APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Michael Wayne Maples, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping on the basis of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in the investigation and presentation of evidence concerning his mental health. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

Julie-Cristie (Barone) Neal ("Step-Daughter") brought an action to quiet title to a nearly three hundred acre farm in Cumberland County, Tennessee, against Veronica Monde Barone ("Ex-Wife") and Anthony F. Barone ("Father"). She primarily asserts that she has acquired adverse possession rights in the entire farm pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-103. The disputed property was also the subject of prior litigation in a circuit court proceeding involving the enforcement of a foreign judgment and fraudulent conveyance claims against Father by Ex-Wife as a judgment creditor. In the present action Ex-Wife moved for summary judgment on several theories including the assertion that filing a lien lis pendens barred Step-Daughter's adverse possession claim. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment on all grounds. Ex-Wife filed a motion asking the trial court for permission to submit an application for interlocutory appeal on one issue raised on summary judgment _ whether the lien lis pendens tolled the seven-year adverse possession statute found in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-103 during the circuit court proceeding. The trial court granted that motion and we likewise granted the application for interlocutory appeal on the asserted issue. We reverse the trial court's judgment on the sole issue presented to us.

Kevin L. Holt, injured in an automobile accident in Arkansas, was first taken by ambulance to an Arkansas hospital and then transported to the Regional Medical Center in Memphis, where he incurred $33,823.02 in expenses. Shelby County Health Care Corporation, the operator of the Regional Medical Center, filed affidavits for a lien as prescribed by statute. Thereafter, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, which had medical coverage for Holt with limits of $5,000, paid $1,290 for ambulance services and $3,710 to the Arkansas hospital. Shelby County Health Care Corporation sued Nationwide for impairment of its lien, seeking as recovery the entire amount due for its medical services to Holt. The trial court awarded $5,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals revised the amount of the judgment to $33,823.02. Because we have determined that liens under the Hospital Lien Act do not attach to medical payment benefits paid pursuant to an insurance policy, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is dismissed.

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Father/Appellant's petition to be named the minor child's primary residential parent or, in the alternative, to increase his parenting time. The trial court denied Father's petition, and also denied Father an award of attorney's fees and costs under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-103(c). Finding that Father failed to meet his burden to show a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in the child's primary residential parent and/or the child's residential schedule, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees and costs, we affirm.

Kimberly Summers Welch ("Mother") gave birth to Aaron A. (the "Child") on July 14, 2004. Prior to the birth, Roger A. Miller ("Father") filed a petition seeking to establish paternity. After the Child was born and a DNA test established that Father was the biological father, Father was ordered to pay $235 per month in child support. This amount was specifically held not to be presumptively correct and Mother was allowed additional time to pursue her claim that Father's income was such that he should pay more child support. The trial court eventually found that Father was capable of earning or presently was earning $40,000 annually. Father also was ordered to pay 10% of Mother's attorney fees. Father appeals both determinations. Mother requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and award Mother her attorney fees incurred in this appeal.

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Father/Appellant's petition to be named the minor child's primary residential parent or, in the alternative, to increase his parenting time. The trial court denied Father's petition, and also denied Father an award of attorney's fees and costs under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-103(c). Finding that Father failed to meet his burden to show a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in the child's primary residential parent and/or the child's residential schedule, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees and costs, we affirm.

The defendant, acting pro se, appeals the entry of a default judgment entered against him in a subrogation action. After a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

This case involves an unusual procedural history and requires us to examine the consequences of an oral motion for voluntary dismissal for which a written order was not entered. We have determined that the trial court did not err in its rulings.

This appeal arises out of an alleged wrongful denial of long term disability benefits. The plaintiff/appellant filed suit asserting multiple causes of action against an insurance company that contracted to provide long term disability insurance to employees of the City of Germantown. The defendants/appellees, the insurance company and its parent corporation, moved for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that the applicable statutory and contractual limitations periods barred each of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal involving intercounty transfer of post-divorce matters. The divorce was granted in Carroll County, Tennessee. The mother and the parties' minor child reside in Davidson County, Tennessee. The father once resided in Carroll County, but has since moved to Georgia. The father filed a motion in the Carroll County trial court seeking modification of child support, alimony, and the parenting plan. The mother filed a request to transfer the case to Davidson County. The Carroll County trial court granted the transfer as to the child support and parenting plan issues, but denied transfer as to the alimony issues. Both the trial court and the appellate court granted the mother's request for permission for an interlocutory appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand, finding that the entire case must be transferred to Davidson County.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. The child at issue was born to teenage parents who never married and have long-term, continuing problems with substance abuse. As a result of his substance abuse, the father has been in and out of prison for much of the child's life. The child has lived with the petitioners, the maternal grandfather and maternal step-grandmother, who filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents and adopt the child. The mother subsequently joined in the petition. After a trial, the trial court terminated the father's parental rights, finding abandonment by, inter alia, engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. The father now appeals. We affirm, finding that the undisputed evidence supports the trial court's finding on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard, and that termination of the father's parental rights is in the child's best interest.

