APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pro se petitioner, Joby Lee Teal, seeks a declaratory judgment concerning the legality of his five 1988 convictions for drug offenses and the resulting concurrent five-year sentences he received as a result of a negotiated plea agreement. As grounds, petitioner argues that the sentences are void because he committed the offenses while on bail and should have received consecutive sentences. The Criminal Court for Shelby County found that declaratory judgment relief is not available to petitioner because his five concurrent sentences had expired. Upon review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

Plaintiff-homeowners filed this action for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against the builder and seller of their home alleging that the home was not constructed in a workmanlike manner. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant breached the contract and the express and implied warranties, and violated the TCPA. The court awarded damages of $90,000 for the diminution in value of the home. The court also held Plaintiffs were entitled to recover their attorney’s fees pursuant to the TCPA. Defendant appealed arguing that Plaintiffs failed to prove causation, that the trial court erred in awarding damages in the amount of $90,000 for the diminution in value of the home, and erred in finding it violated the TCPA for which the trial courtawarded attorney’s fees.We affirm the trial court’s findings as to Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty and affirm the trial court’s determinations as to damages; however, we find the evidence preponderates against the finding of a violation of the TCPA and therefore the trial court erred by awarding Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees.
 

The Defendant, Denise Dianne Brannigan, was convicted by a Carter County jury of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000 and three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value equal to or less than $500. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed terms of 5 years for the theft conviction and 11 months and 29 days for each fraudulent use of a credit card conviction. The trial court ordered consecutive service of the 5-year sentence and two of the 11-month and 29-day sentences. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of prior uncharged conduct under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and (2) that her sentence was excessive. After our review, we affirm.

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for attorney fees and court costs and executed an order to that effect. The plaintiff filed a motion for relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 arguing that the trial court violated his due process rights by awarding the defendant attorney fees without providing proper notice and the opportunity to be heard. We reverse the trial court.
 

Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court to concurrent sentences of 20 years for each conviction. Defendant appeals his convictions and asserts that: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and 2) the trial court erred by limiting Defendant’s cross-examination of a State’s witness and by denying Defendant the opportunity to make an offer of proof of his excluded cross-examination. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Courtney Rashad Farrell, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. As part of the Defendant’s guilty plea, he agreed to a sentence of between ten and twelve years as a Range I standard offender. The plea agreement provided that the trial court would determine the length of sentence within the agreed upon range as well as whether the sentence would run consecutively or concurrently with the Defendant’s prior twelve-year sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven years consecutively to his prior sentence. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Derrick Le’mon Goode, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court committed error in finding that neither his general sessions court counsel nor his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance as a matter of law. He cites six factual grounds supporting his claim and alleges that the cumulative effect of counsels’ errors deprived him of his right to counsel and a fair trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to show that either counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, of aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to prove venue; (2) law enforcement officers’ seizure of him violated his constitutional protections; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Homeowner retained Contractor to remodel her residence and paid Contractor two out of three installments as provided in the contract. Homeowner was not satisfied with Contractor’s work and refused to pay the final installment. Contractor sued for breach of contract and Homeowner filed a counterclaim asserting Contractor breached the contract by failing to perform the job in a workmanlike and reasonable manner. Homeowner also claimed Contractor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act by engaging in unfair and deceptive practices. The trial court dismissed Contractor’s complaint and held Contractor breached the contract by failing to perform the work in a reasonable and workmanlike manner. The court found Contractor was not liable for double or treble damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act because Homeowner did not prove its deficiencies were intentional or willful. Homeowner appealed, claiming the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend her counterclaim to assert a claim for rescission and erred in holding Contractor did not violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm the trial court’s judgment

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that due process considerations could toll the statute of limitations in this case. While there are instances when due process could toll the statute of limitations, this is not one of them. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Christopher Kennedy, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery in exchange for a sentence of nine years to be served at 100%, followed by community supervision for life. After his release for that conviction, the Defendant was indicted for violating a condition of his community supervision. The Defendant filed a motion to declare Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 unconstitutional “and/or” seek habeas corpus relief. After hearing the motion, the trial court granted relief, finding that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 violate double jeopardy protections. The State filed a timely notice of appealed. The Defendant cross appeals, asserting: (1) the community supervision for life statute is unconstitutional; and (2) the conditions for lifetime supervision established by the Board of Probation and Parole are void as the conditions are not enacted pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court improperly declared Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 unconstitutional and that the trial court properly dismissed the remaining issues. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court in part and affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, Troy Fuller, was convicted by a Madison County jury of rape, aggravated criminal trespass, and violation of an order of protection. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Appellant complains that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the length of his sentence was excessive, that the jury was not instructed on the offense of assault and that his wife’s car was illegally searched. On appeal, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; he has waived any issue regrading his sentence because he failed to include a copy of the presentence report in the record; Appellant has waived any issue regarding an assault instruction because he failed to request one; and his constitutional rights were not violated by the search of the car because the knife, which was recovered from the search, was not
presented as evidence at trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Stoney R.Anderson,II,pled guilty in the Hickman County Circuit Court to possession of more than half an ounce of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ probation. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Anderson reserved the following certified question of law: “[w]hether the warrantless search of the Defendant’s bag is supported by exigent circumstances.” Upon review, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case.

