APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant City of Memphis appeals the dismissal of its petition for judicial review of the
ruling of an administrative law judge. The trial court dismissed the appeal on the ground
that the City failed to provide the entire administrative record. Despite profound
deficiencies in the City’s brief, the dispositive issue is one of law and involves only the
question of whether the trial court should have proceeded with its review on the partial
administrative record. Because our review is de novo on questions of law, we exercise our
discretion under Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 2 and 13(b) to proceed with
adjudication of the appeal on the merits. We conclude that the trial court should have
proceeded with its review on the partial administrative record; as such, we reverse the trial
court’s dismissal of the appeal and remand for further hearing.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court
following the denial of a motion that sought the trial court judge’s recusal from the case.
Herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion.

Defendant, Kellye Rhea Crabtree, appeals from the trial court’s sentencing and restitution orders connected with her guilty-pleaded convictions for theft over $60,000, theft over $1,000, and official misconduct, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentencing; finding that she was a professional criminal; denying probation or an alternative sentence; ordering the maximum in-range sentence; and imposing restitution in an ex parte order filed after the sentencing hearing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court regarding consecutive sentencing and the manner of service. However, we reverse the trial court’s restitution order and remand the case for a full restitution hearing.

Plaintiff filed an action against Lauderdale County under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-301 to -
303, more than one year after his cause of action accrued. The trial court examined the
gravamen of the complaint and determined a one-year statute of limitations applied rather
than the two or six-year limitations periods advocated for by the plaintiff. Discerning no
error in the court’s analysis of the issues, we affirm.

The Defendant, Brian Keith Medley, was found guilty of sexual battery and
domestic assault. He was sentenced to the statutory maximum of four years as a Range II,
multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions and that the maximum sentence was excessive. We respectfully affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marcus Thomas, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of
post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction to attempted first degree murder.
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on
his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his
guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
court.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to two children. The trial court concluded that the maternal aunt and uncle proved two statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

As relevant to this appeal, the Defendant, David Ray Duncan, was convicted by a jury of
the offense of unlawfully possessing a controlled substance while present in a penal
institution. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction. He also argues that the trial court should have excluded
evidence produced after the deadline established by the court’s scheduling order, and he
challenges the propriety of his effective twelve-year sentence. We affirm the Defendant’s
conviction, but we respectfully remand the case for resentencing in accordance with Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-11-211.

The Defendant, Katherine E. Pilley, pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, a
Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a), (c)(1) (2018) (subsequently amended)
(simple possession of methamphetamine). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to
eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to probation after thirty days in confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law, challenging the trial court’s
denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless search of the
Defendant’s car. Because the certified question is overly broad as it fails to identify the
scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction
to consider this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

I concur in the majority’s analysis and holding that Tennessee Code Annotated
section 29-20-205 removes immunity for Hawkins County only for ordinary negligence,
not gross negligence or recklessness. I write separately to highlight an issue not addressed
in the majority opinion—whether we should continue to apply the common law public duty
doctrine and the related special duty exception in cases where the legislature has addressed
the issue of immunity by statute.

Ricky Hunter, Defendant, was indicted for one count of first degree murder and one count
of being a felon in possession of a firearm. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of
the lesser included offense of second degree murder and being a felon in possession of a
firearm. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 33 years. The trial court denied
a motion for new trial. After this Court waived the timely filing of the notice of appeal,
this appeal ensued. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
sustaining the second degree murder conviction. We find the evidence sufficient and
affirm the convictions.

The Petitioner, Jahue Mumphrey, pled guilty by criminal information to possessing a
controlled substance with the intent to sell and three counts of domestic assault. He was
sentenced to an effective term of ten years. He later filed a petition for post-conviction
relief alleging that his plea was entered involuntarily and that his lawyer rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by, among other things, failing to review pretrial
discovery with him. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the
Petitioner appealed to this Court. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the postconviction
court.

