APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Alma Cisneros Childers, appeals the sentence of incarceration she received following the revocation of her probation by the Lincoln County Circuit Court. She pled guilty to violating the terms and conditions of her probation but now contends that she should have been given a community corrections sentence rather than one of incarceration. After review, we conclude that the defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the revocation or in imposing a sentence of incarceration. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Andrew Bryan Mann, was convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder after he shot and killed his girlfriend’s father and stepmother. He was sentenced to two consecutive life terms in the Department of Correction. The primary issue at the defendant’s trial was whether or not the defendant’s killing of the victims was premeditated. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress; (2) refusing to allow his expert witnesses to testify concerning the defendant’s ability to premeditate; (3) admitting photographs of the crime scene; (4) excluding a report made in 2003 by his girlfriend to the Department of Child Services claiming that she had been abused by one of the victims, and (5) imposing consecutive life sentences on the grounds that he was a dangerous offender. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we reject each of these claims and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On April 25, 2001, Petitioner, Roger Joseph, pled guilty to first degree murder. The Bradley County Criminal Court sentenced him to life in prison with possibility of parole. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on February 17, 2010. On February 28, 2010, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for being untimely and because Petitioner had filed a previous petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was taking various psychiatric medications at the time he entered his guilty plea and, therefore, his plea was not entered voluntarily. He also argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he knew Petitioner was taking medication. Because Petitioner has shown no due process violation or other reason for tolling the statute of limitations, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition.

Inmate appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of certiorari for failure to comply with the statutory requirement of verification. We find no error in the trial court’s decision.
 

This appeal concerns whether the son of a decedent breached his fiduciary duty under a power of attorney and as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The siblings sued their brother, asserting that he used undue influence over their mother in order to unlawfully obtain her funds for his benefit to the exclusion of his mother and her estate. The brother argued that the money was properly used to take care of his mother and to run her farm. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the siblings for $2,040,276, plus attorney fees totaling $102,576.36, upon finding that the brother failed to meet his burden to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption of undue influence. We affirm.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Oscar Dimery, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted the Defendant’s clothing into evidence because the State failed to establish a chain of custody. The Defendant also asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother of two children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse. Mother appeals, contending that the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish the grounds of termination. We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights on the grounds found by the trial court.
 

A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Anthony Todd Ghormley, of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, and three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He received an effective sentence of 105 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Ghormley argues that the trial court erred by (1) refusing to hold a competency hearing or reset the trial date when Ghormley’s competency to stand trial was questioned two weeks before trial, (2) allowing Ghormley to represent himself for several months during the pretrial  roceedings, and (3) allowing the State to amend the indictment on the day trial began. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in not holding a hearing to determine Ghormley’s competency to stand trial. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of a competency hearing and remand for a hearing. As to the other claimed errors, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant,Brian Kenneth Henneberg,appeals his Williamson CountyCircuit Court jury conviction of first degree premeditated murder, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred by permitting a police officer to offer expert testimony, that the trial court erred by denying his request for a curative instruction, and that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Christopher March, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of two counts of burglary, Class D felonies; five counts of forgery of $1000 or more but less than $10,000, Class D felonies; forgery of less than $1000, a Class E felony; theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor; and attempted theft under $500, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a seven-year sentence for each of the burglary and Class D felony forgery convictions, four years for Class E felony forgery, eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft, and six months for attempted theft. The trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing yielding an effective twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the burglary convictions and (2) the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Darren Allan Vincent, was convicted upon pleading nolo contendere to misdemeanor assault, sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ confinement, and order to pay a $2500 fine. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying probation and requiring him to serve seventy-five percent of the sentence before becoming eligible for release. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This divorce case covered a span of years in the Trial Court, and the Trial Court ultimately granted the parties a divorce, awarded primary custody of the children to the father, denied alimony to the mother and divided the marital estate between the parties. The mother appealed and has raised numerous issues. Many of the issues raised pertain to matters occurring after the appeal was filed, and we decline to consider these issues. The record establishes the mother did not attend the final hearing wherein the divorce was granted. We vacate that part of the final decree, dividing the marital assets and liabilities, on the ground that the mother established grounds of excusable neglect for failing to attend the trial, and remand to the Trial Court to grant a new trial on this issue. We otherwise affirm the rulings in the Judgment by the Trial Court.

We granted the State’s applications for permission to appeal in these two cases to clarify the remedy that should be applied when there is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the denial of an application for pretrial diversion. In each case, the prosecutor denied the defendant’s petition for pretrial diversion and the trial court ruled there was no abuse of discretion. The Court of Criminal Appeals decided in each case that there was an abuse of discretion because the prosecutor failed to weigh all the relevant factors in reaching his decision to deny pretrial diversion to the defendant and remanded the case to the trial court to order the prosecutor to approve the defendant’s pretrial diversion application. We hold that when a prosecutor has abused his or her discretion byfailing to consider and weigh all the relevant pretrial diversion factors or by considering and relying upon an irrelevant factor, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the prosecutor’s ruling and remand to the prosecutor to consider and weigh all of the relevant factors. Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals are reversed, and the cases are remanded to the trial courts with directions to remand the case to the district attorney general to consider and weigh all of the relevant pretrial diversion factors.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I, however, would affirm the trial court on the merits of its sentencing decision.

