APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to an action for damages filed against a defendant that was not covered by the Act when the injuryproducing events occurred. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the Circuit Court for Shelby County seeking the benefit of the claims and defenses available to government entities under the Act. The plaintiffs responded by challenging the constitutionality of legislation extending the coverage of the Act to the defendant on the ground that the legislation had been enacted after the plaintiffs had sustained their injuries. The trial court held that the Act applied to the defendant but granted the plaintiffs permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We granted the plaintiffs' application for permission to appeal after the Court of Appeals declined to consider the case. We have determined that applying the substantive amendment to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act enacted after the injury-producing events occurred to the plaintiffs' damage claims violates the prohibition against retrospective laws in Article I, Section 20 of the Constitution of Tennessee.

This is a medical malpractice action. Appellant originally filed a claim in 2007 in the name of an estate. The original claim was subsequently non-suited. Less than one year later, the claim was then re-filed, also in the name of an estate. With permission of the court, the Appellant later amended the complaint to name the administrator of the estate as the plaintiff. However, upon the Appellee's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint finding: (1) the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations as there were no allegations in the complaint which would invoke the savings statute; (2) the complaint failed to state with particularity the specific acts of negligence; and (3) that the Appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements for a medical malpractice action found in Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 29-26- 121. Finding that the trial court erred, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Husband seeks to set aside a divorce decree and permanent parenting plan entered by default on the ground that the provisions of such differed significantly from the relief sought in Wife's complaint for divorce and proposed parenting plan. We reverse the trial court's decision insofar as it failed to grant Husband the relief sought.

Plaintiffs were assessed, and paid taxes under the Drug Tax, which was later declared unconstitutional. Plaintiffs sought refunds individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated. The trial court certified the class, and the Department filed this interlocutory appeal challenging certification. Because the Taxpayer Remedies Statute, which must be strictly construed as a derogation of sovereign immunity, does not contemplate the maintenance of a class action, we reverse the trial court's grant of class certification.

The Defendant, Paul Williams, appeals from judgments entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving on a suspended license, violation of the passenger vehicle safety belt law, and violation of the motor vehicle registration law. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict him, that his convictions violate his constitutional right to travel, and that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terry Lynn Raney, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine, keeping or maintaining a dwelling place where controlled substances are used or sold, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana on grounds that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. Because there is a clerical error in the judgment form for the petitioner's conviction of possession of cocaine, the case is remanded to the Criminal Court for Sullivan County for the entry of a corrected judgment form.

The petitioner, Michael Davis, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his especially aggravated robbery conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Because we conclude that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a jury instruction on facilitation as a lesser- included offense of especially aggravated robbery, and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the petitioner's trial would have been different had counsel done so, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for the granting of post-conviction relief.

I agree with the majority that, given the present state of the record in this case, summary judgment is not appropriate. As the record now stands, “[w]hether the plaintiff[s] exercised reasonable care and diligence in discovering the injury or wrong is . . . a fact question for the [trier of fact] to determine.” Wyatt v. A-Best Company, 910 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tenn. 1995). In other words, there is a genuine issue as to this material fact. At trial, the finder of fact must determine if the plaintiffs filed suit within one year of the point in time when they first knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 1 have known that an actionable injury had occurred. Id. at 856-57.

Plaintiffs' home flooded and incurred severe water and mold damage when the hot water tank burst. Plaintiffs began to experience varying illnesses after moving back into the home. Despite Defendants' assurances that the home was safe, three years after moving back into the home, Plaintiffs discovered that their home was contaminated with toxic mold. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants alleging various claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint asserting that the statute of limitations barred the claims. After a hearing, the trial court agreed and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment; the trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse.

The Defendant-Appellant, Devon O'Neal Wiggins, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of sale of cocaine over 0.5 grams, a Class B felony; possession of cocaine under 0.5 grams with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; possession of marijuana under 0.5 ounce, a Class A misdemeanor; and evading arrest, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender, to thirty years for the sale of cocaine over 0.5 grams, fifteen years for the possession of cocaine under 0.5 grams, eleven months and twenty-nine days for the possession of marijuana, and six years for the evading arrest conviction. He was ordered to serve the above sentences concurrently to each other, but consecutively to another unrelated case. On appeal, Wiggins argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for sale and possession of cocaine; (2) the testimony of a State's expert witness concerning an exemplar graph violated his right of confrontation; (3) the trial court erred by not charging the jury on the offense of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance; (4) Wiggins' prosecution for possession of marijuana was not commenced within the one-year statute of limitations; (5) the trial court improperly commented upon the evidence; (6) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument; (7) the sentence imposed by the trial court for sale of cocaine was excessive; and (8) cumulative error necessitates reversal of Wiggins' convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Wesley Earl Brown, of two counts of rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for each rape conviction, to be served consecutively, and ten years for each sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the rape convictions, for a total effective sentence of sixty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and (3) the trial court's sentence violated the Petitioner's constitutional right to a jury. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In large part, I agree with the majority in this case. However, I must respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ conclusion reversing the judgment of the trial court based on its failure to exclude Tate’s and Blades’ testimony regarding their acquittals.