The Defendant, Douglas McArthur McGill,1 was convicted by a jury of violating the
Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and
Tracking Act of 2004 by failing to register a secondary address. He was sentenced as a
Range II, multiple offender to a term of two years and six months. On appeal, the
Defendant seeks a new trial, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay
evidence. The State concedes that reversible error exists in the record, and we agree. We
respectfully reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the Defendant’s conviction, and
remand the case for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Darcell Dominique Wright, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it held that the Petitioner’s claim of limited ability to access the penitentiary law library due to lockdowns did not entitle him to due process tolling of the one-year statute of limitations for filing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Governmental entities generally are immune from suit. But the Governmental Tort Liability Act removes immunity for certain injuries caused by the negligent acts of an employee. In this case, we consider whether the term “negligent” in the Act’s removal provision is limited to ordinary negligence or instead also encompasses gross negligence or recklessness. We hold that the Act removes immunity only for ordinary negligence. Because the Court of Appeals held to the contrary, we reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Michael Dewayne Fisher, appeals his Lawrence County conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. Defendant asserts that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court committed structural constitutional error when it denied his motion for recusal. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

Branden Brookins, Petitioner, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking post-petition relief from his 2019 convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, two counts of criminal attempt first degree murder, employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon.  On appeal, Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A member of a limited liability company (“LLC”) brought a suit on behalf of the LLC
alleging a breach of fiduciary duties and constructive fraud by another member in regard
to transfers of LLC property. The plaintiff admitted that no demand for corrective action
was made on the defendant, nor was any demand made on the other members of the LLC
to join in the litigation. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding
both that the plaintiff’s complaint was outside the statute of limitations and that the plaintiff
lacked standing to bring the derivative action. We agree with the trial court that the
plaintiff’s complaint was subject to dismissal because his complaint did not include
allegations sufficiently particular to excuse his failure to meet statutory demand
requirements. The remaining issues are therefore pretermitted.

Following a hearing on the issue of attorney’s fees resulting from a discovery dispute, the trial judge or his office contacted an attorney for the defendants to obtain certain discovery responses that had not been filed with the court. The defendants’ attorney responded by email with the requested documents, carbon-copying plaintiffs’ counsel on the email. The trial court then entered an order awarding the plaintiffs attorney’s fees in which the fees awarded were only a small portion of those requested. The plaintiffs filed a motion to recuse, citing the communication between the defendants’ attorney and the trial judge. The trial court denied the motion for recusal. We agree with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that recusal was not required.

The defendant, Kentavis Antwon Jones, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury
convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of marijuana
with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, theft, driving on a revoked license,
and violation of the window tint law, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions. The defendant also raises the issue of merger, arguing that the trial court
properly merged his convictions. Because the trial court erred by merging certain firearm
convictions and because the judgments contain clerical errors, we reverse the improper
mergers and remand the case for the entry of corrected judgments. We affirm the trial
court’s judgments in all other respects.

Defendant, Timothy Potts, appeals as of right from his jury convictions for two counts of
aggravated rape, for which he received a sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal,
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss based upon
the statute of limitations and due process and that the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions. Following our review, we affirm.

The Appellant, Keith L. Farmer, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Upon review of the motion filed by appointed counsel, and in light of the record on appeal, the Court hereby affirms the judgment of the trial court.

In this consolidated appeal, the defendant, Justin Darnay Graves, argues the trial court erred
in imposing partial consecutive sentences and ordering restitution in his three cases. After
our review, we discern no reversible error in the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences, but we determine the order of restitution was in error. Therefore, we affirm the
sentences imposed by the trial court, vacate the orders of restitution and remand for entry
of corrected judgments.

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children
upon the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds
of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment by failure to visit,
substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, putative father
grounds, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of and
financial responsibility for the children. The juvenile court further found by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interest. We reverse the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a
suitable home and persistent conditions. We also reverse the ground of abandonment by
failure to visit and the putative father ground of failure to seek reasonable visitation as they
pertain to the child, Samyra. We affirm the remaining grounds for the termination of the
father’s parental rights, as well as the juvenile court’s determination that termination of the
father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest.

This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding in which the appellants filed a complaint to set aside a trust established by the ward, along with a motion to recuse the trial judge. The trial judge entered orders dismissing the complaint, resolving various other matters, and closing the conservatorship, without entering any order mentioning the motion for recusal. We vacate the orders entered by the trial court while the recusal motion remained pending and remand for further proceedings before a different trial judge.