Raymond Thomas (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years of incarceration. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence consecutively to a previous sentence. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the consecutive service of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A non-party deponent appeals the imposition of $6,635 in monetary sanctions under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01(4). The non-party deponent, a Tennessee resident, was subpoenaed to give a deposition concerning a civil action pending in a California state court pursuant to a foreign court subpoena, which was issued and served in accordance with the Uniform Depositions and Discovery Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 24-9-201 through -207. During the deposition, the deponent’s attorney objected to almost every question in an argumentative and suggestive manner, often without providing a proper basis for the objection, consulted with the deponent at length several times during questioning, and unilaterally terminated the deposition without seeking a protective order. The California defendants who attempted to take the deposition filed a motion to compel discovery and to recover their expenses pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01. The trial court granted the motion and held the non-party deponent liable for the defendants’ expenses. The deponent appeals contending that he did not obstruct the deposition, that the sanctions are the result of his attorney’s misconduct, and that his attorney should be solely responsible for the sanctions. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01(4) affords the trial court the discretion to require a deponent whose conduct necessitated a motion to compel, or the attorney advising such conduct, or both of them to pay to the moving party’s reasonable expenses. The manner in which the deponent’s attorney conducted the deposition amounted to clear violations of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 30.03 and 30.04. Except for certain circumstances not at issue here, a lawyer’s misconduct is attributable to and binding on the client; therefore, the deponent should not be excused from liability for his attorney’s misconduct, especially considering the deponent is experienced in giving depositions and knew or should have known his attorney’s conduct was outrageous and in violation of the rules of discovery. Moreover,because trialcourts have broad discretion in determining when to impose sanctions and against whom, such decisions are reviewed on appeal pursuant to the very deferential abuse of discretion standard. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Richard Carlton Pickard, Jr. (“the Defendant”) pled nolo contendere to one count of DUI, second offense, and one count of simple possession of Schedule IV contraband. He reserved five certified questions regarding the legality of his stop. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the Defendant is entitled to no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Town of Pegram appeals from the trial court’s decision awarding it no damages in its claims against Cornerstone Development, LLC, the company which constructed theTown’scity hall and surrounding parking lot. Pegram also appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of National Grange Mutual Insurance Company, which provided the performance bond assuring Cornerstone’s performance. We affirm the trial court’s findings in all respects.
 

The pro se petitioner, David Easton Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because due process considerations may toll the statute of limitations in this case and the post-conviction court did not make such determination, we reverse the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Husband appeals the trial court’s division of property in this divorce action. We affirm.

This is a breach of contract case. Appellant, a former employee of Appellee Shelby County, filed suit against Shelby County for alleged breach of a settlement agreement. specifically, Appellant alleges that Shelby County breached the contract by failing to change Appellant’s employment record to reflect that he resigned, rather than that he was fired, and/or by informing Appellant’s potential employer that Appellant was fired. Shelby County filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions had expired. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. We conclude that: (1) the contract is severable; (2) Appellant’s cause of action for Shelby County’s breach of its obligation to change his employment records was correctly dismissed on the statute of limitations ground; (3) Appellee’s contractual obligation to answer employment inquiries pursuant to the terms of the contract was not implicated until the condition precedent occurred (i.e., until inquiry was made by a third-party); and (4) the breach of this obligation accrued when Shelby County disseminated information counter to that contemplated in the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Appellant’s claim that Shelby County violated the express terms of the settlement agreement in 2010 by informing the Appellant’s potential employer that he was fired is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The Defendant, Harriet Robertson Forrest, was indicted on nine counts of identity theft, a Class D felony. The Defendant pleaded guilty to all nine counts. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant received a four-year sentence for each conviction as a Range II multiple offender with the sentences to run concurrently. The plea agreement provided that the manner of service would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her effective four-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her request for an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Channon Lee Williams, appeals from the Benton County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. He was originally convicted for the initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class B felony. He received a sentence of eight years, which was to be served on community corrections after one year’s imprisonment. On appeal, Williams argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the denial of a petition filed by the niece of a decedent’s surviving spouse to have the decedent’s estate administered and to have a personal representative appointed. The probate court dismissed the niece’s petition for lack of standing holding that she could not proceed as next friend of her aunt because her aunt had previously appointed the decedent’s brother as her attorney-in-fact. The niece contends on appeal that she has standing to pursue the administration of the decedent’s estate in accordance Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. 17.03 because the attorney-in-fact for her aunt failed to initiate administration of the decedent’s estate. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.
 

After a bench trial, the Hickman County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Troy Lee McDonald, of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him to two years to be served as thirty days in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his request for full probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Cornelius O. Williams, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Appellant pled guilty to one count of rape of a child, two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. He received an effective thirty-three year sentence to be served in confinement. The State raises an issue regarding appellant’s untimely notice of appeal. After considering the merits, we hold that the trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and affirm the judgment of the trial court.