The Defendant, John Edward Winn, Jr., was placed on probation for eight years after pleading guilty to aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contests the trial court's evidentiary rulings during the revocation hearing and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the revocation. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new hearing.

The Petitioner, Garner Dwight Padgett, appeals the Putnam County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder. The Petitioner contends (1) that the trial court violated the Petitioner's federal and state constitutional rights at the trial by asking members of the venire whether they could be fair to both sides, thus lowering the State's burden of proof, and (2) that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial for failing to object to the trial court's asking whether the members could be fair. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robert Thomas Reed, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) (first offense), a Class A misdemeanor, and driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO), a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I offender to two years with service of six months in the county jail and the balance to be served on probation for the MVHO conviction and a concurrent sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to six months for the DUI conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that formed the basis of both convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Alfred Turner, was found guilty by a jury of the lesser included offenses of facilitation of felony murder, a Class A felony, and facilitation of second degree murder. After merging the convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years of incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that: insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction; a proper chain of custody for the introduction of DNA evidence was not established; the trial court erred in allowing into evidence that two other individuals had been acquitted of this murder; and the trial court erred in both jury instructions and sentencing. After careful review, we conclude that even though sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions, the defendant's sentence ran afoul of Blakely and the prior acquittals of two other individuals deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Therefore, the error requires a remand for a new trial.

Appellant Jeff D. Arp pled guilty to two counts of incest stemming from two separate incidents involving his mentally disabled teenage daughter. One incident took place before the effective date of the 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, and one incident took place after the effective date. Appellant chose to be sentenced under the prior law for the first offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of five years for each conviction, to be served consecutively, and denied alternative sentencing. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in its application of the enhancement factors and in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm.

Appellant Elizabeth Gay Tindell was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) when, after a night out with friends, she stopped on the side of the road to call for a ride home. A sheriff's deputy saw her pull over and, concerned that she might be in distress, approached her car. During his stop, the deputy concluded Appellant was intoxicated, and a subsequent breathalyzer test revealed her blood alcohol content was .20 percent. A Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted her for DUI and DUI per se, and she was convicted after a bench trial. She appeals, contending that the trial court erred in: (1) denying her motion to suppress evidence from the deputy's stop; (2) admitting evidence of the breathalyzer test results; (3) denying, in an issue of first impression, her motion to compel discovery of the source code for the breathalyzer device used to test her blood alcohol content; (4) finding sufficient evidence to convict her of DUI per se; and (5) finding sufficient evidence to justify the court's conclusion that Appellant was subject to the enhanced seven-day incarceration minimum. We affirm.

An Anderson County jury convicted the defendant, Jerry Orlando Weaver, of two counts of facilitation of possession of less than one-half gram of cocaine for sale or delivery, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to twelve years for each count, to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a career offender and in imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude that the defendant failed to timely file his notice of appeal and that his claims do not warrant consideration in the "interest of justice." Therefore, we dismiss his appeal.

The Petitioner, Craig E. Shears, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his conviction of first degree murder on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief based upon its finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to effectively argue a motion to suppress his statement and in preparing for trial. The Petitioner also contends that co-counsel was ineffective in failing to request a continuance when co-counsel was hired to assist trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Defendant, Craig O. Majors, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of twenty years as a Range I offender for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and to six years each as a Range II offender for the attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary convictions, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to excuse African-Americans from the jury pool resulted in a systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury, (2) his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery violate due process, (3) there is insufficient evidence of his identity as the perpetrator, and (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Mickey Earl Brown, appeals his conviction upon a guilty plea in the Davidson County Criminal Court for aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to eleven years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing and in denying alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Montgomery Count Grand Jury indicted Appellant for aggravated robbery and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine. After a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty as charged. Appellant was sentenced to two, concurrent twelve-year sentences to be served at 35% as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Daniel Livingston, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.