APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from the cancellation of a homeowner’s insurance policy. The plaintiff homeowner asked the defendant insurance agent to obtain a homeowner’s insurance policy for a home that was not her residence. The agent contacted the defendant intermediary insurance agency, and an insurance policy was issued. The homeowner paid the insurance premiums to the insurance agent, who failed to pay them to the intermediary insurance agency. The policy was cancelled for nonpayment. The cancellation notice was sent to the insurance agent and to the insured address, but not to the residential address of the homeowner. A fire occurred and the homeowner’s claim was not paid. The homeowner sued the intermediary insurance agency. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant intermediary insurance agency. The homeowner appeals. We reverse in part, holding that the intermediary insurance agency did not negate the homeowner’s claim based on the apparent authority of the insurance agent.

This appeal involves the release of ballots for a condominium association election. The plaintiff condominium owner was a candidate for a position on the board of directors for the defendant condominium association. After losing the election, the plaintiff condominium owner requested to audit the vote and see the other members’ written ballots. The condominium association provided a tally sheet reflecting the number of ballots cast for each candidate but declined to release the actual ballots. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit, contending that the condominium association had a statutory obligation to release the ballots to him. The plaintiff later filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the summary judgment motion and dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiff condominium owner now appeals. We affirm, finding that the plaintiff condominium owner does not have a statutory right to see the association members’ written ballots.

Father and Mother filed a joint motion to modify a parenting plan entered by the trial court in 2010. In their motion, Father and Mother asked the court to reduce Father’s child support obligation, to modify the parenting time schedule, and to amend the plan to permit a known registered sexual offender to be in the presence of their children. The trial court denied the motion with respect to allowing a sexual offender to be in the presence of the children, and otherwise granted the motion. Mother appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Patrick Wayne Carter, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation and order that he serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the revocation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Delivetrick Dewon Blocker, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The married parents of two minor children are involved in custody/visitation litigation in the trial court. The most recent decision by the trial court was prompted by a petition filed by he children’s father. The trial court denied the father’s attempt to obtain custody and suspended his visitation rights pending his completion of anger management and parenting classes. The father appeals. Because the trial court’s judgment is not a final judgment, we dismiss the father’s appeal.

The defendant, Christopher S. Robinson, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that the court erred: (1) in finding that his due process and speedy trial rights were not violated by the long delay between the filing of the probation violation warrant and the revocation hearing; (2) in finding that he violated the terms of his probation; and (3) in ordering him to serve six months in confinement. Following our review, we conclude that the twelve-year delay between the filing of the warrant and the revocation hearing, under the facts of this case, violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and dismiss the revocation warrant.

This case concerns the application of the medical malpractice notice requirement to a lawsuit that was previously nonsuited and then re-filed pursuant to the saving statute. The children of a woman who died due to alleged medical negligence filed suit against the defendant medical providers. The children subsequently nonsuited the lawsuit. Within one-year of the nonsuit, the children sent notice of a potential claim to the medical providers. Within one year and 120 days from the nonsuit, the children re-filed their claim. The medical providers moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim was not filed within the one-year period provided by the saving statute and, as such, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the action and the children appealed. Concluding that the saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-105(a) is not an “applicable statute[] of limitations or repose,” we hold that the saving statute is not extended by compliance with the medical malpractice notice requirement, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(c). Affirmed and remanded.

The executor of the estate of Dana Ruth Johnson Gregory waited approximately 14 months after her death before seeking to open her estate. The Bureau of TennCare filed a claim approximately four months later, shortly after receiving the executor’s notice of the death and the opening of the estate. The executor objected to the claim as untimely under the statute of limitations applicable to claims by the state. The trial court rejected the objection and held that the claim was valid. The executor appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Corry Tyrone Owens, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, to ten years of incarceration, to be served at 45%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition.

Covered Bridge Resort on Waldens Creek, LLC (“Seller”) sold its interest in an ongoing resort development to Tennessee Covered Bridge, LLC (“Purchaser”). Seller agreed to finance the sale and Purchaser agreed to secure the debt with a mortgage on the property. Mountain National Bank (“the Bank”) agreed to loan Purchaser money to continue development of the property but required that its mortgage be in a first position. Seller agreed to subordinate its mortgage with the understanding that the members of Purchaser would personally guarantee the debt to Seller. Attorneys Charlie R. Johnson and Sherri E. Case of the firm of Johnson, Murrell & Associates, P.C. (collectively “the Lawyers”) prepared the documents and handled the closing. Purchaser soon defaulted and Seller learned that Purchaser’s members had refused to execute the guaranties. Seller filed this action against the Bank, the Lawyers and Purchaser . When Seller took the deposition of the Bank’s loan officer, the Bank, through counsel, instructed him not to answer several categories of questions on the ground of privilege. Seller filed a motion to compel which the trial court granted upon finding that the information at issue was not privileged. The trial court granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. This Court agreed to hear the appeal. We now affirm the order of the trial court (1) granting the motion to compel and (2) holding the Bank’s motion for summary judgment in abeyance pending completion of discovery.

