APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, David Edward Niles, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment. On appeal, Niles argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his residence; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his ex parte motion for funds for a psychiatrist. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

In this divorce action, Father appeals certain provisions of the parenting plan, the award of rehabilitative alimony and award of counsel fees to Wife, and the finding that he was in criminal contempt. Mother appeals the valuation and division of marital assets, the failure of the court to require that payments to Mother be secured, rulings with reference to certain pre-trial matters, and the classification of alimony. We remand the case for further consideration of the amount of Father’s annual contributions into the children’s educational accounts; we affirm the judgment in all other respects.
 

I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the requirements for rehabilitative alimony. All types of alimony are statutory, and the legislature’s definitions must be applied. The legislature has stated that it intends that an economically disadvantaged spouse be rehabilitated, through an award of rehabilitative alimony, whenever rehabilitation possible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2).
 

Following a short marriage, the parties were divorced. The issues raised in this appeal by the husband pertain to the marital classification and valuation of the husband’s gun collection, the award of one year of transitional alimony to the wife, and the award of $15,000 for the wife’s attorney’s fees. For her part, the wife contends the husband has not paid the judgment for her portion of the marital estate, $8,065.94, and that she is entitled to post-judgment interest. We find no error with the valuation of the marital estate or the award of transitional alimony and attorney’s fees and, thus, affirm the trial court. As for the wife’s claim for postjudgment interest on any portion of the marital estate which the husband has not paid, it is an issue for the trial court to determine whether the husband has failed to timely pay any portion of the judgment and, if so, to award post-judgment interest pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 47-14-121 & -122. The wife also seeks to recover attorney’s fees she incurred on appeal. We find she is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award.
 

The defendant, Tracy Direll Woodard, entered open guilty pleas to three counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-417(c)(2)(A); three counts of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, see id.; sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, see id. § 39-17-423(a)(1); and delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance, see id. § 39-17-423(a)(2). At sentencing, the trial court merged each delivery conviction into the corresponding sale conviction and imposed an effective sentence of 16 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentences are excessive. We affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. On remand, however, we direct the trial court to correct the judgments to properly effectuate merger of the alternative counts of sale and delivery.
 

Former client filed a pro se complaint for legal malpractice against her former attorney. She had previously filed a complaint against the attorney with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, and that matter had been resolved in the attorney’s favor nearly two years before she filed the malpractice complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint for malpractice, finding it barred by the one-year statute of limitations for such claims. The former client appealed. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order entered by the Circuit Court for Bedford County denying the appellant leave to proceed in that court on a pauper’s oath. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The petitioner, Timothy L. Jefferson, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis which challenged his 2001 guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

Appellant, Terry Bonds, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation because his sentence had expired. Appellant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. The State contends that this court should dismiss the appeal because the notice of appeal was untimely and deficient in form. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services sought to terminate the parental rights of Brandon M. and Anthony T. to their minor child. The trial court terminated Brandon M.’s parental rights, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination based upon, abandonment, substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions and that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Brandon M. appeals the court’s best interest determination. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Danny Miller, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1979 conviction of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and resulting life sentence. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition to test DNA evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

After a subpoena duces tecum was served on Chattanooga attorney Scott D. Bergthold (“the Attorney”) requiring him to appear for a deposition in Hamilton County and to produce documents regarding ordinances enacted by Sarasota County, Florida (“the County”)pertaining to “adult businesses,” he filed this action as a motion for a protective order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-9-201, et seq. (Supp. 2011). The Attorney asserted, on behalf of himself and the County, that the information sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine and that the discovery was overly broad and unduly burdensome. The trial court granted the protective order and quashed the subpoena. The subpoena had been issued and served at the request of Cheetah Lounge, Inc., dba “The Cheetah Lounge” and Sarasota Eateries, LLC (“the Adult Clubs”) as a part of their discovery in a Florida case wherein they challenged the constitutionality of the subject ordinances. The Adult Clubs appeal. While this matter was pending oral argument before us, the County filed motions asking that this Court consider dual facts, i.e., (1) that, following the entry of the trial court’s judgment, the Florida court dismissed the underlying case and (2) that court later denied the Adult Clubs’ motion to rehear. We directed the parties to brief the issue of whether this ancillary matter is rendered moot by the dismissal of the underlying action. We now hold that this case is moot. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiff appeals from the summary dismissal of his legal malpractice claim against his former attorney who represented him during an arbitration of a securities dispute. Finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, causation, we affirm the summary dismissal of the action.
 

