APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case arose from a complaint for specific performance, brought by a developer against a realtor to compel the realtor to complete the sale of a piece of real property which it had agreed to sell to the developer’s corporation. The realtor subsequently discovered that the corporation had been dissolved and moved the court to dismiss the complaint for lack of capacity to contract and lack of standing. The developer applied for and obtained reinstatement of his corporation and then moved the court to be allowed to amend his complaint to name it as an additional plaintiff. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint. We granted this interlocutory appeal to review that decision. We reverse the trial court.

Appellant, Aldrick D. Lillard, and two other individuals were indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for first degree murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property in connection with the death of Randy Betts. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.1 The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction. The jury sentenced Appellant to life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction. On the remaining convictions, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The remaining sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with the life sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated a timely appeal. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the Appellant was prejudiced because one judge ruled on pre-trial motions and a different judge presided over the trial; (3) whether the trial court improperly allowed the jury to view the trial exhibits in the jury room; (4) whether the trial

In this divorce action, after a long and contentious trial, the Trial Court awarded the mother the divorce and awarded custody of the parties' minor child to the father. The sole issue on appeal by the mother is the award of custody to the father. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Quartes Williams, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced as a Range I offender to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and nine years, respectively. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) the trial court erred in admitting autopsy photographs; (3) the trial court erred in allowing Captain David Cupp to testify as a handwriting expert; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rickey Lee Beamon, ¹ appeals the denial of post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Hamilton County from his convictions for theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony; two counts of burglary, a Class D felony; aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor; and three counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. For the felony theft, he received a sentence of fifteen years as a career offender. For the two burglaries, he received concurrent twelve-year sentences as a career offender, to be served consecutively to the felony theft sentence. The four misdemeanor sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days, were ordered to run concurrently to the twelve-year burglary sentences, for an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying relief because: (1) counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to sever offenses in case 238463; (2) counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to include in the appellate record the transcript of the suppression hearing in case 245041; and (3) counsel provided ineffective assistance by waiving the issue of retained counsel of choice on appeal by failing to support his claim through argument, citation to authority, and references to the appellate record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff brought claims of malicious prosecution, outrageous conduct, civil conspiracy, punitive damages, and respondeat superior against defendants for filing a lawsuit against him, on behalf of their clients. The trial court dismissed all the claims. We affirm.

The petitioner, John Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we conclude that the petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating either that counsel was deficient or that any of the alleged deficiencies in representation prejudiced the outcome of his case. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Chattanooga Police Department terminated petitioner’s employment as a policeman for the City of Chattanooga. Petitioner appealed to the City Commission, whose hearing panel upheld his termination. He filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Chancery Court which was granted, and then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court also granted inter alia on the grounds that the City Council employed unlawful procedures which violated petitioner’s rights to a fair, impartial and unbiased appellate panel. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

Petitioners, Luiz Gomez and Franklin Delacruz, each pled guilty to second degree murder and two counts of aggravated arson in Warren County in exchange for effective sentences of thirty-six years. Petitioners then each filed timely petitions for post-conviction relief. After a joint hearing on the petitions for relief, the post-conviction court denied relief, finding that Petitioners did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and that their guilty pleas were entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioners have failed to show that they received ineffective assistance of counsel or that their guilty pleas were entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgments of the post-conviction court are affirmed.

This appeal results from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The issue before the trial court was the scope of a release agreement signed by the decedent’s children and one of the defendants (“the Med”). The remaining defendants argued that this agreement provided for the release of claims against all potential defendants. Plaintiff responded that the parties to the agreement had no intention of releasing additional parties. Examining the language of the release and the circumstances surrounding its execution, we agree with the trial court’s finding that plaintiff’s claims against defendants were released. We also agree with the trial court’s finding that the agreement released any civil rights claims that plaintiff might assert against the Med. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

This appeal arises from a judgment entered by the trial court in favor of plaintiff. In his complaint, plaintiff asked the trial court to remove a cloud from the title to his property and to enjoin defendant from making certain fraudulent claims in the future. Defendant asserts that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. On review, we find that the chancery court has the authority to grant the equitable relief requested by plaintiff. The court therefore had subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. The judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner, Joe Strawther, pled guilty to aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery in Rutherford County in exchange for an effective eight-year sentence. Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals the denial of the petition. However, the issue raised by Petitioner on appeal was not raised in his petition for post-conviction relief and, therefore, is not properly before this Court. The Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty pleas were entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Mario Marquis Gray, also known as Mario Marquis Grey, entered a best-interest plea in Davidson County to one count of aggravated burglary in exchange for a sentence of six years, to run consecutively to a prior conviction for which he was on probation at the time of his arrest. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was improperly denied relief by the post-conviction court. After a review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed.

