APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Gerald Deon Jenkins, entered a best-interest guilty plea to one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony; one count of theft over $500, a Class E felony; one count of theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, and one count of setting fire to personal property, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210(b), -14-103, -14-105(2)-(3), -14-303(b) (2003). The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for the second degree murder conviction, two years for the theft over $500 conviction, four years for the theft over $1,000 conviction, and two years for the setting fire to personal property conviction. The court ordered that the terms run concurrently for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner presents the following issues for review: (1) The post-conviction court erred when it found that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel; (2) The post-conviction court
“commit[ted] error in finding that the sentence of maximum punishment was correct”; and (3) The trial court committed plain error when it considered the convictions contained in the presentence report, failed to consider “lingering doubt or innocence,” and incorrectly applied enhancement factors. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Chris Jones, was charged with one count of first degree murder with respect to victim Donald Munsey; two counts of attempted first degree murder with respect to victims Justin Smith and David Eagan; one count of use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm where alcoholic beverages are served. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of one count of second degree murder; one count of attempted second degree murder with respect to Mr. Smith; one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter with respect to Mr. Eagan; one count of use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm where alcoholic beverages are served. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions on the first three counts; (2) the trial court erred when it excluded testimony of Mr. Munsey’s prior violent acts; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence regarding the Defendant’s recent divorce; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to rehabilitate a witness with his prior consistent statement; and (5) that the Defendant’s rights to trial by jury and due process were violated by the use of sequential jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained a work-related injury in September 2007, but medical treatment was not offered by the employer at that time. He continued to work for several months despite his injury. In March 2008, his employer sent him to a physician. He was diagnosed with a significant spinal injury, which required surgical treatment and resulted in severe disability. His employer had changed its workers’ compensation insurer in November 2007. Employee’s claim was settled, but the two insurers disagreed as to which was liable. The trial court found that the insurer at the time of the original injury was liable. That insurer has appealed, contending that the later insurer should be liable due to the gradual worsening of the employee’s condition after November 2007.  We affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Frederick Lamont Moore, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder; first degree murder committed while in the perpetration of a felony (felony murder); aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and two counts of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the first degree premeditated murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and ordered a sentence of life imprisonment for the resulting conviction. As to the remaining counts, the trial court ordered a sentence of 20 years for the aggravated kidnapping conviction and concurrent sentences of 10 years for each of the tampering with evidence convictions. The trial court also ordered the Defendant to serve his 20-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping consecutively to his life imprisonment sentence for the first degree murder conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Physician appeals Chancery Court decision affirming his summary suspension of his license to practice medicine on the basis of his conviction in the State of Kentucky for facilitation to traffic in controlled substances. We affirm the Chancery Court judgment and the summary suspension of the physician’s license.

In this conservatorship case, a daughter filed a petition asking the court to appoint her as the conservator of her father, who had experienced cognitive decline after a stroke and required full-time care in an inpatient facility. The father’s spouse protested the appointment of the daughter as the conservator and requested that a neutral third party be appointed instead. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the daughter was the appropriate person to serve as conservator, and specifically enumerated the power to file for divorce on behalf of the ward to the conservator. The spouse appeals. We affirm. Our first opinion in this case originally was filed on January 21, 2011. Appellant thereafter filed a petition to rehear. The petition to rehear contained a meritorious assertion. Accordingly, we granted the petition, withdrew our original opinion and now submit this substitute opinion.

