APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Mikel Shane Hutto, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he failed to receive statutorily mandated pretrial jail credits for his sentences, thereby rendering the confinement illegal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner-Appellant, Stephen Lee Scott, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea because counsel misinformed him regarding the elements of felony murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Jason Charles Austin, was indicted by a Washington County grand jury for one count of first-degree murder. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder and subsequently sentenced to twenty-three years. On appeal, Appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by allowing Appellant’s case to be severed from the case of his co-defendant; (2) the State violated Appellant’s rights under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions; (3) the trial court erred in concluding that Christina Boone was a hostile witness and allowing the State to examine her with regard to her previous statement made to the police; (4) the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based upon the loss of key evidence; (5) the State violated the Rule of Exclusion; (6) the trial court erred by refusing Appellant’s request to call a surrebuttal witness; (7) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that guilt may be inferred from evidence of flight and from concealment of evidence; (8) the trial court erred by imposing a twenty-three-year sentence; and (9) Appellant was denied a fair trial because of cumulative error. Following our review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Lindsey (“the Petitioner”), pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the sentence on his second degree murder conviction is illegal, and therefore, his judgment of conviction was void. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing. The Petitioner then filed this appeal. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Upon a plea of guilty, Defendant, Justin Alexander Deweese, was convicted of child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15401(a), a Class D felony. He submitted to the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered a three-year sentence of confinement. Defendant has appealed, asserting that he should receive a totally suspended sentence to be served on probation. He does not challenge the length of the sentence. Having fully reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Kimberly Johnson, was charged by presentment with three counts of the sale of a Schedule II controlled substance and three counts of the delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. Johnson subsequently entered guilty pleas to the charges in the Sullivan County Circuit Court. Pursuant to the terms of her plea agreement, Johnson was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, she was required to pay a $6,000 fine, and her delivery convictions were merged with her sale convictions for an effective sentence of four years, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing and imposed a sentence of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Frederick Greene, of first degree premeditated murder. Greene was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole according to a sentencing agreement. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence, specifically of premeditation and intent, was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict and (2) the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on self-defense. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant has appealed from a final judgment entered on December 28, 2012. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.
 

After a bench trial, the Cannon County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, James Everett Ferrell, of violating the seatbelt law, second offense, and fined him twenty dollars. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the court tried his case without a warrant and because the citing officer did not file an affidavit of complaint. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In two separate trials, a Shelby County jury found the Petitioner, Kevin McDougle, guilty of three counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated assault and one count of unlawful possession of a handgun. For all the convictions, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed separate appeals for his cases, and this Court affirmed the judgments in both cases. State v. Kevin McDougle, No. W2009-01648-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2490752, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 11, 2010) no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed; State v. Kevin McDougle, No. W2007-01877-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2219591, at *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 24, 2010) no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming the two attorneys who represented him on each respective case were ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in both cases. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Richard Frank D’Antonio, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction and resulting life sentence. He contends that the trial court erred in determining that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Martin Dean Gibbs, of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and eight counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for each rape of a child conviction and ten years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing a social worker to testify about the victim’s allegations pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(4), the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify about the victim’s allegations as prior consistent statements; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions in counts 7 and 11; and (4) his convictions in counts 1 and 9, 2 and 10, and 3 and 11 violate protections against double jeopardy. The State concedes that the evidence is insufficient as to count 11. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s rape of a child conviction in count 11. Therefore, that conviction is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. The appellant’s remaining convictions are affirmed.

The defendant, Roger Vines, was convicted by a Wayne County jury for one count of selling .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and sentenced to a term of ten year’s incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the ten-year sentence is excessive; and (3) the court erred in denying probation. Following review of the record,we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction and resulting sentence as imposed.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. Indeed, I join in the majority opinion on all but one issue. I write separately to address the issue of the appropriate standard of review bythis Court on hearsayevidentiaryissues. The majorityapplies an abuse of discretion standard of review to the hearsay issue in this case.
 

Reginald C. Malone, Sr. (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, challenging his conviction for the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, which resulted in a sentence of eight years in confinement. As his bases for relief, he alleged several grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, a Brady violation, illegal evidence, and malicious prosecution. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge the discrepancy in the reports of the weight of the cocaine through either a motion to suppress the cocaine or cross-examination as to its chain of custody. Additionally, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to file a timely motion for new trial. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we remand the case for the trial court to grant the Petitioner leave to file a motion for new trial.

The defendant, Brian Jermaine Dodson, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated assault and sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend counts two and three of the indictment over his objection; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a State witness, Adrian Walker, to testify concerning gang activity and in failing to grant his motion in limine regarding Walker’s testimony; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on alibi; (5) the trial court erred in allowing the defendant’s prior convictions to be introduced during trial; (6) newly discovered evidence could have affected the outcome of the trial; and (7) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by using perjured testimony and an improper closing argument, the cumulative effect of which deprived him of a fair trial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee acquired contact dermatitis, which caused a chronic skin condition of his hands and feet, due to his exposure to potassium dichromate in the workplace. The trial court found that he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the condition. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.

