APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff claimed that in 1997 he entered into a verbal partnership agreement with the defendant to open and operate the antique store that the plaintiff managed for the next twelve years. He further claimed that the defendant withheld profits and other benefits of the partnership  from him, in violation of their agreement. The plaintiff accordingly asked the trial court to dissolve  the partnership and to award him his share of the partnership assets. The defendant filed a Rule  12.02(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. She denied that she had ever been in any sort of partnership relationship with the plaintiff and claimed, instead, that he was a salaried managerial employee-at-will of her solely-owned corporation. The trial court  granted the defendant’s motion. The allegations in the complaint, which we must take as true, state a claim for relief.  Additionally, material extraneous to the complaint was submitted and presumably considered by the trial court, requiring that the motion be treated as one for summary judgment. Disputes of material fact exist in the filings, precluding the grant of summary judgment.
Accordingly, we reverse.

Robert E. Davis and wife, Angela K. Davis (“the Buyers”), filed this action against Crawford L. Williams and wife, Betty Jo Williams (“the Sellers”), to enjoin them from taking possession of real property that the Sellers had sold the Buyers and re-acquired through foreclosure. The Buyers also sought to set aside the foreclosure sale. The Sellers moved to dismiss and then for  summary judgment on the ground that a final judgment against the Buyers in an unlawful detainer action in general sessions court barred the present action under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Sellers. The Buyers appeal. We affirm.

The Perry County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Billy D. Sizemore, for one count of theft over $1,000 in connection with the theft of rolls of wire fencing from Eugene Grinder. A jury convicted Appellant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve yearsas a career offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because there was insufficient corroboration of his co-defendant’s testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was sufficient corroborating evidence and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Tina J. Parks (“the Buyer”) purchased an automobile on an installment payment plan and signed a “Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement” (“the Installment Contract”) pledging the vehicle as collateral to the seller-lender, Chris Yousif dba Quality Motors (“the Seller”). Mid-Atlantic Finance Company, Inc. purchased the Seller’s rights in the Installment Contract. Mid-Atlantic later informed the Seller when the Buyer fell behind on her payments. The Seller repossessed the vehicle. Mid-Atlantic sold its rights under the Installment Contract to the Seller. The Buyer then filed this action against the Seller and Mid-Atlantic on various theories. The trial court granted Mid-Atlantic summary judgment and dismissed the Buyer’s claim against the company, finding that, as the purchaser of the Installment Contract, it had no duty to the Buyer. The Buyer appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Mariam Fada Dirie, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated child abuse by neglect, a Class A felony, and received concurrent sentences of 17 years’ incarceration. A timely filed petition for post-conviction relief followed wherein the petitioner alleged that her guilty pleas were involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the appointment of counsel, amendment of the petition, and an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to be named the sole heirs to trust residue. However, the Attorney General moved for summary judgment, claiming that a later trust document provided for a full disposition of the trust assets, and therefore, that no assets remained to which Appellants could be entitled. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the intent to leave no residue stated in the later document superseded the prior edition. On appeal, Appellants argue that intent is irrelevant without a determination of the legal efficacy of the  trust documents, and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion. We find that the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction in adjudicating the declaratory judgment. Additionally, we affirm the trial court’s denial of attorney fees and costs to SunTrust incurred at trial, and we decline to award SunTrust its attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.

A jury convicted the petitioner, Willie Dockins, of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On direct appeal, this court upheld the conviction and sentence. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and two amended petitions for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner now appeals. Following a review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This is a zoning case. The homeowner purchased a house in an area zoned as single-family residential and applied to have the property rezoned for office use. The application was considered by the town legislative body. Some members of the legislative body recused themselves. A majority of the members present voted in favor of the rezoning application, but it did not receive a majority of the entire membership of the legislative body, including the members who recused themselves. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 13-7-204, the rezoning application was deemed to have failed. The homeowner then filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari, asking that the trial court deem the rezoning application approved based on the favorable vote of the majority of  the members who participated in the consideration of his rezoning application. The trial court  granted the writ, deemed the rezoning application approved, and modified the legislative body’s  decision to grant the homeowner’s application. The town appeals. We reverse, finding, inter alia,  that an affirmative vote by a majority of the entire membership of the town legislative body was required for adoption of the rezoning application.

State representative appeals dismissal of her suit to recover attorney fees incurred as a result of her former opponent’s contest of the election. The trial court held that the Tennessee Constitution and statutes governing election contests vest exclusive jurisdiction to decide contests for the office of state representative, and that, consequently, the court was without jurisdiction to determine the issue of costs and fees awardable under the statute. We hold that the chancery court correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to decide issues arising under § 2-17-115.

The petitioner, James E. Lofton, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Plaintiffs appeal the summary dismissal of their medical malpractice claims against three physicians, an orthopedic surgeon, and two hematologists. In December 2004, Plaintiffs’ mother, who suffered from several medical conditions, underwent a total hip replacement and remained in the hospital under the care of several doctors for ten days. Nine days after surgery, her condition dramatically declined; she died the following day from a severe diffuse pulmonary and gastrointestinal hemorrhage. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging the physicians breached the standard of care for their respective specialties in the care of their mother. Each defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and each motion was supported by the affidavit of the defendant as an expert witness. Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of their expert witness in response. The trial court ruled that Plaintiffs’ only expert was not a qualified witness under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 and granted summary judgment to all three defendants. On appeal, Plaintiffs claim the trial court abused its discretion in finding that their expert witness was not qualified to testify. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that Plaintiffs’ expert was not qualified to testify under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 and the summary dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.

In this action, the Trial Court ordered the Department of Children's Services which had custody of the minor child, to furnish the parents with medical information, including video tapes. A written response was not made by the Department and the video tapes were not obtained and furnished to the parents. The Trial Court held the Department in willful contempt of the Court and entered sanctions as punishment. The Department has appealed.  We hold that the record does not establish a basis to hold the Department in willful contempt of Court and we reverse the Trial Court's contempt judgment.

I respectfully dissent from the holding that Dr. Sobel was not competent to opine as to whether one or more of the defendants deviated from the standard of care.

On May 25, 2007, the petitioner, Tobias Johnson, pled guilty to first degree murder in the perpetration of a felony; two counts of rape, Class B felonies; and incest, a Class C felony.  He received a negotiated sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with the possibility of parole, for the first degree murder conviction. As a Range I, standard offender, he received eight years for each of the rape convictions and three years for the incest conviction, all sentences to be served concurrently with his life sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the petitioner argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when they (1) did not timely litigate an issue regarding the state’s loss of the audio tape of the petitioner’s August 27, 2003, interrogation; (2) failed to allege in a motion to suppress that the state violated the petitioner’s right to remain silent; and (3) misadvised the petitioner regarding his release eligibility. The petitioner further argues that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Henry Alfred Honea, was convicted by a Coffee County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, evading arrest, and being a felon in possession of a handgun. The Defendant received an effective sentence of life without parole plus 153 years, which was to be served consecutively to previous sentences for other convictions. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, first degree felony murder, and first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court erred in admitting expert proof about the rate of decomposition of the victim’s body; (3) he was deprived of due process and a fair trial by the admission of proof of the Defendant’s pending rape charges; (4) the trial court erred in failing to give an alibi instruction; (5) the trial court erred in admitting underlying factual proof about the Defendant’s prior kidnapping convictions at the sentencing hearing; (6) the trial court erred in entering judgments for both first degree felony murder and first degree premeditated murder, then merging the convictions; and (7) he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to call two exculpatory witnesses to testify at the trial. We affirm the especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, evading arrest, and being a felon in possession of a handgun judgments. We vacate the first degree premeditated murder and felony murder judgments and remand the case for entry of one judgment of conviction for first degree murder, noting merger of the two counts of conviction.

The capital petitioner, Vincent Sims, appeals as of right from the October 1, 2008 order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying relief because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective; and (3) the imposition of the death penalty in this case was unconstitutional. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we conclude that there is no error requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction  court.

Kathy Young (“the plaintiff”) stepped backward onto an elevated curb as she opened the driver’s door of her vehicle to leave the parking lot of First Bank of Tennessee. She was injured when she tripped over the curb and fell into the shrubbery that bordered the parking lot. She and her husband filed this action alleging that First Bank was negligent ¹ in creating or maintaining a dangerous condition. First Bank filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Trecia Gayle Watson (“Plaintiff”) formerly was employed as a teacher with the Bradley County School System. In 2002, Bob Taylor (“Taylor”), the Director of Schools for the Bradley County School System, instituted disciplinary charges against Plaintiff seeking to have her employment terminated. Plaintiff voluntarily resigned prior to completion of the disciplinary proceedings. In 2007, pursuant to a grand jury subpoena from the criminal court in Whitfield County, Georgia, Taylor sent all information pertaining to the disciplinary charges and other information in Plaintiff’s personnel file to the criminal court. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sued for defamation and filed suit against Taylor, the Bradley County School Board (the “School Board”), and various other defendants. All of the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and, thereafter, sought various forms of sanctions against Plaintiff for numerous alleged violations of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. The Trial Court expressly declined to Rule on the motion for Rule 11 sanctions, providing instead for this Court to dispose of the defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 sanctions if Plaintiff appealed. The Trial Court then granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We conclude that because the Trial Court has yet to rule on the defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions, there is no final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Prior to their marriage, John Paul Lewis, Sr., (“Husband”) and Miechelle Forgey-Lewis (“Wife”) signed an antenuptial agreement. In this divorce proceeding filed by Wife, the parties agreed that the antenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable but they disagreed sharply as to its application. The trial court awarded Wife a divorce and alimony in futuro of $3,000 per month retroactive to the date of the filing of the complaint. Wife collected approximately $5,000 of the accrued alimony through garnishments. Husband appeals, challenging the alimony award as well as the garnishments. Wife contends the trial court erred in allowing Husband an offset of approximately $80,000 against her entitlements under the court’s orders for payments made by him on joint debts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court except for the garnishments. We quash the garnishments and order the return of funds collected through them to the garnishee.

The Tennessee American Water Company petitioned the Tennessee Regulatory Authority to approve a revision to the existing rates it charges its customers for water. The Authority authorized a revision in the existing tariffs but made several rulings adverse to the plaintiff. Plaintiff has appealed numerous issues. On appeal, we affirm the rulings of the Authority, except its ruling  which only allowed plaintiff to recover one-half of the rate case expenses. We hold that ruling was arbitrary and we require the Authority to pay the full amount of the rate case expenses claim.

An employee of a company providing security services injured a knee at his place of employment. The trial court denied workers’ compensation benefits. Because the injury arose out of the employment and is not idiopathic in nature, the employee is entitled to recovery under the statute. The judgment is reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court for a determination of benefits.

The employee filed a workers’ compensation claim against the employer for injuries sustained in a trucking accident. The trial court ruled that the employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the accident and entitled to full benefits. The employer appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in finding the employee permanently and totally disabled. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of fact made by the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Ronnie Bradfield, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Bank purchased property at a foreclosure sale, and a tenant of the previous owner continued to occupy the property after the sale. The deed of trust executed by the previous owner provided that if the property was sold, any person holding possession of the property through the borrower would either surrender possession of the property or become a tenant at will of the purchaser. Bank filed a detainer warrant against the tenant and was awarded possession of the property by the general sessions court. On appeal, the circuit court also awarded possession to the Bank. The tenant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Perry Avram March, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, abuse of a corpse, a Class E felony, and destruction of evidence, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty-five years for his murder conviction, two years for his abuse of a corpse conviction, and five years for his destruction of evidence conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences for his Class C and Class E felonies consecutive to his sentence for his murder conviction, and his murder conviction in this case consecutive to his sentence in case no. 2005-D-2854 of twenty-four years for his conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, for an effective sentence of fifty-six years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence (1) his statements to Detective Postiglione on August 12, 2005; (2) his taped conversations with Nathaniel Farris while Defendant was housed in the Davidson County Jail awaiting trial; (3) Leigh Reames’ testimony concerning Defendant’s prior conduct; and (4) the draft of a novel written by Defendant. Defendant also contends that the State’s prosecution of the offenses of abuse of a corpse and tampering with evidence are time-barred and, alternatively, that the tolling of the  statute of limitations in criminal cases violates his constitutional right to travel and denies him  equal protection under the law. Defendant submits that the cumulative effect of these errors denied him his constitutional right to due process. After a thorough review we affirm the judgments of the trial court.