APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Colorado court granted a divorce to married parents who were both active-duty members of the armed forces. The court named the mother as the primary residential parent of their two minor children, and a parenting plan with flexible provisions was fashioned in the event of overseas deployment by one or both parents. Both parties were deployed overseas at various times during the next five years. The children spent the majority of that time in the care of the father, or, during father’s deployments, in the care of his mother or his new wife. The father moved to Clarksville, Tennessee in April of 2007, and after living there with the children for eighteen consecutive months, he filed a petition in the Tennessee court for registration of the Colorado judgment and modification of the parenting plan. He asked the court to name him as the children’s primary residential parent. After a hearing, the trial court granted the father’s petition. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that there had been a material change of circumstances which was unanticipated at the time of the divorce, and she contends that the father had therefore failed to meet the statutory threshold before a change in a parenting plan may be ordered under Tennessee law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B). She also argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-113 limits the authority of the trial court to permanently modify the custody and visitation arrangements for the children of a mobilized parent. We affirm the trial court.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a complaint for failure to conform to the minimal pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against numerous public officials. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. After review of the complaint, the trial court found that it was unintelligible and failed to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is a negligence action. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that Defendant/Appellee is liable for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when he fell while walking down the steps at the Shelby County courthouse. Due to Appellant’s incarceration, the trial court granted three continuances; however, Appellant’s request for a fourth continuance was denied. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Appellant had failed to meet his burden to show negligence on the part of the Appellee, and further concluded that, if there was negligence in the case, Appellant was at least fifty percent at fault so as to bar recovery. Appellant appeals both the denial of his fourth motion for a continuance and the trial court’s ruling in favor of Appellee. Finding no error, we affirm.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years. The Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Defendant argues on appeal that he is entitled to unspecified relief because the State displayed his booking photos to the jury during closing arguments. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Steven Chance, pleaded guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of 11 months and 29 days suspended to probation after the service of 48 hours’ incarceration. The trial court also waived as a condition of probation the defendant’s payment of fines and completion of community service hours. A probation violation warrant issued alleging that the defendant failed to pay the court and probation costs. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and extended it for one year to allow the payment of the costs. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court lacked authority to extend his probationary term. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs brought this action for the wrongful death of their son, and also for their damages arising from "negligent infliction of emotional distress". State Farm Mutual Insurance Company filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that its policy afforded no coverage for a negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court overruled the Motion but proposed a Rule 9 appeal, which this Court granted. We reverse the Trial Court on this issue and grant the summary judgment motion.

Beth L. Wineland, the sole plaintiff, sustained serious injuries when the front wheel of her bicycle fell into the open slots of a metal drainage grate (“the subject grate” or “the old style grate”) situated near a curb of State Highway 60. The slots on the subject grate run parallel with the direction of traffic. The subject grate is inside the municipal boundaries of the City of Cleveland. The plaintiff made a claim against the State of Tennessee in the Claims Commission and filed this action against the City of Cleveland in the trial court. The claim against the State was consolidated with this action for trial. The plaintiff alleges that the old style grate constitutes a dangerous condition on the highway and that both the City of Cleveland and the State were negligent in maintaining the highway. The trial court determined that neither defendant had a duty to change the grate and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals only as to the State. We reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of damages.

Jerome Hertis Phillips brought suit to contest a tax assessment made against him by the Department of Revenue (“the Department”). The Department filed a motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion based upon its finding that Phillips failed to file suit within the time provided by law. Phillips appeals. We affirm.

A nine-year-old child, whose initials are C.M. (“the Child”), told her mother, whose initials are also C.M. (“Mother”), that Eddie Davis had touched her inappropriately. The disclosure was made shortly after the Child had reviewed a comic book that is designed to help children recognize and disclose child sexual abuse. Davis is the executive director of the Youth Emergency Shelter (“Y.E.S.”) in Hamblen County. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), a state agency, initiated an investigation and “indicated” Davis as a perpetrator of child sexual abuse. Davis requested an administrative hearing. The administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) found that the Child’s statements to Mother and later to a forensic interviewer were credible because they were “consistent” in that she told both a story of Davis putting his hand on her buttocks inside her panties. Davis appealed the ALJ’s finding to the trial court. The trial court sustained the findings of the ALJ. Davis appealed to this Court. Because there is no substantial and material evidence to support the findings of the ALJ, we reverse.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Jim Frederick Hegel, of rape of a child and incest. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve consecutive sentences of nineteen and three years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the prosecutor made improper comments during voir dire about the victim’s testimony and credibility that may have biased the jury against the appellant, and (3) the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the Sevier County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Samir Ramon Mejia, of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as six months in jail and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pat-down the appellant for weapons. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the pat-down and reverse the appellant’s conviction.

A Hardin County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Boris Darrell Fry, of selling .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a standard, Range I offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying him probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves an award of retroactive child support. When the child was an infant, the mother lied and told the father that the child had died. Subsequently, custody of the child was transferred back and forth numerous times between the mother and the maternal grandmother. The father’s paternity was established when the child was thirteen, and after establishing a relationship with the child, the father sought to be named primary residential parent. The grandmother then petitioned for retroactive child support. Father was named primary residential parent, but the juvenile court ordered the father to pay approximately $40,000 in retroactive child support to the grandmother, finding a certain statute that provides for deviations in retroactive child support to be inapplicable to this situation. We reverse the court’s decision and vacate its award of retroactive child support, and remand for further proceedings.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Mariet L. Patrick, was convicted of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony, possession of .5 ounces or more of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony, and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-503, -17-417. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a traffic stop and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant appealed the trial court’s order granting a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal involves a claim against a bank for conversion. The decedent signed a durable power of attorney appointing his nephew as his attorney-in-fact. Both the decedent and the nephew had accounts at the defendant bank. Using the power of attorney, the nephew endorsed checks made payable to the decedent and deposited them into his own bank accounts at the defendant bank. By the time the decedent died a few months later, the nefarious nephew had almost completely depleted the decedent’s estate. The estate of the decedent and the decedent’s wife filed this lawsuit against the bank. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, based on the statutory immunity granted to banks for recognizing a power of attorney in T.C.A.§ 45-2-707(d). The plaintiff now appeals, arguing that the immunity statute is inapplicable because her claim arose under the UCC, T.C.A. §§ 47-3-307 and 47-3-420. We reverse, finding that T.C.A. § 45-2-707 is inapplicable to the transactions at issue in this appeal.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(3)(3) (2008) for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal involves a dispute regarding the type and amount of temporary benefits an employee working two jobs is entitled to following an injury at one of the employee’s jobs. After sustaining a work-related injury that required the employee to discontinue one but not both of his jobs, the employee filed suit in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County. After the trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits, the employer appealed and asserted that the employee was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits because he continued to work at his second job. We conclude that the employee is entitled to temporary partial, rather than temporary total, disability benefits and remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount of these benefits.

In 2007, the Defendant, John Eric Garvin, Jr., pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault, but the trial court suspended the entry of his judgment of conviction and placed the Defendant on judicial diversion for a term of three years. The Defendant subsequently violated the terms of his diverted sentence by, among other things, possessing a Schedule II drug, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and driving on a suspended license, second offense. The Defendant pled guilty to each of these offenses and admitted violating the terms of his diversion. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of two years for his reckless aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve nine additional years for the offenses he committed while on diversion, ordering those sentences to be served consecutively to his two-year sentence for reckless aggravated assault. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his total effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we conclude the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Richard L. Hollow, Trustee (“Plaintiff”) sued Beulah Butler with regard to a boundary line dispute. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the common boundary line between Plaintiff’s real property and Ms. Butler’s real property is as shown on a September 17, 2003 survey prepared by Plaintiff’s surveyor, James Ogle, and that Ms. Butler had not proven adverse possession, laches, or gross laches. Ms. Butler appeals to this Court. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Steven Daniel Pack, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Coffee County to driving under the influence, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twentynine days for driving under the influence, third offense, all of which was suspended after service of 180 days in confinement. In regard to the driving on a revoked license conviction, Pack was sentenced to six months, all of which was suspended after service of 60 days in confinement. These sentences were to be served consecutively. Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pack reserved as a certified question of law whether there was reasonable suspicion to support the stop and detention of the defendant as required by the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jefferson County, Tennessee filed a petition against Margaret Vance Smith, seeking to recover possession of the unexecuted marriage license issued to David (“Davy”) Crockett and Margaret Elder by the county’s clerk in 1805. The action was filed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-504, which prohibits the destruction of, tampering with, or fabrication of government records. The trial court entered a final judgment against Mrs. Smith, ordering the immediate return of the marriage license to Jefferson County. Mrs. Smith appealed. We affirm as modified.

This is a divorce case. The husband appeals, challenging the trial court’s determinations regarding the classification of property and the valuation and distribution of the marital assets. Wife raises additional issues concerning the property classification and attorney fees. As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

A Hardin County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Joseph Steele, for rape of a child less than thirteen years of age. The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment because the State had allegedly lost or destroyed a videotape of the victim’s interview with Michigan Children’s Services. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the indictment, and the State now appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it dismissed the Defendant’s indictment without discussing the relevant factors required by State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999). We, therefore, reverse and remand to the trial court to reconsider and make findings of fact regarding whether dismissal of the Defendant’s indictment is appropriate in light of Ferguson.

An employee settled his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The settlement stated that the award of vocational disability benefits to which the parties agreed was not based on the medical impairment rating of either the treating physician or the employee’s independent medical examiner. After the employee was laid off, he sought reconsideration of his benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(B)(iv) (2008). The chancery court declined to use the impairment rating of the treating physician or the independent medical examiner. The court further declined to base its increased award on a rating from an independent medical evaluation of the employee conducted after the settlement by a physician listed in the Medical Impairment Rating registry of the Tennessee Department of Labor. The chancery court instead awarded additional permanent partial disability benefits based on an impairment rating computed from the percentage of permanent partial disability reflected in the settlement. The employer appealed. We affirm the chancery court.

Plaintiff Husband appeals the trial court’s order awarding him no visitation with the parties’ children, its classification and award of property to Mother, and the award of attorney’s fees to mother. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand to the trial court to set visitation.