In this divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification and division of marital property. Wife appeals the trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of certain expert testimony and the grant of Husband’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to vacate the award of alimony. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.
 

This post-divorce appeal involves parenting issues. The parties had one child; they divorced in 2005. Initially, the mother was designated as the primary residential parent. The father filed a petition for modification, seeking to be designated as primary residential parent. The modification petition cited, inter alia, the mother’s attempts to frustrate the father’s visitation and alleged physical assaults by the mother. The trial court entered an order temporarily designating the father as primary residential parent and requiring that the mother’s visitation be supervised. The mother’s attorney was to supervise her client’s visitation, but was disqualified after it was alleged that the attorney failed to supervise the visitation. After a three-day hearing, the trial court granted the father’s petition to modify and held the mother in contempt for the unsupervised parenting time. The mother now appeals, representing herself. The trial court declined to approve the mother’s proposed statement of the evidence because a court reporter was present at the trial, citing the provision in Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure indicating that an appellant is to have a transcript prepared where a stenographic report is available. The mother proceeded with the appeal with neither a transcript nor a statement of the evidence. We vacate the finding of criminal contempt because the record does not show that the mother was advised of her right to appointed counsel on the contempt. We also vacate the award of attorney fees and expenses insofar as it relates to the vacated contempt finding, and affirm as to the remainder of the trial court’s ruling.

This appeal arises out of a change of custody petition filed by the father of a minor child. The Juvenile Court magistrate found a material change of circumstances but retained the mother as primary residential parent. Father filed a request for rehearing before the Juvenile Court judge. Before the rehearing could be held, the guardian ad litem filed a motion requesting that the magistrate review the parenting plan and stay its prior order based on the mother’s drug use, domestic abuse, and marital problems. Thereafter, the magistrate entered an order staying its prior order and naming father the primary residential parent. The Juvenile Court judge held a trial de novo and entered an order finding that a material change in circumstance had occurred and that it was in the child’s best interest for the father to be designated the primary residential parent. The mother was ordered to pay the father’s attorney fees and a portion of the guardian ad litem’s fees. The mother appeals. We affirm the court’s decision to designate the father as the primary residential parent, its award of attorney fees to the father, and the award of fees to the guardian ad litem. We remand for determination of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded.
 

The defendant, Antywon Montrace Beasley, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for probation. The defendant pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of ten years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the court determined that the sentence was best served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that this determination was error. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentence as imposed.

Plaintiff sued defendant mortgage company that held a mortgage on his home, on which defendant foreclosed. Plaintiff's alleged cause of action was that defendant had received money from the U.S. Treasury pursuant to the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and that defendant failed to properly consider him for a home loan modification pursuant to the federal acts and regulations. Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and the Trial Court dismissed part of plaintiff's complaint, but denied defendant's motion as to plaintiff's third party beneficiary claim, the negligent implementation of the HAMP claim and the wrongful foreclosure claim. Defendant sought a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal, which was granted by the Trial Court and this Court and we hold that under the federal acts and regulations, there was no provision for a private right of action claim, and reverse so much of the Trial Court's judgment that holds otherwise.

The defendant ran off the road and struck an expensive vehicle on a used car lot. The lot owner sued the defendant for the damages to the vehicle plus the lost profits he would have made with the proceeds of the sale if the accident had not happened. The trial Court awarded the plaintiff $10,482.12, plus prejudgment interest at 5% per year from the date the vehicle was sold at wholesale in a damaged condition. The Court did not make any findings as to the basis for the award. The defendant asserts on appeal that the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages. The plaintiff assigns as error the trial Court’s failure to award him more damages for his lost profits. We hold that the plaintiff did not make a case for lost profits or the before and after retail value of the automobile. We reduce the award to $4,766.47, the estimated cost of repairs to the vehicle and we reverse the award of prejudgment interest.
 

Sevier County Bank (“the Bank”) sued Eileen M. DiMeco, CitiMortgage, Inc., and First American Title Company seeking specific performance with regard to a Grant of Right of Way and Agreement to Dedicate (“the Agreement”) concerning a right of way to be used as a public road. The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment and after a hearing the Trial Court granted the Bank summary judgment. Ms. DiMeco appeals to this Court. We find and hold that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the Bank is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, and we affirm. We further find this appeal frivolous and award the Bank attorney’s fees on appeal.

The Petitioner, Russell Caldwell, pled guilty to facilitation of first degree felony murder and was sentenced to serve fifty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court entered an order denying post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.