APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Durrell James a/k/a/ James Durrell, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of
three counts of aggravated stalking (Counts 1 through 3) and one count of stalking (Count
4). The trial court imposed a four-year sentence for each count of aggravated stalking in
Counts 1 through 3, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for stalking in Count 4. The trial
court further ordered that the sentence in Count 2 be served consecutively to Count 1 and
concurrently with the sentences in Counts 3 and 4 for an effective eight-year sentence as a
Range II multiple offender to be served in a local workhouse. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review of the
entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but
remand for correction of a clerical error on the judgment form for Count 2 to reflect that it
is to be served consecutively to Count 1 and concurrently with Counts 3 and 4.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict awarding damages to a plaintiff injured in a car accident. The plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of her medical bills. Because the plaintiff failed to present expert proof that her medical expenses were necessary, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the bills. The jury verdict is affirmed.

In this real property dispute, the petitioner brought an action to quiet title to and remove
the respondent from a parcel of improved real property located in Cumberland County.
Following a bench trial, the trial court ordered that the title of the property be fully vested
in the petitioner. The trial court also ordered the respondent to vacate the premises within
ten days. Following a damages hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding to the
petitioner $8,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in attorney’s fees. The
respondent has appealed, and the petitioner has raised an issue alleging that this is a
frivolous appeal. Because we are unable to discern from the trial court’s judgment any
consideration of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5
factors (“RPC 1.5 factors”), we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for the
trial court to make a new determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee award to the
petitioner based on the RPC 1.5 factors. We deny the petitioner’s request for damages on
appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Plaintiffs filed this inverse condemnation suit against numerous defendants, alleging that
their involvement with a construction project on an interstate highway resulted in increased
surface waters and flooding of Plaintiffs’ home and property. The trial court dismissed all
of the claims at various stages of the litigation. In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed the
dismissal of multiple claims, but we vacated the trial court’s grant of judgment on the
pleadings for two defendants because the trial court’s order stated that its decision was
based on “the entire record” and cited an exhibit to the complaint. See Harvey v. Shelby
Cnty., No. W2018-01747-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 3854297, at *4-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
16, 2019). We remanded for consideration pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
56. Id. at *6. After some limited discovery on remand, the trial court granted motions for
summary judgment filed by the two remaining defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, James William Mabe, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant challenges the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. The trial court
found that clear and convincing evidence established four grounds for termination of
parental rights including (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) persistent conditions; (3)
substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and (4) failure to manifest an ability
and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found clear and convincing
evidence established that termination was in the children’s best interests. The appellant
challenges the trial court’s findings as to both the existence of grounds for termination and
the conclusion that termination was in the best interests of the children. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cededrick Ivory, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury
for first-degree premeditated murder in the shooting death of Anthony Travis (count one),
the attempted first-degree murder of Malik Muhammad (count two), and unlawful
employment of a firearm during the commission of first-degree murder (count three). Prior
to trial, the State dismissed counts two and three. The Appellant was convicted as charged
by a Shelby County jury of first-degree premediated murder (count one) and sentenced to
life in prison. In this appeal as of right, he raises the following issues for our review: (1)
whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction of first-degree premeditated
murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the prosecutor to correct the
testimony of a state witness; and (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding the dates of
prior charged offenses during the cross-examination of two state witnesses. Upon our
review, we must remand this case for entry of separate judgment forms reflecting a
dismissal of counts two and three. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

In a private petition for terminationof parental rights, the petitioner alleged multiple grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to visit; (2) abandonment for failure to support; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court found the Father’s parental rights should be terminatedbased upon thesethree groundsand that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to the termination grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. Because the trial court did not make findings of factconcluding that placing legal and physical custody withFather would pose a risk of substantial harm tothe physical or psychological welfare of the child, we must vacatethe trial court’s ruling as to the failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody ground. We affirm the trial court’s conclusionthat termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

In this premises liability case concerning a customer’s fall inside of a restaurant, video surveillance footage from a security camera in the restaurant was not preserved, precipitating the filing of a sanctions motion by the Plaintiffs for spoliation. Although several sources of evidence existed pertaining to the condition of the restaurant flooring where the customer fell, and although the trial court concluded that the Plaintiffs were not prevented from proving fault in this case in the absence of the video evidence, the trial court ultimately entered significant sanctions against the Defendants, including holding that it was conclusively established for purposes of trial that the Defendants had actual or constructive notice that the floor where the fall occurred was “slick” because of a substance or because of a general and continuing condition, as well as striking the Defendants’ affirmative defenses of comparative fault. Upon the filing of an application by the Defendants, we granted an extraordinary appeal under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s sanctions order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The trial court found Appellant/Father in civil contempt for alleged failure to comply with discovery propounded by Appellee/Mother. The trial court also dismissed Father’s petition to modify visitation and child support on the ground that Father’s petition constituted an abusive civil lawsuit. We reverse the trial court’s findings of civil contempt and abusive civil lawsuit. However, because the parties’ child has reached majority, we conclude that Father’s petition to modify is moot. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Father’s petition on the ground of mootness.

A father petitioned to change the primary residential parent and for immediate physical custody of his child based on the mother’s allegedly inappropriate behavior. The court granted Father an ex parte order of immediate physical custody. At the show cause hearing, the court determined that the mother had engaged in a pattern of emotional abuse of the father and the child such that her parenting time should be limited. After a final hearing on the father’s petition, the court found a material change of circumstances had occurred and that it was in the child’s best interest to modify the permanent parenting plan. The court then adopted a modified parenting plan that named the father the primary residential parent and limited the mother’s parenting time. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The notice of appeal filed by the appellants, Nathan Lynn Bryant and Melissa Bryant, stated that appellants were appealing the judgment entered on September 27, 2022. Inasmuch as the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Iesha Jones, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of
first degree felony murder; voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; especially
aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. See
T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder),
39-13-211 (2018) (voluntary manslaughter), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated
robbery), 39-13-103 (2018 (subsequently amended) (reckless endangerment). The trial
court merged the first degree felony murder and voluntary manslaughter convictions and
imposed a life sentence. The court also imposed sentences of twenty years for especially
aggravated robbery and two years for reckless endangerment. The court ordered
concurrent service of the sentences, for an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions for first degree
felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, (2) the trial court erred in admitting
hearsay evidence, (3) the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) the court
erred in denying her requested jury instructions regarding self-defense and defense of
others. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A congregation within the Presbyterian Church sought to disaffiliate from its presbytery while retaining ownership of its real property. The presbytery argued that the congregation did not own the real property outright but rather held it in trust for the benefit of the national body of the Presbyterian Church. Following a hearing on competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the congregation owned the property outright. Thus, it denied the presbytery’s motion and granted the congregation’s motion. The presbytery timely appealed to this Court. Following careful review, we reverse.

This appeal concerns a long-running domestic matter. Heather R. Wilder (“Mother”) and
Joseph C. Wilder (“Father”) were issued a final judgment of divorce by the Circuit Court
for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) in 2010. Issues concerning child support have
persisted since then. In the most recent chapter, the Trial Court allowed Mother’s attorney
to withdraw five days before trial but denied her request for a continuance. The Trial Court
subsequently entered its final order. Mother appeals. We find that the Trial Court abused
its discretion in denying Mother a reasonable continuance. We vacate the Trial Court’s
judgment and remand for a new trial to be conducted after Mother has had a reasonable
continuance in which to try to retain counsel or otherwise prepare for trial pro se.

Tenant appeals the trial court’s decision to grant landlord a judgment under a holdover
provision in a commercial lease. Because we conclude that landlord voluntarily
relinquished its claim under the holdover provision, we reverse the trial court’s judgment
of damages, late fees, and attorney’s fees, but affirm the trial court’s decision to deny
tenant’s motion to amend her complaint. We remand this case for the determination of the
sole issue agreed to be heard by the parties.

The State of Tennessee sought the enforcement of a prior administrative order against the Appellant related to the Appellant’s violations of the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act of 1977, requesting civil penalties, damages, and injunctive relief. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Appellant sought a continuance based on parallel criminal proceedings. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance and granted summary judgment to the State. On appeal, the Appellant asserts that the chancery court and administrative tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction and that the chancery court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. We conclude that any challenge to personal jurisdiction has been waived and that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal more than thirty days from the date of entry of the
order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not
timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is a wrongful-death health care liability action against a skilled nursing facility, the Tennessee State Veterans’ Home in Clarksville (“TSVH-Clarksville”), which is owned and operated by the State of Tennessee. The claimant, Linda Black (“Claimant”), is the surviving spouse of Robert Junious Black, deceased, who was a resident of TSVHClarksville from December 16, 2016, through January 9, 2017. Claimant asserted that TSVH-Clarksville proximately caused Mr. Black’s death by failing to monitor and report his symptoms under the applicable standard of care. In particular, Claimant alleged that the staff at TSVH-Clarksville (1) failed to follow Mr. Black’s care plan for risk of dehydration; (2) failed to prevent Mr. Black from developing a urinary tract infection; (3) failed to notify Mr. Black’s physician of a significant changes in his clinical status; and (4) failed to properly assess Mr. Black. Following a two-day bench trial, the Claims Commissioner found that Claimant failed to establish a health care liability claim because, inter alia, the State complied with the applicable standards of care and Claimant failed to establish causation. This appeal followed. We affirm.

This is an eminent domain case in which the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department
of Transportation (“the State”) condemned two portions of the defendant’s eighteen-acre
property in Shelby County. Prior to a jury trial to determine the fair market value of the
condemned property, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of or reference
to a prior sale of a portion of the defendant’s real property to a neighboring fireworks
business. The State argued that the previous sale was not an arm’s-length transaction or a
comparable sale. The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine, excluding the prior
sale from the jury’s consideration. The defendant has appealed. Determining that the
defendant has failed to properly cite to the record in its appellate brief or provide us with a
sufficient record on appeal, we conclude that the defendant has waived its challenge to the
trial court’s exclusion of evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order.

The appellant, Kathy Delores Horton (prospectively D/B/A A-Team Bail Bond Company, LLC), appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition to operate a new bail bond company.  The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying her petition because she had the requisite two years of experience working as a qualified agent.  The appellant also raises a challenge regarding the en banc panel, the denial of a claim concerning ex parte communications, and an equal protection claim.  Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s petition, as well as her other claims.

Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his second petition for habeas corpus relief, in which he challenged the sufficiency of the felony murder indictment under which he was convicted. Petitioner argues on appeal that the habeas corpus court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A juvenile appeals the decision to re-commit him to DCS custody for treatment and
services. We conclude that this appeal is moot in light of post-judgment facts.

The Defendant, Randall Murphy, appeals his convictions by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, reckless aggravated assault, aggravated assault, criminal impersonation of law enforcement, and domestic assault. The Defendant argues: (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it misstated the law and provided its personal opinion on the determinate element of the kidnapping offense; (2) the trial court expressed its personal opinion regarding the testimony of one of the State’s key eyewitnesses; (3) the trial court improperly excluded evidence that the victim had consumed alcohol with her prescription medications at the time of the alleged offenses; (4) the trial court failed to give any weight to the applicable mitigating factors before imposing the maximum sentence for the aggravated kidnapping conviction; and (5) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors entitles him to a new trial on all counts. 1 After review, we reverse and remand this case for a new trial on the aggravated kidnapping charge in Count 1 and affirm the remaining counts.