APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Gregory Keith Wiggins, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $500, a Class E felony, evading arrest creating a risk of death or injury, a Class D felony, and driving on a revoked license, eleventh offense, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to concurrent terms of three years’ confinement for theft and four years’ confinement for evading arrest. He was sentenced to a consecutive term of eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement for driving on a revoked license for an effective sentence of four years, eleven months, twenty-nine days. The Defendant, Robert Brown, pled guilty to theft of property valued under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement. Each Defendant reserved a certified question of law related to their seizure by law enforcement officers. The Defendant Wiggins also appeals the trial court’s sentencing determinations. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant filed a motion to set aside an order that purported to settle a dispute concerning the real estate in a decedent’s estate. The court denied the motion; Appellant contends this was error. The parties announced their agreement to settle the dispute in open court. An order, titled “Agreed Order,” was subsequently entered but it was not signed by Appellant’s counsel; moreover, Appellant filed an objection to the entry of the order prior to it being approved by the court. The transcript of the agreement announced in court reveals that the so-called “Agreed Order” does not contain a material condition to the fulfillment of the agreement, that Appellant “is going to be borrowing money in order to come up with the funds necessary to offset that and pay these amounts to these other two individuals, so that’s part of the agreement.” We find the denial of Appellant’s motion to set aside the so-called Agreed Order causes an injustice to Appellant; accordingly, we reverse the denial of Appellant’s Rule 59.04 motion to set aside the November 3, 2010 Agreed Order. The trial court also found that performance under the agreement was not a legal impossibility, meaning that Appellant could obtain the requisite loan. We have determined the evidence preponderates against this finding because Appellant demonstrated that, due to the current appraised value of the property, she is unable to obtain the requisite financing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion to the extent necessary to complete the administration of the decedent’s estate.
 

The issue in this case is which of two deeds of trust has priority. Deed of trust A was executed before deed of trust B was executed; A was also registered before B was registered, but after B was executed. We affirm the chancellor’s decision that A has priority over B and that equitable estoppel does not apply to change this result.
 

An employee sustained a compensable injury to her hand and elbow. Employee’s authorized treating physician assigned an impairment rating of 1% to both her right and left arms. The employee’s evaluating physician assigned 16% impairment to her right arm and 15% to her left arm. Due to the disparity between the physician’s ratings, the parties selected a  physician from the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) who assigned 5% impairment to each of the employee’s arms. The trial court based its award of disability benefits on the MIR physician’s rating. The employee has appealed, contending that she successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of correctness given to the MIR physician’s rating. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

This appeal arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained after being assaulted by a co-worker while working for the Defendants. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendants alleging vicarious liability for the assault committed by the co-worker, and liability for the negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of the co-worker, and liability for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Subsequently, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants after concluding that they owed no duty to Plaintiff and that the assault was not within the co-worker’s scope of employment. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and a motion to recuse. The trial court granted the Rule 60.02 motion, denied the motion to recuse, and Plaintiff appealed. After reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Prospective buyer who signed real estate sales contract sued seller, seller’s real estate agent and broker, and the actual buyers for breach of contract, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and specific performance. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that there was no enforceable contract. We affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Jon Douglas Hall, appeals the Davidson County Circuit Court’s denial of his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 1997 first degree murder conviction and resulting death sentence. The Petitioner contends that his conviction and sentence are void because (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to change the venue of his trial, (2) the procedure used to implement the death penalty is unconstitutional, and (3) his confinement and death sentence violate double jeopardy principles. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury in Tipton County found Defendant, Maurice Shaw, Sr., guilty of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years as a Range II offender. Defendant appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and that he is entitled to a new trial because “the evidence was so tainted by improper actions and testimony of the drug task force officer and confidential informant.” After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Marquise Harris, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. On appeal, Harris contends that due process considerations tolled the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises out of a bank’s suit seeking to reform a deed of trust to correct a mutual mistake, prevent unjust enrichment, and impose an equitable lien against the defendants’ property. The bank appeals the finding that there was no mutual mistake and the dismissal of the complaint. Because the order appealed does not resolve all claims, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment and remand the case.
 

Plaintiff, an employee, shareholder, and director of Wellness Solutions Inc., filed this action against the Company and shareholders Steven Scesa and Laura Reaves following the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with Wellness Solutions, Inc., asserting a shareholder derivative action and claims for breach of fiduciary duty and duty of good faith. Following her termination and the initiation of this action, the Company exercised a call option contained within the Shareholders’ Agreement and purchased Plaintiff’s stock.Plaintiff then amended her complaint to include claims for breach of contract and false light invasion of privacy against Mr. Scesa. The trial court summarily dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims. We reverse the summary dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract finding there are genuine issues of material fact. We also reverse the summary dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for false light invasion of privacy finding that Mr. Scesa, as the moving party, failed to negate the essential element of damages or demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot prove the essential element of damages at trial. We affirm the summary dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of good faith, and breach of the duty of loyaltyupon the finding the Defendants demonstrated thatthe business judgment rule applies to their decisions at issue, which negates an essential element of each of these claims. Further, we deny Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-56-401(c) upon the finding that Plaintiff did not properly bring a shareholder’s derivative action.
 

