APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, David Nelson McCoy, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and received a negotiated sentence of ten years, as a Range I standard offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of a sentence of continuous confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At a bench trial, the court permitted the Williams to take a non-suit as to the estate of Mr. Hollingsworth.The trial court found Laurel Valley in violation of the court's orders and awarded the Williams damages of $194,915.60. Laurel Valley appeals. We affirm.

As a result of a guilty plea, the Robertson County Circuit Court, sentenced Appellant, Taj O'Chancey Young, to an effective sentence of four years. The sentence was ordered to be served on community corrections. Appellant was placed under the supervision of a case officer on March 20, 2009. On June 29, 2009, the case officer filed a violation warrant. A second amended violation warrant was filed on August 28, 2009, asserting additional grounds. After a hearing on the warrants, the trial court revoked Appellant's community corrections sentence and ordered Appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. Appellant has appealed the revocation of his community corrections sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the community corrections sentence. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the court found that, in September 2005, the principals "settled up" their affairs and that thereafter Leedy wrongfully took an excess of $131,489.99, for which the court gave the Agency a judgment. The court declined to award the Agency approximately $70,000 that it claimed Leedy had taken before September 2005 in excess of what he had earned. Leedy appeals, challenging the trial court's denial of a continuance, among other things, including the award to the Agency. Jones and the Agency challenge the trial court's refusal to award judgment against Leedy for the monies taken before September 2005. We affirm.

Appellant William Robert Wilson, was arrested for driving under the influence ("DUI") after being observed driving erratically by a deputy with the Putnam County Sheriff's Office. The Putnam County Grand Jury indicted appellant for one count of DUI; one count of DUI, third offense; one count of driving on a revoked license; and one count of violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial and his waiver of proof regarding DUI, third offense, appellant was convicted of DUI and driving on a revoked license and entered a plea to DUI, third offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months and 1 twenty-nine days for DUI, third offense and five months and twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with service of 130 days in confinement and the remainder in a community-based alternative program. Appellant appeals arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI; (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss his case because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop; (3) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for continuance; and (4) the trial court erred in denying appellant's request for a jury instruction on the State's duty to preserve evidence. We have reviewed the record on appeal and have found no basis for reversal. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Orlando Knox, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner entered best interest pleas to two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of burglary, a Class B felony; two counts of vandalism, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor. The agreement prescribed an eight-year sentence, which was to be suspended following service of six months. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate the case and prepare for trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Jeffrey Lee Arnold, pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, but reserved a certified question for appeal. The question presented is whether law enforcement officers who entered the defendant's house and discovered the marijuana forming the basis for the charge in this cause, had the right to enter under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the marijuana was lawfully seized from the defendant, and we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The Petitioner, Adam Wester, appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of postconviction relief from his conviction for felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, for which he received life imprisonment. The defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to suppress the petitioner's written statements to law enforcement and in failing to challenge the State's expert regarding the cause of the victim's injuries. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by denying Father’s request for a continuance and proceeding with the trial on the petition to terminate his parental rights. I reach my decision based on two factors: (1) the decision to grant a continuance or to proceed with the trial was within the discretion of the trial court, a decision that will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to the propriety of the decision made; and (2) the fact that Father was arrested three weeks prior to trial and knew he would be unable to attend, yet he did not inform his attorney until the night before trial.
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Petitioner, Grady Wayne Mealer, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was denied the right to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Party A obtained a default judgment in general sessions court against Party B. The general sessions court subsequently granted Party B's motion to set aside the default judgment. Party A appealed to circuit court. The circuit court reversed the general sessions court's decision to set aside the default judgment. Party B appeals to this court. We affirm the decision of the circuit court.

