APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff filed a cause of action against Defendant judge, alleging Defendant wrongfully refused to grant his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm.

The Defendant, Danny Ray Smith, was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-504, 522. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify about instances of sexual contact between her and the Defendant other than those charged in the indictment; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a videotape of the victim’s forensic interview to be played for the jury; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine the Defendant about an expunged criminal conviction; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction on count two of the indictment because the State’s proof materially varied from the allegations in the indictment; (5) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on counts two, six, and seven; (6) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a new trial which was based on newly discovered evidence; and (7) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court determined that Appellants had failed to comply with the written notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, and had failed to state a claim for vicarious liability based on theories of agency or joint venture. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand, concluding that Appellants’ claims of direct negligence do not sound in medical malpractice, but that Appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to vicarious liability based on agency or joint venture.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Kathleen Evans (“Employee”) alleged that she sustained an injury to her knee while at work. Her employer, Shaw Industries, (“Employer”) denied the claim, contending that the injury could not have happened in the manner described by Employee. The trial court held that Employee had a compensable injury and awarded permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits. Employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant in malpractice action was granted summary judgment. Plaintiff filed two motions seeking to set aside the grant of summary judgment, which were denied. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse for reconsideration of the motion filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this action, Stanley Jenkins (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his left leg in the course and scope of his employment with Yellow Transportation, Inc. (“Yellow Transportation”). Employee settled his workers’ compensation claim with Yellow Transportation and returned to work. A few months later, Yellow Transportation merged with another corporation to create YRC Inc. (“YRC”), a completely new corporation. After the merger, Employee was laid off due to an economic downturn and thereafter sought reconsideration of his earlier settlement. The trial court ruled that Employee was no longer employed by his pre-injury employer after the merger and was entitled to reconsideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241. The trial court awarded him additional permanent partial disability benefits. Yellow Transportation has appealed, arguing that Employee is not entitled to reconsideration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Employee, a truck driver, sustained an on-the-job injury during a motor vehicle accident. The treating physician assigned 7% anatomical impairment to the body as a whole due to the injury. Employee’s evaluating physician assigned 17%. The trial court adopted the latter impairment and awarded 60% permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant in malpractice action was granted summary judgment. Plaintiff filed two motions seeking to set aside the grant of summary judgment, which were denied. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse for reconsideration of the motion filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.

The Defendant, Chad Allen Kirk, pled guilty to one count of driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor, in the Blount County General Sessions Court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504(a)(1). The General Sessions Court sentenced the Defendant to six months with 75 percent of the sentence to be served in confinement. The Defendant appealed the decision to the Blount County Circuit Court, which dismissed the appeal and remanded the case back to the General Sessions Court for execution of the judgment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the Circuit Court failed to conduct a de novo review of the sentence. Following our review, we reverse the decision of the Circuit Court and remand the case for a new sentencing.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Anthony D. Forster, for four counts of robbery related charges stemming from two incidents. The Defendant was convicted of one count of especially aggravated robbery, acquitted on the remaining charges, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant claims that:(1) the Defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in failing to sever the offenses; (4) the trial court erred in failing to compel the State to comply with Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (5) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Nephew of grantor of quitclaim deed conveying property to grantor’s sister appeals the declaration that the deed was null and void based on a finding that the nephew exercised undue influence on grantor. Finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of a confidential relationship between grantor and nephew and in light of nephew’s failure to rebut the presumption of undue influence raised thereby, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael R. Smart, was found guilty of sale of a Schedule VI controlled substance, a Class E felony; delivery of a Schedule VI controlled substance, a Class E felony; and simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the sale and delivery convictions and sentenced the Defendant to 2 years for the Class E felony conviction and a consecutive 11 months and 29 days for the Class A misdemeanor conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach him with his prior conviction of receiving stolen property; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to include the requested defense of entrapment in the jury instructions; and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing him. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a preliminary hearing in Hamilton County General Sessions Court, a Hamilton County grand jury charged the defendant, Gary Wayne McCullough, with operating a boat without lights, see T.C.A. § 69-9-209 (2004), boating under the influence, see id. § 69-9- 217(a), violating the implied consent law, see id. § 69-9-217(f)(1), and simple possession of marijuana, see id. § 39-17-418 (2006). In the trial court, the defendant contended in a motion to dismiss the indictment that the actions of the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA) in setting their own cases in a disproportionate number before certain general sessions judges constituted “judge-shopping” and resulted in a violation of the defendant’s due process rights. Following an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion, the trial court agreed and remanded the case for a new preliminary hearing before a division of the general sessions court not implicated by the judge-shopping allegation. On interlocutory appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court should have dismissed his indictment with prejudice instead of remanding the case for a new preliminary hearing. The State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment and remanding the case. Because we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact are not supported by the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and direct the trial court to reinstate the indictment on remand.

