APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to serve twenty years in prison as a Range II multiple offender. The defendant appeals the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for second degree murder, based primarily on his contention that the evidence is not sufficient to show that he acted knowingly or without adequately provoked passion. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Paul Richardson, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the aggravated robbery and aggravated assault convictions; the aggravated burglary and felon in possession of a handgun convictions were to run concurrently with all other counts, for an effective sentence of thirty-nine years. On appeal, this Court overturned the aggravated assault conviction, and remanded to allow the trial court to restructure the service of the remaining sentences to include consecutive sentencing. On remand, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for all three remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of forty-one years. The defendant appeals the imposition of consecutive sentences. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Timothy Damon Carter, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and three counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105(3), -403. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to an effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) that the trial court erred by ordering his sentence to be served in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, who had previously been convicted of a felony drug offense, was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after a jury trial and sentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict and that the jury was improperly influenced by information outside the evidence presented at trial. The trial court found that the evidence supported the conviction and the defendant was not prejudiced by any extraneous information. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Vincent Love Williams, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus, contending that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without reviewing it or answering the allegations, that his judgment was void because of a defective indictment, and that his right against double jeopardy had been violated. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief.

In June of 2008, petitioner, Juan Cantu, entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to sell more than twenty-nine grams of cocaine.The trial court suspended petitioner’s sentence and placed him on probation for ten years. Agents from the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained petitioner at his home on May 17, 2011, before transferring him to a detention facility in Louisiana. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on September 30, 2011, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel’s failure to advise him that pleading guilty would result in deportation. On the State’s motion, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition based on the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). In summarily dismissing the petition, the post-conviction court determined that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), was inapplicable to petitioner’s case, and as such, the petition was untimely filed. To overcome the statute of limitations, petitioner argues on appeal that Padilla should be applied retroactively. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Darry Lee Mitchell (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty in 1991 to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated robbery, receiving an effective sentence of fifty-fiveyears in theTennesseeDepartmentof Correction. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief in 1996 and again in 2004; both petitions were denied. Acting pro se, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition in July 2011, which the post-conviction court denied without a hearing. The Petitioner appealed. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves personal guaranties on a loan to purchase real estate. The Appellants entered into a partnership for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. The partnership obtained a loan in the amount of $2,611,000.00 to purchase real property located in Florida. The Appellants each signed a personal guaranty on the loan in favor of the Appellee bank. By the express terms of the guaranties, the Appellants guaranteed “up to a principle amount of $795,600.00.” The partnership defaulted on the loan and the bank sued to enforce the guaranties. The Appellants answered that the guaranties were joint and several and that, because they were only 30% owners of the partnership, they could only be liable for 30% of the amount of the defaulted loan. In addition, the Appellants argued that the bank  breached the covenant of good faith in failing to foreclose on the subject property. The trial court found that, under Florida law, the guaranties were not ambiguous, but were separate guaranties holding each Appellant separately liable for $795,600.00. The trial court also awarded interest on the entire debt. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the guaranties unambiguously require each Appellant to be separately liable for $795,600.00, but hold that the term regarding interest is ambiguous. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this issue and remand to the trial court for the consideration of parole evidence regarding the amount of interest and fees chargeable to the Appellants. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child. The trial court found two grounds for termination, abandonment and persistence of conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s home. The finding of abandonment was based on the mother’s incarceration at the time of the filing of the petition to terminate and because the mother engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). The trial court also found termination was in the child’s best interest due to the fact that the mother lacked a meaningful relationship with the child, that the mother failed to make adjustments to her home and lifestyle to make it safe for a child, and that the child was happy and healthy in her foster home of over two years such that removal would have a detrimental impact on the child’s emotional and psychological condition. We affirm.
 

Upon the Court's inquiry as to whether the order appealed was a final judgment, Appellant filed an application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although we must dismiss Appellant's Rule 3 appeal, we grant Appellant's Rule 10 application and vacate in part the trial court's order of October 26, 2011, and remand for further proceedings.