The Petitioner, Dimecos Ichad Jones, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a change of venue, a Giles County jury convicted the Defendant of voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, claiming that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his request for a continuance to secure a material witness to the case; (2) denied his request for a jury instruction on ignorance and mistake of fact; and (3) sentenced him as a Persistent, Range III offender. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a dependency and neglect appeal from a finding of severe child abuse. The respondent mother gave birth to premature twins. Before the hospital released the premature infants to the mother’s care, she was given extensive instructions on their feeding. Two weeks later, one twin was hospitalized, near death from severe malnutrition and dehydration. Days later, the other twin was hospitalized, also severely malnourished and dehydrated. The twins were taken into State protective custody, and a petition for dependency and neglect was filed, alleging severe child abuse. The mother stipulated to dependency and neglect, but denied severe child abuse. The juvenile court held that the first twin had been subjected to severe child abuse, but not the second twin. The mother appealed this finding to the circuit court. After a de novo hearing, the circuit court held that both twins had been subjected to “severe child abuse” as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(23)(A) and (B). The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding, inter alia, that subsection (B) of the statute does not require proof that the mother’s conduct was “knowing” in order to find severe child abuse.

The Defendant, Randy Lynn Shelby, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of two counts of aggravated burglary and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. Following a sentencing hearing, he received an effective sixty-year sentence to be served at 100%. In this direct appeal, the Defendant’s only challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, arguing that the short period of confinement was incidental to the burglary and did not substantially interfere with the victim’s liberty. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sought reconsideration of his earlier workers’ compensation settlement, which had been “capped” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-241(d). His employer asserted that he had been terminated for cause, and was therefore not eligible for reconsideration. The trial court found for the employee and awarded additional benefits. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Rickey Clayton Rogers, was charged in a three-count indictment with DUI third offense; driving on a revoked or suspended license, third offense; and violation of the implied consent law. He filed a motion to dismiss all charges in the indictment on the basis that the charges were filed outside the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant pled guilty as charged in the indictment, and purported to reserve certified questions of law for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). The State argues that the appeal should be dismissed because of Defendant’s failure to comply with all of the requirements to reserve a certified question of law for appeal; in the alternative, the State argues that the judgments should be affirmed. After a review of the record and a review of the applicable case law, we dismiss the appeal.

The appellant appeals the trial court’s issuance of orders of protection against him. The appellant’s sister and brother-in-law filed petitions for ex parte orders of protection and alleged that on two separate occasions, the appellant fired shots toward their home. The appellant denies the allegations. After a hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that entry of the orders of protection was necessary. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Timothy Carl Johnson, Jr., pled guilty to attempted second degree murder, theft of property valued over $1000, attempted escape, burglary, nine counts of burglary of a vehicle, and ten counts of theft of property valued under $500. The trial court sentenced him to eighteen years in prison. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed this petition after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate the case. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner, Charles A. Walker, of two counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-eight years, at 100%, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed his convictions, and this Court affirmed his two rape of a child convictions but reversed and remanded for a new trial the aggravated sexual battery conviction. State v. Charles A. Walker, No. M2005-00165-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3313651, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 15, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 12, 2007). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective; (2) the prosecutor committed several acts of prosecutorial misconduct at trial; (3) his convictions should be reversed based upon “cumulative error and bias”; and (4) his sentencing was illegal. After careful review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee injured her back while discharging her duties in the housekeeping department of her employer in October 2003. After treatment in the emergency room, she received conservative treatment from her physicians. She was released by her physician and returned to work. In February 2005, she was terminated by her employer. She continued to receive medical treatment for her back. In 2006, her physician recommended surgery, which was performed in December 2007. The trial court found that the employee was  permanently and totally disabled as a result of her injury. The employer has appealed, contending that the employee had a meaningful return to work and that the award should be limited to two and one-half times her medical impairment ruling pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1). The employer also contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee was permanently and totally disabled. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Guy T. Graves, was indicted in November of 2009 by the Madison County Grand Jury for three counts of burglary. At trial, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for acquittal on count three of the indictment. The jury found Appellant guilty of the two remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range III, persistent offender, to twelve years for each conviction, ordering Appellant to serve the sentences consecutively. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the following issues are presented for this Court on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crimes; and (2) whether the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Detrick Cole, appeals as of right from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County Criminal Court jury found the Petitioner guilty of the premeditated first degree murder of Santiefe Thomas. The jury also sentenced the Petitioner to death after finding that the Petitioner had previously been convicted of one or more felonies for which the statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), and that this aggravating circumstance outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. State v. Cole, 155 S.W.3d 885 (Tenn. 2005). Following the filing of a timely petition for post-conviction relief and a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal to this court, the Petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following categories: (1) the Petitioner’s trial counsel were ineffective, (2) the Petitioner’s appellate counsel were ineffective, (3) the Petitioner is statutorily ineligible for the death penalty, and (4) Tennessee’s death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional. Following our review, we reverse, in part, the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.

