APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Phillip Shane Duncan, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of twenty-five years for his second degree murder conviction. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the habeas corpus court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

Landowner sued surveyor for damages due to an improperly prepared survey done for an adjacent landowner. The trial court granted surveyor’s motion to dismiss based on the application of the three-year statute of limitation found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105. Landowner appealed, arguing that the limitation period is four years based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-114. We agree with landowner.

This is a consolidated appeal from the grant of Defendants/Appellees’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motions to dismiss. We are asked on appeal to determine whether each of Plaintiff/Appellant’s complaints states a claim upon which relief can be granted. We conclude that they do. Reversed and remanded.

In a divorce action, Wife argues that the trial court erred in the amount of its award of periodic alimony and in failing to order Husband to pay her attorney fees. We find that Wife’s periodic alimony should be increased to $3,000 per month. We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award Wife attorney fees.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Camille Kristine Chesney, of facilitation to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and driving on a suspended license. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced her to concurrent sentences of four years for the facilitation to sell cocaine conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction, to be served as ninety days in jail and the remainder on supervised probation. She also was fined three thousand five hundred dollars. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal stop and arrest and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s conviction for facilitation to sell cocaine but reverse the conviction for driving on a suspended license.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Cantrell Lashone Winters, of possession of 50 grams or more of hydromorphone in a school zone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony, see T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4), (j)(3); 39-17-432(b) (2006), and evading arrest, a Class D felony in this case, see id. § 39-16-603(b)(1), (3). In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his person following his arrest, the trial court’s denial of his request for substitute counsel, the admission of expert testimony on illegal drug packaging, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Because the evidence adduced at trial does not establish that the defendant created a risk of death or injury, his conviction of Class D felony evading arrest must be modified to Class E felony evading arrest. The judgments of the trial court are otherwise affirmed.

This is a post-divorce case. The husband sought to have his alimony in futuro obligation reduced or eliminated, asserting that his income had substantially decreased and the wife’s income had increased. The trial court found a material change in circumstances, and reduced the husband’s alimony in futuro obligation but did not eliminate it, finding that the wife still needed support. The husband appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Mack Tremaine Jones, was convicted of one count of first degree murder and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. As a result, Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and twenty-two years for each of the nine counts of attempted first degree murder. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Mack Tremaine Jones, No. W2005-00014-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1840798 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 27, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2007). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief, on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner has appealed. On appeal, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Daniel Leon Lee, was convicted by a Maury County Jury of attempted possession of cocaine over .5 grams and simple possession of marijuana. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. We affirm Appellant’s convictions for attempted possession of cocaine over .5 grams and possession of marijuana because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. However, we determine that the trial court improperly utilized convictions that appeared in Appellant’s presentence report but did not appear on the notice to seek enhanced punishment in order to establish Appellant’s sentencing range. Additionally, the trial court failed to place adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to sentencing on the record. Consequently, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

The defendant, Lisa Joyce Tyler, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation. On appeal, she argues that the non-payment of her restitution was not willful but, instead, due to her inability to pay. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Victor Pritchard, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Plaintiff appeals the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 dismissal of her claims against two defendants, the Circuit Court Clerk of Jackson County, individually and in his official capacity, and Jackson County, Tennessee for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, and numerous intentional torts. The trial court dismissed all claims against these defendants finding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

The Petitioner, Dearice Cates, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise the statutorily mandated mitigating factor that he “voluntarily” released the victims of his especially aggravated kidnappings alive. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-305(b)(2). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An attorney who was suspended from the practice of law for two years and assessed costs associated with the suspension proceedings appeals to this Court for relief from all or a portion of the assessed costs. While this appeal was pending, the attorney filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and his pre-bankruptcy debts were discharged by order entered by the Bankruptcy Court on December 10, 2010. We hold that the assessment of costs of the disciplinary proceeding was a debt that was discharged in the attorney’s bankruptcy case and is, therefore, no longer due and owing. Accordingly, the attorney’s appeal to this Court is moot.

A Cocke County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, John Hall, guilty of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, thirty percent of which the appellant would be required to serve in the county jail. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

The petitioner, Anthony Allen, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was convicted by a Shelby County jury of multiple counts of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. See State v. Anthony Allen, W2004-01085-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1606350, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, July 8, 2005). The petitioner was sentenced to a term of 104 years. Id. On appeal, the petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Willie Clark Bennett, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his person. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Aaron Malone, of first degree murder, and he received a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement, arguing that (a) he did not waive his rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and (b) that the court should have suppressed the statement under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine after ruling that his arrest was illegal; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s teeth into evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing a state witness, qualified as an expert in crime scene investigation, to testify about blood spatter analysis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Lynn Inman, was convicted by a Benton County jury of coercion of a witness, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and assessed a $5,000 fine. On appeal, Inman claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue in this commercial real estate lease dispute is whether the individual defendants are additional lessees and, thus, personally liable under the lease. Plaintiff, the lessor of retail space, filed this action against the three defendants when the limited liability company, Décor Fabrics, LLC, a lessee, breached the lease by failing to pay rent for the term of the lease. The individual defendants denied liability, asserting that Décor Fabrics, LLC, was the only lessee. The trial court found that the lease unambiguously identifies each of the individual defendants as additional lessees and assessed damages against them for breach of the lease, including the plaintiff’s attorneys fees. Only one of the defendants appealed. He asserts that the trial court erred by finding the lease unambiguous as to the identify of the lessee(s) and by failing to consider the parties’ conduct to conclude that Décor Fabrics, LLC, was the only lessee. We affirm.

In this divorce action, Mother appeals the trial court’s permanent parenting plan, residential schedule, child support determination, and division of marital property and debt. We affirm the designation of Father as primary residential parent; modify the residential schedule  and award of unpaid child support; and vacate the “paramour provision” in the parenting plan and the “equalization payment” from Mother to Father. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Travis Dean Jackson, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2008 conviction for rape of a child. He claims his conviction is void because his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and was the result of misrepresentations that he would receive sentence reduction credits that were not applicable to his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cornelius O’Brien Love, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property worth at least $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-403, 39-14-103, 39-14-105(2) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years’ incarceration for aggravated burglary and two years’ incarceration for theft, with the sentences to be served concurrently. He was ordered to pay $1,906.06 in restitution to the victims. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

David Bates d/b/a David Bates Construction Co. (“Plaintiff”) sued Caroline Benedetti (“Defendant”) for breach of a construction contract involving demolition of an existing residential garage and construction of a new one. Defendant answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, (1) that Plaintiff had not proven damages, (2) that Defendant had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-36-103 with regard to her counterclaim and, therefore, pursuant to the statute her counterclaim should be abated, and (3) that Defendant also had failed to give notice and an opportunity to cure pursuant to the common law and that her counterclaim should be dismissed for that reason as well. Defendant appeals the abatement and dismissal of her counterclaim. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-36-103 does not apply to the case at hand, but that the Trial Court correctly dismissed Defendant’s counterclaim. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order.

The employee alleged that he sustained a lower back injury as a result of his job. His employer denied the claim based upon findings by its work site medical staff. An evaluating physician opined that the employee’s job had caused an aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative disc disease. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and awarded benefits. The employer appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment, but we decline the employee’s request to find the appeal to be frivolous.