APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, David Hearing, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his two convictions of felony murder and the accompanying life sentences. The habeas corpus court denied relief, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Davidson County jury found the Petitioner, Benjamin Ashley Ray Dickens, guilty of first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction in State v. Benjamin Ashley Ray Dickens, No. M2006-01697-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1988024, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 28, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2007). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and filed two subsequent amended petitions. After the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing, it dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and he further argues that the State made improper arguments during its closing argument,amounting to prosecutorial misconduct. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding the civil liability of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis for acts of child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by one of its priests in the 1970s. A victim of this alleged abuse filed suit against the Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis in the Circuit Court for Shelby County seeking monetary damages. The Diocese moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived state courts of subject matter jurisdiction and that the victim’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the Diocese’s motion. The Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations had run on the victim’s claims and that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred state courts from considering the victim’s negligent hiring and retention claims but not the negligent supervision claims. Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, No. W2009-00986-COA-R10-CV, 2010 WL 2106222 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2010). We granted the victim’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the victim’s claims and that the victim’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
 

William Robert Lindsley (“the plaintiff’) filed this action for divorce against Lisa Whitman Lindsley (“the defendant”). The defendant, along with her answer, asserted a counterclaim asking that the marriage be declared void for bigamy predicated upon the fact that the plaintiff was married when he purported to marry her. The plaintiff obtained a divorce from his previous wife before the parties to this action separated. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment asking that their marriage be declared void. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. In Lindsley v. Lindsley, No. E2008-02525-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2349200 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed June 11, 2010) (“Lindsley I”) we held that “under Texas law where [the parties were] married, . . . they could, under the [Texas] statute, enter into a common- aw marriage after the spouse was divorced in the prior marriage.” Id. at *1. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court upon finding that there was a “disputed issue of fact . . . whether the parties entered into a common-law marriage after the plaintiff’s prior marriage ended.” Id. We remanded “for a determination of this factual issue.” Id. On remand, the trial court heard evidence and held that the plaintiff did not satisfy his burden of showing that the parties’   cohabitation established the elements of a common law marriage under Texas law. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Husband appeals his conviction of fourteen counts of criminal contempt for violations of the Marital Dissolution Agreement and the imposition of fourteen consecutive ten-day sentences for a total of 140 days in jail. Husband also appeals an award of attorney’s fees to Wife. We affirm the award of attorney’s fees to Wife and the finding that Husband was guilty of fourteen separate counts of criminal contempt; however, we find the imposition of the maximum sentence was excessive and employ our authority under Thigpen v. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) to modify the sentence. Applying contempt sentencing principles found in In re Sneed, 302 S.W.3d 825 (Tenn. 2010) and sentencing considerations under Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-103 and 115(b), the sentences for twelve of the counts are reduced to four (4) days each, which will run consecutive to each other, the sentences for the two remaining counts are reduced to one (1) day each, which will run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the other twelve counts for an effective sentence of forty-nine (49) days. We also award Wife her reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to the enforcement provision contained in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement.
 

This action was filed by Arlie “Max” Watson, an elected county commissioner of Sevier County, and three other citizens and taxpayers of Sevier County, Peggy Marshall, John A. Meyers and Gerra Davis-Mary (collectively “the Plaintiffs”). They purported to act both individually and on behalf of the State of Tennessee. They named as defendants the county mayor, Sevier County, and the county commission as a body (collectively “the Defendants”). They sought to invalidate certain actions – primarily the commission’s adoption of certain procedural rules at a meeting held June 23, 2008 – and to disgorge the mayor of benefits he “wrongly” received. The trial court initially dismissed all claims – except those made under the Open Meetings Act – for lack of standing. It ordered that the caption be amended toreflect that the Plaintiffs were acting individually and not on behalf of the State. The trial court allowed the Open Meetings Act claims to proceed through discovery. Both sides of the dispute filed a motion for summary judgment. With the exception of a finding that minutes of some committee meetings were not properly filed in both the office of the county clerk and the county mayor as required by a local rule, the court found no deficiencies in the challenged actions. It granted the Defendants summary judgment as to all of the Open Meetings Act claims. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The petitioner, Roger T. Johnson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In 1994, the petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder and second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to the agreed sentence of consecutive terms of life plus thirty years in the Department of Correction. In the instant petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner alleges that his convictions are void because the trial court illegally altered the terms contained in his judgment of conviction for second degree murder. This alteration, he asserts, includes an illegal sentence. He further contends the trial court erred when it summarily dismissed his petition. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm.

The defendant, Bryan K. Watkins, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by basing its revocation decision on his failure to pay court costs and supervision fees without also making a determination that the nonpayment was willful. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation and ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement.

After fourteen years of marriage, Alyson Leigh Amonette Eberting (“Wife”) sued Jeffrey Jennings Eberting (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Judgment for Divorce on August 12, 2010, which, inter alia, awarded Wife a divorce, distributed the marital property, entered a Permanent Parenting Plan, awarded Wife transitional alimony, and awarded Wife attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals raising issues regarding the valuation of his orthodontic practice, the parenting plan, and the award of Wife’s attorney’s fees. Wife raises issues concerning the overall property division, and the amount of attorney fees and expenses awarded to Wife as alimony in solido. We affirm.

A Williamson County jury convicted the defendant, Jeffery Wade Osborne, of aggravated assault. Following his conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to thirteen years as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.The State concedes that the evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault but is sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of assault. Therefore, we modify the conviction to assault and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

A jury awarded Mary Catherine Gentry (“the Plaintiff”) compensatory damages of $80,000 against four defendants involved in the sale to her of a condominium. It also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $30,000 – $10,000 each against three of the four defendants. The defendants (collectively referred to herein as “the Defendants”) are Battery Place Condominiums, LLC, the owner of the complex (“the Owner”); Tagner H. Bailey, the builder of the complex (“the Builder”); Gina Sakich, the realtor who handled the transaction (“the Realtor”); and Realty Center of Chattanooga, Inc., the agency for which the Realtor worked (“the Agency”). Before the trial court entered judgment on the verdict, the Builder and the Owner renewed their motion for directed verdict. The trial court entered an order on March 10, 2010, that purports to (1) grant a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages; (2) grant the motion for directed verdict on the issue of compensatory damages; (3) grant a new trial limited to compensatory damages; and (4) deny the motion for directed verdict as to reasonable reliance. Thereafter the chancellor who presided over the trial retired and a new chancellor was appointed. Numerous motions and hearings later, the new chancellor entered an order setting the case for trial; the order also modified, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01, the first chancellor’s March 10, 2010, order by deleting the earlier order’s grant of a directed verdict as to compensatory damages. The trial court later granted the Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application of the Defendants and stayed all proceedings pending appeal. We likewise granted the Defendants’ request for an interlocutory appeal. Finding no error in the trial court’s judgment, we affirm.

The defendant, Gregory A. Shaver, pled guilty to initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the length of the sentence is excessive. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentence.

A Madison County Jury convicted Petitioner of three counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment resulting from an altercation Petitioner had with his live-in girlfriend and her three daughters. State v. Kenneth Ford, No. W2007-02149-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1034522, at *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 17, 2009). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-two years. Id. at *3. Petitioner was unsuccessful in his direct appeal of his sentence to this Court. Id. at *1. Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing and denied the petition. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings. In addition, several issues raised by Petitioner were not raised in front of the post-conviction court. In addition they were not raised during direct appeal but could have been and are now waived; or were addressed on direct appeal. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Because I would have affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I do not interpret Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 as precluding successive ninety-day windows for the purpose of adding additional parties identified as comparative tortfeasors by defendants already in the lawsuit.
 

Wilson Sporting Goods Company brought suit in the Cumberland County General Sessions Court on an open account against U.S. Golf & Tennis Centers, Inc. (“the Company”) and its owners, Arthur H. Bell and Louise Bell (collectively “the Guarantors”). The account resulted from a large shipment of golf balls. After delivery, the Company questioned the price charged and refused and failed to make any payments. In response to Wilson’s suit, the defendants filed a counterclaim in which they denied owing the amount sought and moved the court to modify or rescind the contract with Wilson. Following a bench trial, the general sessions court entered judgment in favor of Wilson. On appeal to the trial court, both sides sought summary judgment; both motions were denied. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of Wilson for $33,099.28. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Mario Thomas, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Perley W. Jr., (“Father”) appeals the termination of his rights to his minor daughter, Rebekah R.W. (DOB: Oct. 7, 2005) (“the Child”). The petition to terminate was filed by Arlin H. and Emma H. (collectively “the Grandparents”), the Child’s maternal grandparents, who were the Child’s temporary custodians. At the time of the bench trial, Father was serving an effective 40-year prison sentence pursuant to two convictions for attempted murder and a conviction for attempted aggravated arson. The court terminated Father’s rights based upon the ground that Father was incarcerated under a sentence of ten or more years while the Child was under eight years of age, and its finding that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals the trial court’s best interest determination. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