Based upon the facts in three cases, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Marey Atef Abou-Rahma, Jr., for five counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of felony murder, two counts of first degree murder, and two counts of attempted first degree murder. On February 8, 2008, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of felony murder. Petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences for the felony murder convictions and sentenced to two, eight-year sentences for the aggravated robbery convictions to be served concurrently to each other and the life sentences. On November 24, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing among other things that he received ineffective assistance of  counsel and that he did not enter his guilty plea voluntarily and knowingly. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the denial of the postconviction petition.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Orlando M. Reames, entered an “open” guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and the State dismissed one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102(e)(1), -16-609(e). The trial court  sentenced the Petitioner to twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that Trial Counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately prepare for the Petitioner’s trial, resulting in the Petitioner feeling coerced to accept the State’s plea offer. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.DAVID H. WELLES,

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Gary Dwayne Johnson, was convicted of one count of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, one count of robbery, a Class C felony, one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, two counts of carjacking, Class B felonies, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and one count of felony escape, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101(b)(1), -13-103, -13-305(b)(1), -13-401(b), -13-404(b), -16-605(b)(2). The trial court found that the Defendant was a career offender and sentenced him to the following terms: six years for his reckless endangerment conviction, fifteen years for his robbery conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for his assault conviction, thirty years for each carjacking conviction, sixty years as a violent offender for his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and six years for his felony escape conviction. The trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for reckless endangerment and robbery and ordered that all of his convictions, except the misdemeanor, run consecutively for a total effective sentence of 141 years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for review: (1) The evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to sustain his convictions for reckless endangerment, robbery, assault, and carjacking; (2) The trial court erred when it sentenced him as a career offender and when it ordered that his sentences run consecutively; and (3) The trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss his Trial Counsel before the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Current owner of a life insurance policy filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, alleging that the life insurance company wrongfully terminated the policy after failing to notify the current owner of the impending lapse of the policy for nonpayment of premiums. The life insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment, along with an affidavit and a copy of the policy, in an attempt to  demonstrate that it had provided notice in accordance with the policy terms. The current owner filed a response along with an affidavit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the life insurance company. We affirm.

The employee filed a motion to compel her employer to provide medical treatment pursuant to a court-approved settlement concerning a claim for an injury sustained in 2002. Her employer opposed the motion, contending that any medical treatment sought by the employee was due to a separate injury sustained in 2004. In the settlement of the 2004 claim, the employee had waived her right to future medical treatment. The trial court granted the employee’s motion, and her employer has appealed. We conclude that the employee’s claim for medical treatment is not ripe for judicial resolution, and vacate the trial court’s order.

The employee sustained a compensable injury to her left wrist. She alleged that she also sustained a neck injury as a result of the same incident. The employer denied the neck claim. The employee’s evaluating physician expressed somewhat contradictory opinions regarding the causal relationship between the work incident and her neck injury. The trial court held that the employee had a compensable neck injury in addition to her wrist injury and awarded benefits accordingly. The employer has appealed that finding. We affirm the judgment.

This is a breach of contract case. The trial court found two defendants liable for breaches of continuing guaranty agreements related to a construction loan and awarded judgment for the plaintiff. The trial court, however, did not adjudicate a pending cross-complaint. Although the court attempted to certify the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the court’s order did not make the express findings essential to certification. Because the trial court did not properly certify the judgment as final, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the issues raised before us. We dismiss the appeal.