We granted the State’s applications for permission to appeal in these two cases to clarify the remedy that should be applied when there is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the denial of an application for pretrial diversion. In each case, the prosecutor denied the defendant’s petition for pretrial diversion and the trial court ruled there was no abuse of discretion. The Court of Criminal Appeals decided in each case that there was an abuse of discretion because the prosecutor failed to weigh all the relevant factors in reaching his decision to deny pretrial diversion to the defendant and remanded the case to the trial court to order the prosecutor to approve the defendant’s pretrial diversion application. We hold that when a prosecutor has abused his or her discretion byfailing to consider and weigh all the relevant pretrial diversion factors or by considering and relying upon an irrelevant factor, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the prosecutor’s ruling and remand to the prosecutor to consider and weigh all of the relevant factors. Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals are reversed, and the cases are remanded to the trial courts with directions to remand the case to the district attorney general to consider and weigh all of the relevant pretrial diversion factors.

Father filed a petition to terminate child support payments, due to the child for whom the support was payable reaching the age of majority. In disposing of the petition, the trial court, inter alia, assessed an arrearage and waived interest on the arrearage. The State appeals the action of trial court in waiving interest on the arrearage. We find that the court erred in waiving interest on the arrearage and remand the case for a determination of the amount of interest.
 

After being indicted by a Sevier County Grand Jury, the Defendant, Nathanael Anderson, representing himself, pled guilty to one count of perjury. The Defendant then, through counsel, filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing, which the trial court denied. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in confinement. After the sentencing hearing, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to continue the sentencing hearing. The trial court overruled the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, but it granted the motion to reconsider the motion to continue the sentencing hearing. In a subsequent resentencing hearing, the trial court considered the testimony of a psychologist who had diagnosed the Defendant with Simple Deteriorative Disorder, or Simple Schizophrenia. After the second sentencing hearing, the trial  court entered an amended judgment, sentencing the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days with six months to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in overruling his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it applied the incorrect legal standard; (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; (3) the trial court improperly admitted evidence at the sentencing hearing; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a condemnation case. Appellant, the City of Cookeville, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment was based upon its determination that the City of Cookeville failed to include Appellee’s real property in its application for certificates of public purpose and necessity as required under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 13-16-207(f). The trial court also awarded Appellee her reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. Affirmed and remanded.
 

This is an appeal from an administrative decision dismissing a student from the University of Tennessee College of Pharmacy. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the student had violated the Honor Code of the University of Tennessee College of Pharmacy by giving or receiving aid during an exam. The Administrative Law Judge recommended dismissal, which was affirmed by the school’s Interim Chancellor. The student filed a petition for administrative review, which was not signed by her counsel. The chancellor concluded that, because the amended petition was filed outside the sixty day time limit set out inTennessee Code Annotated Section 4-5-322, the chancery court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The student appeals. Because the student’s brief does not comply with the requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we decline to address the merits of the case and dismiss the appeal.
 

This appeal involves the status of six children between the ages of four and fourteen who had been in the custody of their biological mother. After one of the children was severely injured, the Shelby County Juvenile Court determined that all six children are dependent and neglected. The juvenile court also determined not only that the injured child but also the other five children are victims of severe child abuse. The children’s biological mother perfected a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Shelby County. The trial court likewise found that all six children are victims of severe child abuse and are dependent and neglected. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Harris v. Tennessee Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. W2011-00037-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 3890341 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2011). The biological mother filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application taking issue with the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings that the children are dependent and neglected and that they are victims of severe child abuse. In its response, the Department conceded that the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding that the five uninjured children are victims of severe child abuse. Having determined that no further briefing or argument is necessary for the disposition of this matter, we grant the biological mother’s application for permission to appeal and find (1) that the injured child is a victim of severe child abuse, (2) that the evidence does not support the lower courts’ conclusion that the remaining five uninjured children are also victims of severe child abuse, and (3) that the evidence demonstrates clearly and convincingly that all six children are dependent and neglected.
 

The petitioner, Trina Dawn Holdway Johnson, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that counsel’s faulty advice rendered her guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, James Tilson, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver not less than one-half  ounce of marijuana, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying his request for jury instructions on a lesser-included offense. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a case involving a teacher who was dismissed without a hearing. Appellee teacher failed to return to work after a sick leave and her employment was terminated by the Appellant school board. When the school board refused to give the Appellee a tenure hearing, she filed a complaint for damages based on the Teachers’ Tenure Act and violations of her due process rights. Despite attempts to hold a tenure hearing, no hearing was ever held. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the chancellor reinstated Appellee and awarded her back pay. After a hearing on damages, the chancellor awarded compensatory damages and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. §1983. School board appeals. We affirm the denial of the school board’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, but vacate and remand the grant of Appellee’s motion for partial summary judgment. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

This appeal involves the amount of damages a plaintiff may seek on a de novo appeal from a general sessions court to a circuit court. The plaintiff filed suit in the Davidson County General Sessions Court seeking damages sustained in an automobile accident. She also notified her uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier of her suit. After deciding that her damages exceeded the general sessions court’s jurisdictional limit, the plaintiff requested the general sessions court to dismiss her suit. The general sessions court obliged, and the plaintiff perfected a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Davidson County. After the plaintiff accepted the defendant’s $25,000 settlement offer, the plaintiff’s insurance carrier moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim because her settlement with the defendant equaled the amount of damages she had sought in general sessions court. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint increasing the amount of her damages claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Brown v. Roland, No. M2009-01885-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3732169 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2010). The plaintiff filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal, asserting that she was not limited to the amount of damages she sought in general sessions court after she perfected a de novo appeal to the circuit court. We disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
 

A Scott County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Paul Chappell, for sale of a schedule III controlled substance. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charge. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to twelve years in the Department of Correction to run consecutively with the sentences in seven other cases. The trial court also imposed a $2,000 fine. On appeal, Defendant argues that the playback at trial of the audio recording of the drug transaction was incomplete and that the trial court improperly denied him a new trial based on allegations that witnesses discussed their testimony during trial. After a thorough review, we conclude that the issues raised by Defendant on appeal are waived, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.