This appeal involves a dispute over the placement of a child formerly in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services. Because the child turned eighteen years old during the pendency of these proceedings, this appeal is moot and must be dismissed.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After the employee sustained an on the job injury, she sued her employer for workers’ compensation benefits. She alleged that her employer was a subcontractor for the principal contractor but she sued only the employer, not the principal contractor. Nearly two years later, the employee requested and received the trial court’s permission to amend her complaint to add the principal contractor as a defendant. The principal contractor filed a motion to dismiss based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of  limitations. The trial court granted the motion. After a trial, the trial court awarded the employee judgement for workers’ compensation benefits against the employer. The employee appealed, contending that the trial court erred by granting the principal contractor’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves the role of expert testimony in proceedings to determine whether a prisoner who has been sentenced to death is intellectually disabled and thus barred from being executed under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 (2010). An inmate facing execution filed a motion in the Criminal Court for Shelby County to re-open his post-conviction proceedings on the ground that he was intellectually disabled at the time he committed the crime for which he was convicted and on the ground that his trial counsel had been ineffective in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence. At the hearing, the prisoner presented expert testimony that his functional intelligence quotient (“I.Q.”) was actually lower than the raw test scores on his I.Q. tests and that he was mentally disabled for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a). The State presented no contrary evidence. The trial court dismissed the prisoner’s motion to re-open his post-conviction petition after concluding that he had failed to prove that he was intellectually disabled and that he was procedurally barred from raising his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Coleman v. State, No. W2007-02767-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 118696 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2010). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a)(1) does not require that raw scores on I.Q. tests be accepted at their face value and that the courts may consider competent expert testimony showing that a test score does not accurately reflect a person’s functional I.Q. or that the raw I.Q. test score is artificially inflated or deflated. We have also determined that both the post-conviction trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals properly determined that the prisoner’s claim involving the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in connection with the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence is procedurally barred. 

In this parental termination case the Trial Court, upon hearing evidence, terminated the mother's parental rights upon finding grounds of abandonment and that it is in the best interest of the child. The mother has appealed and we conclude from the record that the statutory grounds for abandonment were established by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Jeanenne W. M. (“Petitioner”) filed a petition seeking to adopt the minor child, Gabrielle N.N. (“the Child”) and to terminate the parental rights of Russell A.N. (“Father”) to the Child. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on June 14, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to support a termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(3) and (g)(5), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm.

This appeal arises from an entry of divorce. The parties executed a prenuptial agreement prior to their marriage. The prenuptial agreement outlined the classification of separate property and the parties’ respective rights in the event of divorce. After nearly seven years of marriage, the wife filed a petition for divorce. The parties participated in mediation, and a hearing was held to resolve the remaining issues. At the hearing, counsel for both parties presented arguments regarding the unresolved issues and eventually reached an agreement to settle those issues during a recess of the hearing. Counsel for the parties announced the agreement before the trial court, and the trial court subsequently entered an order. The husband appeals and challenges the trial court’s finding that the wife’s retirement account is entirely her separate property. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court erred in finding that the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous. Nevertheless, the trial court properly awarded the wife’s retirement account to her as separate property. Therefore, we reverse in part and affirm in part.

The Petitioner, Victor E. McConnell, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief attacking his 1983 conviction for assault with intent to commit first degree murder. The Petitioner alleged that his judgment of conviction was void because the indictment was illegally amended on the day of his plea “to broaden the original charge without being resubmitted to the grand jury[.]” The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the order summarily ismissing the petition.

The Petitioner, Shanda Alene Wright, appeals as of right from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery. She received an effective sentence of 16 years for her convictions. The Petitioner challenges the performance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This declaratory judgment action challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-201 et seq, on the grounds that plaintiff should not be required to register because his criminal convictions occurred in other states prior to the passage of the Tennessee Act, as applied to him. The Trial Judge declared that plaintiff was required to register under the Act, and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Chancellor's Judgment which requires plaintiff to register in accordance with the Act.

This is the second appeal in this breach of contract case. The plaintiff employee filed this lawsuit against the defendants for breach of an oral employment agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him damages. The defendants filed a motion to revise the summary judgment order and submitted an affidavit in support of the motion. The trial court struck the supporting affidavit and denied the motion to revise. The defendants filed the first appeal. In the first appeal, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, including the award of damages, was affirmed, but the cause was remanded to the trial court for findings on its denial of the motion to revise. On remand, the trial court explained that it struck the affidavit submitted with the motion to revise for lack of personal knowledge and because it violated the Dead Man’s Statute. The defendants now appeal the trial court’s order denying the motion to revise. We reverse the denial of the motion to revise and remand for a recalculation of damages.

The Defendant, Tommy L. Beaty, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and agreed to allow the trial court to set the length and manner of his sentence. The trial court sentenced him to thirteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it set the length of his sentence and when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Kasey N. Maddox, appeals the sentencing decision of the Bedford County Circuit Court. Following her guilty plea to the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, the trial court imposed a nine-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.