APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellants attempted to appeal the decision of the General Sessions Court to the Circuit Court without filing an appeal bond, but the Circuit Court dismissed the attempted appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants claim that an appeal bond need not be filed where an appeal filing fee is paid. We find that, to perfect an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court, an appeal bond must be filed; payment of the appeal filing fee does not satisfy this jurisdictional requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the matter.

The defendant, Walter Lavar Wright, pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and received a Range I sentence of nine years’ incarceration. Following the successful completion of “boot camp,” the defendant was placed on probation. On January 20, 2011, a probation violation warrant issued alleging that the defendant violated the terms of his release by garnering a new arrest, failing to report to his probation officer, failing to maintain employment, and failing to pay fines and costs. At the hearing, the defendant admitted to many of the allegations. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. In this timely appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering him into confinement. Because the record supports the trial court’s order, we affirm.

The Defendant, Monica Rankin, pled guilty to two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, aggravated statutory rape, exploitation of a minor by electronic means, solicitation to commit aggravated statutory rape,and solicitation to commit sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to an effective sentence of five years and ordered her to serve six months in confinement, followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it:
(1) applied enhancement factors and failed to apply mitigating factors; (2) denied her full probation; and (3) denied her request for a variance from the probation rule prohibiting internet access for sex offenders. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

April Hunter Rigsby (Edmonds) (“Mother”) and Aaron R. Edmonds (“Father”) divorced in 2008. Mother and Father are the parents of the minor child, Elijah E. (“the Child”). In the permanent parenting plan entered with the divorce, Mother was designated as the Child’s primary residential parent. Mother and Father were to have equal time with the Child. Mother later petitioned the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) to relocate with the Child. The Trial Court granted Mother’s petition. In 2011, Father filed a petition to modify the final decree of divorce, attached to which was his new proposed permanent parenting plan wherein he requested to be designated the Child’s primary residential parent. Father argued, among other things, that because the Child was approaching school age, the child would be better served going to school in Father’s community. Mother filed an answer to Father’s petition, including her own proposed new permanent parenting plan. The Trial Court found in favor of Father, designated Father as the new primary residential parent of the Child, and set a new parenting schedule. The Trial Court also ordered Mother to pay child support. Mother appeals. We hold that no material change of circumstances occurred to justify a change in the Child’s primary residential parent. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part.

This appeal arises out of dependency and neglect proceedings. The respondent mother has three children, one an infant. The infant suffered numerous unexplained injuries and was diagnosed with failure to thrive. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to have all three children declared dependent and neglected, and alleged severe child abuse as to the infant. The trial court declared all three children dependent and neglected, but declined to find severe abuse. The respondent mother now appeals the trial court’s finding of dependency and neglect, and the Department of Children’s Services appeals the trial court’s failure to find severe child abuse as to the infant. We affirm the trial court’s finding that all three children were dependent and neglected, but find clear and convincing evidence that the infant suffered severe abuse; therefore, we reverse the trial court’s finding on severe abuse.

In this contentious post-divorce dispute, the father has appealed from the trial court’s order
disposing of numerous issues including visitation and contempt. The order appealed does
not, however, address the mother’s request for modification of child support, and we
therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal involves a dispute between brothers. One brother owned an apartment complex and leased one of the apartments to his brother. The tenant brother allegedly failed to pay rent to the landlord brother. The landlord brother filed a forcible entry and detainer action in general sessions court seeking possession of the property and a judgment for the unpaid rent. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the landlord brother. The tenant brother appealed to circuit court. The circuit court conducted a trial de novo. After the trial, the circuit court awarded the landlord brother possession of the property and a judgment for the unpaid rent. The tenant brother now appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Brenda Holliman, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. She received concurrent sentences of life without parole and fifteen years. The victim was Petitioner’s husband. Her convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Brenda Holliman, No. W2003-01736-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 819735 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2005) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005). She timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended. Following an evidentiary hearing the petition was dismissed. Petitioner has timely appealed. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Petitioner, Curtis L. Wren, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Morgan County Criminal Court, seeking relief from several convictions in the Shelby County Criminal Court. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has timely appealed that ruling. We affirm the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

The trial court found that Defendant City of Memphis was not liable for injuries to Plaintiff resulting from an automobile accident in which Plaintiff’s vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by a third party. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiffs filed a voluntary notice of nonsuit in this medical malpractice action in July 2009.  They refiled their claim in September 2010. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Plaintiff was a full-time employee of the Tennessee National Guard until 2002 when he commenced active duty service in the Active Guard and Reserve. Near the completion of his active duty service in the Active Guard and Reserve, Plaintiff asked the Tennessee National Guard to rehire him pursuant to the Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). When the Tennessee National Guard refused, Plaintiff filed this action alleging it violated USERRA. The Tennessee National Guard responded to the complaint by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon sovereign immunity from USERRA claims. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Because the Tennessee General Assembly has not passed legislation to expressly waive its sovereign immunity from claims based on USERRA, as other states have done, we affirm.

