APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Jeffrey A. Waggoner, appeals the denial of error coram nobis relief by the trial court. He was convicted of first degree murder on February 2, 1984, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis relief, alleging that a witness who had testified against him at trial had recanted his testimony. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The petitioner, Richard Joe Fitten, appeals pro se from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Hamilton County. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Fitten resolved case numbers 255275, 261292, and 261403. In case number 255275, Fitten agreed to the revocation of his probation and the imposition of a six-year sentence. He also agreed to plead guilty to filing a false police report, case number 261292, and retaliation for past action, case number 261403. He received a two-year sentence on the false reporting offense, and one year on the retaliation offense, to be served consecutively. However, the effective three-year sentence was suspended to unsupervised probation, to be served consecutively to the six-year sentence. Although not entirely clear from his handwritten brief, Fitten claims: (1) his conviction for retaliation for past action should be dismissed because it resulted from an illegal arrest under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for retaliation for past action and filing a false police report. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a post-divorce modification of child custody and support. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court's order, which increased his child support obligation, modified his parenting time, and ordered him to pay Mother/Appellee's attorney's fees. Finding that the trial court erred in eliminating Father's one-week of uninterrupted summer visitation and not allowing him an additional night per week visitation, we reverse that portion of the order. Further, we find that the trial court erred in providing Father with a "credit" towards his child support in exchange for his payment of Mother's mortgage. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's amount of child support ordered, as well as the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Mother. We affirm the trial court's findings on both Mother's and Father's income. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; vacated in part and remanded.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Johnny Villalobos, of robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to four years in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, John Barlow, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies. The trial court sentenced Barlow as a Range I, violent offender to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for the aggravated child abuse conviction and fifteen years for the aggravated child neglect conviction, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. In Barlow's appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect violate his right against double jeopardy, (3) the trial court erred in declaring Dr. Robert Sanford and Dr. Karen Lakin as expert witnesses, (4) the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Lakin to testify that the victim suffered from an "abusive head trauma incident [that was] most probably associated with [a] bed[-]wetting episode," and (5) the State committed several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support Barlow's conviction for aggravated child neglect. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for aggravated child neglect is vacated. However, the judgment of the trial court in all other respects is affirmed. Because Barlow's fifteen-year sentence for his aggravated child neglect conviction was to be served concurrently with his twenty-five-year sentence for aggravated child abuse, his effective sentence is unchanged.

Prospective buyers entered into a contract with construction company for purchase of a home; the contract was amended to provide that a garage would be constructed. A letter was subsequently prepared specifying a time for the buyers to tender payment for the garage. The buyers failed to secure a loan to finance construction of the garage until a year after closing. When the construction company refused to build the garage for the amount specified in the contract amendment, the buyers initiated this action. The trial court found that the letter clarified the amendment by setting a time for performance and that the buyers' failure to pay within that time was a breach of the agreement which relieved the construction company of its contractual obligations; the court consequently dismissed buyers' action. Finding that there was not an agreement between the parties, the trial court's determination that the letter clarified the amendment is reversed. Finding that a reasonable time for performance was 90 days from closing on the home, and that the buyers' failure to tender payment within such period was a material breach, we affirm the trial court's determination that the construction company was relieved of its contractual obligations.

The Petitioner, Delwin O'Neal, appeals as of right from the Marshall County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his guilty plea convictions for multiple drug offenses for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-three years as a Range II, multiple offender. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner requested a reduction of sentence, and the trial court ruled that it was without jurisdiction to modify the sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in ruling that it could not modify the sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jason Allen Ruiz, pled guilty to one count of sale of cocaine and one count of delivery of cocaine, both Class B felonies. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed an effective sentence of eight years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation following an 11 month and 29 day period of confinement in the local jail on work release. Following the filing of a revocation warrant and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs, commercial and residential consumers of natural gas, purchased natural gas from utilities, which had acquired the product wholesale from the defendants. In this class action antitrust suit, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in various anticompetitive practices, including making false statements about natural gas transactions and engaging in “wash trades” and “churning.” After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the claims were barred by both field pre-emption and the filed rate doctrine, the chancellor dismissed the claims. The plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the claims were not subject to dismissal. Because the Natural Gas Act and subsequent federal legislation pre-empt state actions in this particular field of regulation, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and all claims are dismissed.

The defendant, Jeffery Boyd Trusty, was convicted by a Smith County jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property over $1000. The trial court merged the two first degree murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction, twenty-five years as a violent offender for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and four years as a Range I offender for the theft of property over $1000 conviction, for an effective sentence of life in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises essentially eight issues on appeal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, that the State failed to prove venue in Smith County beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the State's burden to prove venue, and that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's requests for special jury instructions, allowing hearsay testimony that the victim feared the defendant, allowing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence about the search procedures employed to locate the victim's body and the evidence uncovered during those searches, allowing a police officer to offer legal opinions and conclusions, allowing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence about the defendant's possession and movement of firearms, and not allowing each of the defendant's counsel to deliver a separate closing argument. Having reviewed the record and found no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony Douglas Dansby, pled guilty to driving under the influence ("DUI"), violation of the implied consent law, violation of the seatbelt law, violation of the open container law, and possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance. In accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the stop of his vehicle, which led to his indictment and guilty plea, was constitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the stop of the Defendant's vehicle was constitutional; therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. After a trial, the court entered a divorce decree and divided the marital property. The trial court awarded the marital real property to Husband, and Wife, a pro se litigant, appeals the trial court's division of the marital property. We affirm in part, modify in part, and remand.

