APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The order of the trial court entered November 29, 2010, from which the appellant John L. Houston seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.

The order of the trial court entered February 16, 2011, from which the appellant Angelia Lynette Maupin seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.

The order of the trial court entered February 9, 2011, from which the appellant Kenneth E. Ramsey seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.

The order from which the appellant Nader Rahbe seeks to appeal was entered on Wednesday, January 5, 2011. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Tuesday, February 8, 2011, the 34th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, the motion of the appellee to dismiss is granted. This appeal is dismissed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Alvertis Boyd, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The Defendant was sentenced as a repeat violent offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting two prior convictions as impeachment evidence; and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a repeat violent offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The order from which the appellant Ramie Stabler-Marston seeks to appeal was entered on February 24, 2010. Notices of appeal were filed by the appellant on October 18, 2010, and October 20, 2010. Because neither of the notices of appeal was timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Carrie D. Young, stands convicted of possession with intent to deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to an eight-year sentence, to serve 350 days with the remainder suspended. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress and that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. Specifically, she argues that the trial court erred in finding that law enforcement had probable cause to do a field strip search of her, that the trial court erred in finding that the confidential informant was reliable, and that the proof was insufficient to show that she intended to deliver the cocaine. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari in which review was sought of the denial of a grievance filed by an employee of the Metropolitan Action Commission’s Head Start program. The grievance was initially denied by the Executive Director of the Metropolitan Action Commission. The employee then appealed the grievance to the Metropolitan Civil Service Commission, which assigned the appeal to an administrative law judge; after a hearing, the administrative law judge denied the grievance. Upon further appeal, the Civil Service Commission overturned the administrative law judge’s decision and held in favor of the employee; the Civil Service Commission transmitted its decision to the Board of Commissioners of the Metropolitan Action Commission as a recommended final order. The Board of Commissioners rejected the recommended decision and voted to deny the grievance. When the employee sought to appeal the Board of Commissioner’s decision to the Civil Service Commission, that Commission responded that it had no further authority to hear the appeal because the employee was not an employee in classified service and because the Metropolitan Action Commission had final authority on grievance decisions involving employees of the Head Start program. The employee then sought review by writ of certiorari in chancery court, which found that the employee was not a civil service employee and was, therefore, not entitled to a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission; the court also found that the Metropolitan Action Commission had conformed to the applicable grievance process. On appeal, the employee asserts that she was employed in a civil service position and entitled to the grievance process set forth in the civil service rules. Finding that the grievance procedure applicable to employees in the classified service is not applicable to the employee and that the Action Commission properly exercised final authority on the grievance, we affirm the action of the trial court.

This is an action by the bank to recover against the debtor for defaulting on a loan. The plaintiff bank made a loan to the defendant debtor for the purchase of real property, and the property was pledged to secure the loan. The debtor defaulted on the loan, the property was sold, and the proceeds were applied to the debt. The bank filed this lawsuit against the debtor for the deficiency. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the bank. The debtor now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a continuance in order to obtain counsel. We affirm.

In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This case is before the court after remand to the Davidson County Criminal Court for sentencing after this court reinstated three convictions for attempted incest that the trial court incorrectly merged with three attempted rape convictions. On remand, the trial court sentenced the Defendant, David Earl Offutt, to serve four years for each of the Class D felony attempted incest convictions and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively to each other but concurrently with an effective eighteen-year sentence the Defendant was serving for other convictions. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (attempt), 39-15-302 (2010) (incest). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing maximum sentences for his attempted incest convictions and ordering that they be served consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James Edward Farrar, Jr., appealed the Bedford County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. This court reversed the trial court’s revocation, concluding that the State failed to establish a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation. See State v. James Edward Farrar, Jr., No. M2009-01285-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. 6 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept. 10, 2010). The State filed an application for permission to appeal to our supreme court. On April 14, 2011, the supreme court granted the State’s application and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in State v. Teddy Ray Mitchell, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. E2008-02672-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2011). We have reconsidered our prior opinion in light of Teddy Ray Mitchell, and following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, although we reject part of that court’s rationale for the revocation.

In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The plaintiff, an assignee to a foreign judgment, filed a petition to domesticate the judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-101 et seq. The defendant objected to the enrollment of the foreign judgment because it was assigned. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to domesticate the foreign judgment and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. Our review of the record reveals that the plaintiff properly followed the statutory requirements to enroll a foreign judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred. We reverse.

