APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Kenneth Clay Davis, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of identity theft, a Class D felony, and driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony, and was sentenced, as a career offender, to an effective sentence of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the denial of the petition was error because: (1) his due process rights were violated by the State’s failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed before the return of the indictment; and (2) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial and affirm the judgment of the Sevier County Circuit Court.

The pro se petitioner, Ronnie Bradfield, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, George T. McClain, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court imposed illegal sentences and (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves important questions regarding the process for adjudicating the liability of nursing homes for injuries to their residents. In particular, it requires this Court to articulate the principles that should be used to decide whether a claim based in part on the conduct of a certified nursing assistant (“CNA”) should be treated as a medical malpractice claim or as an  ordinary negligence claim. The Court has determined that claims involving the adequacy of CNAs’ training, the sufficiency of the staffing at a particular nursing home, and the adherence of CNAs to a patient’s plan of care are ordinary negligence claims that can be substantiated without the introduction of expert proof. The Court has also decided that the negligence per se doctrine permits the use of federal and state regulations regarding the licensing of nursing homes to create and define the scope of the duty of care that nursing homes owe to their patients. I cannot concur with either decision.

The Defendant, Craig Edwin James, was convicted of speeding in Rutherford County General Sessions Court and appealed his conviction to the Rutherford County Circuit Court. Following a de novo bench trial, the Defendant was convicted of speeding, a Class C misdemeanor, fined five dollars, and ordered to pay $624 in court costs. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) his General Sessions trial was conducted in violation of both Tennessee statute and the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; (2) the designation of his speeding violation as criminal rather than civil violated his right to equal protection; and (3) the United States Department of  Transportation improperly limits state sentencing discretion in violation of the Supremacy Clause. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiffs brought this action to establish a partnership with the deceased against the estate's personal representative and others. Defendants answered, denying the allegation that a partnership existed, and filed a counter-complaint, asserting the estate should be reimbursed for plaintiffs' mismanagement of the farm, and for monies the plaintiffs removed from the estate's bank account. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court held that deceased and plaintiff had entered into a partnership and that the partnership would be wound up by the Court and the partnership assets distributed. Also, the Trial Court held that plaintiffs would be required to pay rent on the house they occupied on the farm for several years. On appeal, we affirm the finding that a partnership existed, but reverse the Trial Court's holding that plaintiffs owed the estate rent for occupancy of the house on the farm. We remand, with directions to the Court to wind up the partnership.

We granted the application of Daniel Kueter, M.D. (“Defendant”) for a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 Interlocutory Appeal on the issue of whether the Trial Court erred in reinstating this case to its  active docket after it had been dismissed without prejudice over a year earlier. We find and hold that although plaintiff was not entitled to relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the Trial Court did not err when it granted Plaintiff’s motion to enter an agreed order nunc pro tunc reinstating this case.  We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order.

This appeal involves the impairment of a hospital lien. The individual defendant was treated at the plaintiff hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by a thirdparty tortfeasor. The patient incurred substantial medical expenses. The hospital filed a hospital lien for the amount of the patient’s medical expenses. Subsequently, the patient received insurance proceeds from his own insurance company under his uninsured motorist coverage, and another payment from the tortfeasor’s insurance company. Nothing was paid to the plaintiff hospital. The hospital filed this lawsuit against both insurance companies for impairment of its hospital lien. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted in part the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Against the patient’s own insurance company, the hospital was awarded one-third of the monies the patient received. Against the tortfeasor’s insurance company, the hospital was awarded an amount equal to the policy coverage limit. The hospital now appeals, arguing that it was entitled to recover from both insurance companies jointly the reasonable cost of the hospital services rendered to the patient. The insurance companies also appeal, arguing that there was no impairment of the lien and that, if there was impairment, the hospital’s recovery should have been limited to one-third of the payments made to the patient. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that the hospital’s lien was valid and was impaired, but that the hospital can recover only for the damages caused by the impairment of its lien.

The petitioner, Christopher Perry, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to properly investigate the case and advise him about testifying at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The administratrix of the estate of the deceased brought this wrongful death suit against the defendant nursing home and its controlling entities, alleging damages as the result of ordinary negligence, negligence per se, and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act applied to the ordinary negligence claims, thereby precluding allegations of negligence per se or violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The trial court also dismissed a claim for punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but vacated the portion of the order dismissing the punitive damages claim. This Court granted the administratix’s application for permission to appeal in an effort to clarify the standards governing nursing home liability and to resolve a conflict in the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals. We hold that, because the administratrix of the estate of the deceased has alleged violations of the standard of care pertaining to both medical treatment and routine care, she has made claims based upon both medical malpractice and ordinary negligence. Further, she may offer proof of negligence per se and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act as support for her ordinary negligence claims. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of the punitive damages claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded to the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Anthony Leon Moore, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his convictions are void or his sentences illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, who was extradited from Mexico to face charges for aggravated child abuse
and felony murder by aggravated child abuse, was convicted for each offense. The trial court imposed sentences of twenty-two years and life, respectively, to be served consecutively. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction for aggravated child abuse, finding the evidence to be insufficient, but upheld the felony murder conviction. This Court granted applications for permission to appeal by both the State and the defendant. Because the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for both aggravated child abuse and felony murder, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. More specifically, the conviction for felony murder is affirmed, and the conviction for aggravated child abuse is reinstated. No other issues warrant the grant of a new trial on either offense. The sentences imposed by the trial court for each of the two offenses are affirmed.

