APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee has been treated for a shoulder injury and a back injury. The shoulder injury occurred on July 1, 2000. The back injury occurred on January 28, 2002. After the shoulder injury, the employee sought treatment from numerous doctors for pain in her shoulder. The doctors were unable to determine the cause of her pain until a SLAP lesion was diagnosed on October 29, 2003. On December 13, 2002, the employee filed a complaint seeking compensation for both injuries. The trial court determined that both injuries were compensable and awarded the employee eighty percent (80%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that the shoulder injury was not barred by the statue of limitations and as a result erred in determining the employee’s vocational disability by including the shoulder injury.  The judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner, Marcellus Jeffries, appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition because Petitioner did not demonstrate that his convictions were void. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Antonio Sanders, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and therefore, that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order dismissing the petition.

The Defendant, Sentorya L. Young, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. He received an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole as a repeat violent offender. Thereafter, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that a prejudicial and extraneous piece of paper was sent to the jury room as substantive evidence. The trial court denied the petition. In this consolidated appeal, he raises the following four issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court failed to properly perform its role as thirteenth juror; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to express a personal opinion through the admission of a chart; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying his writ of error coram nobis petition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Larry Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted aggravated kidnapping.  As a result, he was sentenced as a Range III persistent offender to a fourteen-year sentence.  Appellant appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for attempted aggravated kidnapping and that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant.

In 2003 the defendant, Pierre Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, two counts of leaving the scene of an accident, and one count of driving on a revoked license, third offense, receiving an effective sentence of fifty-two years, five months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he argues that the State’s proof as to prior DUI convictions was deficient, the indictments and jury instructions were deficient, and the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand for resentencing as to the convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide upon finding that the trial court’s application of one sentencing enhancement factor violated the Sixth Amendment. We also direct the entry of judgments reflecting the convictions for leaving the scene of an accident.

The Appellant, Jeffrey Lee Turner, appeals the sentencing decision of the Humboldt Law Court for Gibson County. Turner pled guilty to one count of aggravated statutory rape, fifteen counts of statutory rape, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Turner to an effective term of eleven years, eleven months, and twenty-eight days. On appeal, Turner challenges the length of his sentences, specifically alleging (1) that the trial court misapplied enhancement and mitigating factors and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm.

After conducting a bench trial, the trial court found the Defendant, Richard Anthony Arriola, guilty of one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and two counts o fattempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. This Court remanded the case to the trial court for an order clarifying its findings on the insanity defense. On appeal, the Defendant claims: (1) the trial court erred when it used an improper legal standard for the insanity defense; and (2) the evidence presented at trial proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court applied an improper legal standard for the insanity defense. Therefore, we reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s motion for involuntary dismissal. Appellant brought suit against Appellee under Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-5-111 for damage to his vehicle’s engine allegedly caused by Appellee’s negligent performance of an engine flush procedure. Following Plaintiff/Appellant’s proof, the trial court granted an involuntary dismissal in favor of Defendant/Appellee. Appellant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a divorce action in which the trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to § 36-4-129(b) without attributing fault to either party, divided the parties’ property, awarded Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1500 per month, ordered Husband to pay for Wife’s health insurance, and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals the division of property, the award of alimony, and the award to Wife of her attorney’s fees. We affirm.

Petitioners, Father and his wife, filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment for failure to pay child support, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse, and for adoption of child by Father’s wife. The trial court granted Mother’s motion for directed verdict at the close of Petitioners’ proof and dismissed the petition. Petitioners appeal. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony Riggs, was found guilty of the offense of rape, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to twelve years for his conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the length of the sentence was excessive and contrary to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). Upon review, this Court found that the trial court improperly applied two of the five enhancement factors it found applicable.  Nonetheless, relying on State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005) (“Gomez I”), we concluded that the remaining three enhancement factors were sufficient to enhance Defendant’s sentence to twelve years and affirmed his sentence. State v. Anthony Riggs, No. M2005-02105-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 49553 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, January 8, 2007). Defendant filed an application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted Defendant’s application for the limited purpose of remanding to this Court for reconsideration of the length of Defendant’s sentence in light of State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (“Gomez II”). After a thorough review of the record, we modify Defendant’s sentence for rape from twelve years to eleven years.

I concur in the majority opinion except I would have not relied upon the presentence report for a Blakely-type admission. See State v. Charles Vantilburg III, No. W2006-02475-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 12, 2008) (holding that statements “made outside the confines of any judicial proceeding . . . do not qualify as admissions for purposes of the Sixth Amendment”).

