APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of LaCondra DeShay B. (“Mother”) to her minor child Antonio C. F., Jr. (“the Child”) (d.o.b. 7-26-96). Temporary custody of the Child was awarded to DCS on February 21, 2006, and the Child has been in foster care since that date. During this period of time, DCS made reasonable efforts by offering case management services to the paternal grandmother, Carrie F., who was the Child’s custodian at the time of removal, but because she was incapable of managing his behavior, the Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected on April 27, 2006. Following a bench trial on May 21, 2010, the court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights based upon, (a) willfully failing to visit or making only token visitation with the Child for four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate; (b) abandonment of the Child by willfully failing to support or to make reasonable payments toward the support of the Child for four consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) it is in the best interest of the Child that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appeals, asserting that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. We affirm.

On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees and awarded $20,000.00 in attorney fees to Appellee. In this appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding the fee because it failed to consider the requisite factors regarding fee reasonableness, it failed to differentiate between time spent on fee-generating versus non-fee-generating duties, and because it failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. From our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $20,000.00 in attorney fees. Accordingly, the award is affirmed.

The plaintiff sued the university and two of its representatives for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, alleging that the placement of special credits on his transcript in contradiction to the school’s policies and procedures rendered his transcript without value and, consequently, damaged his future applications for employment or graduate school. The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Robert S. Wilson, was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child. This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel: (a) failed to adequately meet with him prior to the trial and investigate his case; (b) failed to adequately cross-examine the victim, the victim’s brother, and the victim’s mother; and (c) failed to adequately convey the State’s plea offer such that the Petitioner could make an informed and knowledgeable decision. Additionally, the Petitioner contends that the cumulative effect of Trial Counsel’s alleged deficiencies amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

Mother appeals both the trial court’s refusal to approve an agreed upon parenting arrangement reached between the parents and the trial court’s finding that father should be designated the primary residential parent. Finding the trial court was required to make an independent determination of custody issues and that the court acted within its discretion, we affirm.

Appellant filed a motion to quash garnishment of his individual retirement accounts to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees to Appellee, asserting the accounts were exempt pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 26-2-105 and 26-2-111. The trial court denied the motion to quash. We reverse.

This is an appeal from an Order Establishing Parentage and Support entered by the Juvenile Court for Maury County on June 1, 2010. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Father appeals the trial court’s visitation determination and classification of previously awarded attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for entry of a parenting plan.

The Grainger County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Scott Clevenger, for one count of aggravated sexual battery, one count of rape of a child, and two counts of incest. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, Appellant argued that he was denied his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). State v. Scott G. Clevenger, No. E2007-298-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 588862, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 5, 2008). Appellant was unsuccessful on appeal because he had failed to file a motion for new trial and because this Court determined that he was advised of his rights under Miranda and, therefore, a clear and unequivocal rule of law had not been breached in order to allow plain error review. Id. at *4. After being granted a delayed appeal, Appellant once again raises the issue that he was denied his rights under Miranda. However, this issue was previously determined in this Court’s review under the plain error doctrine. Therefore, the law of the case doctrine prevails and we are unable to revisit the issue. For this reason, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this action to enforce a contract for the sale of real estate against defendant buyer, the Trial Court held that defendant failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain a loan in accordance with the requirement to obtain a mortgage for 100% financing, and awarded damages to plaintiff for breach of the contract since the plaintiff had sold the property before trial. On appeal, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Judge's finding that the defendant failed to put forth reasonable efforts to obtain a loan which was a condition in the contract for purchase of the property, and remand.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Orlando Jones, pled guilty as a Range III offender to aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping in exchange for an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

James Antony Wilson, Sr. sued East Tennessee Human Resource Agency, Inc. (“ETHRA”) individually, and as next friend and Personal Representative of the Estate of Callie Irene Wilson, on behalf of himself and all wrongful death beneficiaries of Callie Irene Wilson, Deceased. This suit involves a fall and injuries suffered by Callie Irene Wilson (“Callie Wilson”) while ETHRA was in the process of transporting Callie Wilson to a dialysis appointment, and her death resulting from these injuries. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on July 29, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that the ETHRA driver acted appropriately and was not negligent. Mr. Wilson appeals to this Court. We find that the evidence in the record on appeal preponderates against the Trial Court’s finding that ETHRA’s employee, Mr. Clabo, was not negligent. We reverse, and remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of comparative fault and damages.

The Petitioner, Dennis Wade Suttles, appeals from the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. Suttles, 30 S.W.3d 252 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 967 (2000). On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the effectiveness of his counsel’s representation before trial, during trial, and on direct appeal. The Petitioner also challenges the constitutionality of the death penalty. This court holds that the trial court did not err in finding that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the case and that the Petitioner’s challenges against the death penalty are without merit. The judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

Jenna Lauren Heath Milner (“Wife”) initiated this action by filing a complaint for divorce against her spouse, Derrick Brandon Milner (“Husband”). The only ground for divorce alleged is “T.C.A. § 36-4-101(5), conviction of a felony.” Husband filed an answer pro se which, in substance, admits that he has been convicted but states that the conviction is “a miscarriage of justice” and that his attorney “botched the trial . . . and botched the direct appeal as badly as the trial.” He alleges that he is continuing to challenge the conviction and “there is a great chance of having the case reversed.” Husband denied that a divorce should be granted and alleged that he still loves Wife and their child. Husband, who was incarcerated, testified at trial by telephone, although there is no transcript or statement of the evidence. The trial court declared the parties “divorced pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-101(5).”  Husband appeals, arguing, for the first time, that the statute is unconstitutional under the Tennessee Constitution, the United States Constitution, and the Georgia Constitution, the state in which he is incarcerated. The Tennessee Attorney General was served with a copy of Husband’s brief and has appeared in support of the constitutionality of the statute. We hold that any issue as to the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-101(5)(2010) was waived by Husband’s failure to raise the issue in the trial court, and, pursuant to Court of Appeals Rule 10 , we affirm the judgment granting an absolute divorce.

