APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Erik Guerrero, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his conviction claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed proof of the Defendant’s gang membership to be admitted into evidence at trial; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed a recorded telephone conversation between the Defendant and a co-defendant to be admitted into evidence at trial; (4) the trial court erred when it allowed the Defendant’s statements made at the scene of the crime to be admitted into evidence at trial; and (5) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to the natural and probable consequences rule. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant of solicitation of a minor to commit rape of a child, a Class B felony; driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; and indecent exposure, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of ten years, two years, and six months, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the solicitation of a minor conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal for a non-final judgment entered by the trial court. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellant, Danny Osborne, pled guilty to promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a schedule II controlled substance, and criminal impersonation. As a result, he received a two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Appellant was subsequently released to probation. One month later, a warrant was issued for violation of probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of the original sentence in confinement. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where there was substantial evidence to support the revocation of probation. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Charlie B. York, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), and the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the implied consent law with a prior DUI conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, fifteen days of which were to be served in jail, with the remainder on probation. For the implied consent violation, the trial court suspended the Defendant’s driver’s license for two years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to more than the mandatory minimum sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Nelson Troglin, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to 23 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends (1) that the trial court erred in failing to admonish the jury, instructing the jury to reach a verdict before the July 4th holiday, and in failing to sentence him in open court; (2) that the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion to recuse and his motion for funds to obtain a ballistics expert; and (3) that trial counsel was ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Driver of a sedan was given citations for not having the certificate of public convenience and license necessary to operate a taxicab. The citations were upheld by the general sessions and circuit courts. Driver appeals, claiming that his sedan is not a taxi and that the lower courts did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. We affirm.

In 1990 a Shelby County jury convicted, the Petitioner, John Michael Bane, of felony murder and imposed a sentence of death. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. 1993). After a new sentencing hearing, the jury again imposed a sentence of death, and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s imposition of this sentence. State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411 (Tenn. 2001). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his original trial and at his resentencing hearing; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury; and (3) the death penalty is unconstitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this action alleging retaliatory discharge, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s judgment, holding that the amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. We address the issue of the proper standard for Tennessee courts to apply in ruling on a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). We decline to adopt the new Twombly/Iqbal “plausibility” pleading standard and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner appeals from the dismissal of three petitions for writ of certiorari for review of his disciplinary conviction for assault while incarcerated at the South Central Correctional Facility. The trial court dismissed the action based on Petitioner’s failure to adhere to the statutory verification requirements in his petitions. Petitioner appealed. We affirm.

An individual took his automobile to an auto parts company, apparently to sell it for parts. The individual alleged that he had electronics and baseball cards in the automobile that were stolen at the auto parts company. The trial court dismissed the complaint without making findings of fact, and the individual appealed. The record contains the exhibits introduced at trial but no transcript of the proceedings or deposition testimony. Without a record of the proceedings from the lower court to review, we are unable to reverse the trial court or provide the appellant with the relief he seeks. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint.

The Petitioner, Eric Dewayne McLemore, appeals from the habeas corpus court’s order denying his petition. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the habeas corpus court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the order of the habeas corpus court.

Inmate filed a legal malpractice action against the attorney who represented him in the direct appeal of his criminal conviction for aggravated robbery. Three years later, the trial court dismissed the inmate’s lawsuit for failure to prosecute. We affirm the result reached by the trial court because the denial of the inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief precludes his claim for legal malpractice.