A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, James Willie Blair, of public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor, and imposed a fifty dollar fine, and the trial court sentenced Blair to a thirty-day sentence in the county jail. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support Blair’s conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Wayne Cooper, entered guilty pleas to four counts of burglary, a Class D felony, in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. The trial court sentenced him to forty-two months for each count, imposed concurrent sentences for three of the burglary counts, and ordered that these sentences be served consecutively to the remaining burglary count, for an effective sentence of eighty-four months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Cooper argues that the trial court erred by: (1) imposing a partially consecutive sentence alignment, and (2) imposing a sentence of total confinement. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Albert Frank Kelly, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

In this delayed appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing a fully-incarcerative sentence of 12 years following his pleas of guilty to three counts of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and three counts of the sale of 26 grams or more of cocaine. Discerning no error, we affirm.

 Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Brandon Lloyd Russell, was convicted of two counts of violating a commercial fishing proclamation that prohibited cutting paddlefish to check for eggs or “roe.” The trial court sentenced Russell to two consecutive six-month sentences, which the trial court suspended and ordered him to serve on probation. In addition, the trial court allowed the State to retain the property that was seized as a part of these offenses, ordered Russell to serve eighty hours of community service, and suspended Russell’s hunting and fishing license for three years and his commercial fishing license for six years, retroactive to the date of the offenses. On appeal, Russell argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges because: (1) the General Assembly, in enacting Tennessee Code Annotated section 70-4-102, unlawfully delegated its legislative authority to enact criminal law, thereby violating the constitutional separation of powers doctrine; (2) the relevant wildlife proclamations were not valid because the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Commission was improperly constituted at the time that the proclamations were enacted; and (3) he had insufficient notice of the wildlife proclamations and, therefore, insufficient notice of the criminal offenses with which he was charged. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Maurice Wilson, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon a review of the record, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in finding that the Petitioner is not entitled to reopen his petition. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant Estate sought declaratory judgment against Appellee widow for return of proceeds from the widow and Decedent’s jointly filed federal and state tax returns. The Estate contends that, under an Antenuptial Agreement entered by and between Decedent and Appellee, the income tax refunds were Decedent’s separate property, which thus belong to the Estate. Appellee widow contends that the filing of a joint tax return transmuted the separate property into marital property and, in the alternative, that a tenancy by the entirety was created in the tax refunds. The trial court found that, although the tax refunds were Decedent’s separate property under the Antenuptial Agreement, part of those proceeds should, nonetheless, pass to the wife. We conclude that the filing of a joint tax return does not create a property right, and that a tenancy by the entirety was not established. Consequently, as Decedent’s separate property, the tax refunds should have been awarded to the Estate. Reversed and remanded.

This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing an inmate’s complaint. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.
 

The petitioner, Anthony D. Byers, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, four counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The petitioner raises stand-alone claims that: (1) his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony are void because they are in direct contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c); (2) his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony are voidable on double jeopardy grounds; and (3) three of his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping are contrary to State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1998). The petitioner also argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were involuntarily. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief from the petitioner’s convictions for seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery. However, we reverse the denial of post-conviction relief from the petitioner’s conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and vacate and dismiss that conviction and sentence.

The Petitioner, Anthony M. Patton, pled guilty to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count of facilitation of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to an agreed upon effective sentence of fifty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition.

This appeal results from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee bank. Appellant defaulted on promissory notes executed in favor of Appellee, resulting in a foreclosure sale. After the sale, a foreclosure deficiency existed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, awarding deficiency damages including amounts for unpaid taxes on the property. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves an attorney fee award. The appellee attorney was hired to represent the executor of an estate. After handling the estate, the attorney submitted a fee request to the trial court. The beneficiary of the estate objected, but the trial court awarded the fee amount requested. The beneficiary appeals, arguing that the attorney fee request was so excessive that it should be disallowed entirely under White v.McBride, 937 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1996). In the alternative, if the fee request is not disallowed in its entirety, the beneficiary contends that the trial court erroneously relied on a percentage formula in the local rule, and that the fee should be reduced because the attorney sought fees for work that was either delegated to others or which did not benefit the estate. We hold that the amount of the attorney’s fee request and fee award is excessive. While the case presents a close question as to whether any fee should be allowed, we conclude that the lawyer should not be precluded from receiving any fee, and so modify the fee award to a reasonable amount.
 

The defendant, Courtney Bishop, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions for felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s refusal to suppress his pretrial statement to police. Because the trial court erred by failing to suppress the defendant’s statement, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and first degree murder in the perpetration of attempted aggravated robbery, those convictions are reversed. The conviction for attempted aggravated robbery is dismissed. The conviction for first degree murder is modified to one for second degree murder. Accordingly, the case is remanded for a new trial on the modified charge of second degree murder.

I fully concur in the result reached by the majority in this case. However, I write separately to express a different conclusion regarding the applicability of White v. McBride, 937 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1996), to the instant case.