This appeal involves the lower court’s dismissal of a case on the basis of forum non conveniens. The plaintiff, a resident of Shelby County, brought suit in circuit court in Shelby County. The plaintiff alleged that he drank a glass of cranberry juice that contained a dead fly at one of the defendant’s restaurants, located in Tunica County, Mississippi. From that incident, the plaintiff alleges that he suffered emotional and physical harm. The defendant’s answer requested that the court dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens, contending that the more appropriate forum was a circuit court in Tunica County, Mississippi. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the claim on the basis of forum non conveniens. After the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, the trial court entered an order denying the motion and setting out its findings concerning its decision to decline jurisdiction. The plaintiff appeals, and we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of possession of cocaine over 0.5 grams with intent to deliver and one count of delivery of over 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to eleven years on each count to be served concurrently. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to this Court, and we affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Maurice Shaw, No. W2005-02097-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3085503 *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 21, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2007). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied the petition, and the instant appeal followed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this medical malpractice appeal, the trial court denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment finding that a factual dispute exists as to whether the hospital may be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of an independent contractor radiologist based on a theory of apparent agency. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and granted summary judgment to the hospital on all grounds. We granted permission to appeal and consolidated this case for argument with Boren v. Weeks, No. M2007-00628-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. May 6, 2008). In Boren, in an opinion filed contemporaneously herewith, we adopted the analysis derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 for determining when a hospital may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of independent contractor physicians. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ grant of summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings and for reconsideration of the hospital’s motion for summary judgment consistent with the analysis and new standard adopted in Boren.

Defendant, Willis Ayers, was indicted for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was tried jointly with co-defendant, Charles Curtis, and another co-defendant, David Milken, was tried separately for the charged offenses. Co-defendant Curtis’s case is not part of his appeal. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty-two years for his second degree murder conviction, and as a Range II, multiple offender, to fourteen years for his facilitation of especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively, for an effective sentence of thirty-six years. In his appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that State’s witness Corey Smith was an accomplice to the charged offenses; (3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for severance; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In November 2005, a Putnam County grand jury indicted the defendant, Shane Delano Hunter, on one count of premeditated first degree murder in connection with an incident that occurred in August 2005. Following a January 2007 jury trial in Putnam County Criminal Court, the jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case was remanded by a prior workers’ compensation appeals panel for recalculation of the award of permanent partial disability benefits. On remand, the award was modified. The employer, Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., paid the judgment, but declined to pay post-judgment interest. The trial court denied a motion to require payment of interest that was filed by the the employee, Steven Q. Manchester, and he has appealed. We reverse the trial court and hold that Mr. Manchester is entitled to post-judgment interest on the modified amount of the award from the date of the original judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Her job as a school psychologist required her to travel between schools and other sites in the City of Kingsport. She had gone to a restaurant for lunch after completing an assignment at an elementary school. She was injured in an automobile accident which occurred as she was leaving the parking lot of the restaurant. At the time, she was returning to her office to pick up materials for an assignment at a second school. The trial court granted Employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Employee’s injury did not arise from or occur in the course of her employment. Employee has appealed. We hold that Employer was not entitled to summary judgment, vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This case involves an endorsement to a medical malpractice insurance policy. The physician insured under the policy brought a declaratory judgment action seeking rescission of the endorsement based upon a mutual mistake of fact. We affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing the physician’s case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The defendant, Robert Cash, appeals his Bradley County Criminal Court conviction of one charge of aggravated sexual battery of a person under the age of thirteen, alleging that there was insufficient evidence to prove intent. We find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Troy Sollis, was convicted of two counts of possession of more than .5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of felony evading arrest, and two counts of misdemeanor evading arrest. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 20 years, 11 months, and 29 days to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court’s comments during a pretrial conference established bias and that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Scotty D. Hatfield, originally charged with three counts of aggravated assault and one count of felony reckless endangerment, was convicted of one count of attempted aggravated assault and misdemeanor reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. The case must be remanded, however, for the entry of a corrected judgment reflecting that the defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated assault rather than aggravated assault on Count 1.

Dr. Brian E. Harris (“Doctor”), the insured, brought this action for breach of contract and on the basis of various torts. He alleged that UnumProvident Corporation (“Insurance Company” or “the company”) had wrongfully canceled his disability policy and retroactively rejected his disability claim. The trial court granted Insurance Company summary judgment. The court found that Doctor had filed his suit outside the applicable limitations periods. Doctor appeals, claiming that his suit
was timely filed. We affirm.