On appeal, the trial court affirmed. In this appeal, the attorney has raised the following issues for review: (1) whether the panel erred by denying his motion to continue the hearing; (2) whether the panel erred by considering the attorney’s conduct in a case based upon a complaint by another attorney who had no involvement in the case; (3) whether the evidence supports the panel’s findings; (4) whether disbarment is an appropriate punishment; and (5) whether the trial court erred by denying the attorney’s post-judgment motion to supplement the record. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Reginald W. Davis, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated burglary, theft under $500, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery,and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, he argues that his due process rights were violated by his especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, which were incidental to his aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery convictions. Following our review, we affirm the convictions for aggravated burglary, theft under $500, aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, but we reverse the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and remand for a new trial on those counts of the indictment.

The issue in this appeal is whether the statutory requirements for execution of an attested will prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104(1) (2007) were satisfied when the decedent failed to sign the two-page will but signed a one-page affidavit of attesting witnesses. We conclude that the decedent’s signature on the separate affidavit of attesting witnesses does not satisfy the statute requiring the testator’s signature on the will. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court that the will was not properly executed is reinstated.

Pro se Petitioner, Marlon O. Walls, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to re-open his petition for post-conviction relief.Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the dismissal of his motion, this court is without jurisdiction to review the appeal, and it is dismissed.