APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children
upon the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds
of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment by failure to visit,
substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, putative father
grounds, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of and
financial responsibility for the children. The juvenile court further found by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interest. We reverse the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a
suitable home and persistent conditions. We also reverse the ground of abandonment by
failure to visit and the putative father ground of failure to seek reasonable visitation as they
pertain to the child, Samyra. We affirm the remaining grounds for the termination of the
father’s parental rights, as well as the juvenile court’s determination that termination of the
father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The mother and father appeal the trial court’s
order terminating their parental rights, arguing that there was not clear and convincing
evidence to support termination. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute over a testamentary trust, which was established by the will
of the decedent’s husband. Upon her husband’s death, the decedent became a life income
beneficiary of the trust. Upon the decedent’s death, the corporate trustee distributed the
remaining corpus in equal shares to the remainder beneficiaries, which were two nieces of
the decedent’s husband and a nephew of the decedent. The plaintiffs in this case—a niece
and the surviving spouse of the other niece—filed a complaint to set aside the probate of
the decedent’s will and for an accounting of distribution of trust assets. They alleged that
the decedent’s will should be declared null and void for various reasons. They also alleged
that the testamentary trust was improperly invaded by the decedent’s nephew. However,
the plaintiffs later sought to voluntarily dismiss their complaint insofar as it pertained to
setting aside the probate of the decedent’s will, which the probate court granted. They then
amended their complaint and no longer contested the will. Instead, they alleged, among
other things, that the corporate trustee failed to prevent the improper invasion of the
testamentary trust, thereby breaching its fiduciary duties. The corporate trustee filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). Ultimately, the probate court granted the
motion finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims against the corporate
trustee of the testamentary trust. The court explained that the plaintiffs were neither
beneficiaries under a will of the decedent nor heirs at law entitled to take in the decedent’s
estate through intestate succession. The court further explained that the testamentary trust
was never a part of the decedent’s estate and that the plaintiffs could have brought their
claims in the estate that created the testamentary trust, which was the estate of the
decedent’s husband. Additionally, because the court found that Plaintiffs lacked standing,
it found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion
to transfer the case to the estate of the decedent’s husband finding that it had no authority
to transfer the case to a closed estate in its court. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the
decision of the probate court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Brandon Richmond Bowling, Petitioner, was charged in a twelve-count indictment with
six counts of rape, two counts of sexual battery, two counts of aggravated rape, one count
of first degree felony murder, and one count of first degree premeditated murder for his
role in the death of H.M.1, a 22-year-old woman. The State filed an intent to seek a sentence
of life without the possibility of parole. Prior to trial, counsel for Petitioner filed a motion
to suppress video evidence of an incident found on Petitioner’s phone. The motion was
never litigated. Petitioner pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape and one count of
second degree murder in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. As a result,
Petitioner received an effective sentence of 40 years at 100%. Petitioner filed a petition
for post-conviction relief raising the issue that trial counsel’s failure to advise him that the
search warrant justifying the search of his cell phone was constitutionally defective
rendered his guilty plea involuntary. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied
relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed
to satisfy the burden to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Furthermore,
the record establishes that trial counsel’s strategy of filing the motion, initiated negotiations
that resulted in a very favorable resolution for Petitioner. Accordingly, the judgment of
the post-conviction court is affirmed.
 

The Petitioner, Steven Skinner, appeals the summary dismissal of his third untimely
petition for writ of error coram nobis. Upon review, we affirm.

Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights on the ground that she was not properly served with the termination petition. Because the record raises substantial questions as to whether the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services exercised diligence in its attempt to locate and serve Mother with process, we vacate the termination of her parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Michael Nyok Lueth, was convicted as charged by a Davidson County
Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), sixth offense (Count 1); DUI per
se, sixth offense (Count 2); and driving on a revoked license (Count 3). The trial court
sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent six-year sentences
for the DUI convictions, merged the DUI convictions, and imposed a concurrent sentence
of eleven months and twenty-nine days imprisonment for the conviction for driving on a
revoked license. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in telling
prospective jurors that an interpreter had been provided for the Defendant “out of an
abundance of caution”; (2) the trial court erred in providing a special instruction to the jury
that it was not allowed to consider the Defendant’s lack of fluency in English when
assessing the evidence in the case; (3) the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s
motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor, relying on the trial court’s proposed special
instruction, stated during its rebuttal closing argument that the jury could not allow the
Defendant’s failure to speak English fluently to affect how the jury viewed the evidence;
and (4) he was improperly sentenced as a second offender for his conviction for driving on
a revoked license. After review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand the
case for entry of a corrected judgment form in Count 3 reflecting that the conviction offense
is driving on a revoked license, first offense, a Class B misdemeanor, and that the
Defendant’s sentence is six months, served concurrently with the sentence in Count 1.

This third appeal in a long-running landlord/tenant dispute presents the question of the proper amount of an attorney’s fees award. The tenant, John T. Rochford, III, and several business entities owned or controlled by Mr. Rochford (collectively “Rochford”), sued the church now known as Green Hills Community Church (“Church”), claiming among other things that Church breached a lease agreement. Following a second appeal in which this Court held that an award of attorney’s fees in favor of Church was warranted, the trial court awarded Church $343,535.07 in attorney’s fees and expenses, which reflected a rate of $295 per hour. The trial court declined Church’s request for 10% yearly interest starting from the date of the filing of the complaint, July 30, 2015, finding it unwarranted by the terms of the lease. Church appeals, arguing that it should have been awarded attorney’s fees at a rate of $450 per hour and interest. We affirm.

