APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Darren Allan Vincent, was convicted upon pleading nolo contendere to misdemeanor assault, sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ confinement, and order to pay a $2500 fine. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying probation and requiring him to serve seventy-five percent of the sentence before becoming eligible for release. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This divorce case covered a span of years in the Trial Court, and the Trial Court ultimately granted the parties a divorce, awarded primary custody of the children to the father, denied alimony to the mother and divided the marital estate between the parties. The mother appealed and has raised numerous issues. Many of the issues raised pertain to matters occurring after the appeal was filed, and we decline to consider these issues. The record establishes the mother did not attend the final hearing wherein the divorce was granted. We vacate that part of the final decree, dividing the marital assets and liabilities, on the ground that the mother established grounds of excusable neglect for failing to attend the trial, and remand to the Trial Court to grant a new trial on this issue. We otherwise affirm the rulings in the Judgment by the Trial Court.

We granted the State’s applications for permission to appeal in these two cases to clarify the remedy that should be applied when there is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the denial of an application for pretrial diversion. In each case, the prosecutor denied the defendant’s petition for pretrial diversion and the trial court ruled there was no abuse of discretion. The Court of Criminal Appeals decided in each case that there was an abuse of discretion because the prosecutor failed to weigh all the relevant factors in reaching his decision to deny pretrial diversion to the defendant and remanded the case to the trial court to order the prosecutor to approve the defendant’s pretrial diversion application. We hold that when a prosecutor has abused his or her discretion byfailing to consider and weigh all the relevant pretrial diversion factors or by considering and relying upon an irrelevant factor, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the prosecutor’s ruling and remand to the prosecutor to consider and weigh all of the relevant factors. Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals are reversed, and the cases are remanded to the trial courts with directions to remand the case to the district attorney general to consider and weigh all of the relevant pretrial diversion factors.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I, however, would affirm the trial court on the merits of its sentencing decision.

We granted the State’s applications for permission to appeal in these two cases to clarify the remedy that should be applied when there is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the denial of an application for pretrial diversion. In each case, the prosecutor denied the defendant’s petition for pretrial diversion and the trial court ruled there was no abuse of discretion. The Court of Criminal Appeals decided in each case that there was an abuse of discretion because the prosecutor failed to weigh all the relevant factors in reaching his decision to deny pretrial diversion to the defendant and remanded the case to the trial court to order the prosecutor to approve the defendant’s pretrial diversion application. We hold that when a prosecutor has abused his or her discretion byfailing to consider and weigh all the relevant pretrial diversion factors or by considering and relying upon an irrelevant factor, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the prosecutor’s ruling and remand to the prosecutor to consider and weigh all of the relevant factors. Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals are reversed, and the cases are remanded to the trial courts with directions to remand the case to the district attorney general to consider and weigh all of the relevant pretrial diversion factors.

Father filed a petition to terminate child support payments, due to the child for whom the support was payable reaching the age of majority. In disposing of the petition, the trial court, inter alia, assessed an arrearage and waived interest on the arrearage. The State appeals the action of trial court in waiving interest on the arrearage. We find that the court erred in waiving interest on the arrearage and remand the case for a determination of the amount of interest.
 

After being indicted by a Sevier County Grand Jury, the Defendant, Nathanael Anderson, representing himself, pled guilty to one count of perjury. The Defendant then, through counsel, filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing, which the trial court denied. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in confinement. After the sentencing hearing, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to continue the sentencing hearing. The trial court overruled the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, but it granted the motion to reconsider the motion to continue the sentencing hearing. In a subsequent resentencing hearing, the trial court considered the testimony of a psychologist who had diagnosed the Defendant with Simple Deteriorative Disorder, or Simple Schizophrenia. After the second sentencing hearing, the trial  court entered an amended judgment, sentencing the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days with six months to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in overruling his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it applied the incorrect legal standard; (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; (3) the trial court improperly admitted evidence at the sentencing hearing; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a condemnation case. Appellant, the City of Cookeville, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment was based upon its determination that the City of Cookeville failed to include Appellee’s real property in its application for certificates of public purpose and necessity as required under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 13-16-207(f). The trial court also awarded Appellee her reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. Affirmed and remanded.
 

