APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a trial court's grant of summary judgment in an action against a real estate appraiser for fraudulent misrepresentation and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. A husband and wife alleged that the appraiser, who was hired by the bank financing the husband and wife's home construction, recklessly overestimated the value of their proposed construction and that they reasonably relied on the appraisal value to their detriment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that an appraisal is an opinion that cannot form the basis for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We hold that an opinion can form the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We further hold that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment as to the husband and wife's claims against the appraiser. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The trial court found Husband guilty of two counts of criminal contempt for violation of a court order. Husband appeals the findings of contempt on the ground that he did not receive proper notice. The trial court dismissed a third count of criminal contempt without prejudice and allowed Wife to re-file her claim so as to provide Husband with proper notice. We affirm the court's two findings of contempt and reverse its dismissal of the third count of contempt, finding that Husband was given sufficient notice. We remand the matter to the court for a determination of whether Husband violated the order.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jonathan Doran Tears, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony (Count 1); two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony (Counts 2-3); unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class E felony (Count 4); possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, a Class D felony (Count 5); and employment of a firearm during the commission of a felony, a Class C felony (Count 6). The trial court merged Counts 2 and 3 with Count 1, and the trial court merged Counts 4 and 5 with Count 6. The trial court then sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender and ordered the Defendant to serve 15 years for the attempted second degree murder conviction and a consecutive 10 years for the employment of a firearm during the commission of a felony conviction, for a total effective sentence of 25 years. The trial court also ordered these sentences to be served consecutively to a sentence imposed in a separate case. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of attempted second degree murder and possession and employment of a firearm during the commission of a felony and that (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a trial court's grant of summary judgment in an action against a real estate appraiser for fraudulent misrepresentation and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. A husband and wife alleged that the appraiser, who was hired by the bank financing the husband and wife's home construction, recklessly overestimated the value of their proposed construction and that they reasonably relied on the appraisal value to their detriment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that an appraisal is an opinion that cannot form the basis for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We hold that an opinion can form the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We further hold that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment as to the husband and wife's claims against the appraiser. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, David Carl Duncan, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction for first degree murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Korinna Stephens, appeals as of right from the order of the Knox County Criminal Court denying her petition for post-conviction relief challenging her convictions of aggravated robbery, theft of property valued at over one thousand dollars, and possession of drug paraphernalia for which she received an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, she contends that her guilty pleas were rendered involuntarily by the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Willie J. Cunningham, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Hardeman County. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals because the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Upon our review of the petition and the applicable authorities, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a prisoner seeking review of a disciplinary conviction. The respondents did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and a certified copy of the record of the disciplinary proceedings was filed with the trial court. The respondents then filed a motion for judgment on the record. After review of the parties' briefs and the administrative record, the trial court granted the respondents' motion for judgment on the record. The petitioner inmate appeals. We affirm, concluding that material evidence supported the conviction, and that the petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated.

The defendant was found in civil contempt for failure to pay child support and sentenced to serve 180 days in jail unless she purged her contempt with the payment of $2,200. Finding the evidence inadequate to support a finding that the defendant had the ability to pay child support when it was due or that she had the ability to pay $2,200 at the time of the hearing in order to purge the sentence, we reverse.

This is a divorce action. Wife asserts the trial court erred by not granting her a new trial, by declaring the parties divorced rather than awarding the divorce to her, and in its division of property, award of alimony, and by not naming her the primary residential parent and setting child support accordingly. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The defendant, Anthony Bernard Farr, stands convicted of (1) possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; (2) resisting a stop and frisk, a Class B misdemeanor; and (3) criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to a total effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent to sell cocaine and that his sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This consolidated appeal involves two employees who were injured while traveling in a personal vehicle during lunchtime while going from one job site to another. The trial court held that the injuries were compensable and awarded permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court's holding on the issue of compensability. However, we modify the trial court's ruling on the extent of disability.