This appeal concerns access to a spring on rural land. Arthur Ray Nicely and Henrietta
Nicely (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued Jarrod W. Atkins (“Defendant”) in the Chancery
Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to establish the boundary line
between their respective properties. After a hearing, the Trial Court accepted the opinion
of Defendant’s surveyor as to the boundary line. The spring at issue was determined to be
on Defendant’s land, but the Trial Court also found an easement by implication whereby
Plaintiffs may use water from the spring. Defendant appeals the Trial Court’s finding of
an easement by implication. We find that, while separation of title was proven, the other
elements of an easement by implication, prior use and necessity, were not proven.
Plaintiffs failed to prove any obvious, permanent, or long-established practice of their tract
using water from the spring.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Justin Darnay Graves, of two counts of
simple possession of heroin, introduction of contraband into a penal facility, tampering
with evidence, speeding, and driving while unlicensed, for which he received an effective
sentence of six years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for tampering with evidence.
The defendant also argues the trial court erred in classifying his conviction for introduction
of contraband into a penal facility as a Class C felony. Following our review, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court with respect to the defendant’s convictions for simple
possession, introduction of contraband into a penal facility, speeding, and driving while
unlicensed. However, we reverse and vacate the defendant’s conviction for tampering with
evidence because we conclude the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
Furthermore, we remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing reflecting that the
introduction of contraband into a penal facility conviction is a Class D felony and for
corrected judgment forms in counts one and two.

The Petitioner, Devon Brown, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis, wherein he challenged his
2012 convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault,
facilitation of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and
reckless endangerment. Specifically, the Petitioner contended that he had recently
discovered the State withheld evidence that several of the victims’ vehicles present on the
scene were stolen, information that would have materially impacted the credibility of the
State’s witnesses at trial and might have led to a different outcome. The coram nobis court
found that the petition was time-barred, that the Petitioner was not entitled to due process
tolling, and that the Petitioner had not presented newly discovered evidence entitling him
to a new trial. The Petitioner appeals, and following our review, we affirm.

Makyle J. Love, Petitioner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On
appeal, he alleges that the post-conviction court improperly denied post-conviction relief
because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review,
we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an employment contract dispute involving the interplay of a paid sick leave provision and a bonus compensation provision. The appellant, Keith Cousins (“Cousins”), was hired by a real estate business in 2017. He signed a two-year contract which included provisions for salary, bonuses, and paid sick leave. After being with the defendant company for only a few weeks, Cousins suffered a major heart attack and, ultimately, never returned to work. A dispute regarding his compensation arose and in July of 2017, Cousins filed suit against his former employer for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court determined that the company breached Cousins’ contract and awarded him some damages, but not the full balance of the two-year contract as Cousins requested. Both Cousins and the company appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Jerome Barrett, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his first degree murder conviction. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by not recusing itself and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case concerns service of process on an out-of-state defendant’s registered agent by
mail and a subsequently entered default judgment in the general sessions court. The
defendant moved under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 to set aside the default judgment based on
insufficient service of process. The defendant also asserted that the default judgment was
void because the general sessions court awarded a judgment greater than the amount prayed
for in the summons. The circuit court found service was valid and upheld the default
judgment in all respects. We agree that service was sufficient and could serve as a basis
for default judgment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-904(e); however, we reduce the
amount of the judgment to conform with the amount the plaintiff requested in the summons.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified.

The petitioner, Keith Trammell, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Following our review,
we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

A father filed a petition seeking, in addition to a modification of child support, a judgment
for past overpaid support. The father asserted that mother, without his knowledge, had
received for a period of time double child support payments as a result of payments being
taken directly from his paycheck and also being paid through electronic funds transfers that
he remitted directly to mother. While prevailing as to child support modification, the trial
court denied the father’s claim for overpayment of child support. The trial court concluded
his claim was barred by res judicata and, also, a directed verdict on this matter was
warranted due to the father’s failure to present certain critical evidence in support of his
claim. Father appealed the court’s decision barring his claim due to res judicata, but he
did not challenge on appeal the trial court’s granting of a directed verdict in connection
with failure to present evidence to support his claim. As a result of the appellant’s failure
to challenge an independent alternative basis for the trial court’s decision on appeal, we
affirm the decision of the trial court.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

The defendants in this action failed to timely answer the plaintiff’s complaint.  Upon the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court entered judgment by default against the defendants.  The defendants moved to set aside the default judgment.  The trial court denied the motion to set aside.  Because the trial court’s order lacked findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its ruling, we vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

This action involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their child.
Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to
establish the following statutory grounds of termination for each parent: (1) abandonment;
(2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (3) the persistence of conditions
which led to removal; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the
child. The court also found that termination of each parent’s rights was in the best interest
of the child. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

A landlord appeals from the grant of summary judgment to a commercial tenant in the landlord’s breach of contract action. The lease contained a provision requiring the tenant to obtain fire insurance on the “Premises.” The trial court concluded that the lease failed to define the term “Premises” and that such failure rendered the fire insurance provision unenforceable. We reverse because we find the term “Premises” as used in the fire insurance provision to unambiguously refer to the space within the commercial building that the tenant rented and occupied during the lease. We further conclude that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact regarding whether it was possible for the tenant to obtain fire insurance on only the portion of the building which it rented and occupied. Consequently, we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.