A Bedford County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Terrell Robinson, of violating the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender (“HMVO”) Act, evading arrest, and violating the light law. Subsequently, the Defendant also pled guilty to felony failure to appear for not appearing at his original court date. For all the Defendant’s convictions, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years, to be served as a Range II offender at 60%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for violating the HMVO Act; and (2) his sentence is excessive because the trial court inappropriately ordered his sentences to run consecutively. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Wife filed a complaint seeking a divorce and child support from Husband. Husband filed no answer or counterclaim, but caused to be served upon Wife a summons directing Wife to defend a civil action against her. Husband then filed and served upon Wife a notice of a hearing for default divorce. The trial court entered a Final Decree of Absolute Divorce awarding Husband a divorce based on inappropriate marital conduct and entered Husband’s proposed parenting plan designating Husband as the primary residential parent. Nearly a year later Wife filed a Rule 60.02 motion seeking to have the Final Decree set aside on the grounds of (1) mistake, inadvertence or surprise, (2) fraud, misrepresentation, and misconduct, and (3) the judgment was void. The trial court denied Wife’s Rule 60.02 motion, and Wife appeals. Because the Final Decree of Divorce was not void and because of the circumstances surrounding Wife’s motion, we affirm the trial court.

An inmate at the Turney Center Industrial Complex filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision of the Turney Center Disciplinary Board convicting him of the disciplinary offense of possession of “security threat group material.” Acting sua sponte, the Hickman County Chancery Court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. We affirm.

Petitioner, Frankie Kelly McGowan, entered a best interest plea in Bedford County to one count of aggravated burglary and two counts of burglary in exchange for an effective ten-year sentence. The effective sentence was ordered to run consecutively to sentences in two other cases for which Petitioner was on parole at the time of the offenses. Subsequently, Petitioner sought  post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and because his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. Petitioner has appealed the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief to this Court. After a review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that his guilty plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is an appeal by Norman Lee Robinson from a summary judgment granted against him and in favor of his lender, Citizens Bank, and GMAC Mortgage, LLC, the assignee of Robinson’s secured note. Robinson filed this action against Citizens Bank and GMAC, as well as others, to stop what he alleged was a wrongful foreclosure. He also demanded compensatory and punitive damages. The substance of the action is that the defendants should not be permitted to require Robinson to pay into escrow, funds that had been improperly refunded to him. The trial court held that Robinson was in default and that the foreclosure was not wrongful because, despite some dispute as to certain facts, there was no genuine dispute concerning the facts material to the outcome of this case. We affirm.

This case stems from the divorce of Freda Michelle Humbard Miller (“Wife”) and Steven Dwayne Miller (“Husband”). The Trial Court, among other things, granted the parties a divorce, designated Wife the primary residential parent, and awarded Wife child support and alimony. Husband appeals, raising a number of issues. We hold that the Trial Court erred in setting child support without entering supporting worksheets in the record as required. We further hold that the Trial Court did not err as to the other issues. We vacate, in part, and, affirm, in part, and remand for the Trial Court to set child support utilizing the worksheets as required.

The trial court’s enforcement of a settlement agreement between the parties’ attorneys is appealed on the sole basis that the Statute of Frauds precludes enforcement since the parties never signed any agreement and the settlement pertained to real property. Because the Statute of Frauds concerns the sale of real property interests and not settlement agreements touching upon real property interests, it is not a bar to enforcement of a settlement agreement. The trial court is affirmed on that issue. The trial court’s assessment of court costs, however, is reversed as it differs from the parties’ agreement.

animals, a Class E felony, and agreed to an eighteen-month sentence, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of her sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and ordered her to pay $15,816.76 in restitution. The Defendant now appeals, contending the trial court erred both when it denied alternative sentencing and when it set the amount of her restitution. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing but erred in setting the amount of her restitution. As such, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I concur in the decision of the majority opinion to vacate so much of the trial court’s judgment as pertains to the issue of child support. I also concur in the majority’s decision to remand this case to the trial court with respect to the issue of child support. I write separately to express my view that the absence of the supporting worksheets in the record transmitted to us does not necessarily mean that the trial court failed to utilize these worksheets in arriving at the respective amounts of child support decreed in the court’s judgment. If such worksheets were utilized, and employed correctly, in arriving at the trial court’s child support decrees and if those worksheets are still available, there is no reason for the trial court to again make the necessary calculations. All that would be required is the filing of the worksheets “as part of the official record.” See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. ch. 1240-2-4-.04(1) (2008).

In this boundary dispute, the defendant property owners argue that the trial court erred in its reliance on the survey of the plaintiffs’ expert and in concluding that the road in front of the plaintiffs’ property is a public county road. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision to credit the survey, but that the trial court erred in concluding that the disputed part of the road was a public county road.

An employee was struck in the back of the leg by a wooden pallet while at work. She alleged that she sustained permanent injuries to her neck, back, and foot as a result of that incident and filed a complaint against her employer in chancery court for workers’ compensation benefits. Her employer denied that she had sustained any permanent impairment or disability. The chancery court held that the employee sustained a compensable injury and awarded 20% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment.