APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Charles Claybrooks,1 appeals the dismissal of his 2021 petition seeking postconviction
relief from his 2010 convictions for one count aggravated robbery and two
counts of aggravated assault. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court concluded
that Petitioner “failed to demonstrate entitlement to the tolling of the statute of limitations”
and dismissed the Petition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of persistent conditions
and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of the child.
Father also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in
the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying
Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require
recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

Petitioner, Alexander Carino, appeals from the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus.  He alleges that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily denying his petition without advising him of his right to counsel or  appointing counsel and that his judgments for second-degree murder are void because the affidavits of complaint were not “properly authenticated” because they did not contain a court seal.  Petitioner further alleges for the first time on appeal that the affidavits of complaint contain an insufficient factual basis to support a finding of probable cause.  Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. 

Defendant, Isiah J. Primm, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of first degree felony murder; two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony; and one count of conspiracy to commit voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; and sentenced to an effective life plus forty years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the jury should have been instructed on self-defense, facilitation, and attempt as lesser-included offenses of first degree murder; (3) the jury should have been instructed on the State’s duty to gather and preserve evidence; (4) the State committed a Brady violation by waiting until the morning of trial to provide Defendant with a copy of Mr. Tidwell’s cell phone report; (5) the State knew or should have known that one of the victims introduced false testimony; (6) the trial court should have excluded evidence of drugs found in the apartment where Defendant was staying; (7) Defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right was violated because the jury venire contained no African American jurors; and (8) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, because the trial court did not sign three of the judgments, we remand the case for entry of amended judgments.

This appeal concerns an alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §
8-44-101, et seq. Pauline Madron (“Plaintiff”) sued the City of Morristown, Mayor Gary
Chesney, as well as Councilmembers Al A’Hearn, Chris Bivens, Robert Garrett, Tommy
Pedigo, Kay Senter, and Ken Smith (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for
Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the city’s public notice of a
July 12, 2019 special meeting to exceed the certified tax rate was inadequate. Plaintiff and
Defendants filed crossing motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s Open Meetings Act
claim. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the city’s notice that it intended to exceed the certified
tax rate was mere jargon that did not reasonably inform the public of the purpose of the
special meeting or the action to be taken. In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
Open Meetings Act claim is moot as it arises out of a property tax rate that was passed in
fiscal year 2019-2020, which lapsed before this matter was heard. Alternatively,
Defendants contend that, while most people may not understand the intricacies of city
finances, most people do understand what “exceed” and “tax rate” mean. While Plaintiff’s
claim is moot, it warrants resolution nevertheless. We hold that the city’s public notice of
the July 12, 2019 special meeting was adequate. We affirm.

In this consolidated appeal, the Petitioner, Robert Garner, appeals from the Giles County Circuit Courts’ summary denial of his petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021 (Fingerprint Act) and his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. We affirm the judgments of the post-conviction and coram nobis courts.

This appeal involves a personal injury case where the defendant died during the pendency
of the litigation. Subsequent to the filing of a suggestion of death by the defendant’s
counsel, the plaintiff failed to timely file a motion for substitution within the time provided
in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and, as a result, the defendant’s counsel filed a
motion to dismiss. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for substitution and
simultaneously moved the trial court to enlarge the time for filing the motion. The trial
court denied the plaintiff’s motions and dismissed the case. Upon our review of the record,
we reverse.

This appeal concerns premises liability. The plaintiff slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge on the defendants’ property. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Cadarius Head, of first degree
premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder, and the trial court imposed an
effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient
to support his convictions. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the State’s primary
witness was not credible and that his convictions were otherwise based on circumstantial
evidence. He further contends that the State failed to convincingly prove the element of
premeditation as to his first degree murder conviction. Finally, he argues that the evidence
supporting his conviction for attempted first degree murder was insufficient because the
victim did not testify at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

A woman filed a complaint alleging she was assaulted at a retail store.  Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the woman failed to prove her assault claim, and the woman appealed.  Due to the deficiencies in the woman’s appellate brief, this Court is unable to reach the substantive issues she raises, and we dismiss the appeal.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Brendan Nathan Morgan, was convicted in the
Decatur County Circuit Court of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to ten years at
100 percent in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting testimony that a police investigator saw search history
for pornographic material on the Defendant’s cell phone because the evidence violated the
best evidence rule and the rule against hearsay. Based on our review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

This appeals centers upon a challenge to a chancery court’s findings of fact that proved
determinative as to multiple legal issues arising in litigation related to unpaid repair costs
for rendering a private plane airworthy. The chancery court made the factual determination
that the plane owner did not agree to pay for the repairs performed by a mechanic. In
reaching this conclusion, the chancery court resolved the case based upon documentary
evidence in the form of deposition transcripts and exhibits rather than live witness
testimony. Given the documentary nature of the trial court proceedings, we conducted a
de novo review of the evidence presented without affording deference to the trial court’s
factual findings. We find the trial court erred in its factual finding that the owner did not
agree to pay for the repairs. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court’s legal conclusions
for which the trial court’s contrary factual determinations had been determinative. We
conclude that the plane owner breached his contract with the mechanic and is responsible
for storage costs for the plane pursuant to the possessory lien thereupon. We remand for
further proceedings including a determination of the applicability of prejudgment interest
to the repair costs.