This is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60.02 motion. The plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries arising out of a car accident. Several months later, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was not opposed, and was granted. The plaintiff later retained new counsel and filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for relief, commenting that even if the order were set aside, it would nevertheless grant the motion. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The trial court determined that glucometers sold by Plaintiff taxpayer during the tax period January 1, 2001, through September 30, 2003, were not exempt from sales and use tax under Tennessee Code Annotated _ 67-6-314(5)(1998). The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Revenue. Plaintiff taxpayer appeals. We affirm.

The plaintiff, APAC_Atlantic, Inc. ("APAC"), filed this lawsuit against the defendant, Samuel Robert Morton d/b/a Morton Construction, for breach of contract. APAC moved for a default judgment after Mr. Morton failed to answer APAC's complaint within the allowable time limit established by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.01. The trial court entered a default judgment, awarding APAC $106,776.20 in damages. Thereafter, Mr. Morton filed a motion to have the default judgment set aside under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.02. After a hearing, the trial court determined that Mr. Morton was not entitled to relief from the final judgment. Mr. Morton appealed. We affirm.

Petitioner Roosevelt Morris was convicted of two counts of attempted murder, and received an effective sentence of fifty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This court affirmed the conviction on appeal but reduced his sentence to forty-seven years. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his counsel was deficient for (1) failing to object to the State's questions and closing arguments concerning petitioner's post-arrest silence; (2) failing to object to other prosecutorial misconduct during the closing argument; and (3) failing to have the magazine and the unfired bullet in the firearm used in the crime examined for fingerprint evidence. Petitioner also contends that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and its progeny. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Clifton Harrison, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Sullivan County. He pled guilty and was convicted of seven offenses of selling cocaine, and he received an effective sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without allowing the petitioner an opportunity to amend the petition with the assistance of counsel. We hold that the trial court should have appointed counsel under the circumstances in this case, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Tony A. Phipps, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner claims (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because his trial counsel failed to present exculpatory evidence and explore certain theories of defense; (2) that misconduct by the prosecutor denied him the right to a fair trial; and (3) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tony Ray Anderson, pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted rape, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-12-107(a), -13-503(b). Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction for each count, with the two sentences running concurrently. Almost three years after he pleaded guilty, the defendant petitioned the trial court and requested to serve the remainder of his sentence on probation. The trial court denied the defendant's motion. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Latoya T. Waller, was charged in a two-count indictment with possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, a Class B felony, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann.__ 39-17-417(c)(1), -418(c). Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pleaded guilty to simple possession of marijuana, and the State dismissed the felony cocaine charge. She subsequently filed a Motion for Expungement and requested that the trial court expunge the felony cocaine charge from her record. The trial court denied her motion. In this appeal by writ of certiorari, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her Motion for Expungement of count one of the indictment. After reviewing the record, we reverse the denial of the appellant's motion and remand to the trial court for entry of an order requiring expungement of all records relating to the felony cocaine charge, count one of the indictment.

The defendant, Jon Michael Anseman, appeals the Blount Court Circuit Court's order revoking his probation, and the State has moved this court to summarily affirm the circuit court's order pursuant to Rule 20 of the rules of this court. The motion is well taken, and the order of the circuit court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, David Lynn Harrison, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea convictions for attempted first degree murder, aggravated burglary, and reckless endangerment for which he received an effective sentence of 16 years. The petitioner challenged the voluntariness of his guilty pleas and the performance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We remand the petitioner's case because the trial court failed to enter findings of fact as to the petitioner's contention that he did not voluntarily plead guilty. The trial court is instructed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law on that issue. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.

This case involves the validity of a holographic will. Appellant, son of the decedent, appeals the trial court's finding that the holographic will was valid, arguing that the document did not comply with the statutory requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. _32-1-105. Finding that the presence of more than one signature, the location of the signatures, and the fact that the document contains both handwritten and typewritten sections does not negate the validity of a holographic will, we affirm.

This is an appeal of a lawsuit by Knox County citizens to have a former county sheriff decertified as a peace officer. The plaintiffs' first lawsuit was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The plaintiffs then pursued administrative remedies but were denied administrative relief based in part on an administrative finding that they did not have standing to seek the relief requested. After that, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, seeking judicial review of the denial of their request for administrative relief. The trial court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue for declaratory relief, but did have standing under Tennessee Code Annotated _ 4-5-322 to obtain judicial review of the administrative decision not to investigate the decertification of the former sheriff. Subsequently, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on this claim, remanding the case to the administrative body with instructions to hold a contested case hearing on the decertification of the former sheriff. The plaintiffs and the administrative body both appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part, concluding that the plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue any of the relief they seek, and dismiss the case.

This Court's opinion, filed on September 23, 2010, is hereby withdrawn and substituted with the corrected opinion and judgment being filed contemporaneously with this order. SO ORDERED.

The Petitioner, Trevor Ford, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2007, the petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-two years. On appeal, he argues that the denial of his petition was error because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that counsel failed to introduce evidence of specific violent acts by the victim, failed to secure testimony establishing the victim's reputation for violence, and failed to pursue funding for a forensic pathologist. Additionally, he argues that the refusal to grant funds for an expert at the post-conviction level denies him fundamental due process and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Following our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.