APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Bobby Joe Ladd, appeals the revocation of his probation, claiming that the
evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court. Discerning no error, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Lynn Boling, Jr., filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Blount County requesting jail credits for time he spent on furlough. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, we conclude that this case is not properly before this court because no appeal as of right exists from the trial court’s denial of the motion. We dismiss the appeal.

The employee alleged that she was permanently and totally disabled due to a lower back injury suffered while operating a foot pedal on a drill press in April 2004. The employee had previously alleged an injury to her lower back, which was settled on a “doubtful and disputed” basis. Although the employee’s treating physician testified that the April 2004 incident was a temporary flare-up of her earlier injury, he did assign new permanent restrictions. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a new injury and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The Second Injury Fund and the employer have appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Billy Joe Smith, pled guilty to: (1) possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Class E felony; (2) maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances were used or sold, a Class D felony; and (3) two separate counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Due to his prior criminal convictions, Defendant was designated as a Range II multiple offender for each felony conviction, and agreed to a sentence length of four years for each felony. The plea agreement provided for sentences of 11 months and 29 days for each misdemeanor conviction, and for all of the sentences to run concurrently with each other for an effective sentence of four years as a Range II offender. There was no  agreement as to the manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that Defendant would serve the sentence in the Department of Correction. Defendant has appealed and argues that the trial court should have granted him full probation or split confinement, or ordered the sentences to be served in the community corrections program. Following a thorough review we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Alejandro Rivera, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because: (1) counsel failed to “formulate a defense and to present testimony from all essential witnesses;” and (2) counsel failed to file an appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. After a review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Roger Hathaway, Jr., pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated arson, attempted second degree murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and received a total effective sentence of 12 years to be served at 30 percent. Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Timothy L. Morton, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his three petitions for writ of habeas corpus and its denial of his motion to reinstate these petitions, wherein he alleged that the trial court’s judgment revoking his probation and ordering his one-year sentence for DUI, fourth offense, and two-year sentence for driving in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act (MVHOA) into execution is void. Upon review, we affirm the judgments summarily dismissing the petitions for habeas corpus relief and denying the motion for reinstatement of the petitions for habeas corpus relief.

This medical malpractice action, which had been pending for several years, was summarily
dismissed because the plaintiff did not file a response to the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff’s only expert witness admitted she was not qualified to opine
concerning the standard of care at issue, and the statute of limitations had run. Upon motion
of the defendants pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), the trial court
awarded the defendants $9,000 in discretionary costs. This appeal followed. We affirm. We
have also determined that this appeal is frivolous and remand to the trial court to determine
the proper amount of damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122.

The defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict holding her liable to her employer for her involvement in a co-worker’s misappropriation of funds. The jury found that the defendant’s involvement included (1) intentional misrepresentations, (2) concealment of facts relevant to the misappropriation, and (3) breach of contractual duties owed to the employer. The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of the proof. The motion was based upon the defendant’s assertion that the statute of limitations barred the claim. We affirm.

In this negligence action, the jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict against one of the two
defendants. We find no error in the judgment regarding liability, but we must vacate and
remand as to damages because the trial court erred in excluding testimony and evidence
regarding the plaintiff’s medical expenses.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. After the employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back, the parties reached a settlement of the claim at a benefit review conference.  As part of the agreement, the employer agreed to provide a job for the employee within the medical restrictions arising from the injury. The employer eventually decided not to rehire the employee after he failed to return to work. Thereafter, the employee filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking reconsideration of his settlement. The trial court granted the petition and increased the disability award. On this appeal, the employer takes issue with (1) the trial court’s adoption verbatim of the employee’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, (2) the trial court’s conclusion that the employee was entitled to reconsideration, (3) the exclusion of evidence related to the employee’s prior back problems, and (4) the claimed excessiveness of the award. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Jermain Sean Lipford, was indicted by the Franklin County Grand Jury for initiating a process to manufacture methamphetamine, manufacturing methamphetamine, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, reckless endangerment, felony possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, driving under the influence, violation of the implied consent law, driving on a revoked license, and fourth offense driving on a revoked license. Appellant pled guilty to initiating a process to manufacture methamphetamine. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to eight years, to be served in the Community Corrections program after the service of 150 days in incarceration. After the issuance of a revocation warrant and hearing, Appellant conceded the grounds for the violation of his Community Corrections sentence. Appellant was ordered to serve the original sentence. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly determined Appellant was not entitled to jail credit. After a review of the record, we conclude the trial court properly awarded sentencing credits to Appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Tajay Vaughn (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of thirty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In his petition, he argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Jimmy L. Smith (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that counts one through four of the indictment underlying his convictions are defective, and, therefore, his judgments of conviction are void. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing. The Petitioner then filed this appeal. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Rutherford County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Gregory Moore, of one
count of aggravated sexual battery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-504(a)(4) (2006), and three counts
of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, see id. § 39-13-529(b)(1), for offenses
committed against his seven-year-old step-daughter. The trial court imposed an effective
sentence of 13 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support his conviction of aggravated sexual battery and the trial court’s
imposition of sentences. We discern an anomaly in the judgments for counts three and four
requiring correction on remand. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court, as
modified.