Defendant, Brittany Renee Chambers, pled guilty to burglary, a class D felony, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. The parties agreed that the sentence would be eight years as a Range III persistent offender, that three other counts of the indictment would be dismissed, and that the trial court would determine the manner of service of the sentence. After finding that Defendant had at least nine prior felony convictions, fourteen misdemeanor convictions, and had violated probation and parole several times, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve the entire sentence in the Department of Correction. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court should have ordered the sentence to be served in the alternative sentencing of community corrections. After a thorough review of the entire record,we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Petitioner, Robert E. Bostick, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for first degree murder, aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated burglary, Class E felony theft, and Class E felony vandalism. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder, a lesser included offense of first degree murder and received an agreed sentence of 20 years at 100%. All other charges were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Defendant timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was dismissed by the post-conviction court following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals, raising two issues: (1) The post-conviction court erred by ruling his guilty plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered, and (2) Petitioner should be allowed to obtain a “second opinion mental evaluation” in order to prove he was incapable of agreeing to a plea agreement voluntarily and intelligently. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Troy Ector, of especially aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, and the trial court sentenced him to a twenty-two year effective sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In appeal from final decree in divorce action, Husband contends that the trial court erred in designating Wife as primary residential parent, in valuing the marital residence which was awarded to Wife, and in failing to require Wife to refinance the marital residence in her name alone. We affirm the designation of Wife as primary residential parent and the court’s valuation of the marital residence and remand the case for the courtto determine a reasonable length of time for Wife to secure Husband’s release from the indebtedness on the marital residence and to amend the final decree accordingly.
 

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. Finding that two grounds for parental termination have been established and that termination is in the best interests of the children, we affirm.
 

This is a divorce action filed by the wife and counter-complaint by the husband both seeking the divorce. After the trial, the Trial Court divided the marital property, granted the wife a divorce, and granted the wife alimony. The husband has appealed. We affirm the award of alimony, but modify the marital property division.
 

The Defendant, Heralal Nandlal, was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery. At the close of the State’s proof at trial, the trial court, out of the presence of the jury, sua sponte revoked the Defendant’s appearance bond. The jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated robbery, and the Defendant now appeals. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court demonstrated bias in its decision to revoke the Defendant’s bond. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

A Hamblen County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Earnest Laning, of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as 135 days in jail and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce his blood test result into evidence because the State failed to establish the chain of custody. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Tomario Walton a.k.a. Quadricus Dean, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a nine-year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Walton presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s showup identification of him as the perpetrator of the offense, and (2) whether the evidence at trial, specifically that of Walton’s identity, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Randy K. Wallace, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for one count of rape and one count of sexual battery. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of sexual battery. As a result, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of eight years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for sexual battery and that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eight years, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, David Weed, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of official misconduct, a Class E felony. Defendant pleaded guilty to the offenses charged and was sentenced by the trial court to two years in the Shelby County Workhouse for each count, with all but 90 days suspended, after which Defendant would be placed on probation for five years. Defendant’s sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Defendant appeals his sentences and asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion, or in the alternative, his request for full probation. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Corey Lynn Clark, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea conviction for second degree murder, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this post-divorce proceeding, the mother of the parties’ only minor child filed two motions to alter or amend the divorce decree in order to clarify the parties’ obligations under the marital dissolution agreement regarding their 2009 income tax returns, and two petitions for civil contempt. The contempt petitions alleged that the father failed to make timely child support payments and failed to reimburse the mother for mortgage payments, medical expenses, and school-related expenses for the parties’ child. The trial court denied the motions to alter or amend,finding that the amendment sought by the mother was unnecessary and that the father breached the tax provision of the MDA as written. The court also denied the petitions for civil contempt, finding that the father purged himself of the contempt prior to hearing on the petitions. The court ordered the father to pay the mother $10,302.36 plus post-judgment interest for the tax liability she incurred due to the father’s refusal to file a joint tax return and $3,500 for the attorney’s fees the mother incurred in filing the petitions for contempt. We affirm.