A Sevier County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Kevin Allen Gentry, of twelve counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the charges should be dismissed because the State “held back” the indictment in the instant case in violation of Rule 8(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because of an invalid search warrant, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court erred in sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employee was promised 10% ownership interest in the company he worked for if he stayed with the company for six years. When the time came to transfer the employee’s 10% interest to him, however, the parties learned that the tax laws then in effect made the transfer impractical at that time. The parties therefore decided to delay the transfer. The parties entered into a contract the following year which the employer interpreted to mean that the employee was giving up his 10% ownership interest in exchange for a raise in his salary plus 10% of the company’s net profits each year. The employee claimed he did not give up his 10% ownership interest and sued the company and former majority owner for his 10% interest when the company was sold a few years later. The trial court concluded the employee did not give up his 10% ownership interest by signing the later agreement and awarded the employee 10% of the company’s net profits for the years following the employee’s termination plus 10% of the ultimate purchase price. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an insurance case. The plaintiff daughter purchased a home with her mother as tenants in common. The homeowner’s insurance policy listed both the daughter and the mother as named insureds. The daughter later quitclaimed her interest in the property to her mother. Years later, the daughter had an accident on the property and filed a claim under the homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurance company denied recovery based on the policy’s exclusion from coverage for injury to an insured. The daughter filed this lawsuit against the defendant insurer, contending, inter alia, that she was not an insured because she did not sign the contract with the defendant insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. We affirm.

A Campbell County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Meagan N. Reid, guilty of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense; possession of a Schedule II controlled substance; and a violation of the implied consent law. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, 125 days of which were to be served in the county jail with the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her possession of a controlled substance conviction and the propriety of the State’s cross-examination regarding a prior conviction for DUI. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for entry of a corrected judgment regarding the appellant’s violation of the implied consent law.

An employee of Sumner County was injured on the job and sought disability benefits pursuant to the Sumner County compensation plan. The employee’s physicians initially gave him an anatomical impairment rating of 20%, but later determined that the employee was totally disabled and could not work. The County treated the employee’s disability as a permanent partial disability and offered the employee a lower settlement than if the  employee’s disability were treated as a total permanent disability. The employee appealed the initial offer to the administrative review board, which upheld the initial offer of settlement. The employee petitioned the chancery court for a writ of certiorari and asked the court to review the administrative decision and rule that it was arbitrary and capricious. The chancery court found the review board should have considered whether the employee was totally disabled based on the evidence in the record and remanded the case back to the review board for this purpose. The County appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s decision. The plain language of the county plan does not support the administrative decision not to consider the employee’s total disability in determining the compensation he is entitled to receive.

Petitioner, Michael Tyrone Gordon, has appealed from the trial court’s dismissal of the pleading he designated as a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence,” and which the trial court treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion for this Court to affirm the judgment by Memorandum Opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. Upon review of Petitioner’s brief, the State’s motion and the entire record, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lawrence County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, William Keith Blackburn, of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for review: 1. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the appellant’s convictions; 2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after a detective testified that the appellant exercised his right to remain silent and refused to give police a statement; 3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting, or in the alternative not redacting, an audio tape recording of telephone calls the appellant made while in jail; 4. Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight and attempting to conceal or suppress evidence; 5. Whether the court reporter’s failure to provide a complete transcript denied the appellant a full and complete appellate review; and 6. Whether the cumulative errors require a new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Carl J. Wagner, of second degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2006); first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-202(a)(2); and especially aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-403. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 22 years’ incarceration, life imprisonment, and 22 years’ incarceration, respectively, and merged the conviction of second degree murder into the conviction of first degree murder. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. We determine that there is insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery. We also determine, however, that there is sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction in count one and remand that count for resentencing, and we reverse and dismiss the charges in counts two and three.

Teacher who received a reprimand brought this action to challenge the actions of school officials and the school board. She argues that the school failed to provide due process to her and defamed her. The trial court found in favor of the defendants, and we affirm.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Gregory D. Douglas, of second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, David Earl Offut, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his guilty-pleaded convictions for three counts of incest for which he is serving an effective sentence of 18 years’ incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. He contends that his guilty pleas were entered involuntarily and unknowingly because trial counsel failed to adequately advise him regarding his release eligibility. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Appellee. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the order granting summary judgment fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, as it does not “state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grants the motion.” Consequently, this Court cannot proceed with our review and must vacate the judgment of the trial court. Vacated and remanded.