After an investigatory stop and frisk, the defendant was charged with the unlawful possession of a handgun after a felony conviction and the unlawful possession of a handgun while under the influence of alcohol and was convicted on both counts. The trial court imposed probationary sentences of three years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. The defendant appealed, arguing that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. Because the investigatory stop and frisk of the defendant was not supported by specific and articulable facts establishing reasonable suspicion that a criminal act was being or about to be committed, the trial court erred by failing to suppress the handgun found by the police and presented as evidence at trial. The judgments of conviction are, therefore, reversed and the cause dismissed.
 

The Chattanooga Housing Authority (“CHA”) evicted its tenant, Reginald Locklin (“the Tenant”), after two of his sons were involved in an incident with neighbors. The eviction was accomplished by order of the trial court giving CHA possession of the property. The Tenant appeals arguing that CHA, which is a public housing authority (“PHA”), made the decision to evict him and his family arbitrarily and without due process. We affirm.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Mother appeals the trial court’s order enjoining the parties from allowing their child to be in the presence of a friend of Mother’s. Father appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days he exercises parenting time for purposes of determining his child support. Finding that the court erred in its calculation of the number of days of Father’s parenting time, we vacate the award of child support and remand for a redetermination. We affirm the trial court’s issuance of the injunction.
 

The petitioner, Melvin J. Reed, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. In this appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition because principles of due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations in his case. Because we agree that the petitioner alleged grounds for due process tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations, we reverse the dismissal of his petition and remand the case for a hearing to determine whether due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations.
 

The circuit court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.

Donna J.S. (“Mother”) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Ethin E.S. and Mary J.C. (collectively “the Children”). The younger child, Ethin, was born drug-exposed and required intensive care for treatment of his withdrawal symptoms. As a result, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) became involved. In the weeks after Ethin’s birth, a protective order was entered and DCS took temporary custody of the Children. Following a two-day bench trial, the court found that there are multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s rights and that termination is in the best interest of the Children, both findings by the court said to be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Mother challenges both of these determinations and, in addition, contends that DCS failed to provide reasonable efforts to assist her toward reunification with the Children. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises out of a lawsuit in which plaintiff sought recovery on claims of fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation with respect to the purchase of real property; the trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff only on the claim for negligent misrepresentation only. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgement in all respects
 

Following his guilty pleas to reckless aggravated assault, assault, and possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, the Montgomery County Circuit Court sentenced the defendant, Vincent D. Steele, as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of four years, 11 month and 29 days, and 11 years’ imprisonment, respectively, to be served consecutively to a previously-imposed sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentence imposed was excessive both in length and manner of service. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Petitioner, Edward Jerome Harbison, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis seeking relief from his 1983 convictions for first degree murder, second degree burglary, and grand larceny. Petitioner claims that an order of a previous coram nobis court establishes a new predicate for review. Petitioner also claims that a statement of a prosecutor during a previous hearing constitutes “new evidence.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the error coram nobis court.

The defendant, Brandi Nichole Miller, appeals the revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original twelve-year sentence, arguing: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation; (2) that her due process rights were violated by the fact that the trial court relied on grounds that had formed the bases for her prior probation revocations and were not alleged in the instant revocation warrant; and (3) that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve sentences that had already expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating her twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Teresa O. and Harrison O. Teresa O. was the mother of three children, while Harrison O. was the father of two of those children. The trial court terminated Teresa O.'s parental rights to all three children and terminated Harrison O.'s parental rights to his two children. Teresa O. and Harrions O. appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Lawrence, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, and resulting effective sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not plead guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.