Petitioner, Jerome Sawyer, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As grounds for relief, petitioner argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his eighteen-year sentence for aggravated sexual battery by applying enhancing factors, other than prior criminal convictions, not found by a jury. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirm the judgment of the court.

This custody case arises from an agreed order of parentage. After Father’s paternity was established, he filed a petition in juvenile court for custody of the child. At the conclusion of several hearings that took place over a span of years, the juvenile court entered an order naming Father primary residential parent and awarding Mother weekend parenting time. Mother appealed. While awaiting appeal, Mother filed a petition to have the child declared dependent and neglected. The Special Judge presiding over that petition transferred Mother’s petition to Lake County, where Father and the child reside. In response to the allegations in Mother’s petition, Father filed a petition for an injunction and to have Mother’s future parenting time supervised. A different Special Judge granted Father’s request without a full hearing, stating that Mother’s parenting time would remain supervised until further orders of the court. No further orders were ever entered. We affirm the trial court’s order naming Father primary residential parent, but vacate the transfer of Mother’s petition to Lake County and the modification of Mother’s parenting time. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

In this appeal, a show cause order was entered in this case on August 28, 2012, directing counsel for the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant has responded to the show cause order in a response that does

In this action, the Estate has appealed to this Court the denial of an exception to
appellee's claim.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, George R. Thacker, of solicitation to commit first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it declined to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment and the law regarding accomplice testimony. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an agreement between the Appellee, a nonprofit corporation, and the Appellant, a real estate agent, whereby the Appellant would acquire foreclosed properties, oversee all necessary repairs and renovations of the properties, and ultimately sell them for the benefit of the Appellee. The Appellee’s executive director was given the authority to act on its behalf in all dealings with the Appellant. As compensation, the Appellant received commissions on the purchase and sale of each property, and a percentage of the repair costs for his oversight of the repairs and renovations of each property. After operating pursuant to the oral agreement for over a year, the parties executed a written agreement for the same purpose. Throughout their relationship, the Appellant acquired approximately eighty-four (84) properties for the Appellee. Subsequently, after discovering that their records did not contain documentation of actual repair costs which the Appellant was required to submit under the written agreement, the Appellee filed a complaint for an accounting. The trial court appointed a Special Master to conduct an accounting. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Special Master filed a report in which he ordered that the Appellant be disgorged of all funds received by virtue of the agreements with the Appellee based on his failure to provide documentation of actual repair costs, and further suggested an award of attorney’s fees and costs in favor of the Appellee. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final order adopting and confirming the Special Master’s findings, and denied the Appellant’s objections to the Special Master’s report. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the Appellant was not required to submit documentation of actual repair costs on the properties acquired pursuant to the oral agreement. We further conclude that the course of conduct between the Appellant and the Appellee’s executive director modified the written agreement, such that the Appellant was not required to submit documentation of actual repair costs. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Josue Segura, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, Segura argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, by refusing to grant a second mental evaluation, and by allowing the State to introduce certain photographs of the victim. Segura also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After the Rhea County grand jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Daniel G. Hampton, for one count of first degree premeditated murder, Hampton entered an Alford plea, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), to second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court accepted the parties’ agreed sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction and, after a sentencing hearing, ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to Hampton’s unserved federal sentences. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering a consecutive sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cole Woodard, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, Class C felonies, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three concurrent sentences of ten years. On appeal, Woodard argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) his convictions violate principles of double jeopardy. Upon review, we affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting merger of the jury verdicts into a single conviction for sale of cocaine.

Husband of a decedent filed a wrongful death medical malpractice action against the
decedent’s physician and sought to amend his complaint to add a count for negligence per
se based on the physician’s failure to review his physician assistant’s narcotics prescription.
The trial court denied Husband the opportunity to amend his complaint and dismissed the
action on summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court
erred in denying Husband’s motion to amend but affirmed the trial court’s other rulings. On
remand, the trial court allowed Husband to amend his complaint to add a count for
negligence per se, but the court then granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment
on the issue of causation. Between the first Court of Appeals decision and this appeal, the
Tennessee Supreme Court decided Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546
(Tenn. 2011), in which it held that negligence per se claims cannot be maintained when
medical malpractice is alleged. The Estate of French holding bars Husband’s negligence per
se claim against the physician. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the
physician summary judgment.