A Hamblen County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Nathan Brad Cornwell, of driving under the influence, third offense, a class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days and fined one thousand, one hundred and ten dollars. The court also ordered that his driving license be suspended for three years. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, John L. Trull, pled guilty in the Crockett County Circuit Court to driving under the  nfluence (“DUI”), third offense, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with all but 120 days suspended. As a condition of his guilty plea, he reserved the following certified question of law: “Whether the arrest of the defendant was unconstitutional in violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”  Upon review of the record, we agree with the State that the certified question of law does not clearly state the scope and limits of the legal issue the defendant sought to reserve for appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Carey Haynes, Jr., was convicted of a Class B and a Class C felony involving the sale of cocaine and received an effective eighteen-year sentence. The only issue raised on direct appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel, which was deemed waived because it was not included in the motion for new trial. The petitioner has now filed seeking post-conviction relief, and the postconviction court has granted the petitioner a delayed appeal and ruled that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was previously determined. As to the delayed appeal, we address whether the evidence was sufficient to support the petitioner’s convictions and whether the petitioner’s sentence was proper. We further address whether the post-conviction court properly denied relief. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the lower courts.

The petitioner, Mark Allen, was convicted of one count of exhibition of materials harmful to a minor, one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation, and one count of rape of a child, and sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-four years. He filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After our review of the record, we affirm the dismissal.

This is an eminent domain case. The Appellants appeal the trial court’s denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02 motion. We dismiss the appeal for failure to appeal a final judgment.

Defendant, Ivory Gray, was indicted in count one for the first degree premeditated murder of Derek Jones and in count two for the attempted first degree premeditated murder of Georglvekio Hampton.  Following a jury trial, Defendant was found not guilty in count one of the indictment. The jury found Defendant guilty of attempted first degree premeditated murder in count two. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury on the definition of “reasonable doubt;” (3) the trial court erred in restricting Defendant’s crossexamination of one of the State’s witnesses; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors denied Defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an action for contribution. The two individual plaintiffs and the defendant formed a limited liability company for the purpose of owning and operating an arena football team. To fund the team, the three investors took out two loans in their individual names. The business was a losing venture, and eventually the team was sold. The proceeds of the sale were used to pay all of the business’s debts except the remaining liability on the two personal loans. The two plaintiffs paid the balance of the loans out of their personal funds. The plaintiffs then filed the instant lawsuit against the defendant for contribution, alleging that he was jointly and severally liable for his pro rata share of the debt. The defendant conceded that he owed a small part of the debt, but argued that his liability should be reduced by the amounts distributed to the plaintiffs by the business. The defendant contended that the funds distributed to the plaintiffs should have been applied to the business debt. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiffs. The trial court rejected the defendant’s claim that his debt should be offset, finding that the distributions made to the plaintiffs constituted a repayment of loans, not a distribution of capital. It also awarded the plaintiffs attorney’s fees. The defendant now appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

This is a divorce case. On appeal, Husband argues that certain settlement monies, which he claims Wife failed to disclose, should be considered marital property subject to equitable division. Such monies include Wife’s personal injury settlement, Wife’s payment for past SSI benefits, and Wife’s car insurance settlement proceeds. Husband also contends that Wife’s share of the marital home should be reduced based on the discovery of these additional assets. Finally, Husband argues that he should not have been required to pay rehabilitative alimony and alimony in futuro to Wife. We affirm.

The defendant, Richard Price, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twenty years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in declining to grant a mistrial after a witness testified that he attempted to speak to the defendant and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tremaine Letroy Paige (“Paige”), pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, Paige reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. The certified question of law  s “[w]hether Officer Anna McDowell had a legal basis for the traffic stop of the Defendant’s vehicle.” Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Lamar Pritchett, presents for review a certified question of law as allowed by Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI). As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress based upon his allegation that he was subjected to an unconstitutional investigative stop. Because the defendant failed to meet the requirements of reserving a certified question for review, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Roy Shotwell, Jr., was convicted of two counts of rape, each a Class B felony, and one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced to ten years for each Class B felony and to two years for the Class E felony. The defendant received a total effective sentence of twenty years. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in: denying his motion for a severance; allowing the State to offer expert witnesses on DNA and forensic nursing; and in sentencing. After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s decisions to join the indictments in one trial and to admit the State’s expert testimony. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement factors or in ordering consecutive sentences. Therefore, the judgments from the trial court are affirmed.