APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Rolly William Whitford, pled guilty to sexual battery and rape and agreed for the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years for the sexual battery conviction and ten years for the rape conviction, and it ordered that the sentences run consecutively for an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred when it: (1) enhanced his sentences; (2) ordered consecutive sentencing; (3) denied him an alternative sentence; and (4) admitted into evidence his 1984 psychosexual evaluation over his objection. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Father filed a petition to relocate with the parties’ minor child, and the trial court denied his petition. On appeal, Father argues that the trial court made evidentiary and procedural errors necessitating vacating its decision, that the trial court’s decision denying his petition to relocate was erroneous, and that the trial court erred in declining to award him his attorney fees in defending against  Mother’s petition for dependency and neglect. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

A Putnam County jury convicted the Petitioner, James A. Burgess, of two counts of second degree murder, two counts of felony murder, especially aggravated burglary, and felony reckless endangerment and sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment for each of the felony murder convictions. The Petitioner appealed the convictions, and this Court remanded the case for  modification of the Petitioner’s conviction for especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary and affirmed in all other respects. State v. Burgess, M2009-00897-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3025524 (Tenn. Crim. Ct. Aug 4, 2010). In May 2010, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged the existence of newly discovered evidence. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to raise the existence of newly discovered evidence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the trial court’s denial was in error. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Henry Springer, was convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a standard offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Springer claims the evidence was insufficient because it did not identify him as the perpetrator. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an accident between a bicycle and a pick-up truck. Appellant was struck by Appellee’s truck when Appellant failed to obey a stop sign and rode his bicycle into traffic. The trial court found that Appellant was sixty percent at fault for the accident, and, pursuant to a comparative fault analysis, entered judgment for Appellee. On appeal, we find that the trial court erred in applying a pedestrian statute to a bicyclist, but that this error was harmless in light of our finding that Appellant was negligent per se in failing to obey the stop sign, and/or in failing to yield to oncoming traffic. We conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that Appellant was at least sixty percent at fault so as to foreclose any recovery under a  comparative fault analysis. Affirmed for the reasons discussed herein.

The Petitioner, Calvin Fleming, appeals from the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a mental evaluation and in failing to inform the trial court of the absence of the mental evaluation at trial. He also argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the State’s introduction of the victim’s medical records on the basis that they violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the confrontation issue on appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The appellant, Dexter Dodd, appeals the denial of his petition to remove the oath of secrecy with respect to two grand jury proceedings. Mr. Dodd is pursuing discrimination and tort claims against certain individuals who allegedly instigated these criminal proceedings against him, and he alleges that removal of the traditional grand jury oath of secrecy is necessary for him to effectively pursue these claims. After careful review, we conclude that the appellant’s appeal is not properly before this court, and we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Broderick Joseph Smith, was convicted of two counts of carjacking, a Class B felony; three counts of attempted robbery, a Class D felony; one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and one count of attempted carjacking, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 20 years on each of the carjacking convictions, eight years for each of the attempted robbery convictions, 11 months and 29 days for the assault conviction, 15 years for the aggravated robbery conviction, and ten years for the attempted carjacking conviction. The trial court ruled that the sentences for all but the assault conviction should run consecutively for an effective sentence of 89 years. The trial court also ruled that the sentence should run consecutively to the Defendant’s sentence in federal court for two related armed bank robbery convictions. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the aggravated robbery count from the remainder of the indictment; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence that the Defendant committed the two related armed bank robberies; and (4) that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences and by imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

While on probation, the defendant, James Demario Nabors, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of marijuana, one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver .5 grams or more, and one count of introduction of contraband into a penal institution in case number 6274. Simultaneously, he pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance less than .5 grams, possession of a Schedule II controlled  substance with intent to deliver .5 grams or more, one count of possession of a firearm during a dangerous felony, and one count of felony possession of a firearm in case number 6390. In exchange for conceding his probation violation and his guilty pleas, the defendant received a total effective sentence of twenty-four years at 35% and, consecutively, five years at 100%. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying any form of alternative sentencing and imposing confinement in cases 6274 and 6390. Following our review of the record and the  parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision.

I concur. I write separately to express my concern that the courts could turn the phrase “contextual background evidence” into its own exception under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). I think “contextual background evidence” is a vague concept that can become too broad, much like “res gestae” was used before the courts attempted to consign that phrase to history because of its vagueness. See Gibbs v. State, 300 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tenn. 1957); State v. Carpenter, 773 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Kenneth Patterson (Pat) Bondurant and Hugh Peter (Pete) Bondurant, No. 01C01-9501-CC-00023, Giles County (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 1996) (Tipton, J., concurring), app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 12, 1996). In State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 270-73 (Tenn. 2000), the supreme court’s analysis regarding background evidence focused on such evidence’s relevance to material issues in the case, the need to present the evidence to prevent confusion, and the weighing of its probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. Each of these three factors must be considered and found before the evidence is admissible.