A jury convicted the petitioner, Ricky Awatt, of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court upheld the conviction. The Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently denied a discretionary appeal. The petitioner now appeals the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, the petitioner argues that, although the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief has passed, the statute of limitations should be tolled, allowing him to proceed with his petition. After review, we affirm the judgment denying post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Antonio Bigsbee, was convicted by a Robertson County Circuit Court Jury of especially aggravated kidnapping and reckless endangerment. He received a total effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present the testimony of a rebuttal witness, that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Robert Wayne Bell regarding a gun purchased by the appellant, and that the State's closing argument was improper. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ricky Flamingo Brown, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking his judgment of conviction of aggravated rape and resulting life sentence. See T.C.A. _ 39-2-603 (1986). Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Tommy F. Poe, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the sentences he negotiated in exchange for his guilty pleas to aggravated kidnapping are illegal because they were ordered to be served at 35% release eligibility instead of the 100% required by law. Following our review, we affirm the habeas court's dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Steven D. Skinner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that counsel's representation was ineffective because counsel failed to investigate and prepare for his case. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The pro se petitioner, Louis T. Robinson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without appointing counsel or issuing any findings of fact. Following our review, we affirm the habeas court's summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, David William Cosgrif, III, was convicted by a Roane County jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and theft over $1000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to an effective term of twenty years in the Department of Correction. He raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his second degree murder conviction; (2) whether the trial court erroneously admitted scientific testimony that did not meet sufficient indicia of reliability; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence for the murder conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but modify the defendant's sentence to fifteen years.

After a plant closure, employee sought reconsideration of a prior workers’ compensation settlement for right shoulder and elbow injuries in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 241(a)(2) (2008). Employer denied that he was entitled to reconsideration of the elbow injury because it was a separate injury to a scheduled member. Id. § 50-6-241(a)(1). The trial court found that the two injuries were concurrent and that employee was entitled to receive reconsideration as to both. It further found that employee had proven three of the four factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a) (2008) by clear and convincing evidence and was therefore not limited by the six times impairment cap. The trial court awarded 57.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, employer contends that the trial court erred by finding the injuries to be concurrent and by finding that employee had satisfied the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a). We affirm the holding that the injuries were concurrent but find that employee did not satisfy his burden of proof under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a). We modify the judgment accordingly.

Plaintiff insurer brought this declaratory judgment action to determine which of the two policies issued to defendants insured and their corporation, covered a van which had been involved in an accident. Plaintiff named the insureds as defendants, as well as the third party who had filed a tort action against the insureds for personal injuries. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the insureds had told the agency plaintiff to keep the van in dispute on the commercial policy, but it had transferred the van to the insureds' personal policy. The court further ruled that a notice of the transfer was sent to the insureds by plaintiff, and plaintiff sent at least five bills to the insureds that reflected the van was then insured under the personal policy and not the commercial policy. The court concluded that the insureds ratified the change and ruled that the van was insured under the insureds personal policy. On appeal, we reverse and dismiss the action.

The defendant, James Adam Conard, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's revocation of his probation in one case and the denial of alternative sentencing in a second case. The result of the trial court's actions is a nine-year effective sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. Upon review, we affirm the order and judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Ronald Woods, Jr., appeals pro se from multiple convictions in the Criminal Court of Shelby County. He pled guilty to intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class D felony, driving while a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony, driving under the influence of an intoxicant, a Class E felony, reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Woods received a an effective sentence of six years to be served consecutively to another unrelated sentence. On appeal, Woods claims: (1) he was denied his right to a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct; and (2) his conviction for reckless driving and intentionally evading arrest violated principles of double jeopardy. Upon review, we conclude that Woods's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and double jeopardy have been waived. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Sequna Copeland, pled guilty in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court to one count of facilitation of second degree murder, a Class B felony. The agreement provided for an eight-year sentence, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied the defendant's request for an alternative sentence and ordered confinement in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentence as imposed.