APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a multitude of challenges brought to the orders of the trial court in a post-divorce dispute involving minor children. We vacate the trial court’s decision to sua sponte order a new parenting plan, as well as to enter a temporary and permanent injunction against Mother. We also reverse the trial court’s decision to award Father discretionary costs for expert fees regarding an issue on which he did not prevail. Otherwise, we affirm the rulings of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a last will and testament, which provided for the creation of a trust. The decedent’s wife is the current income beneficiary of the trust, with the decedent’s son being a remainder beneficiary. The son requested an accounting of the trust financials, to which the trustees of the trust responded that the son was not entitled to receive them. The trustees filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to instruct the parties whether the son was entitled to the information he requested. The son subsequently filed a counterclaim asking that the trustees be required to provide him with the information he requested and alleging breach of trust by the trustees. The Trial Court granted the trustees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings after finding that the son was a remainder beneficiary and not a current income beneficiary of the trust and, therefore, was not entitled to financial information regarding the trust. The Trial Court found that the language in the decedent’s last will and testament was intended to override the reporting requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-813(a) and limit the trustees’ statutory obligation of reporting to qualified beneficiaries. In doing so, the Trial Court determined that the trustees were not required to provide the son with reports or other financial information concerning the trust. The Trial Court denied the son’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, David H. Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  He maintains that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over his case because the superseding indictment was returned after the expiration of the statute of limitations for aggravated rape.  The habeas court summarily denied the petition because the record failed to establish that the judgment was void.  After review, we affirm the habeas court.

The Petitioner, Sterling Carter, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed a twenty-two year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  The Petitioner filed a post-conviction relief petition, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, finding that the Petitioner had not proven his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his arguments.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, DeShawn McClenton, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal concerns a penalty assessed against a company by the Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“the Bureau”). The Bureau assessed a penalty against Jase Enterprises, LLC (“Jase”), a construction company owned by Jason Usery (“Usery”), for failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage. After a contested case hearing, the administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) upheld the penalty assessment but modified its amount. Jase petitioned for judicial review in the Chancery Court for Henderson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court upheld the ALJ’s decision. Jase appeals to this Court, arguing among other things that it was not afforded due process and that the decision to assess a penalty against it was arbitrary. In particular, Jase argues that the evidence did not establish that Joe Sheldon (“Sheldon”) was a Jase employee. We find that Jase was afforded due process; it received adequate notice and had an opportunity to be heard. We find further that the penalty assessment against Jase was supported by substantial and material evidence, including Sheldon’s deposition. We affirm.

The plaintiff was injured when his car was hit by an uninsured driver. The plaintiff was initially paid $5,000.00 from the medical payments coverage of his automobile policy. A jury then found the plaintiff’s compensatory damages to total $80,000.00. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier then paid the plaintiff $45,000.00, representing the policy limit of $50,000.00 less the prior $5,000.00 payment. The plaintiff then sought to compel the uninsured motorist carrier to pay the additional $5,000.00 owed under the uninsured motorist policy. The trial court agreed and ordered the uninsured motorist carrier to pay the plaintiff an additional $5,000.00, resulting in total payment by the carrier to the plaintiff of $55,000.00. The uninsured motorist carrier appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. 

This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 28, 2022.  Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Cody W. Bales, Defendant, pled guilty to statutory rape in July of 2019 and received a six-year sentence to be served on supervised probation after the service of 12 months in incarceration. A probation revocation warrant was issued in April of 2021. After a hearing, the trial court revoked probation in full, ordering Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Defendant’s probation. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of the father upon concluding that the petitioners had proven by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit the child, (2) abandonment by failure to support the child, (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the father’s custody, (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child as a putative father, and (5) risk of substantial harm to the child’s physical or psychological welfare if returned to the putative father’s legal and physical custody. The father timely appealed. Upon review of the final order, we conclude that the trial court did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) due to its failure to include sufficient findings of fact in its written order. We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for the expedited entry of sufficient written findings of fact. We deny the petitioners’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

Pro se Petitioner, Corry Merriweather, appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition seeking post-conviction relief from his conviction of second-degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Bobby Lovin, of two counts of rape of a child, and he received an effective sixty-four-year sentence. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on one count of rape of a child and the trial court’s admission of the victim’s recorded forensic interview. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that there was no error in the admission of the video, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Etta Faye Beck Bombacino (“Wife”) filed for divorce from Anthony John Bombacino (“Husband”) on January 29, 2021. Trial was held on July 21, 2021, and the trial court assessed equal fault to the parties and ordered them divorced. The trial court also ordered that the parties split the equity in their home after marital debts were paid and awarded Wife no spousal support. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this premises liability action, the plaintiffs sued three local governments and a parks and recreation commission, jointly created by the local governments, to recover for injuries suffered by one of the plaintiffs when she stepped into a hole while attending a concert at a park maintained by the commission. The trial court dismissed the action as to the three local governments, concluding that they were immune under the state’s Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). Later, the trial court granted the commission’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the commission enjoyed immunity under both the GTLA and the state statutes known as the Recreational Use Statutes. We dismiss the appeal as to the three local governments, concluding we lack subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to timely initiate an appeal against them. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the commission retained immunity under both the GTLA and the Recreational Use Statutes.

A review of the record on appeal reveals that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Justin R. Allen (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s decision regarding custody of his two minor children. Because the order appealed from is interlocutory, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan, calculation of child support, and classification of assets. We affirm the court’s decisions.

Petitioner, Christopher James Carbin, appeals the trial court’s denial of his “Motion for Order Compelling Discovery,” which he filed regarding his 1986 Shelby County convictions for attempted second degree burglary, carrying burglar’s tools, and receiving stolen property. Upon review, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to address the merits of the instant case, and the appeal is dismissed.

Appellant, Frances Diane Weeks Wright, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Probate Court (the “Trial Court”) that was entered on January 3, 2022. We determine that the January 3, 2022 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

The Defendant, Demerrick Porter, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and received an effective sentence of thirty-eight years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a detainer action filed by a bank following a foreclosure sale.  The defendant borrower filed a counterclaim for “Wrongful Foreclosure – Breach of Contract,” alleging that the plaintiff bank breached the deed of trust by failing to provide proper notice prior to acceleration.  The trial court originally granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff bank, finding that notice was properly sent, but this Court reversed, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed such that summary judgment could not be awarded to either party.  On remand, the trial court permitted both parties to amend their answers.  The plaintiff bank then asserted res judicata based on a prior lawsuit in federal court and moved for summary judgment on that basis.  The trial court ultimately granted the plaintiff bank summary judgment, concluding that the defendant’s argument regarding lack of notice either was raised or should have been raised in her prior action in federal court in which she attempted to halt the foreclosure.  The defendant appeals.  We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

A landlord and tenant entered into a lease-purchase agreement.  Near the end of the lease term, the tenant sought to exercise the purchase option.  The landlord claimed that the tenant could not do so because she defaulted on rent payments.  The landlord also argued that he terminated the agreement before the tenant exercised the option.  The trial court rejected both arguments and granted the tenant specific performance of the purchase option.  We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s decision to deny a motion to compel arbitration. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s order.