APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Barry Wayne Dunham, appeals the Macon County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the minor child M.R. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found M.R. to be an unruly child. M.R. filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss (“Petition to Vacate”) regarding the order finding M.R. to be an unruly child. The Juvenile Court denied the Petition to Vacate. M.R. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. M.R. appeals to this Court, arguing that the Circuit Court should have heard M.R.’s appeal from Juvenile Court. We hold that the Circuit Court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss M.R.’s appeal of the Juvenile Court’s order denying M.R.’s Petition to Vacate. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court.

The petitioner, Michael Wilsey, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention via rendition warrant, and the State moves this court to summarily affirm the denial via Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals .The State’s motion is well taken, and accordingly, the denial of habeas corpus relief is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20. Additionally, the petitioner’s request for bond pursuant to Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure is denied.

The Defendant, Kale Sandusky, pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417, -425 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ probation for the possession with intent to sell conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ probation for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, to be served concurrently. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the arrest warrant that led to a search of his home. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the Defendant.

In this boundary line dispute, the defendants sought to claim property beyond a road known as “Creek Road.” The trial court concluded that the road constituted the defendants’ southern boundary. However, because the plaintiff’s complaint sought the adoption of a survey that conceded a small strip of land south of Creek Road to the defendants, along with the fact that the plaintiff testified that he believed that the defendants owned some property south of Creek Road, the trial court granted the defendants a strip alongside the road about four feet deep. After the defendants moved to conform their pleading to the proof and sought relief under the doctrine of adverse possession, the trial court reopened the proof to consider adverse use. Another opinion was issued awarding the defendants a strip extending approximately ten feet from the southern edge of Creek Road. The defendants appeal. We affirm the findings of the trial court.

The defendant, Larry Thomas Johnson, appeals his Bedford County Circuit Court guilty- pleaded convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, claiming that the trial court erred by imposing a Range II sentence in the absence of any notice from the State that it would seek enhanced punishment. Discerning no error, we affirm

Inmate filed petition seeking review of decision of prison disciplinary board. Trial court dismissed petition for failure to comply with applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. Finding that the trial court did not err, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Chad Allen Love, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to establish the Defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crime. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss the judgment of the trial court.

Personal representative appeals from order granting $27,900 claim against decedent’s estate. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The divorce action in this case was commenced in 2001. The Final Decree in the divorce action was entered in January 2008. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court in an adjoining county. Post to that transfer, numerous motions and petitions were filed in the Trial Court and on January 5, 2011 the Trial Court tried the issues relating to child support and a parenting plan. As a result of that hearing a Judgment was entered which held that the father failed to appear for the hearing, despite proper notice, had failed to respond to discovery and mediation in violation of the Court's order and the Court found that the mother's proposed parenting plan was in the children's best interest and incorporated the same in its Decree. The Court awarded child support based on the computed amount of income of the father, and also awarded the mother Judgment for her attorney's fees. The Court dismissed all of the father's request for relief and the father appealed. We hold that the facts relied on by the father in his brief are not supported by any evidence in the record, and his conclusions of law are not supported by authority, and the record establishes no basis for finding any merit in the issues raised on appeal. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Inmate filed petition seeking review of decision of prison disciplinary board convicting him of various disciplinary offenses. Trial court dismissed petition for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-106. Finding that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Petition, we affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises out of a dispute over personal property located on land sold at a foreclosure sale. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The defendant, Ernest W. Mays, pled guilty, in two separate cases, in the Dickson County Circuit Court to: (1) two counts of selling cocaine less than .5 grams, a Class C felony; (2) conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping, a Class C felony; (3) simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and (4) retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant was to receive an effective sentence of ten years, as a Range II offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Following review of the record before us, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the sentences as imposed.

Lender appeals the trial court’s decision awarding judgment in its favor for only part of the debt it claims to be owed by borrower. Finding no error in the trial court’s factual findings and conclusions, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

Arthur Lee Taylor (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and/or deliver and possession of dihydrocodeinone and his resulting effective thirty-year sentence as a career offender. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court.

Father appeals an order of the juvenile court requiring Father to pay private school tuition as an upward deviation from the presumptive child support amount, which more than doubled his child support obligation. We have determined that the trial court erred by ordering an upward deviation for private school tuition without first determining whether the extraordinary educational expense was appropriate based upon the parents’ financial abilities and the lifestyle of the child and by failing to make the requisite findings of fact to establish that Father has the abilityto payall of the tuition in addition to the presumptive child support. Therefore, we reverse the upward deviation for private tuition and remand the issue of the extraordinary educational expense to the trial court to make the requisite findings to determine, inter alia, whether private schooling is appropriate based upon the facts of this case and, if so, to determine which parent pays what portion of the private school tuition and costs.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged that he injured his back at work. His employer denied the claim. While the trial court found that the employee was not a credible witness, it found that he had sustained a compensable injury based upon the testimony of an independent lay witness and the treating physician. The trial court awarded 78% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of compensability. We affirm the judgment.

Truck driver was discharged for having too many accidents pursuant to employer’s policy on preventable accidents. He was denied unemployment benefits and the denial was upheld by the Appeals Tribunal, the Board of Review and the Chancery Court. We affirm.
 

Upon determining that the order appealed in this matter is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Defendant-Appellant, Lorenzo McLemore, III, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated burglary, and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. During the first phase of McLemore’s bifurcated trial, he was convicted of three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and the trial court declared a mistrial on the especially aggravated burglary count. During the second phase, the jury found McLemore guilty of employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of four years at thirty percent for the three convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and a consecutive sentence of six years at one hundred percent for the conviction for employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, McLemore argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony and that the trial court committed plain error in bifurcating his trial. The other Defendant Appellant, Melissa Denise Gaines, McLemore’s mother, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of attempted first degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. She was subsequently found guilty of three counts of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court dismissed the firearm charge because the reckless endangerment convictions did not qualify as a dangerous felony for the firearm charge. Gaines argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for reckless endangerment. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Johnny Coffey, appeals his Bradley County Circuit Court jury conviction of second degree murder, claiming that the trial court erred by denying him funds to procure additional expert assistance, by denying his request to play witness statements in their entireties, by refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial, by denying his request for a jury instruction on self-defense, and by failing to apply certain mitigating factors to reduce his sentence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Appellant, Jessica Birkhead, appeals under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 after the trial court’s grant of judicial diversion on a charge of vandalism under $500. On appeal
Appellant asks this Court to determine: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient; (2) whether the trial court improperly considered irrelevant evidence; (3) whether the trial court improperly excluded responses to requests for admissions in a related civil suit; and (4) whether the trial court should have remanded the matter for a preliminary hearing because there was no transcript or recording of the hearing. We determine that no final judgment of conviction exists that would entitle Appellant to an appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 and that Appellant has not presented a compelling case for the grant of an extraordinary appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Accordingly, Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the petitioner, David Hammond, of rape, and he was sentenced to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Criminal Court of Morgan County granted habeas corpus relief to the Petitioner, Gary Wayne Calhoun, for convictions in the Criminal Court of Sullivan County for “bringing stolen property into the State valued in excess of $200.00” in case number 21,478 and for “simple robbery” in case number 22,532. The Respondent, David Mills, Warden, has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

I agree with much of the majority’s well reasoned analysis in this case. However, in some respects, I would use different reasoning to reach the same result, and so must file this separate concurrence. In some other respects, I disagree with the result reached by the majority and so must partially dissent. These are discussed below.