This is an appeal from an administrative decision dismissing a student from the University of Tennessee College of Pharmacy. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the student had violated the Honor Code of the University of Tennessee College of Pharmacy by giving or receiving aid during an exam. The Administrative Law Judge recommended dismissal, which was affirmed by the school’s Interim Chancellor. The student filed a petition for administrative review, which was not signed by her counsel. The chancellor concluded that, because the amended petition was filed outside the sixty day time limit set out inTennessee Code Annotated Section 4-5-322, the chancery court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The student appeals. Because the student’s brief does not comply with the requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we decline to address the merits of the case and dismiss the appeal.
 

This appeal involves the status of six children between the ages of four and fourteen who had been in the custody of their biological mother. After one of the children was severely injured, the Shelby County Juvenile Court determined that all six children are dependent and neglected. The juvenile court also determined not only that the injured child but also the other five children are victims of severe child abuse. The children’s biological mother perfected a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Shelby County. The trial court likewise found that all six children are victims of severe child abuse and are dependent and neglected. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Harris v. Tennessee Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. W2011-00037-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 3890341 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2011). The biological mother filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application taking issue with the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings that the children are dependent and neglected and that they are victims of severe child abuse. In its response, the Department conceded that the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding that the five uninjured children are victims of severe child abuse. Having determined that no further briefing or argument is necessary for the disposition of this matter, we grant the biological mother’s application for permission to appeal and find (1) that the injured child is a victim of severe child abuse, (2) that the evidence does not support the lower courts’ conclusion that the remaining five uninjured children are also victims of severe child abuse, and (3) that the evidence demonstrates clearly and convincingly that all six children are dependent and neglected.
 

The petitioner, Trina Dawn Holdway Johnson, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that counsel’s faulty advice rendered her guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, James Tilson, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver not less than one-half  ounce of marijuana, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying his request for jury instructions on a lesser-included offense. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a case involving a teacher who was dismissed without a hearing. Appellee teacher failed to return to work after a sick leave and her employment was terminated by the Appellant school board. When the school board refused to give the Appellee a tenure hearing, she filed a complaint for damages based on the Teachers’ Tenure Act and violations of her due process rights. Despite attempts to hold a tenure hearing, no hearing was ever held. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the chancellor reinstated Appellee and awarded her back pay. After a hearing on damages, the chancellor awarded compensatory damages and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. §1983. School board appeals. We affirm the denial of the school board’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, but vacate and remand the grant of Appellee’s motion for partial summary judgment. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

This appeal involves the amount of damages a plaintiff may seek on a de novo appeal from a general sessions court to a circuit court. The plaintiff filed suit in the Davidson County General Sessions Court seeking damages sustained in an automobile accident. She also notified her uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier of her suit. After deciding that her damages exceeded the general sessions court’s jurisdictional limit, the plaintiff requested the general sessions court to dismiss her suit. The general sessions court obliged, and the plaintiff perfected a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Davidson County. After the plaintiff accepted the defendant’s $25,000 settlement offer, the plaintiff’s insurance carrier moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim because her settlement with the defendant equaled the amount of damages she had sought in general sessions court. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint increasing the amount of her damages claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Brown v. Roland, No. M2009-01885-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3732169 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2010). The plaintiff filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal, asserting that she was not limited to the amount of damages she sought in general sessions court after she perfected a de novo appeal to the circuit court. We disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
 

A Scott County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Paul Chappell, for sale of a schedule III controlled substance. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charge. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to twelve years in the Department of Correction to run consecutively with the sentences in seven other cases. The trial court also imposed a $2,000 fine. On appeal, Defendant argues that the playback at trial of the audio recording of the drug transaction was incomplete and that the trial court improperly denied him a new trial based on allegations that witnesses discussed their testimony during trial. After a thorough review, we conclude that the issues raised by Defendant on appeal are waived, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff filed this civil action in the shadow of a criminal case brought against him, which resulted in an acquittal. The defendants named in this civil action include two trial judges who presided over different aspects of the criminal case, the Circuit Court Clerk and two deputy court clerks of Roane County, Tennessee, and the State of Tennessee. All of the defendants filed motions to dismiss the civil action or motions for summary judgment on various grounds including judicial immunity, sovereign immunity, and that all of the alleged acts or omissions were performed under the color of law or in the performance of their official duties. The trial judge dismissed the civil action against the judges based upon judicial immunity, dismissed the action against the State upon sovereign immunity, and summarily dismissed the action against the clerks upon the unrefuted fact that the clerks properly fulfilled their official duties and because the complaint failed to explain how the plaintiff was damaged by the clerks’ actions. The trial court also dismissed Roane County, which was named as a defendant, because no specific allegations were made against the county independent of the claims against the clerks. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