The Petitioner, Chris Allen Dykes, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing his petition on procedural grounds and (2) that the judgments against him are void because they reflect a conviction of criminal responsibility for first degree murder when he was indicted for criminal responsibility for attempted first degree murder. Following our review, we conclude that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing the petition on the grounds stated in its order. However, we affirm the summary dismissal based upon other grounds stated in this opinion.

This is a post-divorce case. Thomas E. Goddard (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order granting Christa Goddard (“Mother”) permission to move to Florida with the parties’ minor child, Emma Elizabeth (DOB: July 1, 2004)(“the Child”). Based upon finding that Mother was spending the greater amount of time with the Child, the court applied Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d)(1)(2010). The court found that the proposed relocation (1) had a reasonable purpose, (2) posed no threat of specific and serious harm to the Child, and (3) was not motivated by a vindictive effort to defeat Father’s parenting rights. Father appeals. We affirm .

In this post-divorce action, a father seeks to have his child support obligation reduced following the emancipation of the parties’ older child.Mother opposes a reduction due to the expense of the younger child’s extracurricular activities and Father’s failure to exercise visitation with the younger child. Mother also seeks payment for unpaid child support from 2002. The trial court held Father was entitled to a reduction in his child support obligation, and that the circumstances justified the creation of a new parenting plan with less visitation time for Father, and an upward deviation from the Child Support Guidelines for Father’s child support obligation for the younger child. Further, the court held Father in “willful civil contempt” for the unpaid support from 2002, and ordered Father to pay the arrearage and a portion of Mother’s attorney fees. We affirm the trial court in all but two respects. We reverse the decision holding Father in contempt for failing to satisfy his support obligation in 2002, because it was not willful. Father was out of work due to an injury. We also reverse the decision denying prejudgment interest on the child support arrearage from 2002, finding that Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(f)(1) mandates that interest on unpaid child support shall accrue from the date the ordered support was due, at a rate of 12% per year. We also find Mother is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal and remand for determination of the amount.
 

The defendant was convicted in a jury trial of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, for killing her boyfriend following an altercation. She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years, split one year in jail with the balance to be served on probation. The defendant now appeals her conviction and sentence, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to sentence her to the minimum sentence. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We accepted this appeal to determine whether the phrase “a defendant named . . . within the applicable statute of limitations” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(a) (2009) refers only to a defendant sued within the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s claim or also refers to defendants not sued within the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s claim, but added to the lawsuit during the ninety-day period provided by section 20-1-119(a). Whether section 20-1-119(a) affords successive ninety-day windows during which a plaintiff may amend a complaint to add a new nonparty defendant as a comparative tortfeasor is an issue of first impression. Because we answer that question in the negative, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court granting Fulmarque’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing this action.
 

This case arises from a dispute over which parent should be the primary residential parent of two minor children, Julian and Tristen (“the Children,” collectively). Julie Leamon Tomlin (“Mother”) and Nathan Leamon (“Father”) are the parents of the Children. Mother and Father divorced several years ago and both have since remarried. Some time after the divorce, Mother, with whom the Children spent the majority of their time, filed a petition for correct child support and to modify the existing permanent parenting plan in the Circuit Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”). Father filed an answer and counterclaim, requesting that he be made the primary residential parent, or, in the alternative, that he have equal parenting time with the Children. Following trial, the Trial Court found that a material change of circumstances had occurred and that it was in the Children’s best interests that Father be made primary residential parent of the Children. Mother appeals, arguing, in part, that no material change of circumstances had occurred that could support making Father the primary residential parent. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing an inmate’s petition for writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.
 

This lawsuit was filed by the decedent’s nephew and the nephew’s wife alleging that the caretakers of the decedent improperly influenced him to change his will. The proponents of the decedent’s will filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that no confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the caretakers in regard to the will. The trial court granted the proponents’ motion, finding that proof of a confidential relationship was necessary to pursue a will contest on the ground of undue influence, and that no such confidential relationship existed between decedent and the caretakers. The contestants appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.