APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant defaulted on a $300,000 loan from plaintiff bank. He subsequently renewed the loan but not before transferring certain assets to his wife. He never repaid the loan. The bank filed suit against the husband for breach of contract and fraud and against both defendants for fraudulent conveyance, conversion, civil conspiracy to defraud, and unjust enrichment. The bank also sought a lien lis pendens, a constructive trust, and a judicial sale and foreclosure. The trial court found against the husband with respect to the bank’s claims for breach of contract and fraud (in renewing the loan), against the wife for unjust enrichment, and against both defendants for fraudulent conveyance. The court denied the bank’s request for a constructive trust and a judicial sale and foreclosure. The parties appeal the trial court’s disposition of claims for fraud, civil conspiracy to defraud, and unjust enrichment, as well as its decision not to impose a constructive trust. We find for the bank on its fraud (against the husband) and unjust enrichment (against the wife) claims. We find against the bank on its claims for civil conspiracy to defraud and the imposition of a constructive trust.
 

An applicant for a billboard permit appeals the dismissal of his Petition for Judicial Review of the decision of the Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny his application. During the pendency of this action, the applicant admitted he had sold his leasehold interest in the property on which the billboard was to be located. Upon the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the trial court concluded that petitioner “lacks standing to maintain this lawsuit and this cause is moot as a matter of law.” We affirm.

A Roane County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Robert Colin Pelfrey, for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, and assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The Defendant pled guilty to the aggravated burglary charge and agreed to a sentence of three years, with the manner of service left to the discretion of the trial court. The remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying all forms of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction. However, we remand the Defendant’s case because the judgment for the resisting arrest count improperly reflects that the Defendant was indicted for evading arrest, a Class E felony. The trial court is directed to correct that judgment in accordance with the indictment.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Ernest Lee Jennings, of sexual exploitation of a minor and three counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eighty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, George Washington, was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide. He was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction and asserts that the sentence is excessive. Following a review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jose Luis Vizcaino-Ramos, was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, Vizcaino-Ramos presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of the victim’s son; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Nicholas Shawn Marshall, stands convicted of rape, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, violent offender to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The owner of a piece of rural property in Wilson County applied for a “permissible use” permit that would allow him to display vehicles for sale on the property. The County planning staff recommended against issuance of a permit, reasoning that the proposed use was not consistent with other uses permitted in an A-1 (agricultural) zoning district. The owner appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which agreed to issue the permit, but limited the use to “no more than 10 serviceable items being on the property at any given time.” The owner challenged the limitation by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Wilson County Chancery Court. The court determined that the BZA had acted arbitrarily and had exceeded its authority by placing a condition on the owner’s use of the property of a type not contemplated by the controlling ordinance, and it removed that condition. We affirm the removal of the condition, but we reverse the trial court’s holding that the BZA had violated the property owner’s substantive due process rights.

The defendant, Jimmy Sprague, was convicted of failure to appear in court, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction consecutive to an existing federal sentence. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court improperly refused to allow the admission of his medical records; and (3) he was improperly sentenced. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

The defendant, Donnie Lee Sullivan, stands convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to four years and nine months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the sentence length, and the  denial of alternate sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Robert Earl Cole, appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lamar Tyrone Harris, was charged with tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. Following the denial of his motion to suppress his inculpatory statement following a traffic stop, the Defendant pled guilty as charged. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years, suspended to probation. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Defendant sought to reserve a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Maurice Edward Carter, pled guilty in Smith County to one count of aggravated statutory rape and one count of criminal exposure to HIV for an effective sentence of twenty years. Additionally, he pled guilty in Rutherford County to four counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, two counts of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, one count of statutory rape, and one count of criminal exposure to HIV for an effective sentence of twenty years, to be served concurrently with his Smith County sentences. As a condition of his guilty pleas, the defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the denial of his motions to suppress the stop and search of his automobile, and his subsequent statement to police and evidence obtained during the execution of search warrants. After review, we conclude that the record supports the findings of the trial courts that the motions to suppress were without merit and that the certified question is not dispositive of the charges against the defendant and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiffs sued Defendants in an amended complaint following the expiration of the statute of limitations. Defendants moved for summary judgment/judgment on the pleadings based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. Subsequently, co-defendants alleged Defendants’ comparative fault in an amended answer. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and for judgment on the pleadings were granted, but were not made final. Based on co-defendants’ answer, Plaintiffs again amended their complaint to name Defendants pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119. However, Defendants claimed that section 20-1-119 could not be utilized as they were already parties to the lawsuit, and they moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The trial court granted said motions, and we affirm.