The defendant, Ellis Randall Darnell, Jr., was convicted of one count of manufacturing one-half gram or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; one count of possession with intent to deliver one-half gram or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two concurrent nine-year terms for the methamphetamine convictions and to a consecutive four-year term for the firearm conviction, for a total effective sentence of thirteen years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and that the trial court erred by ruling during a hearing concerning his motion for a new trial that a juror could not testify that other jurors engaged in intimidating conduct during the jury’s deliberations. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Wade Payne, of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, possessing cocaine, and possessing less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. The three convictions were merged into a single conviction for selling cocaine, for which the appellant received a sentence of fifteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the State failed to sufficiently establish a chain of custody for the cocaine. He also contends that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of an officer regarding the preliminary testing of the cocaine and in admitting recordings of telephone calls made by the appellant while he was in jail. Further, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following an indictment charging three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and two counts of rape, a Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Adrian Leroy Scott, of three counts of assault, see T.C.A. § 39-13-101(a)(3) (2003); one count of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, see id. §§ 39-13-527(a)(1)(B), 39-12-101; and one count of attempted sexual battery, see id. §§ 39-13-505(a)(1), 39-12-101. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years’ split confinement consisting of six months’ incarceration in the workhouse followed by two and one-half years on probation. In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, the defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by denying (1) his motion to suppress his statement to the police,(2) his motion for a mistrial based upon the undisclosed testimony of a rebuttal witness, (3) his motion to dismiss counts three and five based upon a fatal variance between the indictment allegations and the proof presented at trial, and (4) his request to present evidence at trial concerning the sexual offender registry. The defendant also contends that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences and denying him full probation. The State concedes that the trial court erroneously imposed consecutive sentences and also notes that the trial court failed to merge two sets of alternative counts. On remand, the trial court shall enter corrected judgments reflecting merger and concurrent sentences. Discerning no other error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified.

In this case, Patricia Carlene Mayfield (“Wife”) sought a divorce from Phillip Harold Mayfield (“Husband”). The parties had two minor children, a daughter (“Daughter”), born on September 10, 1998, and a son (“Son”), born on March 2, 2001. The trial court granted the divorce and designated Wife as the primary residential parent of the two minor children, divided the marital property, and awarded Wife discretionary costs. The court denied Husband’s request for alimony. Husband appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

The appellant, Jackie J. Porter, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years, six months with part of the sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed a retaliatory discharge claim against her employer pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304 and the Tennessee common law. The employer filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the employer’s motion without granting Plaintiff’s requests to amend her complaint. From the record, it is unclear whether the trial court considered Plaintiff’s requests, and if it did, the reasons for its denial of such are not apparent. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and we remand for consideration of her requests to amend and for express findings.

The defendant, Marcus L. Branner, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (1997), and two counts of attempted second degree murder, see id. §§ 39-13-210; 39-12-101, for which he received an effective sentence of 24 years’ incarceration. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court committed error at sentencing by imposing enhancement factors not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury to increase his sentence beyond the statutory minimum. We determine that the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court committed no reversible error at sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony T. Woods, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of one count of facilitation of intent to deliver less than 0.5 grams of cocaine and one count of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to six years for the facilitation conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the simple possession conviction. The Defendant now appeals. The Defendant claims that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress; (2) denying the Defendant’s request to introduce either an audio tape recording or a transcript of certain testimony from the preliminary hearing; and (3) finding sufficient evidence to support the convictions. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial before the trial court. Additionally, the Defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Finally, he has made no request and offers no evidence to support this Court waiving the untimely notice of appeal in the interest of justice. Accordingly, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

I agree with the majority that Mr. Stancil, as the proponent of the validity of the antenuptial agreement, “has the burden of establishing the existence and terms of the agreement, . . .” and, going further, that he has the burden to ...