The defendant, Shun Jelks, was convicted of introduction of contraband in a penal facility, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to four years in confinement as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that he was improperly sentenced. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The Petitioner, Russell Nolan Quarles, pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove his claims. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On January 12, 2009, the Defendant, Paul Jay Vassallo, pleaded guilty to three counts of forgery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of theft of property valued under $500. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received a sentence of two years at 30% for each forgery conviction, a sentence of four years at 30% for the aggravated burglary conviction, and a sentence of eleven-months and twenty-nine days at 75% for the theft conviction. These sentences were concurrent terms, resulting in an effective four-year sentence at 30%. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and the motion was denied. The Defendant now appeals, contending that his guilty plea was made based upon a gross misrepresentation by the prosecutor. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the Sevier County Circuit Court.

The defendant, Gary Lynn Poole, appeals the revocation of his probation in case number C-16760, arguing that the sentence imposed in that case had expired before the filing of the probation revocation warrant. The State concedes that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke the defendant’s probation in case number C-16760 as well as case numbers C-16756 and C-16706. We agree that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke the defendant’s probation in case numbers C-16706, C-16756, and C-16760. In consequence, we reverse the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation in those cases and dismiss the revocation warrants. We affirm the revocation and order of incarceration in case number C-17292.

This appeal involves a dispute over the location of a boundary line between tracts of land owned by two hunting clubs. After many years of litigation, the parties agreed that a new survey would be conducted by a new surveyor and that they would be bound by his decision. After the new surveyor filed a report and survey, one of the clubs filed a motion to set aside the survey, contending that the new surveyor did not make an independent determination regarding the location of the boundary line, but rather, copied a previous survey that was completed in the past. The trial judge refused to hold a hearing regarding the validity of the survey because the parties had agreed to be bound by the surveyor’s decision. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J

As part of a global plea agreement disposing of charges in four cases from two separate counties, the defendant, John Edward Dawson, entered pleas of guilty to three counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; one count of burglary; one count of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; two counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine; and two counts of the sale of a Schedule III controlled substance in exchange for a total effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration to be served concurrently with a previously imposed federal sentence. The defendant also reserved for our review the following certified question of law: “Whether there was sufficient proof of an interference by State authorities of the defendant’s right to counsel and a showing of prejudice as a matter of law from the allegations presented at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss that letters allegedly drafted by a detective from the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department and contact directly with a Monroe County detective convinced defendant he was represented by other counsel and should not communicate with appointed counsel and thus interfered with defendant’s constitutionally protected right to counsel and due process under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.” Because the egregious actions of the law enforcement officers in this case substantially and profoundly interfered with the defendant’s right to counsel under the state and federal constitutions, we reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss, vacate the defendant’s guilty pleas, and dismiss the indictment in each of the four cases.

The Defendant, Steven W. Black, pleaded guilty to two counts of Class E felony forgery and one count of theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105, -114. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years for each felony conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered that the two felony sentences be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of four years. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences; (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred by weighing one enhancement factor heavily and minimizing one mitigating factor; and (3) the trial court erred in not recusing itself due to the conflict created when the judge presided over both the Drug Court and the Defendant’s sentencing hearing. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Hank P. (“Father”) is the biological father of Destiny S. (“the “Child”). After the Child was removed from Father’s home in 2006, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) eventually filed a petition to terminate his parental rights to the Child. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(2) and (g)(3). The Juvenile Court also found that the evidence established clearly and convincingly that it was in the best interest of the Child for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals challenging these findings as well as an evidentiary ruling and the Juvenile Court Judge’s refusal to recuse himself. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment.

Plaintiff, a lactation consultant formerly employed by Cookeville Regional Medical Center, sued the hospital for common law retaliatory discharge and violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act; plaintiff also asserted a claim for punitive damages. The case was tried before a jury. At the close of plaintiff’s proof, the court granted the Medical Center’s motion for directed verdict on the Protection Act and punitive damages claims; the common law retaliatory discharge claim was allowed to proceed to the jury. The jury found for the Medical Center. Plaintiff appeals, asserting error in the trial court’s grant of directed verdict and its rulings on evidentiary issues. Finding no error, we affirm.

Landowner appeals trial court’s grant of summary judgment to county in action to enforce delinquent tax lien. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Crystal G. Barnes, was convicted of the promotion of methamphetamine manufacturing, possessing drug paraphernalia, and introducing drugs into a penal institution. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years to be served on probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered her to serve six months in confinement before being released again on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the length of confinement ordered by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, David Schroeder, pleaded guilty to one count of criminally exposing the victim to the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) in exchange for a three-year sentence with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Finding the circumstances of the offense particularly reprehensible and the defendant’s criminal record extensive, the trial court ordered a fully-incarcerative sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of alternative sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Quintell Deshon Hardy, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court of Hardeman County. He pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced as a multiple offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In the habeas corpus petition, the petitioner claimed his sentence should be vacated because the State gave no notice of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence, as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a). Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Daniel Gonzalez, Jr., appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentences for three convictions for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony, and two convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his effective six-year sentence in confinement. He contends that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Herman Shurn, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for aggravated robbery and two years for criminally negligent homicide, to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s amendment of the indictment over his objection; (2) the trial court’s denial of his request to include facilitation of the charged offenses; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions; (4) the trial court’s finding of enhancement factors in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); and (5) the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.