APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Carl Bost, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell cocaine, a Class C felony, and attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, in exchange for a cumulative sentence of six years, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. He filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. On appeal, he argues that he entered his plea unknowingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the learned intermediary doctrine is not applicable to the facts of this case. I disagree, however, that Pittsburgh Corning Corporation (“Pittsburgh Corning”) and Owens Corning Corporation (“Owens Corning”) were unavailable for service of process and that North Brothers, Inc. (“North Brothers”) therefore is subject to suit in strict liability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-106 (2000).

The defendant, Rodney McAlister, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of vandalism between $1000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. He was thereafter sentenced to a term of five years, as a multiple offender, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State failed to negate the defenses of duress and necessity. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the conviction.

The petitioner, Chad Rogers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase of his trial by not investigating and presenting evidence of his mental illness as a mitigating factor. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, John Michael Whitlock, was convicted of two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1003(d). In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor; (2) The trial court erred when it allowed the State to give a rebuttal closing argument when the Defendant waived opening statements and offered no proof; and (3) The trial court erred when it instructed the jury regarding the factors contained in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986). Following our review, we conclude that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor and, therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the Defendant.

The Sullivan County Grand Jury charged by presentment Appellant, Daniel H. Jones, with possession of .5 gram of cocaine with intent to sell. This charge was the result of the execution of a search warrant during which officers arrested five individuals and found containers holding  rocks of crack cocaine and other drug paraphernalia. After a jury trial held on August 26, 28, and 29, 2008, Appellant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eleven years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony of a prior bad act of Appellant in contravention of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence in question and that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Scott W. Grammer, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for three counts of aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective twenty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, he argues that the State engaged in egregious, improper, and deceptive practices during the trial; that the post-conviction court should have amended his improperly enhanced sentences; and that the evidence is insufficient to support one of his convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Antonio F. Baker, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his request to modify his sentence via Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An employee sustained an injury to his shoulder at work. After a surgical repair, he briefly returned to work but was laid off prior to reaching maximum medical improvement. He filed a complaint in chancery court seeking workers’ compensation benefits from his employer. His treating physician assigned no impairment rating and placed no restrictions on his activities. An evaluating physician assigned 6% impairment to the body as a whole and recommended that Mr. Lewis avoid certain activities. The trial court awarded 36% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the award is excessive. We modify the judgment to award 24% permanent partial disability to the employee. We also conclude that local Rule 17A of the Chancery Court of the 28th Judicial District of Tennessee conflicts with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

The Petitioner, Tyler King, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and received an agreed sentence of 15 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The Petitioner challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the performance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Danny D. Holmes, appeals the revocation of his probation. He pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Rutherford County to robbery and aggravated assault, both Class C felonies. Holmes received an effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was granted an alternative sentence of six years on probation. Holmes claims on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and imposing the original term of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Brande Kirk and Amanda Jordan, as children of Barbara Jordan, (“Plaintiffs”) sued Michael A. Chavin, M.D. alleging medical malpractice in his treatment of Barbara Jordan. Dr. Chavin filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order on August 30, 2010 finding and holding that Plaintiffs’ expert was not qualified to testify in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115, and granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Defendant, Earnest Ulyessee McEwen, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. In 2006, Defendant was indicted for burglary and theft of property over $1,000. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to burglary and was sentenced to twelve years as a career offender with one year to serve in confinement and eleven years on community corrections, and the theft charge was dismissed. A warrant was issued charging Defendant with a violation of his community corrections sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s sentence and imposed his original twelve-year sentence, to be served in confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this conservatorship estate, Geoffrey Sottong, son of Mary Louise Sottong, raises issues as to the ruling of the Trial Court regarding the conservator's administration of the conservatorship estate. Upon review, we conclude that the Trial Court's series of orders properly instructed the conservator on administering the estate, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court on these issues.

The defendant, Chris L. Robinson, pleaded guilty to possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in exchange for an eight-year sentence, leaving the trial court to determine whether he would serve the sentence concurrently with or consecutively to his six-year sentence in Davidson County Criminal Court case number 2009-I-508. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve the eight-year sentence consecutively to the six-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences was inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the sentencing statutes. Following our review, we affirm the sentence of the trial court and remand solely for entry of an amended judgment reflecting that the defendant’s sentence in this case is to run consecutively to his sentence in case number 2009-I-508.

The Defendant, Leonard Eugene Myers, was convicted following a jury trial in the Hamilton County Criminal Court of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; vehicular assault, a Class D felony; and driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102(2)(A) (2006) (amended 2009, 2010), 39-13-106(a) (2010), 55-10-401 (2008) (amended 2010). The trial court merged the reckless aggravated assault and DUI convictions with the vehicular assault conviction and sentenced the Defendant to four years as a Range I offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting blood analysis evidence because the chain of custody was not properly established; (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s civil judgment against the Defendant; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant based upon enhancement factors that were not found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. We affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments and remand the case to the trial court for entry of one judgment reflecting that the reckless aggravated assault and DUI convictions are merged with the vehicular assault conviction.

The Defendant-Appellant, Demetrius Nacoyea Dunn, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and burglary, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years for aggravated robbery and one year for burglary. On appeal, Dunn claims: (1) his convictions were not supported 1 by sufficient evidence; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to issue a curative instruction following hearsay testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jerry W. Alley, Jr., entered pleas of guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to one count of the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-435 (2006); one count of simple possession of methamphetamine, see id. § 39-17-418(a); one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, see id. § 39-17-425(a)(1); and one count of child neglect, see id. § 39-15-401(a). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the imposition of a fully incarcerative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Dusty Haynes, appeals the order of the post-conviction that denied him postconviction relief from his guilty plea conviction for burglary but nonetheless granted him a delayed appeal of his sentence. The petitioner argues that the post-conviction court instead should have reversed his conviction and granted him a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief and reverse the granting of a delayed appeal.

This is an appeal of the grant of an application by the Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Tennessee to place an allegedly illegal insurance enterprise into receivership for purposes of liquidation pursuant to the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-9-101, et. seq. Respondents contend they are not insurers subject to the Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act and that, because the court found that the insurance was nonexistent, the appointment of a receiver of the businesses was not authorized. Finding that the activities of the various respondents constitute “insurance business” as defined by the applicable statute and that placing the businesses into receivership was proper, we affirm the order of the trial court.

This case involves judicial review of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance’s denial of a staff leasing company license. The trial court reviewed the denial of the license under the common law writ of certiorari standard and upheld the decision. Finding that the denial was unsupported by substantial and material evidence, we vacate the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, James Daniels, was convicted by a Cocke County jury of first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life in prison and twelve years, respectively. Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal and the supreme court denied permission to appeal. State v. James Wesley Daniels, No. E2006-01119-CCA-R3-CS, 2007 WL 2757636 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 24, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 4, 2008). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition for relief. Petitioner appeals. After a review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Anthony Dodson, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-five years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant now appeals, claiming insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was excessive. After reviewing the record, we find error in neither the defendant’s conviction nor his sentence, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant Kristopher Smith was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated kidnapping and rape, both Class B felonies. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective ten-year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, Smith claims the trial court erred by: (1) failing to sustain his Batson challenge to the prosecution’s peremptory strikes of two African American males; (2) finding that “the prosecution’s explanation of its peremptory strike of a white male sufficiently sex neutral”; (3) finding that his prior aggravated robbery conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes; (4) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and new trial; and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant sought a special exception to establish a waste transfer facility. The Metro Council, pursuant to its authority under the Metropolitan Code, disapproved of the proposed location. The appellant sought a writ of certiorari and the trial court dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to this court. We affirm the trial court.