This case involves an alleged breach of a construction contract. The plaintiff contractor entered into a fixed priced contract to build a custom home for the defendant homeowners. During the construction, the contractor told the homeowners that the project was under budget, and that they could apply the cushion in the budget toward upgrades. Many upgrades and additions outside the scope of the original contract were made. The project ended up over budget, and the homeowners refused to pay more than the fixed price of the contract. The contractor filed this lawsuit, alleging breach of contract. The homeowners counterclaimed for breach of contract, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the contractor some of the upgrade costs and dismissed the homeowners’ counterclaims. The homeowners now appeal. We reverse the award for the cost of the upgrades and remand for specific findings as to each upgrade or addition. In all other respects, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

Michael Lindsey (“the Petitioner”), pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the sentence on his second degree murder conviction is illegal, and therefore, his judgment of conviction was void. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing. The Petitioner then filed this appeal. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Upon a plea of guilty, Defendant, Justin Alexander Deweese, was convicted of child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15401(a), a Class D felony. He submitted to the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered a three-year sentence of confinement. Defendant has appealed, asserting that he should receive a totally suspended sentence to be served on probation. He does not challenge the length of the sentence. Having fully reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Alvin Young, of aggravated kidnapping and domestic assault. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eight years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated kidnapping conviction and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See State v. Michael AlvinYoung, No. E2010-00849-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 5517281 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 9, 2011). The Defendant filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of State v. Jason Lee White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). After considering the facts and circumstances of this case as compared to those in White, we again affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner-Appellant, Joe Eddie Maclin, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This appeal involves an order of protection obtained by Wife against Husband in 2009 and the extension of that order of protection in 2010. We find no basis for Rule 60 relief with respect to the original order of protection. As to the child support provisions in the amended order of protection, we vacate and remand for a determination consistent with the child support guidelines.
 

The defendant, Isaac McDonald, Jr., was convicted by a jury of attempted aggravated rape, a Class B felony, and sentenced to serve twelve years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Secured party brought action against debtors and guarantors, seeking recovery of deficiency which remained after sale of collateral. The trial court granted summary judgment to secured party. Because genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, we reverse.

Deney Brockman (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of burglary of a building other than a habitation. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The father of an eight year old girl filed a petition for divorce from the child’s mother. After the petition was filed, the court entered a standard restraining order, which among other things prohibited either party from relocating with a minor child outside the state without the permission of the other party or an order of the court. The wife asked the court to name her as the child’s primary residential parent and to allow her to relocate with the child to St. Louis,because that city offered her better employment prospects than did MiddleTennessee. The father opposed the mother’s request to relocate, and he asked the court to divide parenting time equally. After a three day trial, the court ruled that the mother’s proposed relocation was unreasonable and pretextual and that it was in the child’s best interest that the mother be named the primary residential parent, with the mother and child remaining in Tennessee. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court should have allowed her to relocate with the child because the criteria set out in the relocation statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108, did not preclude her from doing so. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition to relocate with the child.
 

The Petitioner, Michael Panzini, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, to be served at 100%. The record contains two judgments of conviction, one provided by the State and one provided by the Petitioner. The judgment form in the official court file indicates the box on the judgment form showing the Petitioner was sentenced to community supervision for life as checked. The judgment submitted by the Petitioner does not contain that check mark. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his sentence was illegal because he was not sentenced to community supervision for life. The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his original judgment of conviction did not include community supervision for life as required by statute and that his judgment was modified without notice, a hearing, or an order. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner, Tony Holmes, of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The jury sentenced him to life in prison for first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole for attempted first degree premeditated murder, to be served consecutively. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal to this court, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an eyewitness’s identification of him. He also contended in his petition that trial counsel was ineffective for improperly making personal attacks against the prosecutor during closing arguments, for failing to impeach witnesses with their prior criminal convictions, and for failing to impeach a witness with her prior inconsistent statement to police. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child. The trial court found two groundsfortermination,abandonmentby wantondisregard and persistence of conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s home.The trial court also found termination was in the child’s best interest. The record contains evidence that clearly and convincingly established the ground of persistent conditions and that termination is in the child’s best interest; therefore, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
 

The defendant, Robert Lee Vandergriff, Jr., was convicted of driving while intoxicated, a Class A misdemeanor, by a Union County jury. He was sentenced to a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, all of which was suspended but for eight days service in the county jail. On appeal, the defendant’s single contention of error is that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress. Specifically, he asserts this decision was error because he was seized without reasonable suspicion. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.