This application for an interlocutory appeal concerns a client’s standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the amount of fees to be paid to one of the three attorneys who represented  her in a personal injury suit. The trial court dismissed the client’s complaint for lack of standing  but granted the client permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial  court that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation. We also conclude that the client has a real interest in the litigation, and we thus reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the client’s complaint.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Appellant, Heather Richardson, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s order denying her relief from the prosecutor’s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. The State concedes that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying the application. Upon review, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for the trial court to order the prosecutor to grant the Appellant pretrial diversion.

The defendant, Chuncy Lesolue Hollis, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In a timely appeal to this court, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by issuing an expanded jury instruction on the element of premeditation. Based on our review, we conclude that although the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that the defendant premeditated the killing, the trial court committed reversible error by improperly commenting on the evidence and giving an incomplete statement of the law in its expanded premeditation instruction. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Robert A. Cantrell, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II multiple offender to sixteen years in the Department of Correction. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial following a bomb threat and ensuing building evacuation that took place during voir dire; (2) whether his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury was prejudiced by the jurors’ exposure to the bomb threat and publicity surrounding the case; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Gerry Tallant, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder, for which he received a life sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on criminal responsibility, and that the State’s closing argument was improper. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Trestan Lemark Yarbrough, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence for his convictions for facilitation of aggravated assault and two counts of aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that was more severe than necessary to achieve the purposes set forth in the sentencing guidelines. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s order revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating his original sentence.

A Blount County jury convicted the petitioner, Douglas Jordan, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court found that the state suppressed evidence but that the evidence was not material to the defense. On appeal, the petitioner argues that (1) the state withheld favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the post-conviction court erred by applying a sufficiency of the evidence standard to the materiality prong of the Brady test; (3) the state’s suppression of evidence violated Article 1, sections 1 and 2, of the Tennessee Constitution; and (4) in the alternative, the petitioner’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate the case. Following our thorough review, we conclude that the state failed to disclose evidence that was both favorable and material to the defense in violation of the petitioner’s right to due process. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for a new trial.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Deadrick Eugene Garrett, of first degree premeditated murder in the shooting death of Dyishun Foust, 1 and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted separately for two different criminal episodes, one involving an aggravated robbery and the other involving a homicide and an especially aggravated robbery. On the State’s motion but over the defendant’s objection, and without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court consolidated the indictments for a single trial. The jury convicted the defendant of all offenses charged, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in consolidating the offenses. We hold that the trial court erred both as to methodology and as to result in consolidating the indictments. When a defendant objects to the State’s pretrial motion to consolidate offenses, the trial court must conduct a hearing and consider the motion under the severance provisions of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1), not the provisions of Rule 8(b). We also hold that a prosecutor should refrain from seeking the consolidation of offenses over a defendant’s objection unless the prosecutor has a good faith basis for arguing that the requirements of Rule 14(b)(1) will be met. The trial court’s error in ordering consolidation requires that we reverse the defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery and remand for a new trial on that charge. The trial court’s error was harmless as to the defendant’s convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and we affirm those convictions.

The defendant, Thomas Milton Carver, III, was convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury with a flight instruction; and (2) whether the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant as a Range II offender. Following review of the record, we conclude no error exists and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mr. Gonzalez filed a petition to alter his final divorce decree, alleging that the decree violates federal law by allowing the wife to receive more than 50% of his military retirement. The trial court denied relief. Mr. Gonzalez appealed. We affirm, holding that federal law does not limit Tennessee trial courts to awarding a maximum of 50% of a former service member’s retirement to the ex-spouse.

Petitioner, Ricky Lynn Hill, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner pled guilty to vehicular assault, driving under the influence (“DUI”) fifth offense, attempted tampering with evidence, and leaving the scene of an accident.¹ Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced 1 to an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days and released to intensive probation. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he argued that his guilty pleas were involuntary, that his convictions violated double jeopardy, and that his sentence was excessive. The habeas corpus court denied relief for failure to comply with the habeas corpus statute and for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

The defendant, Darrin Mosby, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to two counts of carjacking, a Class B felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent ten-year sentences, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the imposed sentences, specifically contending that: (1) the term of ten years is excessive in light of the trial court’s misapplication of an enhancement factor and failure to consider mitigating factors; and (2) the court erred in ordering the sentences be served in confinement. Following a review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration based upon this opinion.