A former student who obtained a student loan from Middle Tennessee State University appeals the judgment of the trial court holding him liable on the student loan, including interest that accrued thereon, costs of collection, attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Bryant Carter, entered into a negotiated plea agreement and pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and properly reserved the following certified question of law for appeal: “Whether further prosecution of this case is barred by double jeopardy under the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions when the Defendant was detained under a pro forma policy of the General Sessions Criminal Court while properly out on a misdemeanor citation in lieu of arrest.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Christopher Hubbard (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping. He appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In a previous appeal, this court vacated and remanded the trial court’s order dismissing a petition for an order of protection based upon the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. On remand, the trial court issued an order making the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law and again dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of proof and thereby abused its discretion. We find no merit in this argument. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

The Defendant, Lisa Faye Allison, pled guilty, pro se, to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine and one count of possessing less than 0.5 ounces of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of three years to be served on probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that she had violated the terms of her probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her request to apply for the community corrections program, improperly basing the denial on her decision to exercise her right to a hearing on the issue of whether she violated her probation. She further  contends that the trial court erred because it denied her community corrections request without holding a hearing on her eligibility. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves a conservatorship. After the parties announced in open court that they had reached an agreement on a partial conservatorship, the appellant ward stood up in court and asked to speak. The hearing was adjourned and subsequently the partial conservatorship was ordered in accordance with the agreement. The ward now appeals, arguing inter alia that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, failing to make the requisite findings, and failing to hear from the ward. We find no error and affirm.
 

Derrick Brandon Bush (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of attempt to commit rape in December 2000. On April 25,  2011,the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief,alleging that his guilty plea was unconstitutional in light of Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), and that the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations should be tolled. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief. The State appealed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we hold that the rule announced in Ward does not apply retroactively. Therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(b)(1). We also hold that the Petitioner is not entitled to tolling on due process grounds. Thus, the Petitioner’s claim for relief is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, John Todd, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2006) (amended 2007), 39-13-210 (2010). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for first degree murder and twenty years’ confinement for second degree murder. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding him competent to stand trial; (2) denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement; (3) denying his motion for a mistrial trial on the ground that an outburst during the trial prejudiced the jury against him and prevented a fair trial; (4) admitting gruesome photographs of the victims at the trial; (5) allowing a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsies to testify at the trial; and (6) denying his request for a mistrial on the ground that the State failed to provide his oral statement reduced to writing before the trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case addresses the issue of whether an announced, and otherwise qualified, candidate for the District 89 (Knox County) seat in the State House of Representatives satisfies the residency requirement to run in the Democratic primary on August 2, 2012. The trial court held that she was not eligible to run because the court found that she was a resident of Anderson County. She appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

We granted this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal to answer the question of whether the Tennessee Revenue Bond Law, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-101, et seq., permits a private right of action on behalf of Appellees, utility rate payers, against Appellants, the City of Bolivar and its utility. The trial court denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that Appellees could maintain a private cause of action because Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-115(f) did not provide the sole remedy for violation of the statutory scheme. We hold that the Revenue Bond Law does not expressly create an individual private right of action, and that Appellees have not carried their burden to establish that the legislature intended to imply such a right. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants. Reversed and remanded.

Property owner hired a general contractor to perform construction work on a commercial building. The parties subsequently discovered that when the building was originally constructed, there were no fire dampers installed in the ductwork. The contractor performed the additional work necessary to install the missing fire dampers, but when the work was completed, the property owner refused to pay the amount invoiced by the contractor for the additional work. Both parties asserted that the other had breached the contract. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the contractor and awarded her a judgment for the unpaid balance and other damages. The property owner appeals. We affirm as modified.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Ramone Gholston, of facilitation of first degree felony murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered him to serve an effective sentence of nineteen years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that his sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied enhancement factors. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, William Henry Wiggins, was convicted in the Davidson CountyCircuit Court of felony possession of a controlled substance, namely oxycodone, and a violation of the sex offender registry. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve an effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the convictions and that his sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kevin Anthony Dickson, Jr., was found guilty by the Sevier County Circuit Court of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2010), 39-14-404 (2010), 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010, 2011), 39-13-402 (2010), 39-12-101 (2010). The trial court merged one count of aggravated assault into an attempted first degree murder conviction. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for each attempted first degree murder conviction, twelve years for especially aggravated burglary, and six years each for the aggravated assault and attempted aggravated robbery convictions. The trial court ordered the attempted first degree murder convictions to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted first degree murder convictions, (2) his conviction for especially aggravated burglary is barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d), and (3) the trial court erred by applying improper sentencing enhancement factors and ordering partially consecutive sentences. We  ffirm the judgments for the attempted first degree murder of Christopher Lyons, aggravated assault, and attempted aggravated robbery. We reverse the judgments for the attempted first degree murder of Rodney Hardin and especially aggravated burglary and remand the case for sentencing and entry of judgments of conviction for attempted second degree murder and aggravated burglary.

After careful review of the record and relevant law, I am unable to agree with my colleagues’ determination that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for the attempted first degree murder of Rodney Hardin. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent on this issue. I concur with the majority’s conclusions otherwise.