The majority opinion has provided an excellent analysis of the facts and the law in this case, and I agree with the conclusion regarding the lack of evidence of public intoxication. I also believe that the present statute regarding revocation requires a preponderance of the evidence to show that a probation violation has occurred and that a subsequent decision regarding revocation is within the trial court’s discretion. See, e.g., State v. Vincent Jordan, No. M2009-02488-CCA-R3-CD, Montgomery County, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2010); State v. Richard Thomas Jones, No. E2009-01241-CCA-R3-CD, Hamilton County, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2010). I respectfully disagree, however, with the result reached regarding “excessive consumption of alcohol.” My problem in this case is with the concept of “excessive consumption” and what proves it has occurred.

The Petitioner, Keith Ezell, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective 198-year sentence. He contends that his trial attorney failed to provide effective assistance because counsel did not advise him that accepting a guilty plea offer was in his best interest and did not accurately advise him of the likelihood he would receive a greater sentence after a trial than if he accepted the plea offer. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bryant Adair, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his untimely filed petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated robbery and from his effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that principles of due process require the tolling of the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court granted the father sole custody and decision making authority over the parties’ minor children. The mother appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all issues.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay an alimony arrearage of $86,000.00. We affirm the judgment for the arrearage and remand the case for reconsideration of the requirement that Husband pay the arrearage at $1,500.00 per month.

The Defendant, Carl Lee Houghton, was found guilty by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504(a)(4) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years’ confinement in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession because it was not made voluntarily, and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing by not giving more weight to applicable mitigating factors. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This post-divorce appeal involves recusal of the trial judge. In the initial divorce proceedings, the trial judge recused himself based in part on friendship with the parties. A special judge was appointed to hear the case. The special judge tried the divorce, divided the parties’ property, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. Several years later, the husband filed a petition to terminate or modify his alimony obligation. The trial judge who had previously recused himself declined to do so for the post-divorce proceedings. After a hearing, the trial judge terminated the husband’s alimony obligation. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial judge should have recused himself and that he erred in terminating the alimony. We reverse the trial court’s decision on recusal, and therefore vacate the trial court’s ruling on the husband’s petition to modify.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Nancy L. Blue, of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed her convictions but modified her sentences. See State v. Nancy Blue, No. W2008-00187-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1097450, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Apr. 23, 2009), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Sept. 28, 2009). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief; however, the postconviction court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that the petition was not timely filed. The Petitioner alleges that both prison notaries were unavailable for several days preceding the date that her petition was due and, because of their absence, she was not able to get her petition to the appropriate prison authorities for mailing until the day after the one-year statute of limitations ran. After our review, we remand to  the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant tolling the statute of limitations for due process concerns and whether the Petitioner timely filed her petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Steven Craig Wilcox, pled guilty to conspiracy to promote the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class E felony, in exchange for a four-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for an alternative sentence, ordering instead that the defendant serve his term in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of confinement. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

Sally Jo Witty is a teacher employed by the Blount County School System. She filed this action after her request to draw pay from a pool of donated sick leave was denied. She named as defendants the trustees appointed to administer the pool (collectively “the Trustees”). She also sued the Blount County Board of Education (“the School Board”) and alleged it is vicariously liable. She demanded the full monetary value of the requested sick leave and also asked for damages to compensate her for the mental suffering resulting from the “wrongful” decision to deny her  benefits. The trial court held that the Trustees were an independent body for which the School Board could not be held vicariously liable. It also held that the Trustees were immune from liability in their individual capacities and that the action filed against the Trustees in their official capacity was a petition for writ of certiorari that was not timely filed. Therefore, it dismissed the complaint. Witty appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and vacate it in part.

This is an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mother of a middle school student filed suit against Knox County, the Knox County Board of Education, and the City of Knoxville after her daughter viewed graphic photographs of her dead father during a presentation on the dangers of drunk driving. The trial court found the City of Knoxville liable for the student’s emotional injuries because the school resource officer who distributed the photographs intended  to evoke an emotional response. We conclude it was generally foreseeable that providing graphic  accident scene photographs to seventh grade students could cause serious or severe emotional harm in a student related to a victim depicted therein. Thus, the school resource officer owed a duty to exercise reasonable care when displaying the photographs to a class that potentially included students related to the victims. The evidence, however, preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the school resource officer failed to exercise reasonable care. We reverse the decision of the trial court.