Plaintiff brought this action, charging defendant utility breached its contract with plaintiff to construct a line and deliver electricity to his property. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial judge held that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties and defendant was not obligated to construct a line to deliver electricity to plaintiff's dwelling. On appeal, we affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tracy Thomas Hepburn, was convicted of twenty-four counts of burglary, a Class D felony, three counts of attempted burglary, a Class E felony, fourteen counts of misdemeanor vandalism, six counts of vandalism, a Class E felony, two counts of vandalism, a Class D felony, ten counts of misdemeanor theft, one count of theft, a Class E felony, and two counts of theft, a Class D felony, in case nos. 02-0844, 02-0875, 02-0876, 02-0888, and 02-0291. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to ten years for each Class D felony conviction, five years for each Class E felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each Class A misdemeanor conviction. The trial court imposed a combination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of one hundred years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Duane Michael Coleman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights with regard to a child, Nathan T., who came into protective custody of the Department of Children's Services ("DCS") on November 7, 2006. DCS initiated a proceeding to secure temporary custody of Nathan following receipt of a referral that he had been left by his mother, Megan T., ("Mother") with two elderly women in a house with no heat and where the women were using drugs; This Court has a policy of protecting the identity of children in parental termination cases by initializing their last name. could not be found.2 By order entered January 24, 2007, Nathan was adjudicated dependent and neglected and custody awarded to DCS; he was subsequently placed in a foster home, where he has remained throughout these proceedings.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Paul Wallace Dinwiddie, Jr., of two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The defendant appeals, alleging that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight and by allowing a nurse practitioner to testify as an expert witness. The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentences. Upon our review, we find no error in the convictions; however, we remand to the trial court to merge the two aggravated sexual battery jury verdicts into one conviction judgment and the two aggravated rape jury verdicts into one conviction judgment.

A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Sedric Holt, for nine counts of aggravated robbery. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to five counts of robbery, all Class C felonies. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to five years each in counts two, three, seven, and eight, and four years in count four. Counts two and three were ordered to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to count four. Counts seven and eight were ordered to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to counts two, three, and four for an effective fourteen year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and that he should have been granted an alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s judgment entered on the jury’s verdict. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Horner’s attempt to tell the jury what the “personal representatives of the International Code Council” told him is an effort to give the jury hearsay testimony. Finally, I agree that, assuming the trial court was incorrect in sustaining the plaintiff’s objection to the subject testimony, the error was nevertheless harmless. My departure from the majority opinion is with respect to the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred when it sustained the plaintiff’s objection. In my judgment, the proffered testimony was not only hearsay, it was hearsay that does not fit within any exception to the hearsay rule. I believe the trial court was correct in sustaining the objection

Father of child appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to continue hearing to terminate his parental rights and subsequent termination of his rights on the grounds of abandonment and failure to establish/exercise paternity. Finding that the court erred not recessing the hearing to allow Father to be present at the termination hearing, we vacate the judgment terminating Father's parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Theresa W. Robinson, was indicted for soliciting unlawful compensation, misuse of official information, and official misconduct. She applied for pretrial diversion, and the district attorney general denied her request. After granting her petition for a writ of certiorari, the trial court ruled that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. The State appealed. Following our review, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction because the State cannot appeal the trial court's decision to grant pretrial diversion under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 and we decline review under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Accordingly, the State's appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiff sustained personal injuries resulting from a fall on defendant's premises and brought this action for damages, which resulted in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff for damages against defendant. Defendant appealed, and asserted that the trial judge erred when he refused to allow defendant's expert to testify to his conversation with a third party. On appeal, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the proffered testimony, but the error was harmless. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Wayne L. Holt, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of first degree felony murder, one count of premeditated first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. State v. Wayne L. Holt, No. M2001-00945-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31465263, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 5, 2002), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2003). At trial, a motion for judgment of acquittal was granted by the trial court as to the count of first degree felony murder and to the count of especially aggravated robbery. On the remaining charge of first degree murder, the jury convicted petitioner of the lesser included offense of second degree murder. He received a thirty-year sentence. A direct appeal was unsuccessful. Id. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief on the basis that, inter alia, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied the petition for relief. After a thorough review on appeal, we determine petitioner has failed to prove he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.