Kathryn Wilburn fractured her pelvis during the course and scope of her employment with
Food Lion, Inc. Wilburn and Food Lion entered into a settlement agreement that obligated
Food Lion to provide for future medical treatment related to Wilburn's fractured pelvis.
More than a decade later, Food Lion filed a petition to determine whether Wilburn's
ongoing treatment for pain was causally related to that injury. After considering the report
and testimony of the physician who conducted an independent medical examination
("IME") at Food Lion's request and the C-32 form of Wilburn's authorized treating
physician, the trial court denied the petition. It also denied Wilburn's request for attorney's
fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(b)(2). The appeal has been
referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of
findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. Because the father did not
file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry
of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss
the appeal.

This appeal involves a breach of contract action filed against the agent of an undisclosed principal. The trial court entered an order granting judgment against the agent. The agent appeals. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, filed by N.R.H. (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the trial court judge.
Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and finding it fatally
deficient, we dismiss the appeal.

After pleading guilty to two counts of violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender law and reckless endangerment, Defendant was sentenced to a total of eight years and six months on supervised probation.  Several probation violation warrants, a partial revocation, and additional convictions followed, eventually culminating in a hearing on the revocation of Defendant’s probation.  Defendant admitted the violations.  The trial court ultimately determined that Defendant’s multiple probation violations warranted the complete revocation of probation.  After a review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The mother of Aubree D. appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) established several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights—including severe child abuse—and that termination of her rights was in Aubree’s best interest. On appeal, the mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove any ground for termination or that termination of her parental rights is in Aubree’s best interest. In a dependency and neglect proceeding, the Circuit Court for Overton County found that the mother subjected Aubree to severe child abuse, and this court affirmed that finding in In re Aubree D., No. M2021-01229-COA-R3-JV, 2022 WL 4488507 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2022). Thus, the finding of severe child abuse is res judicata. We have also determined that DCS proved other grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in Aubree’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

A homeowner sued his homeowners’ association in general sessions court. Upon motion of the homeowner’s association, the case was removed to circuit court. After the case was removed to circuit court, the homeowner amended his complaint to add an attorney for the homeowner’s association as a defendant. The homeowner’s association and the attorney sought to dismiss the amended complaint. The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss but allowed to the homeowner to file a second amended complaint against the attorney in order to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Ultimately, the circuit court granted the attorney a judgment on the pleadings after concluding that the second amended complaint failed to allege facts satisfying all of the elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The homeowner appealed. Discerning that the circuit court erred in granting the homeowner’s association’s motion to dismiss, we vacate that portion of the court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment in all other respects.

Petitioner, Reginold C. Steed, appeals the error coram nobis court’s summary dismissal of
his petition for error coram nobis relief. Following review of the record and applicable
law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court in accordance with Rule 20 of the
Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Father appeals the termination of his parental rights, asserting his due process rights were
violated as a result of failure to timely appoint counsel in both dependency and neglect
proceedings and termination proceedings. The juvenile court terminated Father’s rights
for abandonment, under several statutory provisions relating to putative fathers, and for
failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the child, and the court determined
that termination was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that any issue regarding the
appointment of counsel in the dependency and neglect proceedings is not properly before
this court and that Father’s due process rights were not violated in the termination
proceedings. Because the Department of Children’s Services does not defend the
abandonment ground on appeal, we reverse this basis for termination. We also reverse the
trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence established a risk of substantial
physical or psychological harm to the child. Nevertheless, the evidence presented supports
in a clear and convincing manner multiple statutory grounds for termination and that
termination is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, the judgment terminating Father’s
parental rights is affirmed.

The Defendant, Carrie Joann Hamlin, was convicted by a McMinn County Circuit Court
jury of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance within 1000′ of a drug-free zone, a Class
C felony, for which she is serving a nine-year sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(3),
(c)(2)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (sale of a controlled substance), 39-17-432
(2018) (subsequently amended) (Drug-Free Zone Act). On appeal, the Defendant contends
that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, (2) the trial court erred in
declining to resentence her under the 2020 amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act, and
alternatively, (3) this court should remand her case to the trial court for resentencing under
the 2022 amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

Defendant, Patsy Hensley, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and received
a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court’s exclusion of testimony
from her expert witness violated her right to present a defense and that the prosecutor
improperly commented during closing argument on her decision not to testify at trial.
Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

Following convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon and a felony drug offense, the
Defendant, Tavares Tobin, was sentenced to an effective term of eleven years and placed
on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant engaged in new criminal conduct and stopped
reporting for supervision. As a consequence of the violations, the trial court revoked the
suspended sentences and ordered that the Defendant serve the balance of the effective
sentence in custody. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by finding that he violated the conditions of his probation and by fully revoking
his suspended sentences without considering lesser options. We respectfully affirm the
judgments of the trial court.