The plaintiff requested a transcript of a deposition from the defendant, a court reporter. When the defendant notified the plaintiff that the transcript was ready and told him her fee, he neither retrieved the transcript nor paid her. After the defendant made several telephone calls to the plaintiff in an attempt to obtain payment, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This wife, Stefanie Lynne Brumit (Durham) (“Wife”), and husband, Walter Jessee Brumit (“Husband”), were divorced in the early 1990s. The parties had one child, and Husband was ordered to pay $1500 per month in child support. From that amount, Wife was ordered to place $300 per month into an educational trust account for the child’s benefit. In 2008, Husband filed a motion for contempt, asserting that Wife was $6,600 behind in the payments to the trust account. Wife claimed that she had fallen behind in the payments because of financial difficulties and brought the trust account up to date prior to filing her response. In April 2009, the trial court, prior to hearing, dismissed the contempt motion and taxed the costs to Husband. Upon Husband’s appeal, we vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a hearing on the merits before a new trial judge. On remand, the trial court found Wife in contempt of court. As Wife had brought the payments to the trust account up to date, the trial court ordered her to pay the interest income lost by the account due to her delinquent payments and half of Husband’s attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. We affirm.

We granted this appeal to determine if the defendant’s four sentences for aggravated rape are illegal because each of the four uniform judgment documents designates the defendant as a “Multiple 35% Range 2” offender and does not designate the defendant as a “Multiple Rapist.” Because the four uniform judgment documents indicate that the defendant is eligible for early release on parole, which is in direct contravention of a statutory provision, we hold that the four sentences are illegal and void. The defendant’s underlying convictions of aggravated rape, which arose from a jury verdict before a court of competent jurisdiction, remain intact. We remand this matter to the sentencing court for the entry of four amended judgment orders, each to set forth the legal sentence on each of the defendant’s four convictions of aggravated rape, including the designation that the defendant is a “Multiple Rapist.”

In February 2005, a 14-count indictment was returned against the Defendant, Salwillel Thomas Fields. In exchange for concurrent sentencing, the Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine, a Class A felony; possession with intent to sell more than one half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony; possession of a machine gun, a Class E felony; and three counts of unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class E felony. The parties agreed to the Defendant’s sentencing range for each of the convictions but left the length of the sentences to the trial court’s discretion. The remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to 38 years for the Class A felony and as a Range III, persistent offender to 5-years for each of the Class E felonies. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting the length of his Class A felony sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I can concur that the petitioner’s sentence is illegal and void because it directly contravenes the multiple rapist sentencing statute. By granting limited habeas corpus relief and remanding to the trial court for entry of a corrected sentence, the majority has essentially adopted the position of the State. While this result is proper under these specific circumstances, I would submit that the ruling today is inconsistent with the opinion in Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn. 2008), a case I continue to believe was wrongly decided. Moreover, in an apparent effort to conform its decision today with rulings in our previous habeas corpus cases, the majority has created new and heightened standards for relief which, in my assessment, will serve to further confuse this area of the law. Finally, I believe that this case offered an opportunity to overrule altogether our decision in Edwards and, by doing so, reconcile a series of our prior opinions on the subject of habeas corpus.

This appeal arises out of an action in which the plaintiff asserted a claim that the agent of a used car business in which the plaintiff allegedly invested committed misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion, and violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act in failing to give him stock in the business or compensate him for work performed at the business. Plaintiff also asserted a claim based on defendants’ alleged failure to repair his vehicle. The trial court held that plaintiff had not established the necessary elements for any of his claims and dismissed the case; plaintiff appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a complaint for failure to conform to the minimal pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against numerous public officials. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. After review of the complaint, the trial court found that it was unintelligible and failed to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is a negligence action. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that Defendant/Appellee is liable for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when he fell while walking down the steps at the Shelby County courthouse. Due to Appellant’s incarceration, the trial court granted three continuances; however, Appellant’s request for a fourth continuance was denied. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Appellant had failed to meet his burden to show negligence on the part of the Appellee, and further concluded that, if there was negligence in the case, Appellant was at least fifty percent at fault so as to bar recovery. Appellant appeals both the denial of his fourth motion for a continuance and the trial court’s ruling in favor of Appellee. Finding no error, we affirm.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years. The Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Defendant argues on appeal that he is entitled to unspecified relief because the State displayed his booking photos to the jury during closing arguments. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Steven Chance, pleaded guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of 11 months and 29 days suspended to probation after the service of 48 hours’ incarceration. The trial court also waived as a condition of probation the defendant’s payment of fines and completion of community service hours. A probation violation warrant issued alleging that the defendant failed to pay the court and probation costs. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and extended it for one year to allow the payment of the costs. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court lacked authority to extend his probationary term. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs brought this action for the wrongful death of their son, and also for their damages arising from "negligent infliction of emotional distress". State Farm Mutual Insurance Company filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that its policy afforded no coverage for a negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court overruled the Motion but proposed a Rule 9 appeal, which this Court granted. We reverse the Trial Court on this issue and grant the summary judgment motion.