The Defendants, Kenneth Miller and Ray Junior Turner, were convicted by a Davidson County jury of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine and delivery of 300 grams or more of cocaine. Additionally, the Defendant Miller was found guilty of possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine. All convictions are Class A felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-417(j)(5). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant Miller to an effective sentence of one hundred and twenty years as a Range II, multiple offender; the trial court ordered all three of his forty-year sentences to be served consecutively to one another. As for the Defendant Turner, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty years as a career offender, running both of his sixty-year sentences concurrently with one another. On appeal, the Defendant Miller presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence gathered via wiretaps; (2) whether it was error to allow a State's witness to "field-test" a substance found on an exhibit; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support verdicts for conspiracy and delivery of 300 grams or more of cocaine; and (4) whether the trial court committed sentencing errors. The Defendant Turner, in addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions, argues that: (1) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain "drug ledgers" found in his apartment; and (2) the telephone calls intercepted during the wiretap investigation, purported to contain the Defendant's voice, were, in fact, inadmissible hearsay. After a review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff worker allegedly injured his knee while in the defendants’ home. The plaintiff visited a doctor the next day, and ultimately had surgery on the knee the next month. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendants, alleging premises liability. A jury trial was held. After the testimony concluded, the trial court declined to include a jury instruction requested by the plaintiff. During closing arguments, the plaintiff’s attorney started to read from a deposition that had not been entered into evidence; the trial court sustained a timely objection. Also during closing argument, the closing remarks of the defendant’s attorney alerted the plaintiff’s attorney to the fact that a particular medical record was not a part of the evidence submitted to the jury. While the jury was deliberating, the plaintiff sought to reopen proof to admit into evidence the omitted medical record; the trial court declined to reopen the proof. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this appeal should be
dismissed. The record on appeal includes the court’s minutes for April 30, 2008. The minutes reflect that on October 4, 2007, judgment nisi was taken against the defendant and that a scire facias was issued and served. According to the minutes, a final judgment was entered against the defendant and his sureties in the amount of $75, 000 “the penalty of the defendant’s appearance bond, for which execution will issue, together with the costs of this prosecution.”

The appellants, Aaron Bonding Company, T Bonding Company, and Around the Clock Bonding Company, LLC, appeal the order of a final forfeiture against them, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the order. Following our review of the record, we dismiss this appeal as being premature and remand the case to the trial court to issue an order of final disposition  appellants may then appeal.

The Defendant, Timothy Mark Agee, II, appeals his conviction upon a guilty plea in the Davidson County Criminal Court for second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty-three years. The Defendant appeals, contending that the sentence imposed is too lengthy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of an elderly woman's attempt to recover assets from her daughter and former son-in-law, who allegedly exercised undue influence over her financial decision-making for a period of years following the death of her husband. In a motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate two transfers of substantial assets to the defendants. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion and certified the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court's order does not dispose of a claim between the parties, we vacate the entry of final judgment and remand.

This appeal involves delay of service of process. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging medical malpractice by the defendants almost a year earlier. The plaintiffs delayed service on the defendants until they had an expert witness review their claim. Summonses were issued to the defendants over eleven months after the complaint was filed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, alleging insufficiency of service of process, and asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion. The defendants appeal. We reverse and remand for entry of an order dismissing the complaint, finding that the delay of prompt service of process rendered the filing of the complaint ineffective to commence the action and stop the running of the statute of limitations.

I join in the results reached by the majority. I write separately to note that the sentence imposed by the trial court does not comport with the sentencing guidelines and to further analyze a difference between Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-306 and 40-35-501.

The defendant, George Ward, appeals his resentencing following the revocation of his eight-year community corrections sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum twelve-year sentence for his Class B felony drug offense of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell. Following our review, we affirm the twelve-year sentence imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner, Tommy Lee Clark, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper cross-examination and for not investigating the petitioner's mental competency. The State argues that the petitioner has waived appellate review of these issues by not including them in his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves the alleged breach of an insurance policy. The plaintiff insured had an automobile insurance policy with the defendant insurance company. The insured paid his insurance premium by check. He subsequently was involved in an automobile accident and notified the insurance company of the accident. The check was later returned for insufficient funds. The insurance company notified the insured that if he did not bring the premium current by a date certain, his insurance policy would be cancelled. The insured gave the insurance company a valid check for the premium, which was negotiated. The insurance company later cancelled the policy, retroactive to a date prior to the insured’s automobile accident. The insured sued the insurance company for breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff  insured. The insurance company appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Steven Murphy, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder, which the trial court merged, and two counts of theft of property valued at more than $ 1000, which the court also merged. He was sentenced to an effective life sentence. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences, and the supreme court denied his application for permission to appeal. State v. Steven Murphy, No. W2004-02899-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171, 2006 WL 432388 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2006), perm. to appeal denied [*2] 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 834 (Tenn. Sept. 5, 2006). He filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition; and, upon review, we affirm that denial.